Paper 2025/687

Myco: Unlocking Polylogarithmic Accesses in Metadata-Private Messaging

Darya Kaviani, University of California, Berkeley
Deevashwer Rathee, University of California, Berkeley
Bhargav Annem, California Institute of Technology
Raluca Ada Popa, University of California, Berkeley
Abstract

As billions of people rely on end-to-end encrypted messaging, the exposure of metadata, such as communication timing and participant relationships, continues to deanonymize users. Asynchronous metadata-hiding solutions with strong cryptographic guarantees have historically been bottlenecked by quadratic $O(N^2)$ server computation in the number of users $N$ due to reliance on private information retrieval (PIR). We present Myco, a metadata-private messaging system that preserves strong cryptographic guarantees while achieving $O(N \log^2 N)$ efficiency. To achieve this, we depart from PIR and instead introduce an oblivious data structure through which senders and receivers privately communicate. To unlink reads and writes, we instantiate Myco in an asymmetric two-server distributed-trust model where clients write messages to one server tasked with obliviously transmitting these messages to another server, from which clients read. Myco achieves throughput improvements of up to 302x over multi-server and 2,219x over single-server state-of-the-art systems based on PIR.

Note: Full version

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2025
Keywords
PrivacyAnonymityMessagingMetadataORAM
Contact author(s)
daryakaviani @ berkeley edu
deevashwer @ berkeley edu
bannem @ caltech edu
raluca popa @ berkeley edu
History
2025-04-18: revised
2025-04-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/687
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/687,
      author = {Darya Kaviani and Deevashwer Rathee and Bhargav Annem and Raluca Ada Popa},
      title = {Myco: Unlocking Polylogarithmic Accesses in Metadata-Private Messaging},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/687},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/687}
}
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