Paper 2025/611

Proving CPU Executions in Small Space

Vineet Nair, Arithmic
Justin Thaler, Georgetown University, a16z crypto research
Michael Zhu, a16z crypto research
Abstract

zkVMs are SNARKs for verifying CPU execution. They allow an untrusted prover to show that it correctly ran a specified program on a witness, where the program is given as bytecode conforming to an instruction set architecture like RISC-V. Existing zkVMs still struggle with high prover resource costs, notably large runtime and memory usage. We show how to implement Jolt—an advanced, sum-check- based zkVM—with a significantly reduced memory footprint, without relying on SNARK recursion, and with only modest runtime overhead (potentially well below a factor of two). We discuss benefits of this approach compared to prevailing recursive techniques.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
zkVMsSNARKsprover memoryprover speed
Contact author(s)
vineet @ arithmic com
justin r thaler @ gmail com
mzhu @ a16z com
History
2025-04-08: approved
2025-04-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/611
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/611,
      author = {Vineet Nair and Justin Thaler and Michael Zhu},
      title = {Proving {CPU} Executions in Small Space},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/611},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/611}
}
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