Paper 2024/2081

Generalized Cryptanalysis of Cubic Pell RSA

Hao Kang, Zhejiang Wanli University
Mengce Zheng, Zhejiang Wanli University
Abstract

The RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) cryptosystem is a fundamental algorithm of public key cryptography and is widely used across various information domains. For an RSA modulus represented as $N = pq$, with its factorization remaining unknown, security vulnerabilities arise when attackers exploit the key equation $ed-k(p-1)(q-1)=1$. To enhance the security, Murru and Saettone introduced cubic Pell RSA --- a variant of RSA based on the cubic Pell equation, where the key equation becomes $ed-k(p^2+p+1)(q^2+q+1)=1$. In this paper, we further investigate the security implications surrounding the generalized key equation $eu-(p^2+p+1)(q^2+q+1)v=w$. We present a novel attack strategy aimed at recovering the prime factors $p$ and $q$ under specific conditions satisfied by $u$, $v$, and $w$. Our generalized attack employs lattice-based Coppersmith's techniques and extends several previous attack scenarios, thus deepening the understanding of mathematical cryptanalysis.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Inscrypt 2024
Keywords
CryptanalysisCubic Pell equationFactorizationLatticeRSA variant
Contact author(s)
mengce zheng @ gmail com
History
2024-12-27: approved
2024-12-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/2081
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/2081,
      author = {Hao Kang and Mengce Zheng},
      title = {Generalized Cryptanalysis of Cubic Pell {RSA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/2081},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2081}
}
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