Paper 2024/1983
UTRA: Universe Token Reusability Attack and Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption
Abstract
As dataset sizes grow, users increasingly rely on encrypted data and secure range queries on cloud servers, raising privacy concerns about potential data leakage. Order-revealing encryption (ORE) enables efficient operations on numerical datasets, and Delegatable ORE (DORE) extends this functionality to multi-client environments, but it faces risks of token forgery. Secure DORE (SEDORE) and Efficient DORE (EDORE) address some vulnerabilities, with EDORE improving speed and storage efficiency. However, we find that both schemes remain susceptible to token forgery. To address this issue, we propose the concept of Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption (VDORE) with a formal definition of token unforgeability. We then construct a new VDORE scheme $\mathsf{TUDORE}$ (Token Unforgebale DORE), which ensures token unforgeability. Furthermore, our $\mathsf{TUDORE}$ achieves about 1.5× speed-up in token generation compared to SEDORE and EDORE.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- order-revealing encryptioncross-database systemtoken-based authentication
- Contact author(s)
-
jpark127 @ utk edu
leehb3706 @ hanyang ac kr
jbhur @ isslab korea ac kr
jaehongseo @ hanyang ac kr
doowon @ utk edu - History
- 2025-01-11: last of 2 revisions
- 2024-12-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2024/1983
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1983, author = {Jaehwan Park and Hyeonbum Lee and Junbeom Hur and Jae Hong Seo and Doowon Kim}, title = {{UTRA}: Universe Token Reusability Attack and Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1983}, year = {2024}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1983} }