Paper 2024/1983

UTRA: Universe Token Reusability Attack and Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption

Jaehwan Park, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Hyeonbum Lee, Hanyang University
Junbeom Hur, Korea University
Jae Hong Seo, Hanyang University
Doowon Kim, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Abstract

As dataset sizes grow, users increasingly rely on encrypted data and secure range queries on cloud servers, raising privacy concerns about potential data leakage. Order-revealing encryption (ORE) enables efficient operations on numerical datasets, and Delegatable ORE (DORE) extends this functionality to multi-client environments, but it faces risks of token forgery. Secure DORE (SEDORE) and Efficient DORE (EDORE) address some vulnerabilities, with EDORE improving speed and storage efficiency. However, we find that both schemes remain susceptible to token forgery. To address this issue, we propose the concept of Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption (VDORE) with a formal definition of token unforgeability. We then construct a new VDORE scheme $\mathsf{TUDORE}$ (Token Unforgebale DORE), which ensures token unforgeability. Furthermore, our $\mathsf{TUDORE}$ achieves about 1.5× speed-up in token generation compared to SEDORE and EDORE.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
order-revealing encryptioncross-database systemtoken-based authentication
Contact author(s)
jpark127 @ utk edu
leehb3706 @ hanyang ac kr
jbhur @ isslab korea ac kr
jaehongseo @ hanyang ac kr
doowon @ utk edu
History
2025-01-11: last of 2 revisions
2024-12-08: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1983
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1983,
      author = {Jaehwan Park and Hyeonbum Lee and Junbeom Hur and Jae Hong Seo and Doowon Kim},
      title = {{UTRA}: Universe Token Reusability Attack and Verifiable Delegatable Order-Revealing Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1983},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1983}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.