Paper 2024/1852

Faster algorithms for isogeny computations over extensions of finite fields

Shiping Cai, Sun Yat-sen University
Mingjie Chen, KU Leuven
Christophe Petit, University of Birmingham, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Abstract

Any isogeny between two supersingular elliptic curves can be defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, however, this does not imply that computing such isogenies can be done with field operations in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$. In fact, the kernel generators of such isogenies are defined over extension fields of $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, generically with extension degree linear to the isogeny degree. Most algorithms related to isogeny computations are only efficient when the extension degree is small. This leads to efficient algorithms used in isogeny-based cryptographic constructions, but also limits their parameter choices at the same time. In this paper, we consider three computational subroutines regarding isogenies, focusing on cases with large extension degrees: computing a basis of $\ell$-torsion points, computing the kernel polynomial of an isogeny given a kernel generator, and computing the kernel generator of an isogeny given the corresponding quaternion ideal under the Deuring correspondence. We then apply our algorithms to the constructive Deuring correspondence algorithm from Eriksen, Panny, Sotáková and Veroni (LuCaNT'23) in the case of a generic prime characteristic, achieving around 30% speedup over their results.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. NuTMiC 2024
Keywords
isogeny
Contact author(s)
shiping cai @ ulb be
mjchennn555 @ gmail com
christophe f petit @ gmail com
History
2024-11-15: approved
2024-11-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2024/1852
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2024/1852,
      author = {Shiping Cai and Mingjie Chen and Christophe Petit},
      title = {Faster algorithms for isogeny computations over extensions of finite fields},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1852},
      year = {2024},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1852}
}
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