Paper 2025/421
A Note on Obfuscation-based Attacks on Private-coin Evasive LWE
Abstract
The evasive learning with errors (evasive LWE) assumption is a new assumption recently introduced by Wee (Eurocrypt 2022) and Tsabary (Crypto 2022) independently, as a significant strengthening of the standard LWE assumption. While the assumption is known to imply various strong primitives including witness encryption [Wee22,Tsabary22], the assumption in the most general case (i.e., the private coin variant) is considered quite implausible due to the obfuscation based attack mentioned in [Wee22]. This obfuscation based attack is then later formalized by Vaikuntanathan, Wee, and Wichs [VWW22]. In this note, we revisit their attack and show that the attack actually does not work by showing a concrete counterexample. We then show that their attack can be made valid with some modifications. Along the way, we also improve the counterexample by making it provable. Specifically, our counterexample is valid assuming the (plain) LWE assumption and the existence of instance-hiding witness encryption, whereas their original counterexample was dependent on the heuristic assumption of the existence of an ideal obfuscation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Evasive LWELatticesWitness EncryptionObfuscation
- Contact author(s)
-
jimmy @ iis sinica edu tw
arniehung @ iis sinica edu tw
yamada-shota @ aist go jp - History
- 2025-03-05: approved
- 2025-03-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2025/421
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/421, author = {Tzu-Hsiang Huang and Wei-Hsiang Hung and Shota Yamada}, title = {A Note on Obfuscation-based Attacks on Private-coin Evasive {LWE}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/421}, year = {2025}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/421} }