Paper 2025/415

On the Soundness of Algebraic Attacks against Code-based Assumptions

Miguel Cueto Noval, ISTA, Klosterneuburg, Austria
Simon-Philipp Merz, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Patrick Stählin, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
Akin Ünal, ISTA, Klosterneuburg, Austria
Abstract

We study recent algebraic attacks (Briaud-Øygarden EC'23) on the Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem and the assumptions underlying the correctness of their attacks' complexity estimates. By relating these assumptions to interesting algebraic-combinatorial problems, we prove that they do not hold in full generality. However, we show that they are (asymptotically) true for most parameter sets, supporting the soundness of algebraic attacks on RSD. Further, we prove—without any heuristics or assumptions—that RSD can be broken in polynomial time whenever the number of error blocks times the square of the size of error blocks is larger than 2 times the square of the dimension of the code. Additionally, we use our methodology to attack a variant of the Learning With Errors problem where each error term lies in a fixed set of constant size. We prove that this problem can be broken in polynomial time, given a sufficient number of samples. This result improves on the seminal work by Arora and Ge (ICALP'11), as the attack's time complexity is independent of the LWE modulus.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2025
Keywords
Learning Parity with NoiseRegular Syndrom DecodingProvable Algebraic cryptanalysisDegree of Regularity
Contact author(s)
mcuetono @ ista ac at
research @ simon-philipp com
stpatric @ ethz ch
auenal @ ista ac at
History
2025-03-05: approved
2025-03-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/415
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/415,
      author = {Miguel Cueto Noval and Simon-Philipp Merz and Patrick Stählin and Akin Ünal},
      title = {On the Soundness of Algebraic Attacks against Code-based Assumptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/415},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/415}
}
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