Paper 2025/410

TreeKEM: A Modular Machine-Checked Symbolic Security Analysis of Group Key Agreement in Messaging Layer Security

Théophile Wallez, Inria Paris
Jonathan Protzenko, Microsoft Azure Research
Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Cryspen
Abstract

The Messaging Layer Security (MLS) protocol standard proposes a novel tree-based protocol that enables efficient end-to-end encrypted messaging over large groups with thousands of members. Its functionality can be divided into three components: TreeSync for authenticating and synchronizing group state, TreeKEM for the core group key agreement, and TreeDEM for group message encryption. While previous works have analyzed the security of abstract models of TreeKEM, they do not account for the precise low-level details of the protocol standard. This work presents the first machine-checked security proof for TreeKEM. Our proof is in the symbolic Dolev-Yao model and applies to a bit-level precise, executable, interoperable specification of the protocol. Furthermore, our security theorem for TreeKEM composes naturally with a previous result for TreeSync to provide a strong modular security guarantee for the published MLS standard.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
mlsmessagingf*fstardy*dystarsymbolicdolev-yao
Contact author(s)
theophile wallez @ inria fr
protz @ microsoft com
karthik @ cryspen com
History
2025-03-04: approved
2025-03-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2025/410
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
CC BY-NC-ND

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2025/410,
      author = {Théophile Wallez and Jonathan Protzenko and Karthikeyan Bhargavan},
      title = {{TreeKEM}: A Modular Machine-Checked Symbolic Security Analysis of Group Key Agreement in Messaging Layer Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/410},
      year = {2025},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/410}
}
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