

# An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

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**Abstract.** Grover's algorithm is a quantum searching algorithm that poses a threat to symmetric cryptography. Due to their smaller key sizes, lightweight cryptographic algorithms such as Simplified-AES face a much more immediate threat from Grover's algorithm than traditional cryptographic algorithms. By analyzing different S-boxes, it was discovered that the S-box 946C753AE8FBD012 may be more quantum resistant than the S-box that Simplified-AES uses, 94ABD1856203CEF7. In addition to this, 16x4 S-boxes (or 4 4x4 S-boxes) showed to be significantly more quantum secure than 4x4 S-boxes. This is because the number of gates needed to model a  $2^n \times 4$  S-box increases at an exponential rate. It was also found that this property extends to  $2^n \times 8$  S-boxes, implying the existence of a more quantum secure 8x8 S-box that AES could use. However, an increase in quantum security does not equate to an increase in classical security, as some of the least quantum secure S-boxes analyzed displayed some of the best classical security. Finally, an alteration of Simplified-AES that used a 16x4 S-box was found that displayed better classical and quantum security than Simplified-AES and did not require an increase in key size.

**Keywords:** Grover's Algorithm, 16x4 S-box, Simplified-AES, Quantum Security

## 1 Introduction

Grover's algorithm is a quantum searching algorithm able to find values in  $\sqrt{N}$  steps, where  $N$  is the amount of unstructured data being searched. This differs from classical algorithms which need to make an average of  $\frac{N}{2}$  checks [20]. It can be used to perform brute force attacks to determine the key used in a symmetric encryption algorithm. To do this, one must implement the encryption algorithm used on a quantum computer. As such, the quantum cost of such an implementation directly impacts the cost of Grover's algorithm, wherein quantum cost refers to the number of gates needed to model said implementation.

This is especially true regarding lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptography is a branch of cryptography that aims at enabling devices with limited resources to perform cryptography. This is because many Internet of Things (IoT) devices have limited memory, power, and processing speed that can be dedicated to performing cryptographic algorithms [21]. Lightweight cryptography has become increasingly prevalent given the rise of IoT devices. In 2021 there were 11.28 billion IoT devices, and this figure is predicted to reach 29.42 billion by 2030 [22].

Given the limited resources, lightweight cryptography uses smaller keys than standard encryption algorithms. Not only does this reduce the security of lightweight cryptographic algorithms, but these algorithms will be the first algorithms that Grover's algorithm may pose a threat to. IonQ is currently working on IonQ Forte, a quantum computer with 32 quantum bits (qubits) [19], which is enough qubits to perform an attack via Grover's

algorithm on Simplified-AES (S-AES). It is because of this that lightweight cryptographic algorithms should be limited to ephemeral data with a short lifespan. As such, even minor increases in the security of lightweight cryptographic algorithms are greatly beneficial.

One aspect of symmetric encryption algorithms that can be modified is the construction and implementation of substitution boxes (S-boxes). These are precomputed tables that map an input value to an output value. This paper analyzes how the construction of an S-box impacts its respective quantum cost, and if the use of multiple variably assigned S-boxes provides better quantum security against Grover's algorithm.

## 1.1 Methodology

The original plan was to modify the S-box used in S-AES and perform a brute force attack on this modified version of S-AES via Grover's algorithm. S-AES is a lightweight cryptographic algorithm whose structure is identical to AES. It has a key and block size of 16-bits and has two rounds [13].

This would be achieved by modifying the work done by Kyung-Bae Jang, Gyeong-Ju Song, Hyun-Ji Kim, and Hwa-Jeong Seo in a paper entitled "Grover on Simplified AES". This paper managed to create an efficient quantum implementation of S-AES that only used 32 qubits for a 16-bit plaintext and 16-bit key. A tool called LIGHTER-R was used to generate the quantum circuit for the S-box that did not require the use of any ancilla qubits [5].

LIGHTER-R was originally going to be used to generate the quantum circuits for the modified S-boxes which would then replace the substitution circuit and be run through Grover's algorithm. IBM Quantum (IBMQ) would be used in conjunction with Qiskit to model these results. However, LIGHTER-R produced inconsistent results that could not be replicated. In addition to this, memory constraints prevented the modified versions of S-AES from being run in Qiskit. As such, SageMath was used to generate the algebraic normal form (ANF) of various S-boxes which was then used to create a quantum circuit for said S-box. Grover's algorithm was then used to perform a known plaintext attack on a quantum circuit that XOR-ed a key with a plaintext before running said plaintext through the S-box. A known plaintext attack was performed instead of a brute force attack because it required less resources to simulate.

Afterwards, three possible full implementations of S-AES that use 16x4 S-boxes were tested. This was proceeded by classical analysis performed through the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical test suite on said algorithms and modified versions of S-AES that use different S-boxes. This process was then repeated on implementations using the three 16x4 randomly generated S-boxes that required the most quantum gates to model.

## 2 S-Box Construction

Four sets of four S-boxes were created. They were broken into these groups because a 16x4 S-box would also be tested that consisted of each S-box in the set. This S-box would use two bits from the provided key to determine which S-box would be used on the plaintext. The first set of S-boxes were created using the same methodology as the S-boxes from S-AES and AES. They served as the base set of S-boxes that the other sets would modify to meet various criteria.

The S-box that S-AES uses was generated by inverting values as an element of  $GF(2^4)$  using the prime polynomial  $x^4 + x + 1$ . These values were then multiplied by a matrix and had a vector added to them. This produces the equation below, wherein  $b_n$  is the  $n$ th bit of the inverted input [13].

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

This process was used to create each of the S-boxes in the first set of S-boxes, with the prime polynomials used being  $x^4 + x + 1$  (i.e., the S-box that S-AES uses),  $x^4 + x^3 + 1$ , and  $x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ . Since there are only three prime polynomials in  $\text{GF}(2^4)$ , the fourth S-box was generated using a rotated matrix and the prime polynomial  $x^4 + x + 1$ . The 16x4 S-box formed from Set 1 can be seen in Table 2.

The second set that was created aimed at analyzing S-boxes that produced a unique output for any given input. This was achieved by progressively shifting each S-box in the first set of S-boxes to the left. Afterwards, repeat occurrences of an output for any given input were swapped with the next value in the S-box that would not cause a collision.

The third set aimed at analyzing S-boxes that had no collisions with the input, i.e., no output values are identical to the input values. This was done by taking the first set of S-boxes and swapping any values that resulted in a collision with the next value in the S-box that would not cause said collision. Finally, the fourth set of S-boxes aimed at analyzing S-boxes that had no collisions with each other or the plaintext. This was generated by repeating this process on the second set of S-boxes. The resulting set of S-boxes can be seen in Table 1.

**Table 1:** Sets 1-4

	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
Set 1	94ABD185	940756EB	946C753A	9E518BDA
	6203CEF7	FD1C2A83	E8FBD012	67F3C402
Set 2	94ABD185	40756EBF	6C573AE8	18BDA673
	6203CEF7	D1C2A839	FBD01294	CF4920E5
Set 3	94ABD185	940756EB	946C735A	9E518BDA
	6203ECF7	FD1C2A83	E8FDB012	67F34C02
Set 4	94ABD185	40756EBF	6C573AE8	18BDA673
	6203ECF7	D1C2A839	FBD01294	CF49205E

## 2.1 S-Box Quantum Circuit Construction


It is possible to express an S-box as a series of polynomials, or their ANF. This can be used to reduce the quantum cost needed to perform Boolean functions on a quantum computer [4]. SageMath was used to calculate the ANF of each S-box. The ANF of S-box 1 of Set 1 is depicted below, with  $y_n$  being the  $n$ th output bit and  $x_n$  being the  $n$ th input bit. The ANF of the other S-boxes can be found in Appendix A.

$$\begin{aligned} y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\ y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\ y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\ y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \end{aligned}$$

This can be converted to a quantum circuit by using a multi-controlled X (MCX) gate whose target is the register  $y_n$  and whose controls are the registers in  $\{x_0, \dots, x_n\}$ . The controls for each MCX gate are dictated by which  $x$  values are being multiplied together. Doing this for the equation above results in the quantum circuit depicted in Figure 1.

**Table 2:** 16x4 S-box formed by Set 1

	0b000000	0b000001	0b000010	0b000011
0b000000	0x9	0x4	0xA	0xB
0b000100	0xD	0x1	0x8	0x5
0b001000	0x6	0x2	0x0	0x3
0b001100	0xC	0xE	0xF	0x7
0b010000	0x9	0x4	0x0	0x7
0b010100	0x5	0x6	0xE	0xB
0b011000	0xF	0xD	0x1	0xC
0b011100	0x2	0xA	0x8	0x3
0b100000	0x9	0x4	0x6	0xC
0b100100	0x7	0x5	0x3	0xA
0b101000	0xE	0x8	0xF	0xB
0b101100	0xD	0x0	0x1	0x2
0b110000	0x9	0xE	0x5	0x1
0b110100	0x8	0xB	0xD	0xA
0b111000	0x6	0x7	0xF	0x3
0b111100	0xC	0x4	0x0	0x2



**Figure 1:** Quantum circuit for S-box 1 of Set 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)

### 3 Quantum Cost of S-Boxes

Quantum particles must be trapped in a low energy state to allow the performance of meaningful operations. Reducing the number of gates needed for a quantum algorithm reduces the cost of performing said algorithm, as it reduces the number of necessary quantum computations and therefore the time atoms need to stay in a specific state. This is important as it reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of decoherence. Decoherence can cause a spin flip of quantum particle and can cause trapped atoms to be excited into higher vibrational modes [16].

Table 3 depicts the resulting cost of the quantum circuit for the ANF of each S-box. It lists the number of MCX gates with  $n$  controls. An MCX gate with 0 controls is equivalent to an X gate. Table 4 depicts the cost of a 16x4 S-box generated from each set. It should be noted that the quantum circuits depicted in Table 3 require 8 qubits, while the circuits in Table 4 require 10 qubits. This is because a 16x4 S-box requires 2 additional bits to determine what S-box should be used. It should also be noted that using a rotated matrix to generate S-box 4 in Set 1 had no impact on the cost of performing said S-box.

#### 3.1 Analyzing Quantum Cost of Random S-Boxes

This process was repeated on a set of 1,500 randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes and a set of 800 randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes. Table 5 and Table 6 list the MCX gates needed

**Table 3:** Cost of each S-box in Sets 1 through 4

MCX Controls	Set 1				Set 2			
	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1
1	10	9	13	10	10	6	8	10
2	12	14	19	12	12	11	13	14
3	11	7	7	11	11	6	6	7
Total Gates	35	32	41	35	35	24	29	32

MCX Controls	Set 3				Set 4			
	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
0	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	1
1	10	9	13	10	10	6	8	10
2	11	14	17	11	11	11	13	14
3	10	7	7	10	10	6	6	6
Total Gates	33	32	39	33	33	24	29	31

**Table 4:** Cost of each 16x4 S-box formed by Sets 1 through 4

MCX Controls	Set 1	Set 2	Set 3	Set 4
0	2	2	2	2
1	10	17	10	17
2	22	26	21	25
3	48	39	45	38
4	27	32	25	33
5	10	10	8	12
Total Gates	119	126	111	127

to run the 3 most costly randomly generated 4x4 and 16x4 S-boxes respectively. The 16x4 S-boxes were created by combining 4 randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes. A list of all the S-boxes generated and their associated costs can be found in Appendix B.

The most expensive randomly generated 4x4 S-box was 7FAC98B234516D0E, which required the same number of gates as the most expensive 4x4 S-box generated by hand (946C753AE8FBD012). The most expensive 16x4 S-box that was generated by hand was formed from Set 4, requiring 127 gates. However, the randomly generated S-box CB91D538E7A20F64A217C6534D8EBF09D14A58BF792C630E58B214C790E6DFA3 required 150 gates. This is approximately 3.659 times more gates than the most expensive 4x4 S-box found, and an increase of 23 gates compared to the 16x4 S-box generated from Set 4.

It should be noted that all the 16x4 S-boxes depicted in Table 6 were more expensive than the hand generated 16x4 S-boxes depicted in Table 4. This is even though each 16x4 S-box in Table 6 had at least one collision with the input, and at least one collision between the different 4x4 S-boxes used to generate the 16x4 S-box. This implies that reducing these collisions in 16x4 S-boxes does not increase said S-box's quantum security.

**Table 5:** Cost of the 3 most expensive randomly generated 4x4 S-boxes

MCX Controls	S-Box		
	7FAC98B234516D0E	FD8716ABCE459320	C2BA7FD51408E396
0	3	4	2
1	8	9	12
2	19	14	15
3	11	13	11
Total Gates	41	40	40

**Table 6:** Cost of the 3 most expensive randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes

MCX Controls	S-Box		
	CB91D538E7A20F64	70812A3B496DCEF5	6A543D18EC27F09B
		A217C6534D8EBF09	89C62357BA4ED01F
		D14A58BF792C630E	841CEAB73265DF09
58B214C790E6DFA3	0386F4127B95ECAD	309C7BA2D8F4E651	FC1BE0568A423D79
0	2	3	2
1	10	19	13
2	42	38	38
3	48	44	52
4	36	37	34
5	12	8	8
Total Gates	150	149	147

## 4 Using Grover's Algorithm to Perform a Known Plaintext Attack

A known-plaintext attack is an attack wherein the attacker has access to both the ciphertext and plaintext of an encryption algorithm. Such an attack aims at figuring out the key used to encrypt the plaintext [15]. Performing a known plaintext attack with Grover's algorithm is cheaper than performing a brute force attack using Grover's algorithm. This is because Grover's algorithm will only need to search through the possible values of a key as opposed to the values for both the key and the plaintext.

Using Grover's algorithm, a known plaintext attack was performed on an algorithm that XOR-es a 4-bit key to a 4-bit plaintext that is then ran through an S-box (Algorithm 1). This performs the add round key and substitution steps of round 1 of S-AES on a 4-bit block. The shift rows, mix columns, and second add round key steps were excluded due to memory and time constraints. Two different implementations of a 16x4 S-box were tested. The first implementation (Algorithm 2) used the first and last bit of the key to determine what S-box to use (acting as  $x_4$  and  $x_5$ ) and the second implementation (Algorithm 3) appended two bits to the key that determined what S-box to use (once again acting as  $x_4$  and  $x_5$ ).

These algorithms serve as a simplified single round version of S-AES that requires fewer resources to model and operates on a single plaintext block. Below is the pseudocode for these algorithms, wherein BitToInt is a function that converts a bitstream to an integer value and  $sbox$  is a list of values between 0x0 and 0xF that represent the S-box being used.

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**Algorithm 1**

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**Input:** bitstream[4]  $pt$ , bitstream[4]  $key$ , list[16]  $sbox$   
 bitstream[4]  $ct$   
 $i = 0$   
**while**  $i < 4$  **do**  
    $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$   
    $i = i + 1$   
**end while**  
 $ct = sbox[\text{BitToInt}(ct)]$

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**Algorithm 2**

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**Input:** bitstream[4]  $pt$ , bitstream[4]  $key$ , list[64]  $sbox$   
 bitstream[4]  $ct$   
 $i = 0$   
**while**  $i < 4$  **do**  
    $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$   
    $i = i + 1$   
**end while**  
 bitstream[2]  $b$   
 $b = [key[0], key[3]]$   
 $box = \text{BitToInt}(b) * 2^4$  ▷ Which 4x4 S-box to use  
 $ct = sbox[box + \text{BitToInt}(ct)]$

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**Algorithm 3**

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
**Input:** bitstream[4]  $pt$ , bitstream[6]  $key$ , list[64]  $sbox$   
 bitstream[4]  $ct$   
 $i = 0$   
**while**  $i < 4$  **do**  
    $ct[i] = pt[i] \oplus key[i]$   
    $i = i + 1$   
**end while**  
 bitstream[2]  $b$   
 $b = [key[4], key[5]]$   
 $box = \text{BitToInt}(b) * 2^4$  ▷ Which 4x4 S-box to use  
 $ct = sbox[box + \text{BitToInt}(ct)]$

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## 5 Construction of Grover's Algorithm

### 5.1 Oracle Construction

To construct Grover's algorithm, one must create an oracle that is used to find a desired state [20]. The oracle for a known plaintext attack on a 4x4 S-box and a known ciphertext of 1100 is depicted in Figure 2 registers key, plaintext (pt), ciphertext (ct), expected, and passed. Had LIGHTER-R been used to generate the oracle, the ciphertext register would not be necessary. This is because LIGHTER-R is able to construct quantum circuits for reversible ANF representations of S-boxes that do not need an ancilla register and require fewer gates, significantly reducing the cost associated with an S-box's quantum circuit [7]. The first thing the oracle does is XOR the key register with the plaintext register. This is done by using a series of controlled-X gates on the key and plaintext registers. An S-box is then used on the plaintext and ciphertext registers, with the plaintext register acting as  $x_0$  through  $x_3$  and the ciphertext register acting as  $y_0$  through  $y_3$ .




**Figure 2:** Quantum oracle for S-AES

The ciphertext register is then tested to see if it is in the randomly chosen state  $|1100\rangle$ . This is done using the 2-qubit expected register. The first qubit of this register is used to check the 0's of the ciphertext and the second qubit being used to check the 1's of the ciphertext. This is done by applying an X gate on qubits that should be in the state  $|0\rangle$ . A controlled-X gate is then applied, using these qubits as its control and the first qubit of the expected register as its target. It is then followed by another X gate on the ciphertext qubits in question. If the known ciphertext does not contain any zeroes, the first qubit of the expected register can either be removed or initialized to the state  $|1\rangle$ . Another controlled-X gate is then ran using the qubits that should be in the state  $|1\rangle$  as the control, and the second qubit of the expected register being its target. If the known ciphertext does not contain any zeroes, the second qubit of the expected register can either

be removed or initialized to the state  $|1\rangle$ .

A controlled-X gate is then run using the expected register as its control and the passed register as its target to determine if the ciphertext register is in the desired state. The process of checking the 1's and 0's of the ciphertext, running the S-box, and XORing the key with the plaintext is then repeated. Doing this sets everything back to the state they were in originally.


This process was repeated for  $16 \times 4$  S-boxes. Figure 3 depicts the oracle for Algorithm 2, while Figure 4 depicts the oracle for Algorithm 3. Once again, a known ciphertext of 1100 is being looked for. As seen in Figure 4, the two additional bits of the key in Algorithm 3 are not XORed with the plaintext.




**Figure 3:** Quantum oracle for Algorithm 2

## 5.2 Assembling Grover's Algorithm

To find the 4 to 6-bit key used to generate the known ciphertext from a known plaintext, one must perform 2 searches. The plaintext register will also need to be initialized to its known value. This is done by applying a X gate on each plaintext qubit that is meant to be a  $|1\rangle$ . Finally, the passed register will need to be initialized to the state  $|-\rangle$ . An example of this is shown in Figure 5, wherein a known plaintext of 1101 is being looked for using a single  $4 \times 4$  S-box. After the oracle is run, a diffuser is applied to the key register. The diffuser rotates the key register closer to the states that satisfy oracle [20].



**Figure 4:** Oracle for Algorithm 3




**Figure 5:** An example of Grover's algorithm that is looking through a 4x4 S-box to find what produces the plaintext 1101

## 6 Results


Table 7 lists 3 sets of randomly generated plaintext ciphertext pairs that were used to perform a known plaintext attack. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show the results of performing a known plaintext attack via Grover's algorithm on Algorithms 1, 2, and 3 respectively with the randomly generated plaintext 0110 and randomly generated ciphertext 0100. These tests were performed using Qiskit via IBMQ. These figures only depict the results of performing the attack on Set 1. The rest of the results of each of these attacks on 16x4 S-box algorithms can be seen in Appendix C. The results of a known plaintext attack on Algorithm 1 had an average of 932.146 out of 1024 shots being correct with a standard deviation of 8.636. Comparable results were present when performing this attack on Algorithm 2, having an average of 930.5 out of 1024 shots being correct with a standard deviation of 9.987. However, instead of finding only 1 valid key, it found 4. Such a result means that Algorithm 2 is unable to provide authentication.

**Table 7:** Randomly generated plaintext ciphertext pairs


Plaintext	Ciphertext
0000	0110
0011	1011
0110	0100



**Figure 6:** Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover's algorithm on Algorithm 1



**Figure 7:** Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover's algorithm on Algorithm 2



**Figure 8:** Results of performing a known plaintext via Grover's algorithm on Algorithm 3

## 6.1 Analyzing ALG 2

However, when Grover's algorithm was run on Algorithm 2, results were very inconsistent. Figure 7 best demonstrates this, as the attack only found a valid key when using the S-boxes in Set 1 and 3. Furthermore, Set 1 yielded two possible keys (0111 and 1011) while Set 3 only yielded one possible key (0111). Sets 2 and 4 did not find any valid keys because no keys exist that could produce the ciphertext 0100 from the plaintext 0110. Since the value that is XORed with the plaintext also decides which S-box to use, the plaintext will only be XORed with one of 4 values before being put through a specific S-box. Table 8 depicts what key values correlate to each S-box for any particular set.

XORing a plaintext before putting it through an S-box serves to create permutations that are computationally indistinguishable from a random permutation. To do this, a function must map each  $n$ -bit input to exactly one random  $n$ -bit output, with the input being the key XORed with a 4-bit plaintext block [23]. However, ALG 2 fails at doing this. Table 9 shows the output of Algorithm 2 using Set 1 for any given key and a plaintext of 0x0. One can see that a ciphertext of 0x4, 0x7, and 0xD are produced multiple times, while a ciphertext of 0x0, 0x5, and 0xC are never produced. As such, it fails at providing a computationally random permutation.

**Table 8:** Keys applicable to  $n$ th S-box in Algorithm 2

S-Box	Key			
S-Box 1	0 (0000)	2 (0010)	4 (0100)	6 (0100)
S-Box 2	1 (0001)	3 (0011)	5 (0101)	7 (0111)
S-Box 3	8 (1000)	A (1010)	C (1100)	E (1110)
S-Box 4	9 (1001)	B (1011)	D (1101)	F (1111)

**Table 9:** Output of Algorithm 2 when using Set 1 for any given key and a plaintext of 0x0

	S-Box 1				S-Box 2				S-Box 3				S-Box 4			
Key	0	2	4	6	1	3	5	7	8	A	C	E	9	B	D	F
CT	9	A	D	8	4	7	6	B	E	F	D	1	7	3	4	2

## 6.2 Analyzing Algorithm 3

In contrast, Algorithm 3 supplies a computationally random permutation since each  $n$ -bit plaintext input has an equally likely chance of being mapped to any other  $n$ -bit ciphertext. However, each ciphertext generated has 4 possible keys that could be used to decrypt it. Ideally, given a key size of  $n$ -bits, an attacker should have a  $\frac{1}{2^n}$  chance of guessing the correct key. However, when Algorithm 3 is implemented, an attacker has a  $\frac{4}{2^4}$  or  $\frac{1}{16}$  probability of guessing the key instead of a  $\frac{1}{2^8}$  or  $\frac{1}{64}$  chance of guessing the key. While this does not provide ideal security, it provides the same amount of security as Algorithm 1, as an attacker would also have a  $\frac{1}{16}$  chance of guessing the correct key.

It is because of this that Grover's algorithm must run the same number of times for all three algorithms evaluated. As such, the only benefit that Algorithm 3 provides is an increased cost of the oracle used to perform Grover's algorithm. As depicted in Tables 3 and 4, if Algorithm 3 was ran using Set 4, the S-box subcircuit would require 127 gates. Whereas if Algorithm 1 was ran using S-box 3 of Set 4, the S-box subcircuit would only require 24 gates.

Since each oracle subcircuit applies two S-box subcircuits, and since the oracle had to be run twice, this meant that the S-box subcircuit had to be run a total of 4 times for each known plaintext attack performed. Therefore, given the scenario outlined above, Algorithm 3 would require 412 more gates in total than Algorithm 1. In addition to this, Algorithm 3 requires 2 more qubits to perform a known plaintext attack than an attack performed on Algorithm 1. However, this increase in gates and qubits can be circumvented by just testing on a single specific S-box, i.e., by using Algorithm 1.

## 7 Implementation in S-AES

It might be possible to overcome the security holes present in Algorithms 2 and 3 by implementing them in the full S-AES algorithm. To do this for Algorithm 2, the S-AES algorithm was largely unmodified. The key expansion algorithm was left unchanged, using the first S-box from the set to perform the key expansion. The only step that was changed was the substitution step, wherein the previous round key was used to determine which S-box to use (i.e.,  $W_0W_1$  was used in round 1 and  $W_2W_3$  was used in round 2 to determine which S-box to use). Figure 9 depicts this process. The high and low bits of  $K_0$  are used to determine which S-box to use on Block 1, while the high and low bits of  $K_1$  are used to determine which S-box to use on Block 0. This implementation will be referred to as ALG 2. It serves to perform a version of S-AES that uses a 16x4 S-box without increasing the key size.


### 7.1 Implementing Algorithm 3 in S-AES


Implementing Algorithm 3 in S-AES required a lot more changes to S-AES. The first thing that had to be modified was the key expansion algorithm. Key expansion in S-AES operates by breaking the 16-bit key into 4 4-bit nibbles ( $K_0$  through  $K_3$ ) that are then used to form 6 8-bit words ( $W_0$  through  $W_5$ ). These nibbles are then rotated and put through a S-box before adding the round constant  $g$ . The first round of this process is depicted in Figure 10.

To implement Algorithm 3, the key size needed to be increased to 24 bits, with these additional bits forming the nibbles  $K_4$  and  $K_5$ .  $K_4$  and  $K_5$  are then used to form  $\alpha_0$ , which determines which S-box to apply on each plaintext nibble in round 1. Before performing the key expansion,  $K_0(\kappa_0\kappa_1)$  and  $K_2(\kappa_2\kappa_3)$  are swapped with  $K_4$  and  $K_5$  to form  $\alpha'_0$ .  $\kappa_0\kappa_1$  are then used to determine which S-box to use on  $W_1$ .


$\alpha'_0$  is then expanded using a process that mirrors the original key expansion algorithm used by S-AES. 2 2-bit words ( $\omega$ ) are formed from  $\alpha'_0$ , with  $\omega_0$  being formed from  $\kappa_0\kappa_1$  and  $\omega_1$  being formed from the rotated  $\kappa_3\kappa_2$ . The substitution step is skipped and  $\omega_1$  is XORed with the constant  $\rho$  (0b1000) before being XORed with  $\omega_0$  to form  $\omega_2$ .  $\omega_2$  is then XORed with  $\omega_1$  to form  $\omega_3$ , with  $\omega_2\omega_3$  forming  $\alpha_1$ .  $\alpha_1$  is then used to determine which S-box to use on each plaintext nibble in round 2. Figure 11 depicts this process.

To calculate  $W_5W_6$ , this process, excluding the key expansion of  $\alpha_1$ , is repeated. This implementation is referred to as ALG 3 Double Swap. Another implementation was tested that did not swap  $K_4K_5$  with  $K_0K_2$  when calculating  $W_5W_6$ , with this implementation being referred to as ALG 3 Single Swap.

**Figure 9:** ALG 2



**Figure 10:** S-AES key expansion algorithm


**Figure 11:** ALG 3

## 8 Analyzing Full S-AES Implementations of ALG 2 and 3

Running Grover's algorithm on these modified versions of S-AES was too resource intensive. As such, every possible key was used on 3 randomly generated plaintexts (as well as the plaintext 0x0000) to determine how many keys generated the same ciphertext given a specific plaintext. When doing this, the S-box S-AES used was always set to the first S-box of the set being tested. This was done to see how resistant each implementation was to a known plaintext attack of an unmodified version of S-AES that uses the first S-box of a 16x4 S-box.

The average results of performing this test on each set is depicted in Figures 12 and 13. Table 10 provides the average minimum, maximum, mean, median, variance, and standard deviation of these tests.

The distribution of keys that correlated to identical outputs is statistically identical between S-AES and ALG 2. They were also statistically identical between ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. Roughly 36.76% of the possible  $2^{16}$  16-bit outputs (or around 24,094) could not be generated by S-AES or ALG 2. Another 36.85% of the possible outputs (or around 24,149) could only be generated with a single key. On average, each ciphertext produced by ALG 3 could be generated with 256 different keys. This is because a 24-bit key is being applied to a 16-bit plaintext block that will produce a 16-bit plaintext block.




**Figure 12:** Key distribution of S-AES and ALG 2

### 8.1 Effectiveness of ALG 3 Double Swap & Alg 3 Single Swap

ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap were designed to prevent an attacker from being able to use any possible value for the additional 8 bits when attacking the algorithm. Five random ciphertexts that could be generated from the plaintext 0xD3AE with 256 possible keys were selected from ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. Each key that could generate the ciphertext in question was then analyzed to see how many of the possible values for  $K_4K_5$  generated said ciphertext. If all  $2^8$  of these values can be used, an attacker would be able to ignore these additional 8 bits.

Doing so revealed that ALG 3 Double Swap, on average, used 62.34% of the possible  $K_4K_5$  values. Doing this on ALG 3 Single Swap had similar results, with it using an



**Figure 13:** Key distribution of ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap

**Table 10:** Keys per ciphertext

	Average Minimum	Average Maximum	Average Mean	Average Median	Average Variance	Average Standard Deviation
S-AES	0	7.75	1	1	1	1
ALG 2	0	7.75	1	1	1	1
ALG 3 Double Swap	192.5	325.25	256	256	255.805	15.993
ALG 3 Single Swap	190	325	256	256	256.63	16.023

average of the 63.67% possible  $K_4K_5$  values. This difference is most likely due to the small sample size. It is likely that repeating this test on all the ciphertexts that could be generated with 256 different keys would result in a near identical ratio between the two algorithms.

## 8.2 The Ability of S-AES, ALG 2, and ALG 3 to Provide Authentication

IoT devices are found in many settings such as the military, industrial, and healthcare fields. Many of these devices are required to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authentication of transmitted data. Authentication is provided using shared keys that transform a plaintext into a ciphertext, wherein the same key must be used to decrypt the ciphertext to a valid plaintext value [10]. This is especially true for IoT devices in the medical field, as the security of patient data is a top priority. Due to the various applications and benefits provided by IoT devices, the healthcare industry has been quick to adopt IoT devices [8].

Due to the distribution of keys, ALG 3 could never provide authentication. Since there will always be more keys than possible ciphertexts, there will always be more than one possible valid key that could be used to authenticate data. However, ALG 2 was equally as capable of providing authentication as S-AES was. This is because their key distributions

were nearly identical.

To provide ideal authentication, each ciphertext should map to exactly one key given a specific plaintext. However, encryption algorithms can still provide authentication if they produce collisions such that it is difficult to find  $x$  values that compose of a key and plaintext that satisfy the equation  $\text{encryption}(x_1) = \text{encryption}(x_n)$ . This is best done with hashing algorithms but can still be performed through the use of encryption algorithms [9].

Due to the constraints of lightweight cryptographic algorithms (i.e., their limited computational costs and limited key space) any lightweight algorithm that has an  $x$  value that satisfies the above equation a collision in it would be easy to find. Seeing as there are only around 36.85% possible values of  $x$  that do not cause a collision in S-AES or ALG 2, both algorithms fail at providing adequate authentication. However, the lack of differentiation between the number of collisions amongst the two algorithms would imply that implementations of ALG 2 on algorithms such as AES would not impact their ability to provide authentication.

## 9 Statistical Analysis of These Implementations

One of the criteria that encryption algorithms must provide is their ability to act as random number generators [18]. NIST has provided a statistical test suite that can be used to analyze random number generators and cryptographic algorithms. It works under the null hypothesis that the sequence being analyzed is random. This test suite performs 15 tests that measure the randomness of an algorithm to produce a *P-value*. This is the probability that a test statistic will produce values that are equal to or worse than the test statistic value. A *P-value* of 1 indicates perfect randomness, while a *P-value* of 0 indicates that the sequence analyzed is completely non-random [1]. Information about each test can be seen in [1].

The implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap were analyzed using this test suite. In addition to this, versions of S-AES that used each S-box in each set of S-boxes were also analyzed. The algorithms generated 60 bitstreams of 100,000 bits each. This was done by generating 60 random 32-bit input values for the different versions of S-AES and ALG 2, as well as 60 random 40-bit input values for ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap. These values were then fed into their respective algorithms, being incremented by one until each bitstream had the necessary number of bits.

Appendix D lists the *P-value* associated with as well as the percentage of bitstreams that passed each test. Tables 11 lists the results for implementations of S-AES that use S-box 1 and 3 of Set 1. S-box 1 of Set 1 is the S-box that S-AES uses, and S-box 3 of Set 1 was the most expensive 4x4 S-box found. Table 12 lists the results of implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Single Swap, and ALG 3 Double Swap that use Set 4, as it composed the most expensive 16x4 handmade S-box.

### 9.1 Test Flaws

Fine tuning each test performed was infeasible, as 49 different algorithms ended up being tested. As such, several tests produced questionable results. This is most apparent in the various tests that had a *P-value* of 0 despite having a very high pass rate. Furthermore, only 3 Random Excursions and Random Excursions Variant tests could be performed on each algorithm. In addition to this, the only Discrete Fourier Transform (FFT) tests that did not result in a *P-value* of 0 were the ones ran on ALG 2. Finally, only one Muarer's "Universal Statistical" test could be performed on each algorithm tested.

**Table 11:** Statistical analysis results of S-AES using its default S-box (S-box 1 of Set 1) and the most quantum expensive 4x4 S-box found (S-box 3 of Set 1)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 3	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.299	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.016	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.001	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.01	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.773	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.706	98.33%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.195	93.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.247	98.96%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.195	98.33%
Universal	0.83	—	0.886	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0.02	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.148	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.773	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.054	100%
Average Pass Rate	94.0%		97.0%	
100% Pass Rate	11		10	

## 9.2 Analysis of Results

Apart from the Binary Matrix Rank and FFT tests, each algorithm passed each test more than 80% of the time. ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap tended to have low pass rates of the rank test, with ALG 3 Double Swap consistently having a significantly lower pass rate than ALG 3 Single Swap when performing this test. ALG 3 Double Swap also tended to have lower pass rates than ALG 3 Single Swap across every test performed, implying that ALG 3 Single Swap is more secure than ALG 3 Double Swap. Finally, the only algorithm that consistently passed every single test, including FFT, was ALG 2. Each test performed on this algorithm had a pass rate of 90% or more, implying that ALG 2 was the most classically secure algorithm tested.

The Binary Matrix Rank test is used to look for linear dependencies among fixed length substrings of a binary stream [1]. Failure of this test implies that the various values produced by an encryption algorithm are dependent on each other and are therefore not random. Such a dependence makes algorithms susceptible to linear cryptanalysis that can be used to perform key recovery attacks [14]. The FFT test is used to find repetitive patterns that are near each other [1]. These patterns can be exploited by cryptanalysts to recover the plaintext [3].

ALG 2 was also the algorithm that had the highest average pass rate of 99% of all tests performed passing when used in conjunction with Set 4. Despite this, the unmodified version of S-AES had the highest number of tests that had a 100% pass rate for each *P-value* generated, as 11 of the performed tests had a 100% pass rate. ALG 3 Double Swap using Set 4 performed the worst, having an average pass rate of 89% and with only 3 tests having a 100% pass rate.

**Table 12:** Statistical analysis results of implementations of ALG 2 and 3 using the most expensive handmade 16x4 S-box (Set 4)

	ALG 2		ALG 3		ALG 3	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0.111	95.0%	0.195	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	98.33%	0.254	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
Sums 1	0.276	96.66%	0	91.66%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0.888	100%	0	91.66%	0.025	100%
Runs	0.254	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.324	100%
Longest Run	0	96.66%	0.74	100%	0.067	98.33%
Rank	0.122	100%	0	58.33%	0.091	93.33%
FFT	0.804	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.99%	0.486	98.72%	0.498	98.96%
Overlapping	0.06	100%	0.135	98.33%	0.991	98.33%
Universal	0.461	—	0.713	—	0.621	—
Entropy	0.35	98.33%	0.028	98.33%	0.005	100%
Excursions	—	93.75%	—	98.61%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.005	100%	0.534	100%	0.378	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.888	100%	0.437	100%
Linear Complexity	0.148	100%	0.35	95.0%	0.602	100%
Average Pass Rate	99.0%		89.0%		97.0%	
100% Pass Rate	8		3		8	

### 9.3 Avalanche Criterion

Another desirable property of encryption algorithms is their ability for small changes in an input to produce significant changes to the output. To achieve this effect, each output bit should have a 50% chance of changing when any individual bit of the input is flipped. This is known as the Strict Avalanche Criteria (SAC) [17]. While the SAC requires each bit to have an exactly 50% chance of changing, such a criterion is very hard to achieve, and it is more useful as a means of measuring a sample's divergence from the SAC. As such, algorithms are considered to meet the generalized SAC when each bit has a probability close to 50% of changing [12].

This was tested by generating 2,500 random plaintexts and keys for each implementation. Each bit in the input was then iterated through to measure the ciphertext produced when said bit was flipped. Furthermore, this test was also applied on a version of S-AES that used each S-box from each set of generated S-boxes. Table 13 lists the average chance that each bit had of changing, and Appendix E contains charts depicting the chance of each individual bit changing for each implementation tested.

Across all four sets analyzed, the bits when running ALG 2 ranged from having a 47.76% to a 51.14% chance of changing. Results were near identical with ALG 3 Double Swap and ALG 3 Single Swap, with bits ranging from having a 48.89% to 51.17% chance of changing. Similarly, each modified version of S-AES produced results that ranged from 48.35% to 53.21%.

Overall, each bit across all the algorithms tested in Table 13 ranged from having a 49.28% to a 50.63% average chance of changing when any given input bit is changed. As such, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, ALG 3 Single Swap, and each implementation of

S-AES tested met the generalized SAC.

**Table 13:** SAC test results of Sets 1 through 4

Set 1							
	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.65%	49.28%	49.98%	49.76%	50.52%	49.78%	49.87%
Set 2							
	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.60%	50.02%	50.04%	49.72%	50.02%	49.92%	50.23%
Set 3							
	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.83%	49.94%	49.93%	49.63%	50.55%	49.90%	50.01%
Set 4							
	ALG 3 Double Swap	ALG 3 Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.65%	50.04%	49.87%	49.80%	49.89%	49.98%	50.63%

## 10 Analyzing Randomly Generated 16x4 S-Boxes

When analyzing the quantum cost of the ANF of the randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes, multiple S-boxes were found that were more expensive than the S-boxes analyzed in Sets 1 through 4. Table 6 lists the three most expensive randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes. The individual 4x4 S-boxes that produced the three most expensive 16x4 S-boxes were categorized into Sets 5 through 7, as depicted in Table 14. Table 15 depicts the cost of the quantum circuit for the ANF of each of these S-boxes. Appendix A lists the ANF of each of these S-boxes.

**Table 14:** Sets 5-7

	S-Box 1	S-Box 2	S-Box 3	S-Box 4
Set 5	CB91D538 E7A20F64	A217C653 4D8EBF09	D14A58BF 792C630E	58B214C7 90E6DFA3
Set 6	70812A3B 496DCEF5	89C62357 BA4ED01F	841CEAB7 3265DF09	0386F412 7B95ECAD
Set 7	6A543D18 EC27F09B	9ADC7F3E 502816B4	FC1BE056 8A423D79	309C7BA2 D8F4E651

**Table 15:** Quantum costs of Sets 5 through 7

	MCX Controls						Total
	0	1	2	3	4	5	Gates
<b>Set 5</b>							
S-Box 1	2	7	19	9	0	0	37
S-Box 2	2	9	11	8	0	0	30
S-Box 3	3	7	10	7	0	0	27
S-Box 4	2	9	7	8	0	0	26
16x4 S-Box	2	10	42	48	36	12	150
<b>Set 6</b>							
S-Box 1	3	11	18	8	0	0	40
S-Box 2	1	6	10	3	0	0	20
S-Box 3	1	9	10	8	0	0	28
S-Box 4	0	10	14	9	0	0	33
16x4 S-Box	3	19	38	44	37	8	149
<b>Set 7</b>							
S-Box 1	2	7	13	11	0	0	33
S-Box 2	2	8	10	11	0	0	31
S-Box 3	4	9	11	8	0	0	32
S-Box 4	2	8	15	6	0	0	31
16x4 S-Box	2	13	38	52	34	8	147

## 11 Statistical Analysis of Randomly Generated 16x4 S-Boxes

To see if Sets 5 through 7 also provided classical security, each of these S-boxes were analyzed using the NIST statistical test suite and tested to see if they met the generalized SAC. The same procedure used when analyzing Sets 1 through 4 was once again used on Sets 5 through 7. The NIST statistical test suite was ran on versions of S-AES that use S-box 1 of each set, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. These algorithms (as well as versions of S-AES that use each S-box in Sets 5 through 7) were then analyzed to measure the likelihood of each bit changing in accordance to a single bit flip in the input to measure their compliance with the SAC. Table 16 and Table 17 contains the results of performing the NIST statistical test suite on Set 5, and Table 18 contains the results for the SAC tests. Appendix D lists the results of running the NIST statistical test suite on each implementation tested, and Appendix E lists charts depicting the chance of each individual bit changing for each implementation tested.

### 11.1 Analysis of Statistical Tests

Table 19 depicts the results of running implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap using Set 5, the most expensive 16x4 S-box analyzed in terms of quantum gates. Table 20 depicts the algorithms that performed the best and worst when running statistical tests using Sets 5 through 7. These results were generated using ALG 2 and ALG 3 Double Swap respectively, with both algorithms using Set 6.

Despite requiring the most gates, implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap that used Set 5 tended to perform worse than implementations that used Sets 6 or 7. Using Set 6 in conjunction with ALG 3 Double Swap resulted in the worst performance with an average pass rate of 86% and only 3 *P*-values that had a

**Table 16:** Statistical analysis results of implementations of S-AES using each S-box from Set 5.

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.074	100%	0	100%	0.378	100%	0.534	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.602	100%	0	96.66%
Sums 1	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%
Sums 2	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.637	100%	0.637	100%
Runs	0.039	100%	0.534	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%
Longest Run	0.501	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%	0.254	100%
Rank	0.407	98.33%	0.862	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.672	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	21.66%	0	30.0%	0	8.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	99.15%	0.333	99.03%	0.314	99.14%	0.305	98.86%
Overlapping	0.74	98.33%	0.95	98.33%	0.932	100%	0.911	98.33%
Universal	0.53	—	0.3	—	0.338	—	0.898	—
Entropy	0.025	100%	0.001	100%	0.035	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	0.361	100%	0.016	97.36%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.293	100%	0.009	99.7%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.862	96.66%	0.213	100%	0.469	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.195	100%	0.407	100%	0.862	100%
Linear Complexity	0.911	98.33%	0.991	98.33%	0.672	100%	0.602	98.33%
Average Pass Rate	94.21%		94.44%		95.57%		93.67%	
100% Pass Rate	10		9		14		10	

100% pass rate. In contrast, using Set 6 in conjunction with ALG 2 resulted in the best performance. These results had an average pass rate of 99%, with 11 *P*-values that had a 100% pass rate.

### 11.1.1 Analysis of S-Box 3 of Set 5

When the NIST statistical test suite was ran on implementations of S-AES that used S-boxes from Sets 5 through 7, there was a massive outlier when S-box 3 of Set 5 was tested. The results of this test are depicted in Table 21. This test produced 14 *P*-values that had a 100% pass rate. This was the highest number of *P*-values out of the 49 different algorithms tested. It also had an average *P*-value of 0.442, which is the 4th highest average *P*-value.

This could be due to a poor choice of parameters, or it could be due to an anomaly from the inputs fed into the algorithm. However, if it is not, this would imply that the S-box D14A58BF792C630E was the most classically secure 4x4 S-box tested. This is even though this S-box only required 27 gates to create its quantum oracle. The ANF of this S-box is listed below, and Figure 14 depicts what its quantum oracle would look like.

$$\begin{aligned}
 y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\
 y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\
 y_2 &= x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \\
 y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1
 \end{aligned}$$

**Table 17:** Statistical analysis results of implementations of ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap using Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average Pass Rate	98.35%		85.64%		94.32%	
100% Pass Rate	9		4		8	

**Table 18:** SAC test results of Sets 5 through 7


	ALG 2	Set 5					
		Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)
Average	49.78%	49.86%	49.88%	50.19%	49.87%	49.94%	49.55%
Set 6							
ALG 2	Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.48%	50.06%	50.12%	50.07%	49.48%	50.36%	50.10%
Set 7							
ALG 2	Double Swap	Single Swap	S-AES (S-Box 1)	S-AES (S-Box 2)	S-AES (S-Box 3)	S-AES (S-Box 4)	
Average	49.49%	49.48%	49.95%	49.83%	49.12%	50.26%	50.04%

## 11.2 Analysis of SAC Tests

While each bit had an average chance of changing that is close to 50% when using Sets 5 through 7, each individual bit did not have a near 50% chance of changing. This is best shown in Figure 15. When using S-AES with S-box 2 of Set 7, bits  $b_7$  and  $b_{11}$  only had a 44.76% and 44.93% chance of changing respectively. This is the lowest probability that a single bit had of changing across all the tests performed on implementations of S-AES with different S-boxes. When using ALG 2 with Set 6, bit  $b_5$  only has a 46.61% chance

**Table 19:** Statistical analysis results of ALG 2 and ALG 3 implementations using Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average Pass Rate	98.35%		85.64%		94.32%	
100% Pass Rate	9		4		8	


**Figure 14:** Quantum oracle of the ANF of S-box 3 of Set 5

of changing. This is the lowest probability that a single bit had of changing throughout all the tests performed on ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. The individual bits that had the highest chance of changing are not of concern, as across all 49 different algorithms analyzed the highest chance any single bit had of changing was only 51.28% (specifically bit  $b_1$  of ALG 2 when using Set 7).

S-box 2 of Set 7 performed the worst in this test, which is not surprising as it was a randomly generated S-box. Furthermore, this S-box had the lowest quantum cost out of all 28 4x4 S-boxes analyzed, with it only needing 20 quantum gates for a quantum circuit of its ANF.

**Table 20:** The best and worst performing algorithms across Sets 5 through 7, both of which are from Set 6

	ALG 2 P-val	Double Swap Passed	ALG 2 P-val	Double Swap Passed
Frequency	0.054	100%	0.378	96.66%
Block Frequency	0.672	100%	0	100%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0.437	95.00%
Sums 2	0.007	96.66%	0.135	95.00%
Runs	0.706	100%	0.005	93.33%
Longest Run	0.049	98.33%	0.672	98.33%
Rank	0.082	100%	0	25.00%
FFT	0.122	100%	0	0.00%
Non-Overlapping	0.271	99.21%	0.522	98.79%
Overlapping	0.054	100%	0.637	100%
Universal	0.213	—	0.076	—
Entropy	0	96.66%	0.091	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.074	100%	0.568	95.00%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.932	96.66%
Linear Complexity	0.276	98.33%	0.932	98.33%
Average Pass Rate		99.0%		86.0%
100% Pass Rate		11		3


**Figure 15:** SAC test results of S-AES using S-box 2 of Set 7 and ALG 2 using Set 6

## 12 Overall Observations and the Correlation Between Quantum and Classical Security

Table 22 lists the range of average pass rates amongst the different implementations of S-AES, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap. Based on these results, it is clear that ALG 2 performed better than any of the other algorithms tested.

The most quantum secure 4x4 S-box found (S-box 3 of Set 1, or 946C753AE8FBD012) only had an average pass rate of 94%. The 4x4 S-box that produced the highest average pass rate, S-box 4 of Set 4, or 18BDA673CF49205E, was also the 4x4 S-box that had the

**Table 21:** Statistical analysis results of an implementation of S-AES using S-box 3 of Set 5 (D14A58BF792C630E)

	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	100%
Block Frequency	0.602	100%
Sums 1	0.233	100%
Sums 2	0.637	100%
Runs	0.672	100%
Longest Run	0.233	100%
Rank	0.706	100%
FFT	0	30.00%
Non-Overlapping	0.314	99.14%
Overlapping	0.932	100%
Universal	0.338	—
Entropy	0.035	100%
Excursions	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%
Serial 1	0.469	100%
Serial 2	0.407	100%
Linear Complexity	0.672	100%
Average Pass Rate		96.0%
100% Pass Rate		14

highest FFT pass rate of 80%. This is abnormally high, as the average FFT pass rate of S-AES was only 25.35%. S-box 3 of Set 5, or D14A58BF792C630E, had the highest number of *P*-values with a 100% pass rate. As such, these two 4x4 S-boxes were some of the most secure 4x4 S-boxes analyzed. This is even though they only required 27 to 31 gates to model their ANF. The 4x4 S-box that required the most quantum gates to model its ANF, S-box 3 of Set 1 (or 946C753AE8FBD012) only had an average pass rate of 94%.

**Table 22:** Range of average pass rates for each implementation of each algorithm tested

Algorithm	Range of Average Pass Rates
S-AES	93 – 97%
ALG 2	98 – 99%
ALG 3 Single Swap	94 – 97%
ALG 3 Double Swap	86 – 89%

The most quantum secure 16x4 S-box, or Set 5, had one of the worst performances when ran through the NIST statistical test suite when implemented in ALG 2. It was the only 16x4 S-box that had an average pass rate of 98%, as all the other 16x4 S-boxes had an average pass rate of 99% when implemented in ALG 2. Furthermore, Set 5 produced the worst results when implemented in ALG 3 Single Swap, but one of the best results when implemented in ALG 3 Double Swap.


This implies a lack of correlation between quantum security and classical security, i.e., better quantum security does not necessarily equate to better classical security. This is further supported by what happened to the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) algorithm. This was an algorithm that was believed to be quantum secure but was

cracked in about an hour using a nine-year-old Intel Xeon process [11].


## 13 Analysis of $n$ -Length S-Boxes

### 13.1 Analysis of $2^n \times 4$ S-Boxes

To see how increasing the number of 4x4 S-boxes used to construct variably assigned S-boxes impacts the quantum security of an algorithm, S-boxes with the dimensions  $2^n \times 4$  were tested to see how increasing  $n$  impacted the quantum security of said S-box. Doing so enabled the analysis of S-boxes with dimensions ranging from 4x4 ( $n = 2$ ) to 1024x4 ( $n = 10$ ). Each S-box required  $n - 2$  bits to determine which 4x4 S-box to use. Figure 16 depicts the average number of gates needed to model each  $2^n \times 4$  S-box and Figure 17 depicts the number of 4x4 S-boxes are needed to construct each  $2^n \times 4$  S-box.



**Figure 16:** Number of gates needed to model the ANF of a  $2^n \times 4$  S-box




**Figure 17:** Number of 4x4 S-boxes required for a  $2^n \times 4$  S-box

As  $n$  increased, both the number of S-boxes and the number of gates required increased at an exponential rate, while the number of additional bits needed increased at a linear rate. The average number of necessary gates increased at a rate of approximately  $2^{n+3}$ , while the number of necessary S-boxes increased at a rate of  $2^{n-2}$ .

A regular 4x4 S-box maps a single input to one of 16 ( $N$ ) values. As such, a classical device will need to perform an average of 8, or  $N/2$ , searches each time it runs something through an S-box during the encryption or decryption process. The value of  $N$  in a variably assigned S-box is equal to  $2^{n+2}$ . Therefore, the average number of searches a classical device will need to make when performing said S-box will be  $2^{n+1}$ .

## 13.2 Analysis of $2^n \times 8$ S-Boxes

AES uses an 8x8 S-box. As such, this test was repeated on  $2^n \times 8$  S-boxes. This was performed on 3 randomly generated S-boxes. The results of doing so are depicted in Figure 18. Due to computational costs, only 3 different values of  $n$  could be analyzed. Similar to  $2^n \times 4$  S-boxes, the number of gates required to model the ANF of an  $2^n \times 8$  S-box also increased at an exponential rate. This rate of increase was approximately equal to  $2^{n+7}$ .



**Figure 18:** Number of gates needed to model the ANF of  $2^n \times 8$  S-boxes

### 13.2.1 AES S-Box Implications

The ANF of AES' S-box is depicted in Appendix F, and the necessary gates required to model said S-box's ANF in a quantum environment is depicted in Table 23. Based on this, the S-box that AES uses requires slightly less than 1024 gates, which is the expected average number of gates necessary to model an 8x8 S-box. This implies that there is a more quantum secure 8x8 S-box that AES could use.

## 14 Conclusion

Throughout this paper, an alteration to S-AES was tested that provided better classical and better quantum security. This algorithm, ALG 2, used a 16x4 S-box instead of a 4x4 S-box, using bits in the key to determine which S-box to use. While ALG 2 provided better classical and quantum security, quantum security does not necessarily result in classical security. This was demonstrated by how the most quantum secure 4x4 S-box (946C753AE8FBD012), as well as the most quantum secure 16x4 S-boxes tended to result in comparatively poor performances when analyzed with the NIST statistical test suite. The

**Table 23:** MCX gates needed to model the ANF of AES' S-box

MCX Controls	Amount
0	4
1	35
2	97
3	245
4	268
5	236
6	107
7	25
Total Gates	1017

two S-boxes that displayed the best classical security were the S-boxes 18BDA673CF49205E and D14A58BF792C630E. These S-boxes required 31 and 27 gates respectively to model their ANF in a quantum environment. Both values are less than the expected average of 32 gates needed to model a 4x4 S-box.

When trying to optimize the quantum security of an S-box, it is important to select the S-box whose ANF requires the most XOR operations. Doing so will maximize the cost necessary to run Grover's algorithm on said S-box. This suggests that an S-box that uses the prime polynomial  $x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$  (specifically the S-box 946C753AE8FBD012) is more quantum secure than the prime polynomial that S-AES currently uses ( $x^4 + x + 1$ ). This is because an ANF implementation of said S-box requires 41 quantum gates, whereas an ANF implementation of the S-box that S-AES uses only requires 35 quantum gates. While this is only a minor increase in security, it could be very beneficial in protecting ephemeral data with a short lifespan. This is especially true of lightweight cryptography, wherein security is compromised to allow devices with limited resources to provide partial protection to data [2].

It was also demonstrated that the number of gates needed to model the ANF of variably assigned S-boxes increases at an exponential rate, as does the number of searches that need to be performed during the encryption and decryption process. Specifically, the rate of increase in the number of required quantum gates to model a  $2^n \times 4$  S-box increases at a rate approximately equal to  $2^{n+3}$  while the number of required quantum gates to model a  $2^n \times 8$  S-box increases at a rate approximately equal to  $2^{n+7}$ . This implies that AES could use a more quantum secure S-box, as the S-box that it currently uses only requires 1017 gates to model instead of the expected 1024 gates. However, the methods used to construct the quantum circuits for the S-boxes analyzed throughout this paper could be greatly improved. Tools such as LIGHTER-R can generate quantum circuits of S-boxes that do not require additional qubits and use fewer gates. It does this by generating a reversible ANF [6]. As such, this expected rate of growth in quantum cost could probably be significantly reduced.

When designing these larger S-boxes, it is important to analyze the ANF of the S-box as a whole instead of the ANF of each individual 4x4 S-box composing said larger S-box. Furthermore, reducing the collisions between an S-box and the plaintext or amongst the other S-boxes in a 16x4 S-box does not increase the quantum security of said S-box. The most quantum secure 16x4 S-box was found to be the randomly generated S-box CB91D538E7A20F64A217C6534D8EBF09D14A58BF792C630E58B214C790E6DFA3, requiring a total of 150 quantum gates to model. Since 16x4 S-boxes have an  $n$  value of 4, they are expected to require an average of 128 quantum gates to model in a quantum environment. As such, this randomly generated 16x4 S-box is in the upper bounds of the

possible 16x4 S-boxes. Despite this, there could be an even more secure 16x4 S-box, as this S-box was found from a small sample size of only 800 randomly generated 16x4 S-boxes.

## 15 Further Work

### 15.1 Improved Quantum Circuit Construction

While the ANF of an S-box was used to generate their respective quantum circuit, there are alternative and more efficient methods of doing so. Tools such as LIGHTER use a graph-based meet-in-the-middle approach to calculate the smallest implementation needed to implement an S-box. It then computes good implementations of the smaller functions to reduce the time and memory requirements of said implementation [7]. This approach has been built on through LIGHTER-R, which uses this approach to generate reversible ANF representations that do not need extra qubits and require fewer gates [6]. The S-boxes assessed throughout this paper should be analyzed to see if the strengths and weaknesses discovered still hold true when using this alternate approach. This alternate approach should also be analyzed to see how it impacts the rate of growth of the number of required gates needed to model  $2^n \times 4$  and  $2^n \times 8$  S-boxes in a quantum environment.

### 15.2 Improved & Alternate ALG 2 Implementations

It might be possible to further increase the quantum security of ALG 2 by using the 16x4 S-box in the key expansion algorithm. Alternatively, instead of just using the first 4x4 S-box in ALG 2's 16x4 S-box, one could use the most expensive 4x4 S-box that composes said S-box. Doing so should increase its quantum security without increasing the cost associated with performing encryption and decryption. Finally, an implementation of ALG 2 on AES should be tested. Since S-AES and AES share the same structure, this should require minimal alterations to ALG 2.

### 15.3 Analysis of Algorithms in a Quantum Environment

The full S-AES, ALG 2, ALG 3 Double Swap, and ALG 3 Single Swap algorithms could not be implemented in a quantum environment due to computational and time constraints. Further analysis of the ALG 3 implementations is probably unnecessary as ALG 2 outperformed said algorithm and ALG 3 provided lackluster classical security. However, analyzing S-AES and ALG 2 in a quantum environment still holds merit and should be further investigated.

## A ANF of Each Set and Their Corresponding 4x4 S-Boxes

### Algebraic Normal Form of 4x4 S-Boxes

#### Set 1 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

#### Set 1 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 1 S-Box 3 (946C753AE8FBD012)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 1 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F3C402)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 2 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203CEF7)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 2 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 2 S-Box 3 (946C753AE8FBD012)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 2 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F3C402)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 3 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203ECF7)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 3 S-Box 2 (940756EBFD1C2A83)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 3 S-Box 3 (946C735AE8FDB012)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 3 S-Box 4 (9E518BDA67F34C02)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 4 S-Box 1 (94ABD1856203ECF7)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 4 S-Box 2 (40756EBFD1C2A839)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

**Set 4 S-Box 3 (6C573AE8FBD01294)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

**Set 4 S-Box 4 (18BDA673CF49205E)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

**Set 5 S-Box 1 (CB91D538E7A20F64)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 5 S-Box 2 (A217C6534D8EBF09)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 5 S-Box 3 (D14A58BF792C630E)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 5 S-Box 4 (58B214C790E6DFA3)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 6 S-Box 1 (70812A3B496DCEF5)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 6 S-Box 2 (89C62357BA4ED01F)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 6 S-Box 3 (841CEAB73265DF09)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 6 S-Box 4 (0386F4127B95ECAD)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_1 &= x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2\end{aligned}$$

### **Set 7 S-Box 1 (6A543D18EC27F09B)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

**Set 7 S-Box 2 (9ADC7F3E502816B4)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 7 S-Box 3 (FC1BE0568A423D79)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 7 S-Box 4 (309C7BA2D8F4E651)**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\y_2 &= x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \\y_3 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

**Algebraic Normal Form of 16x4 S-Boxes****Set 1**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\&x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus \\&x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}y_2 &= x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus \\&x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}y_3 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\&x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

**Set 2**

$$\begin{aligned}y_0 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\&x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}y_1 &= x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus \\&x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus \\&x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus \\&x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3\end{aligned}$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

### Set 3

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1$$

### Set 4

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

### Set 5

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

$$x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 + x_0x_1x_2x_4 + x_0x_1x_2x_5 + x_0x_1x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_3 + x_0x_1x_4x_5 + x_0x_1 + x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 + x_0x_2x_3x_4 + x_0x_2x_3x_5 + x_0x_2x_5 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_3x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_0x_4x_5 + x_0x_4 + x_0x_5 + x_0 + x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3x_4x_5 + x_1x_3x_4 + x_1x_4 + x_2x_3x_4x_5 + x_2x_3x_4 + x_2x_3x_5 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4x_5 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4x_5 + x_3 + x_4x_5 + x_4$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_2 = & x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus 1$$

## Set 6

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_2 = & x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 + x_0x_1x_2 + x_0x_1x_3x_4 + x_0x_1x_3x_5 + x_0x_1x_3 + x_0x_1x_4x_5 + x_0x_1x_5 + x_0x_1 + x_0x_2x_3x_4 + x_0x_2x_3x_5 + x_0x_2x_4x_5 + x_0x_2x_4 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_3x_4x_5 + x_0x_3x_4 + x_0x_3 + x_0x_4x_5 + x_0x_5 + x_1x_2x_3x_4 + x_1x_2x_3x_5 + x_1x_2x_3 + x_1x_2x_4 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3x_4x_5 + x_1x_3 + x_1x_4x_5 + x_1x_4 + x_1 + x_2x_3x_4x_5 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_3x_4x_5 + x_3x_5 + x_4 + x_5$$

## Set 7

$$y_0 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5$$

$$y_1 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus 1$$

$$y_2 = x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus 1$$

$$y_3 = x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5$$

## B Randomly Generated 4x4 & 16x4 S-Boxes

Randomly Generated 4x4 S-Boxes

S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates
B9A53E18D2CF4706	28	7F143A20B698E5CD	29	9EBCB78415DAF032	31	92570F4E13D86BCA	30
EA86DC91B04732F5	32	43A5B58E6F2108C9	32	DB93F210A8EC6745	26	645D9F73A0EBC182	31
F24B731DC9658E0A	32	0B74D58E92613CFA	26	15B3FEC8907D6A42	27	EB37094621FAD58C	30
E9D4A180B763C5F2	37	258C9EB0F146AD73	34	FD501B48C7963E2A	36	3956D018EA2F47BC	30
B358FA7ED12690C4	27	25EDF68174CB90A3	28	A7960FB2E2C31845D	21	5AEBD63C2081F794	33
DE2C0F7B9156A834	37	0D5A7E29FC8134B6	26	AD6901C34B7285PE	27	29DAB77C40E1358	35
D6310A495FB2EC78	31	C064B9135A2DF7E8	35	23F0A1E4B6C859D7	33	57FD810CE269AB34	29
E1C34B0765F928A12	29	714C29853F0DA6B0E	29	AD9C35284BE076F1	29	9FE6C2758D431AB0	30
DA31C8F067EB2954	33	689FB0DE2A1745C3	30	B3E1495A62D7FC0	36	642BAC810D5F73E9	30
FD2345CA9E60B71	31	9841DCE052F7A386	30	04DB62C9AE7531F8	23	ED6F9814B7A0325C	36
57D01BC864A29FEE3	26	2A9DF5EB374018C6	30	FD9A1CB604E52873	34	68735F2DCB4AE910	28
E11DFA06CB7824539	36	568CB94327EDA1F0	32	401B7FEC5DA69238	31	32807A4D69CF1EB5	28
A7D4E98B23C510F6	26	37F2809DBA1E1C45	24	19E48D0F23C57B6A	26	B3C28190F5DA467E	29
CA196DTB05P48E23	30	5260C78B9A14FE3D	35	D0A3E4FC86B91257	31	60C93B71FEA482D5	36
18D6B23FC47095	32	2CA71B0465D9F3E8	29	648ACB2953107EFP	33	0F78E54AB126D9C3	32
B687F0C9D412A53E	25	A4D1806C93E2B57F	30	68B091E45F3A7C2D	37	BE6CA197F70D45382	35
15F260AAE9B743C8	27	CE1538926704BDFDA	34	425BDE00937186C	30	D7EA61280B45C3F9	34
2CAF5E06193B847	25	F78A30DE24BC1695	38	89DCB435A71F206E	27	48CDA09F625E7B13	32
1C9A3D60BF8E4572	33	E0F95872D63A4B1C	30	6BA9E051C7D8F432	31	9E403C2D71865ABF	30
836CE49057D2ABF1	27	CE732804D915AB6F	30	74B1FCF860AD293E	24	3A9DB56417FEC802	31
E53D9A867BC12401	30	31589AC46F2EB7D0	29	68F6DC132E0A79B45	34	46F77A98E13C502D	31
DF91054CEAB62387	29	4F5B5E31D964E07	25	CE3987621F40B5AD	31	A43D7B109CF8256E	33
D45BC96E38A7F012	27	065A289C4DFE3B71	29	47EADF92386B1C50	36	AD0479E638BC2F51	37
490DFC7AB16832E5	32	1628DB4E7F0A53C9	34	67F2548A9DBE130C	34	A2EF6D5193C84078	25
0589CA1DB37E24F6	28	D326C0A9F5B4817	35	EA0CF25341D7B968	29	FD8716ABC459320	40
E0A4D762F13C85B9	30	3DBC75A04F91E68	31	E1CBF96DA3458720	32	C4A0782963B1FDE5	32
68BC8A495307ED2F1	33	A0D745C581EB6329F	30	E4B62073C159DF8	31	9E8631F274DBA50C	34
C416952F3D3EAB70	28	1DCA7B84E6F5D2039	26	7FAC98B234516DOE	41	48CA5F37E0912D6B	31
02AE869B147F5D75	30	A0596842F1B7C3DE	31	67DE9B42C305F1A8	33	13F0A6EBD94257C8	33
04F8273DC9165AB	25	B3E92405FD8A61C7	33	328E51C406D79PBA	36	6DEA8534170CF92B	35
D314F9C82B76EA50	36	B96E8A0215734CF	24	5B03A872C96E4D1	33	BA3CDF2E96704158	29
D3791FBC652408E	27	A8F25197E6CD043B	31	2CBA67081FED4539	30	54B0A8789D26CF31	31
609F7DBCB24A183E5	30	4A05B2F1D9863C7	33	29AF7E041D63B58	29	F21536A078BDEC94	29
5E46FC2018A793D8	27	4FD2510A3E968B7C	30	87B5AF0D92E136C4	23	1BD264A78950FEE3	24
2BD946158F0AE3C7	29	A5096842F1B7C3DE	31	67DE9B42C305F1A8	33	13F0A6EBD94257C8	33
3E69015F7A48D2C5	25	B3E92405FD8A61C7	33	328E51C406D79PBA	36	6DEA8534170CF92B	35
38A19546FD2BETC0	32	B96E8A0215734CF	24	5B03A872C96E4D1	33	BA3CDF2E96704158	29
EC6B3A24897DF051	31	EBC13674A28590DF	26	2A41C63F9E8D70B5	32	65F8730B2A9CD4E1	31
B702149D53AFC6E6	38	E4C5B0D6327A891F	32	BA2E3C41F685097D	35	378E0A49C2FB51D6	30
4862D5B7C1A8E903	20	CSD9612A0F3EB547	25	C69F5348EB07D21A	32	AE3017F9B85D64C2	33
5DFB2C830A91764E	27	3CFDA107964528B6	25	9DB835C217EA04F6	30	F9D10274BCEA6385	32
B07AD491CF5E8236	32	F702B3C61D4A598E	21	D21E7F3954B8A607C	24	D3140F56C9BA872	31
DFC0284BE573916A	30	DFC0284BE573916A	29	EF4B261A7D09C835	34	8405DAB9F1E267C3	34
6853DF09C42E17B	32	9D8CF4A2B0E15763	24	635DB1EC972A084F	36	4586B0739F2DCEA1	33
CAE498625D30BF1	31	E3D2061A8F5B497	35	59184EBC673D2A	26	84329E01CBA7D56F	32
DB7081A3C39E29654	33	A7E8C60D45F9B321	35	62C01E8B549D83A7	29	17C620D5AF8E4B93	36
8E75B7F2694130DAC	28	4F3B7920156EDC8A	33	9FCE8A180D274563	30	514F278ABCE906D3	30
B827EF01D659C4A	28	FD0423B91CA7586E	37	251DF04397E68BAC	32	E29D1A567C084FEE3	34
8AE761F2D0B5C439	30	5AD48E06713BFC92	27	FB74038916C5D2A	32	F7AB459180E62D3C	30
39D0F26E417CBA58	37	68DA9F2B731E40C5	34	F396E2613459B7A	33	02E7536C48FA1BD9	26
E86F9B75C430D21A	34	29ED0C87F6134BA5	26	593F7AC01BDE4268	27	B197EFC43680D52A	30
1594F867D7BAC203	28	630F671A8F9328B	31	643E071D9435CE2B9F6	32	8A71D0435CE2B9F6	32
8AF379D1C4B260E5	30	6BD875943CEA201F	30	4C39B78D50F12AE6	28	97FBC1A62D5083E4	29
64B903187CEDF2A5	24	C28A314D9E5F760B	29	6D3CB0174859F2A	30	D053F8A4B91672EC	36
831097525CBAE6F6	26	87AEC2DF354B1609	28	D7E24965B083A1F	28	2D985067EBA31FC4	31
DA9185F42CE63B70	34	517894DABF2C360E	25	13BD64E789F0C2A5	30	69FB7D03C154EA28	31
493EA0572DB8F1C6	28	68DA9F2B731E40C5	32	DAB34C691275C1B8	33	680917EB4D3F2C5A	30
F7C149E5D3B0A286	30	B527F6D8C1094E3A	34	145DCB82309A7F6	32	203BC57AD689E4F1	31
7BCDEA63580F2149	32	89A56DE12C7B3F40	32	B25A849E76D130F	34	90AF68C512E47B3D	31
9658F8D43B12A70E	35	C70D519B86F423A9	29	24AB47F36D1C8590	30	2D985067EBA31FC4	31
B839DF0526E41C7	25	54D9361F7B2A80C	30	BF29C13ADE650478	37	723DF860CAEB9145	30
8A476ED0913BC52F	28	F160D7A48E5C5B392	31	79AC138BDF65E204	29	72964E83805CFDA1	35
C205361E8DA794BF	38	B576AFED841092C3	28	70CDA483256F9B1	31	3580E6DAF179C42B	33
1DC805F39476EB2A	20	95AB7321F0C6D084	33	78FA941C20B5D63E	33	BC7F06A32951DE48	29
D0EFA59C3B714261	29	3C145609287DABFE	33	16BD0275E7A839C9	32	C1DF3AB59E048672	35
F51CE2038B79D4A64	27	05E6C9A3B7D47142	23	3B71F62C40A1D598	31	62F07D5C19E834B	31
0C4D3F896E7A2B51	27	7F048CDB1E39256A	32	7C6035F94A18D2E8	35	42A05961B1E7FDC83	32
36792B4E018D68FC5	30	743526D0EA891B	31	FCA8467E30D5291B	31	418EAD7025C6FB39	26
A5F5E872C1D43006	32	8ED347F6B5A2C190	28	436589A4F17D2BC0	20	A9851E7BCD2F6043	28
D0284E6BA7C3F591	33	9064A17DBF35EC82	31	14CEAFBD73568902	27	D597A0FC3E21846B	31
9CB84F23A156D70	34	FD14A09EB657C283	32	0C678D9342A51B	29	3947F2A0C5B5D681E	25
7D4FEB26CA085139	36	18F9A7B24E5C036D	35	CE6580B4DA19F327	25	A48921BD7F3065E	35
5E8A83B769CD40F21	37	85D7294B1F6AC3E0	32	9FC850172D6E6A43	24	2176DB5F93E840AC	32
60F82D2E53791BA4C	32	A6D32E2798FC1045B	19	18CF942375E06ABD	27	8AEC2F0369754B1D	31
D1A47293B68FC05	36	92451EC7680A3F2D	31	EAD10946532CBF7	29	18E6309C48FD25A7	29
F9A84B3CE7D15062	27	B1A42586C937F0ED	31	47369051B2DAEFC8	33	D019752B48A6E3FC	34
A7491B3E506C82FD	35	7CA34E2105BD689F	36	A5B13EC94D76F02	33	15CDB9F826A734E0	26
4A93B7EDC8F10562	33	C63E14F09582BDA7	37	8F05E2D6B934C17A	26	9E78C21F350A846D	29
62347FDBA5198EC0	30	E71A3598FB0C624D	35	18F8D3C2A754069E	31	CA5B2D2E348061F97	27
3652E1A8C07F4D98	35	236FB8ADC740E519	26	B0CE51A9F67324D8	35	9021ACB75F643D8E	29
72CB10E843F65D9A	28	95F802B71E64AC3D	33	056E398A4FBC271D	29	5EC403B62F7A819	28
47CF62E839D105BA	22	1D0AB9547386FC2E	31	4E7952683FC0AB1D	23	70C68B13FEDA5942	33
86EC1FA29537DB40	28	731D2A42E069CB5F	28	09426CDF78351BAE	27	847ED2F0C9A6315B	31
2B6E95D8401ACT3F	26	C139A528F46D0BE7	31	91C430B56827DAFE	31	0672B5D8341CA9EF	26
5EF8170A93CD42B6	30	DA145372C68B9E0	30	85C7F46D21A0B93	37	9AEB7D04163582CF	28
75BCA30186942FED	37	F98130C25E6D7B4A	34	E8A3416C2D5B07F9	32	F01A4568DB92EC73	34
3FA618527BD0C49E	23	0651A24BDF893E7	23	D91A7B8C082E546F3	34	7514C298B86A30E9	32
85641F2EAC307D9B	37	01F2973A84BC5D6E	33	54F9E1A7C6308BD2	25	80AE65F1B79D324C	32
5719A2364FB8COED	31	4B072CF18395A6DE	29	031CBAE468D7F952	27	814E9D30AF62B75C	20
1F05968BA72C3D4E	27	23517CBF8D6E94A	25	35A8406ECB7D2F19	28	4ACE6B3591870F2D	33
0937DF82B541AC6	34	718D3AC246B5E9F0	32	8CF5D1AB76E40923	28	B65F7AE014283CD9	32
4916ECD8A0F2537	29	13ADC56B748F02E9	24	86B1593472FA0DEC	34	56E74B01832D9FCA	26
0F5B7A8C346ED921	23	0F25AE3B3D79184C6	34	38C6529A17D0BEF4	35	D9B6FE5830417CA2	33

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

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61D38542B7F09CEA	36	18075EDBF9C96A423	30	0BC294DF71638A5E	29	90475A136C8FB2DE	33
E2CAB638105F4D97	29	FA90347852DEB6C1	27	859742ED3AF6BC01	31	8CBEB546137092ADF	24
03B856F147E2ACD9	24	F04159E7DA8C362B	31	40D9BA815C276E3F	26	396FBCD4015278AE	33
8DCB71A42E9605F3	32	94D71E2F3068B5CA	30	728E05F16ADB9C43	26	536E98204ACFDB71	33
23E7546B0AD1AF98	29	78394FD6B0A5E62C1	37	A4605DF8739E21CB	33	16A794CF25ED38B0	30
67D043FE9CB1852A	28	5DE61CB427A9F380	28	8E021C9743ADBF56	24	137E4BF529086D8AC	30
BFCDA60E39258417	31	ABD045E6F78213C	32	9CB81256D0AE4F37	25	8CD791B620F35AE4	25
9F6AE014BDC35287	25	9264F6D105A83TCBE	29	BDAF1590C46E7238	35	6834F702EBCD159A	28
A4279FCE513860DB	31	0FACE61978B523D4	31	1FB3AD0846E5279C	30	B0C73E659D284F1EA	32
AB7F48C539ED206	31	7AB1D40F5E3692C8	27	74D0263A8F9B1C5E	39	14D29FC5B360EA78	31
D0F583CE14AB7629	30	B4FD20E83A96517C	32	08153DA49F62E7CB	27	B0CD579A3F8E4261	33
9A614E2D5830F7CB	33	EA318D7C2B64F950	32	95E4278A610C3DBF	34	984DA675F23E01CB	23
3A745DB2F6E0C6981	35	03AEC67F84B521D9	28	ABF2193ED807645C	30	728ED6FB1A54930C	36
1A094FCD3528E786	24	6A47CFB82D50391E	33	5E7B6093DF281CA4	37	BD21C6FA0394E758	31
6012D5F834AB9E7C	33	382C1D0ABF954E67	29	48CD36215FB9E07	31	3659124EF0ABDTCS	27
B75EAC380261F9D4	35	50234A8F9D9B71CE6	28	E39D6250AB1F874C	30	D75E016A9C48FB23	34
2AC1E0BD6F598437	27	C12E76839DB04F5A	32	768AB3D20FC594E1	33	415BC9E4A3D7628F0	26
01438C257BEA9DF6	30	A7234CB085B6DE9F1	31	4136BDEF972C5A08	29	A3F5B6148D902CE7	33
83AF4B4E52967D1C0	30	8325AD106FCB749	26	39E480C65AF7D2B1	31	6201FA5C398EDB74	33
A79CF801B64532DE	29	D57E3A2694C8FB10	26	F0C7952D1A863EB4	31	92E37F4CD01B8A65	32
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B67DC05A31F2E498	31	D8EAF5D8E384C1A	30	CD34A861B2095E4A	32	84BED19F253C60A7	25
69BC03178A52DF4	35	517B082494A3CF6D	23	7601A4BCE8D2935F	27	A4B81F750C29E63D	27
B9C1416AE5F2D3	30	781B0D8495C36A	24	BE5894A3D027C6F1	27	35E09BC268DF741A	26
4DBA5629831F07C	32	975C2A3EB8F1406D	28	D96B74821EAC05F3	26	9C267E58A1B04D3	30
C12763985AECFDB04	27	F604C175B38DA29	32	7EB64923DCFA8105	24	561E398C2DFA74B0	32
29E05F684BD1C73	34	2CAE697D8304FB561	29	3BCE874175D08426	32	70981D6B2CFA24E53	36
C1D93BA56E478F20	28	F197248ABDC635E0	26	9678FC1B245AE03D	31	B310E7F76D84CA5	32
4CE1B3D7A135B89	31	B970D256F8E3C41A	30	71BC258E06D94F	32	D47652CF0A9E813	28
987042A31F5D6B5E	32	32B8EAE56473F91C1D	29	2EC869301A45F7DB	27	C358B17DAF29046	32
E40BD729183AC6F5	26	2670FCEA39B1584D	39	DC56F120ABE87349	30	FC601B87359D4E42	31
41385C50AD9B2F276	34	CA219853F0D74B6	32	F78356940BAC2D1E	39	B2F8013ED76944AC5	32
B4C6253F0D7E98A1	27	F357142B9ACD08E6	36	1FB084DC2967EA53	32	2D9A8437FB6E1C0	32
982D6F473C01E8	32	5846ADE92C7013FB	37	C59E3701A8D462E	25	B4F29D05E817AC63	34
61DF20C9854B3A7E	35	70216D3EFCB8A95	24	A213ED08545F679	28	C1E52F6D38BOA794	31
20FCE67D1A35B89	30	8C652B9D3A8F1047F	34	2B3C10D78A6E495F	32	5C2B89014A673FDE	31
FB0D893CE6524A71	33	2145D3A9B76E83E0F	34	9F30A657B2DC48E1	27	410CAEF9657D2B83	26
B6F3D7E92184C05	34	6B32048579C1DEFA	33	DC1032C94B5E78A6	32	960BEC1D24735A8F8	31
564AB1097C28E3DF	32	874CD299A510E6B3	28	F21E7053CDB498A6	26	SDC12EB906A5F734	29
EB25A38F96407C1D	29	81E3D49056ACBF72	25	6A37DB4E9052C81F	34	FB3C6AED71490825	28
05CA734B892D1E6	30	4D8E09F136725ABC	28	B8EF6A5D19720C43	38	4D0BC685A1E3F297	29
AECT8B259034D61F	34	50F892A73614DCEB	23	91D0CABE285473F6	26	0A9B684CF5ED3217	27
2D0491E68F573CBA	34	5AF610C289E7B34D	39	C823D04AF1EB7659	32	BAD87195CE2F3460	30
5CD4A9E972134086	36	84D7F690125ACEB3	28	6A019C4ED528F73B	35	CB7EF54D329860A1	35
51034F692B68D4C7	33	4A9026BCDE513F7	33	DE257FC830B964A1	31	0F56BE2137A8DC49	34
DB9A20C534F681E7	29	92FD541E3CAB076	30	4C8A9F6E20B371D5	24	A3F4D28BE50C1E697	29
EB20D9FC6815473A	32	D4CE830A67B51					

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
44 Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

431A2FD9B58607EC	34	D4E3786CAF9521B0	24	B872EA53C9D6F014	33	02AEC7D9153648FB	25
78B9F4E021A5D63C	32	CB70D25F3A19648E	31	79453DB81E26F0AC	26	5CA19D7FB80E3264	37
2B487C9F56ED13A0	26	F5BE31DCA4960827	35	2B3A1E0F6975CD48	19	1FEA0CB794D63582	31
7985ABD301E62FC4	39	6F9AC2DE73B01485	36	9D45EF03B8A1762C	36	E2A4D3B1F58976C0	28
F5123BAE67C4098D	31	E3B16D0248F795C	34	EF69AC407DB31825	28	A4F2E85D6079C13	30
6E7C2DB309514A4F8	21	E57F9DB38602C14A	40	712D83B9CAE405F6	34	B21AF964C80D57E3	34
27E8FCDA1964B035	34	67BEF12AD09C5843	30	BE5D14679A0F8C32	33	0CF674ED9B21A835	32
46EA8DC70F39521B	31	AFB6E02D389C5174	31	0DF7A32B98E652BA	29	E4879D063A1BC5F2	37
D238CF679B15A00	34	4C2DF6B901E78A3	28	D486F71C936E52BA	28	1DE9B3270AC8F465	30
8B421390DFC7AE65	30	8FE24BD0A3965C71	33	08DF7B2CE64A3951	25	7DAB460159FE2C83	30
4FAD3E5C09618B27	27	B50AD18764293EFC	40	F1C4BD236A9E8075	30	BEDF826703459CA1	35
495EB2DFA806317C	34	AF482D7360C519EB	31	21F38B05A4C9D67E	31	6C891A74FD2E503	30
1B286A95743DCE0	30	43B5ADC2F768E910	40	1AD6B80E24C593F7	31	F850ED439B127C6	30
CSAF43D56179EB20	26	E378564D10AB92FC	28	89B16EA0DF435C27	31	57FE10A6B82C49D3	30
397405C6DE1A2B8F	30	6F7AD2CEBD3054198	31	B1ECA96035724DF8	29	4C0A729FB6D3518E	25
A254D90813BF6CE7	29	DA5B4F60931287CE	25	F8756D91240BEC3A	34	625971E4BA08FC3D	23
0C43F5AE819672BD	27	B84235A6E70DCF19	34	1D8B45F03A762EC9	28	3F2C6195ABDE0478	33
C9341A06FED2B587	37	4E3B7FAC029165D8	25	9B1625A0F783CE4D	31	5AD3F4879C0E6B21	29
8CFD503A96E2B417	27	9FC265A0718E4D3B	27	2153769FA08CEBD4	27	01E7F39C48BAD256	30
29631B07E54FDC8	27	6BDEA53479F0C218	33	86127DEC9A4B530	32	F2A3B3E0D7C548196	30
E207D931CA84B2E6	28	E8D4A93581C0627	31	80D2B9E47356CA1F	30	B8407C26A1DF935E	31
A163F458B702D9C6	27	2F7ADBE58104936C	32	0F7C2ED68A95413B	29	31B587E0D42FC6C9A	34
059FT7D8BCA3612E4	29	8716A1E4CF538BD9	30	167249E80DC3BFA	34	10F82A94E6C35D7B	29
79581CFA36ED2B40	38	6109D2EB853A47C7	36	AC980D6E372B41F5	32	4095B632A1C87EFD	35
7F092B2CDE63514A8	31	240F3D5C9AEB7681	31	D3E29108745CFAB6	26	AF2475DE986C1B03	28
62DFA71EB903C458	27	86247CE55B1D1390F	32	869FBE134C7DA025	30	48F19367D05B2CEA	24
07A9C24B31F58E6D	27	17E928D4A53F06C7	27	985B371A42FC6DE0	32	E8721C39054D6FBA	38
28410CAD35769EB	26	DAE7B9F5B061342C	30	89105EBCFD746A32	25	OB827FC3AE9D461	25
847D9F5B60E1AC32	35	31DE0764BAC985F2	23	6EB9D874F30C152A	32	3F1905B42C76ADE8	27
81CA526E0D4F97B3	26	A5D08973F1G4C2BE	33	65BCD84970F4E321	25	2D5041E7CAB38F69	30
F423079D5EBCA186	32	0729B1C5834FDEA6	34	4F8190CDB3A5276	34	9C6A703F5128DB4E	29
D4235FB068A9C71	31	4CE6B5301DA287F9	20	4D1CEA6F529830B7	25	E3C4FAD280675B91	29
0A8F1DCB253746E9	30	C7DAE38905126B4F	26	1B6AEDFC97803245	26	BAE29178D40C65F3	30
CB3218E76FAD4590	34	D9EC104A7BF26853	34	306487915AC2BEFD	27	1275FCE0A8B943D6	28
5B09321746DFAC8	31	35EB17F6D28C094A	29	9B56D7FS3024ECA1	27	5AD3C016928E47FB	31
9C148F2AD6075B3E	27	07BA19258E36C4FD	23	B71839CFEDA45062	29	145D8BF6A9732EC0	32
1BCA8DE3F4076529	26	47E59F8361CBOADA	29	A98D3F72B5E4061C	32	3B952701E846DAFC	20
89D071E563AC4FB2	35	025F3DBCA96E8741	23	10E8F42C2B35769AD	29	9C6A703F5128DB4E	29
E09435BCDFA72186	30	8716C942E5B2AF0D	29	3F74E62126A0B598	29	9BFC367D01E42A85	30
86A57E40FCD39B12	31	6F45E89A72B10DC3	34	09E5243C67A8F1D1B	31	43DA0EBC9768F521	23
52F9EC7B34681A0D	33	37B5F9EAC284160D	27	093EC2A8D1B47F65	28	856397EB0F1DC24A	28
A054F267C3B1E9D8	37	37E94A21C85963D8E	29	E7B6D42C80913F5	26	6BD593817E0C2F4A	32
BEC1FD345728609A	32	51A37D80CEF9642B	33	D342A980C8B76F1E5	30	4871CA90E26D5B3F	26
7A5E9F2B04D1863C	32	3FEC1A58490D27B6	32	A86051E3274FBCD9	32	5B0F6378CA2E9D14	31
7C19DF6E8A54B203	34	F820E4C17AD596B3	36	8A29130F6BCD57E4	29	5C63D7B094F2E18A	30
D3A7BEEF82C145609	30	E3817456F4CD209	36	89031B2E4DA75CF6	26	297DA14E68B2C5F30	20
C1E2079F3485B6D6	32	CD56832R4A0FB791	29	A6D47B8FE15923C0	30	F034716CA59DB28E	35
1ADE8743C6F5B290	26	4E83DB20C17F5A96	26	68F3E051C2A94B7D	25	125A4B6CF908DE73	30
A72FB4DE90436C815	32	3E984E0B2567A1FD	39	2EBC4056F1DA9873	26	C2E67F83B1DA490	24
AFD0849E53C261B7	27	4856C91E23D7ABF0	28	3A8DBF917426E50C	28	94F80761CEB53A2D	29
31045ABDF8726EC9	36	OF6DE8453A9C7B21	29	07F854CEAB63192D	31	63BE812540D97FAC	26
65C9DA02F3E8B741	35	34692A1BDF8E0C75	26	378D4162BFAC095E	25	F430DC865BEAT912	29
072CEA949A2F1D563	26	F520D37945E21AC86	26	5C6B81498F413E70D	29	23FDE647A9810C5B	27
D20BC589761EAF34	33	B647089F3ECAD512	27	82BAE63419D7CF50	32	7CA53FD4620E189B	35
2AFB67D3C984105E	31	9DB8AF415237C6E0	26	D2B16E4ACF705398	31	7C96248150DEA3BF	32
B1F83674A50CDE29	34	75E0219AEB6843DC	26	96E8D7450F1AB2C3	32	69CA140D7F53EB28	35
6D8E92375BF14A0C	30	0523D7B9C4E6F8A1	29	4E109623AD587FCB	31	B1395E640C2ASD7F	28
07ACB5924836E1DF	26	9B4D426E817530CF	28	18BF40329AD57CE6	30	B6719FA3802C54DE	37
F7893E05BCA2D461	33	EB2A89F1D047C356	32	3058ED7ACFB29146	28	B1687495FA320ECD	29
47902A8CF536B1E	31	97F8B31540CD6A2E	29	EF48653D7201ACB9	28	475AD69FE1CE3028	23
D35CA67249PB0E0F1	31	58CA7B2D3F416E09	30	1C04B8D32A7F9E65	28	E2BF861A3D074C95	26
235FC1AE749D068B	29	1792C0A3FEB654D8	31	54E3DBA8C072196F	26	DF7C3925841AE06B	31
4CB26D95E807F13	32	61B9A23854CE0D7F	32	8FBC50A4D23761E9	30	9E1F750B36C28DA4	29
EB3F07859D6A421C	30	30E9758B3D6C24A1	29	781A0F52ED46B9C3	30	A3986FE4D071C5B2	29
E23AD8B4F5170869	32	CD2798A41356E80F	34	D2785E6301F9BC4A	32	AF04CBDS36ET5129	26
52EF468C8D01A397	27	1A80943B2CD7E6F5	28	AD069B3EFC574281	21	3F8BA1CD9E642507	33
BA70419CE6D3258F	30	F5ABD263C90714E8	37	7D3B4C6928F10E5	24	F6ADC57402E983B1	37
1BE03C5974AD6F28	27	0F6745EC1293B8D8	33	D1895CFB73064AE2	33	4C8D71E5F5AB60932	27
4BD1ECAF78326905	36	7A6C1B523F948E0D	34	B84F0EC93761A52D	35	18AE76B0F5324CD9	34
68E3BACF517920D4	33	ACD2E49850FB6371	31	270B16D539FC48A	32	123F65BD80E7A4C9	34
16A24F5ED9C7B380	30	9BD1C7E3540A86F2	25	E084C61FA7DB2395	28	5C6F7D08921EAB34	23
8BAF5134E72D609C	28	24968D3A17B5C8E0	24	FE0C126E2458A7D9	38	78BF0C964231DE5A	38
DC3F0BA8297E4561	35	9BD1C7E3540A86F27	27	B791D5E0A43F86C2	23	6E1AC0B729F5D384	23
A935C176D42FB0E8	27	31E8CA4D2F750B69	32	948A1FE7D6C0B523	28	D7A89E30542F6C1B	31

Randomly Generated 16x4 S-Boxes

S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates	S-Box	Total Gates
69DE7C85FA41320B	9721F380A6ECBD45	21CEB59A67DF0348	5A3042198DFCB76E				
376E5084BA1C29FD	DC5417E3F8A209B6	A5DBE46093C1F827	7D580B3EF4912C6A				
CE24F10A387DB956	B76C03948DE52F1A	D438FA6CBE570291	63DE2C2405178BFA9				
871ABE20C5F493D6	C35B46DE02971A8F	F80B1E4A25C79D36	59E84C3B176A0D2F	112			
38D6E4B02C9A751F	EBDC26A45803197F	0B728F3CA5D41E96	90CF1DE2847635AB				
0A57B3DE19PC4628	4E0D0CF4A7395B2186	B3285D7E41AC9F0	426F7ECA91053DB8				
5D9B4078621CA3EF	108D3E62CB7A594F	9087F15A3E2DB46C	4F9D586A7C23B1E0				
24F5E1D6073A8B9C	64E829FDC5A1B730	1EBCDA7F29403568	12BFD98673EA54C0	118			
4856EF7A21C39D0B	682C13AEFD495B70	F9CE2A57483B0D61	2CA049D7635F81EB				
3A569D4081E7CF2B	5E71948CB63F20DA	98AB57F346C1E02D	45A69BDE3C827F01				
A5C7FEE94316B0D82	863209A4C1B57FDE	E1F807B9D5A2C643	1549EC80DF27A36B				
5D21349C870EAF6B	C345E0D9AF78B216	931FDA2B4E5807C6	EB6783CA421905FD	115			
6930E5182BA47DCF	C0495261F3DB8E47	F16E9D582A7B40C3	604F5A712CB983DE				
1482B5EF0D6C379A	CA289E7B04F5D361	4B7DCE95A368F120	08E46FC9DA3B7125				

EF3DBAC852604917 A60FD427CB3E5891	123	3F628D1A0749C5BE 43AECB8D7026591F	130	709B6AFC4381DE25 FC81B73AD9540E26	124	94C75E68D3F21A0B 12A0F84DC93B576E	121
AE4B2C8D06F35719 46B7CF298A0315DE 328AD60BE1CF9457 D6054132B78CA9FE	119	869D1ECA57023F4B 120D437AC8B5EF69 F9BE75CD12430A68 796ASE1DB24F53C0	118	E6413D27B9CSA0F5 870CEBF2394A61D5 4B2851FAD63C097E 78BA91C3ED504F62	135	5032D6A9C71EB8F4 B814DC6E5F09273A 3A90E542CF1B8D67 6897E510FDBA432C	116
3178E29FA65BC0D4 4CADE209F573681B 4A6BE132DC0879F5 58204C1B69E37DFA	134	5DC7FEA68B430291 B6D387A540F2EC91 TB9C04E13FB5A2D6 784C5A0F3BD6192E	115	09B5CA6ED14F8732 7F01E639C5B24AD8 3BD20A561C8EF947 86F2D9C4751A9DBEC6	116	1BCE6FA897235D40 CEF48921D0B5A376 C3158AF72609ED4B D8B349E72F6AC105	120
8C3F70D612AB945E 6BE13F872CAD9405 2017A4C59DDBE386F 429137AC0DFB6E85	116	C2156F4B3AD9E078 C9834AF517E60D2B 4DA9F67E02CB3581 9453E2A8FB7B601CD	123	FEC596307B2A14D8 1CFB53E0AD829476 40BDA5286F73E9C1 86F2D9C4751A9DBEC6	115	25D3CB18076A9F64 37F150BC4A9E862D DE12A36F9C7B5480 516BEFCA97D42038	113
52D740B869C1EFA3 FA984C52E3D601B7 275BDAEF4106C983 29D31A8CF4705E6B	125	FB6C87921EA403D5 3D8B7C2A156F49E0 6F14E902C3AD587B 7A98F2D63540BEC1	137	179F25ACD60B38E4 701DB6F2A48E593C 4ABF02E1783D56C 34E7CBD658AF0129	122	6170FA9B2C54D3E8 647B2F2C8E03195DA D507C684931F2EAB 54A68F17BD3C209E	115
5E173CD6092B4F8A 9842D301FB7AEC6 F49D3EA275086BC1 A7B59F0CEDD638412	115	8BD713294056CEFA 5C872D30469BA1F 34F971C8D05EB62A 87ED062C4593B1FA	114	80E19CD6AF273B45 13EA6FD5894B2C70 30479EDB6851AF2C 5D2EFA94B017836C	130	5A6DF0172BCE4893 DC15BA42E9F70638 8D069A2E15B74F3C 9CF35407ED681BA2	125
0BA915C2E8F73D64 9A2FECD45086B137 CBDA38045F6719E2 D14B85029F36E7CA	128	45A07B1FC0D6E832 1ABC5893472E60D F270534861DABE9C 1435EC78A029F6D	115	45738CE9FB0216D 20C8793E1A4DFB56 56217FBC9E03A4D8 FCBA9538D60417E2	113	B80D1752EAC9F463 2A4C0EF51863B79 2CE9BA1564D7038F 362980EBC1D4AF57	131
DAEC60735182FB49 7F369E01B2C84AD5 F6CEB57213A4D809 B4E29D6A10735C8F	126	8763CDE429BAF015 E65D729A43801FCB ED78C10634FB259A FB7302CED95461A	112	E4A3F08D25B1769C D8AEF7B926035C41 1B6753E29C48FAD0 361780FBD4259CA	110	DA5C71E34029FB86 CD0F6A354E81B729 06E19A47FB385C2D C6EF107DB329845A	100
36E052FD8B794AC1 6BD93280A715F4C 458BEFC69D7A2031 7290C543A1FDE68B	125	EF98ABD6723154C0 A3C9B568E02D174F 9C34B7E50FD682A1 C378B4D601AEF295	118	98DC7E04B15FA362 94E2AB0731CD685 FD24A7C08563E91B D31F5690784BECA2	107	7DF0B15CA43E6892 9C365E4B7FD2A810 51E97B420ADC3F68 704A1ED63285FB9C	112
B3258A640D9FEC17 CB789FD245E301A 0ACD584E1379F6B2 916B7F0D8C253E4A	122	51FCD8796A3024F 47ECFS0B59A613D2 1359E8047D6CFAB2 B106CEF7243D5A8	111	0F416E28CAB9D357 4C916F58E03B2A7 3278BDCF4E05A961 13F9E7BDC42508A6	122	7DF6259CEB03A841 38C6420A5BEDF791 E1AF35B0287946CD E2F74A36509DB8C1	111
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F93517428ED06CAB 4BD7C56A912FE038 18BA23E60CF9D475 2E08A71934B56FCD	121	657F913CE8042BA A978ECBF416D5203 4BA105C2E687F3D9 1C3F74AB590E86D2	119	265E137CA4B0F089D 85A6C7EB2FD94310 A7E8F4C2610BD359 428B9CF761AED350	110	ED2B6F850A17C439 197B50843DA62BCF D835AB2C6049F7E1 10937FA64CB25ED8	121
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C176F28B59AD340 671F9A40D2C53B8 0A3179D542E6C8FB 503C2AF948167BDE	103	57F64E20983DA1CB 25D7689E43A1F0BC 2AEB01493CD86F57 CFD809E32A146B57	109	FD35704BC19A82E6 BF63C7DA98405E12 C206DB579A834F1E 89327D41BC5A60EF	112	37A8BD195C46E02F 9B350246EFA817CD 804F325E916CDA7B 1F3C45E69A87B2D0	118
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An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
46 Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

BD27E1539C8FA604 9E1834A062C7F5BD DCF18B4A0693E257 87A4D5BFC120E963	118	E978450A631DCF2B 17EF3280A69BDC45 D3F20A7C195B684E F06E285BC91374AD	107	ACDF450972368BE1 B2345C18760F9EDA 98F2E17C4D5BA063 685130DBE427AFC9	116	872EB0A4165DFC93 AB0618F52934ED7C 1F9E425AB08C7D63 92D08375CA4B6EF1	113
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6E190F482C3DAB57		17C460AD58E3BF29		BA7F842CD39601E5		053FDB2417E9C68A	

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

23647B50D91E8FCA F927D830E54BCA61 40FB6DA97C85E321	115	7095C41FBE32DA68 28695C703F4EAB1D 6D8C7015AF9B342E	113	624F9AE875BDC130 D3E6C507F28B41A9 A1769DEF243CE058	125	E83CFD2A6140B957 BD32F456891AEC70 8BE79623D50A14CF	122
D73B45EC198A2F06 F532E4107B98DA6C 79D0FEB8A632C14 BA62370DF45E81C9	114	8502A34167C9FBED 13658B9FA47CE20D A259ED7381C4F06B E9B7A15D2CF40836	122	28A90ED1B67C3F45 1F39C0A482D6B57E 140ACF8D325B69E7 A72ED38F94065C1B	119	09CB3624D7A81E5F E897A4DFB032C156 0F9B36D7142ACSE5 70289FED3A65B4C1	131
7604F89CAD3E5B12 162A9703B2DEF4C8 42C7EFA8D106B953 1FB48E369D57A20C	130	34BDFAT1E8892C06 6BA09375281DC4EF 487FB569C203D1AE C74A59036FD8E2B1	119	FE4789A2C16B53D0 4097CF6E1285AD3B 1FC4A4D0B53279E68 5C8AB30E21647F9D	137	93062CBE7F15DA48 B9A451F03DC7E826 5A62DB1C3798F04E B897C46A3E52DF01	115
C1A260E379D854BF BA2F3D16058E794C 9CD12356E47ABOF8 8BE5AC7362F091D4	123	6E8A0357FB19D2C4 67D8A902BF415E3C 50148F2ABD769C3 1C39A405B7862FED	115	0A4F923C5D867E1B 2F071A8E39B6DC54 018EDB325FA69C74 1B936E0ACD8F5742	105	A32F0851B4C97ED6 312E685CBD0F9A47 928BCAOF754D13E6 42F37EDC56098B1A	124
3AB9C7F8E61502D E47038BD1A62F5C9 E90C91BF23A5467 BC408DFE967123A5	110	F698120DBA453CE7 36BEF10C8A79542D AE749C5621BF380 BA69D840E325C71F	124	3869F0142EBD7C5A 3D47589C2F61BOEA 9C20F6473EAB518D 3B1A62D5980E74F	124	65BAF4E328D09C71 F634C5DA15702E9B 082C149E6FA357BD 859670F13AE2DC4B	99
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25CE1A7BD603F849	122	2F41789B3560ECD4	124	76FC2AD345B891E0	120	0CDB782319A5E546	126
AB419F2ED6C58307		7956102D8CFBA4E3		DC9BF7E482A63510		05C9861DEFAB2437	
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2A059B437EDC8F16		SFB5619E7A0C423D		A258E3C3F49701D6		C7E1D46A2F0859B3	
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26A4D09F7E51B3C8		64C5EB208D17A93F		2A58039BC14FD67E		60FC9AB5731E284D	
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94650E2C137ABFD8		F750A28413BEC96D		AB5410E3F72DC689		9CD4B21A53E0F687	
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79F342056DA81ECB		0A1769C3ED85B42		D024F58A7B3C6E19		48DE2F710C9563AB	
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DB3FE76C2859A104		C0E12B9AD378456F		A4F20D593EC167B8		CBEA826540391F7D	
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FCEDB69A47083512		128AFB094DC76E53		0B64A517C3DFE289		316E927CB58DF40A	

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

B693A48071FD2CE5	2483EDAC57916FB0	E9620F58C14A3DB7	18AEFD623B54970C
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672EB8391DFC0A45	8709A314DF265CEB	111	095873ABF1EDC426
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DE82407AF1C3B569			114
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609C5D72E4F38AB1	105E8F7B436D2AC9	7FE0B291DA43658C	C41079853FAEBD26
FBA31ED548729C06	79C6513DE824B0AF	95C846EF1B2DA073	28B0731ED4CA95P6
3EOF7C4AB89D6215	621A39E4BC078F25	116	564B12098AF7CE3D
122			113
2CF94518ED7BA360			128
AB75FD2461930C8E	F09814B7C25EAD63	F2BD0A398CE76145	2E8CAD9615F437B0
B153C6D29F84EA07	3A8761EFC2D945B0	3FE4D718CA96B025	8547FDA32B10CE69
20A91EB743D8F6C5	75CA6418DF039BE2	AB2F174E95D806C3	593D2470186BEFCA
9821B30AD5C4F6E7	D026E839C1A7B5F4	135	7EDB2F45A9C80631
127			125
3E2164A90D85B7CF			120
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078E5AD2C4619F3B	1D59FACE78630B42	5BFEF1AC27864903D	743C8650FBE91DA2
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109			123
3CDCB84AE16F27590			114
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124			127
C5A2F1B40369E78D			115
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09D682F1C4B573AE	E34C4GF29A501B7D8	BD52079A9FE164C38	DA53B81FC2E67409
E2183947FCDB65A0	74E19D6FA30C852B	119	8974E6D3512AB0F
112			114
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D23CBA7F5098E146	D86AE3F924C71B05	70812A3B496DCE5	184F0639A7CED2B5
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112			149
8D6F47B093A2EC51			111
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23640EA9CD5B7F81			103
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124			129
92E4608F1CD7AB35			120
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126			130
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CD9F2B3E6A817054		51BD867EACF29043		1EB82F43695A7C0D		6C2B5901EA473DF8	

An Analysis of the Post Quantum and Classical Security of 4x4 and 16x4 S-Boxes and  
Their Implementations in Simplified-AES

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

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

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54 Their Implementations in Simplified-AES


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## C Results of Using Grover's Algorithm to Perform a Known Plaintext Attack on Implementations of S-AES That Use a 16x4 S-Box







## D Statistical Analysis Results

### Set 1

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.276	100%	0	93.33%	0.254	100%
Block Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0	98.33%	0.299	100%
Sums 1	0.672	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	98.33%
Sums 2	0.111	100%	0	88.33%	0.254	100%
Runs	0.006	95.0%	0.501	96.66%	0.773	98.33%
Longest Run	0.082	100%	0.276	95.0%	0.213	98.33%
Rank	0.091	96.66%	0	35.0%	0	78.33%
FFT	0.888	100%	0	0.0%	0	70.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.304	99.32%	0.445	98.36%	0.499	98.98%
Overlapping	0.035	100%	0.74	100%	0.804	100%
Universal	0.041	—	0.054	—	0.001	—
Entropy	0.005	98.33%	0	86.66%	0.976	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.61%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	98.76%
Serial 1	0.054	98.33%	0.091	98.33%	0.637	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.706	100%	0.534	100%
Linear Complexity	0.324	98.33%	0.74	100%	0.862	100%
Average	0.273	99.01%	0.237	86.01%	0.436	96.12%
100% Pass Rate		9		4		7

### S-AES (Set 1)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.324	100%	0.299	100%	0.082	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.276	98.33%	0.016	96.66%	0.01	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.001	100%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.35	100%	0.01	100%	0.091	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.213	100%	0.773	100%	0.004	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.163	100%	0.706	100%	0.324	100%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.804	100%	0.195	98.33%	0.025	100%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	33.33%	0	20.0%	0	23.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.342	99.06%	0.247	98.88%	0.269	99.07%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.028	91.66%	0.195	98.33%	0.135	100%
Universal	0.83	—	0.826	—	0.886	—	0.98	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0	98.33%	0.02	100%	0.001	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	98.21%	—	100%	0.35	98.86%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	97.22%	0.46	100%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.834	100%	0.148	100%	0.135	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.672	100%	0.773	100%	0	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.602	98.33%	0.054	100%	0.407	100%
Average	0.332	94.10%	0.37	94.82%	0.288	94.33%	0.198	94.97%
100% Pass Rate		11		9		10		12

## Set 2

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.95	100%	0.067	96.66%	0.568	100%
Block Frequency	0.002	98.33%	0.437	98.33%	0.74	98.33%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0	95.0%	0.163	100%
Sums 2	0.437	100%	0	96.66%	0.074	100%
Runs	0.378	96.66%	0.911	98.33%	0.122	100%
Longest Run	0.018	96.66%	0.568	100%	0.233	100%
Rank	0.378	100%	0	53.33%	0.044	86.66%
FFT	0.067	98.33%	0	0.0%	0	73.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.306	98.59%	0.529	98.82%	0.515	98.95%
Overlapping	0.004	98.33%	0.35	100%	0.437	96.66%
Universal	0.66	—	0.404	—	0.222	—
Entropy	0.534	100%	0.195	95.0%	0.95	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	0.382	98.86%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	0.43	98.14%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.378	100%	0.773	100%
Serial 2	0.101	100%	0.276	98.33%	0.233	100%
Linear Complexity	0.195	100%	0.378	100%	0.834	100%
Average	0.271	98.97%	0.3	89.40%	0.395	96.82%
100% Pass Rate		9		6		8

### S-AES (Set 2)

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.013	100%	0.163	100%
Block Frequency	0.178	93.33%	0.002	98.33%	0.111	96.66%	0.001	91.66%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.002	100%	0	100%	0.06	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.007	100%
Runs	0	100%	0.135	95.0%	0.054	100%	0.082	100%
Longest Run	0.324	98.33%	0.178	100%	0.672	98.33%	0.049	100%
Rank	0.437	100%	0.74	98.33%	0.773	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	10.0%	0	41.66%	0	43.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.256	99.06%	0.269	99.2%	0.231	99.0%	0.251	99.03%
Overlapping	0.804	98.33%	0.602	98.33%	0.437	100%	0.049	100%
Universal	0.83	—	0.131	—	0.768	—	0.413	—
Entropy	0.407	100%	0.074	100%	0.035	100%	0.039	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.364	98.75%	—	98.42%	0.231	99.1%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.398	99.44%	—	100%	0.204	100%
Serial 1	0.74	100%	0.001	98.33%	0.407	96.66%	0.031	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.469	100%	0.469	96.66%	0.254	100%
Linear Complexity	0.773	100%	0.148	98.33%	0.998	98.33%	0.804	98.33%
Average	0.332	94.10%	0.214	93.37%	0.331	95.25%	0.169	95.61%
100% Pass Rate		11		6		7		10

### Set 3

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.437	100%	0.035	90.0%	0.637	100%
Block Frequency	0.773	100%	0	98.33%	0.637	100%
Sums 1	0.74	100%	0.067	83.33%	0.016	100%
Sums 2	0.233	100%	0.006	88.33%	0.111	100%
Runs	0.299	100%	0.637	98.33%	0.178	100%
Longest Run	0.005	96.66%	0.773	100%	0.534	100%
Rank	0.602	100%	0	38.33%	0	71.66%
FFT	0.407	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	60.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.265	99.05%	0.443	98.22%	0.531	98.87%
Overlapping	0.213	100%	0.501	100%	0.148	100%
Universal	0.074	—	0.433	—	0.584	—
Entropy	0.001	95.0%	0	90.0%	0.324	96.66%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	0.532	97.72%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	0.531	100%
Serial 1	0.049	100%	0.378	91.66%	0.276	100%
Serial 2	0.091	95.0%	0.178	95.0%	0.534	100%
Linear Complexity	0.299	95.0%	0.834	100%	0.932	96.66%
Average	0.299	98.58%	0.286	85.72%	0.383	95.09%
100% Pass Rate		10		5		10

**S-AES (Set 3)**

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.111	100%	0.035	100%	0.254	100%
Block Frequency	0.804	93.33%	0.276	98.33%	0.054	98.33%	0	98.33%
Sums 1	0	100%	0.148	100%	0.067	100%	0.178	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0.299	100%	0.009	100%	0.163	100%
Runs	0.101	100%	0.804	100%	0.002	98.33%	0.568	100%
Longest Run	0.534	96.66%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%	0.054	98.33%
Rank	0.602	100%	0.534	100%	0.122	100%	0.135	100%
FFT	0	20.0%	0	40.0%	0	45.0%	0	13.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.296	99.02%	0.343	99.05%	0.27	99.14%	0.285	99.13%
Overlapping	0.025	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.028	100%	0	100%
Universal	0.085	—	0.118	—	0.041	—	0.222	—
Entropy	0.039	100%	0	100%	0.932	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	98.21%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%	—	99.38%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.074	96.66%	0.008	100%	0.407	100%
Serial 2	0	100%	0.049	100%	0.804	96.66%	0.407	100%
Linear Complexity	0.501	95.0%	0.911	100%	0.706	96.66%	0.862	100%
Average	0.199	93.79%	0.277	95.45%	0.25	95.88%	0.269	94.28%
100% Pass Rate		10		10		10		11

## Set 4

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.378	98.33%	0.111	95.0%	0.195	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	98.33%	0.254	98.33%	0.233	98.33%
Sums 1	0.276	96.66%	0	91.66%	0.091	100%
Sums 2	0.888	100%	0	91.66%	0.025	100%
Runs	0.254	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.324	100%
Longest Run	0	96.66%	0.74	100%	0.067	98.33%
Rank	0.122	100%	0	58.33%	0.091	93.33%
FFT	0.804	96.66%	0	0.0%	0	71.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.99%	0.486	98.72%	0.498	98.96%
Overlapping	0.06	100%	0.135	98.33%	0.991	98.33%
Universal	0.461	—	0.713	—	0.621	—
Entropy	0.35	98.33%	0.028	98.33%	0.005	100%
Excursions	—	93.75%	—	98.61%	—	96.87%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	96.28%	—	93.05%
Serial 1	0.005	100%	0.534	100%	0.378	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.888	100%	0.437	100%
Linear Complexity	0.148	100%	0.35	95.0%	0.602	100%
Average	0.326	98.60%	0.338	88.66%	0.304	96.80%
100% Pass Rate		8		3		8

**S-AES (Set 4)**

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0	100%	0.005	100%	0.035	100%	0.276	100%
Block Frequency	0.804	93.33%	0	98.33%	0.501	100%	0.054	95.0%
Sums 1	0	100%	0	100%	0	100%	0.888	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0	100%	0.004	100%	0.74	100%
Runs	0.101	100%	0.135	100%	0.122	100%	0.049	100%
Longest Run	0.534	96.66%	0.501	100%	0.602	98.33%	0	96.66%
Rank	0.602	100%	0.95	100%	0.028	98.33%	0.002	100%
FFT	0	20.0%	0	5.0%	0	55.00%	0	80.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.296	99.02%	0.259	99.09%	0.269	99.26%	0.32	98.92%
Overlapping	0.025	100%	0.378	100%	0.501	98.33%	0.01	100%
Universal	0.085	—	0.028	—	0.971	—	0.583	—
Entropy	0.039	100%	0.378	100%	0.932	100%	0.082	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.546	100%	0.311	100%	—	92.85%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.23	100%	0.574	98.98%	—	98.41%
Serial 1	0.003	96.66%	0.023	100%	0.082	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0	100%	0.101	100%	0.501	100%	0	100%
Linear Complexity	0.501	95.0%	0.378	95.0%	0.082	98.33%	0.469	96.66%
Average	0.199	93.79%	0.23	93.58%	0.324	96.66%	0.232	97.40%
100% Pass Rate		10		12		9		9

## Set 5

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.254	100%	0.009	91.66%	0.706	100%
Block Frequency	0.568	100%	0	91.66%	0.031	100%
Sums 1	0.299	100%	0	90.0%	0.437	100%
Sums 2	0.01	100%	0	86.66%	0.299	100%
Runs	0.011	100%	0.122	95.0%	0.834	98.33%
Longest Run	0.035	100%	0.254	95.0%	0.195	98.33%
Rank	0.74	98.33%	0	28.33%	0	73.33%
FFT	0.009	90.0%	0	0.0%	0	45.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	98.94%	0.462	98.59%	0.462	98.91%
Overlapping	0.602	96.66%	0.672	100%	0.534	98.33%
Universal	0.79	—	0.021	—	0.956	—
Entropy	0.011	100%	0.834	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	94.64%	—	98.42%	—	97.91%
Excursion Variants	—	98.41%	—	100%	—	99.07%
Serial 1	0.082	100%	0.407	96.66%	0.888	100%
Serial 2	0.74	100%	0.568	100%	0.602	100%
Linear Complexity	0.163	96.66%	0.568	98.33%	0.74	100%
Average	0.308	98.35%	0.261	85.64%	0.505	94.32%
100% Pass Rate		9		4		8

**S-AES (Set 5)**

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.074	100%	0	100%	0.378	100%	0.534	100%
Block Frequency	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.602	100%	0	96.66%
Sums 1	0.001	100%	0	100%	0.233	100%	0.672	100%
Sums 2	0.018	100%	0	100%	0.637	100%	0.637	100%
Runs	0.039	100%	0.534	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%
Longest Run	0.501	100%	0.672	100%	0.233	100%	0.254	100%
Rank	0.407	98.33%	0.862	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.672	98.33%
FFT	0	16.66%	0	21.66%	0	30.0%	0	8.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.303	99.15%	0.333	99.03%	0.314	99.14%	0.305	98.86%
Overlapping	0.74	98.33%	0.95	98.33%	0.932	100%	0.911	98.33%
Universal	0.53	—	0.3	—	0.338	—	0.898	—
Entropy	0.025	100%	0.001	100%	0.035	100%	0.501	100%
Excursions	0.361	100%	0.016	97.36%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.293	100%	0.009	99.7%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.862	96.66%	0.213	100%	0.469	100%	0	100%
Serial 2	0.834	100%	0.195	100%	0.407	100%	0.862	100%
Linear Complexity	0.911	98.33%	0.991	98.33%	0.672	100%	0.602	98.33%
Average	0.347	94.21%	0.299	94.44%	0.442	95.57%	0.472	93.67%
100% Pass Rate		10		9		14		10

## Set 6

	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.054	100%	0.378	96.66%	0.054	100%
Block Frequency	0.672	100%	0	100%	0.911	100%
Sums 1	0.031	100%	0.437	95.0%	0.378	100%
Sums 2	0.007	96.66%	0.135	95.0%	0.067	100%
Runs	0.706	100%	0.005	93.33%	0.862	100%
Longest Run	0.049	98.33%	0.672	98.33%	0.932	98.33%
Rank	0.082	100%	0	25.0%	0	68.33%
FFT	0.122	100%	0	0.0%	0	56.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.271	99.21%	0.522	98.79%	0.508	98.94%
Overlapping	0.054	100%	0.637	100%	0.299	100%
Universal	0.213	—	0.076	—	0.031	—
Entropy	0	96.66%	0.091	98.33%	0.074	98.33%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.21%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	93.05%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.074	100%	0.568	95.0%	0.501	100%
Serial 2	0.233	100%	0.932	96.66%	0.06	96.66%
Linear Complexity	0.276	98.33%	0.932	98.33%	0.324	98.33%
Average	0.19	99.32%	0.359	86.46%	0.333	94.61%
100% Pass Rate		11		3		8

**S-AES (Set 6)**

	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.031	100%	0	100%	0.025	100%	0.011	100%
Block Frequency	0.054	95.0%	0	90.0%	0.003	100%	0.091	100%
Sums 1	0	100%	0	100%	0.003	100%	0.122	100%
Sums 2	0	100%	0	100%	0.005	100%	0	100%
Runs	0.06	100%	0.407	100%	0.163	100%	0.044	100%
Longest Run	0.049	95.0%	0.233	98.33%	0.091	100%	0.233	100%
Rank	0.888	100%	0.534	100%	0.773	100%	0.706	100%
FFT	0	0.0%	0	5.0%	0	25.0%	0	36.66%
Non-Overlapping	0.292	99.21%	0.295	99.03%	0.29	99.17%	0.331	99.13%
Overlapping	0.049	95.0%	0.672	100%	0.299	100%	0.195	100%
Universal	0	—	0.098	—	0.593	—	0.012	—
Entropy	0.254	100%	0.101	100%	0.049	98.33%	0.035	100%
Excursions	0.168	98.07%	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	0.247	99.2%	—	100%	—	100%	—	98.88%
Serial 1	0.049	100%	0.016	100%	0.035	96.66%	0.101	100%
Serial 2	0.111	100%	0.178	96.66%	0.005	100%	0.74	100%
Linear Complexity	0.014	100%	0.324	100%	0.082	100%	0.706	100%
Average	0.133	92.59%	0.191	93.06%	0.161	94.94%	0.222	95.91%
100% Pass Rate		9		11		12		13



## Set 7



	ALG 2		Double Swap		Single Swap	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.74	98.33%	0.911	95.0%	0.706	98.33%
Block Frequency	0.082	100%	0	86.66%	0.195	98.33%
Sums 1	0.035	96.66%	0.008	93.33%	0.834	100%
Sums 2	0.74	96.66%	0.016	91.66%	0.602	100%
Runs	0.018	100%	0.834	98.33%	0.082	100%
Longest Run	0.178	98.33%	0.985	100%	0.602	100%
Rank	0.672	98.33%	0	31.66%	0	75.0%
FFT	0.534	98.33%	0	0.0%	0	73.33%
Non-Overlapping	0.313	99.0%	0.471	98.65%	0.469	98.98%
Overlapping	0.501	100%	0.35	96.66%	0.324	96.66%
Universal	0.279		0.937		0.224	
Entropy	0.122	100%	0.178	98.33%	0.804	100%
Excursions	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	—	100%	—	100%
Serial 1	0.023	98.33%	0.568	100%	0.35	100%
Serial 2	0.324	100%	0.862	100%	0.324	100%
Linear Complexity	0.407	100%	0.672	98.33%	0.233	100%
Average	0.331	98.99%	0.453	86.78%	0.383	96.28%
100% Pass Rate		8		5		10



**S-AES (Set 7)**



	S-Box 1		S-Box 2		S-Box 3		S-Box 4	
	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed	P-val	Passed
Frequency	0.773	100%	0.018	100%	0.074	100%	0.082	100%
Block Frequency	0	93.33%	0.213	100%	0	98.33%	0.005	96.66%
Sums 1	0.834	100%	0	100%	0.067	100%	0.001	100%
Sums 2	0.862	100%	0.004	100%	0	100%	0.002	100%
Runs	0.007	100%	0.35	100%	0.018	100%	0.013	100%
Longest Run	0.195	100%	0.35	100%	0.534	100%	0.35	98.33%
Rank	0.213	100%	0.122	100%	0.008	100%	0.637	100%
FFT	0	11.66%	0	28.33%	0	13.33%	0	30.0%
Non-Overlapping	0.321	98.99%	0.312	98.98%	0.248	98.98%	0.297	99.22%
Overlapping	0.101	100%	0.163	100%	0.95	100%	0.378	95.0%
Universal	0.103	—	0.669	—	0.807	—	0.832	—
Entropy	0.013	100%	0	96.66%	0.002	100%	0.888	100%
Excursions	—	100%	0.337	98.86%	—	97.91%	0.558	98.95%
Excursion Variants	—	100%	0.427	100%	—	100%	0.478	99.53%
Serial 1	0	100%	0.002	100%	0.008	100%	0.35	100%
Serial 2	0.06	100%	0.568	100%	0.163	100%	0.195	100%
Linear Complexity	0.637	96.66%	0.706	100%	0.706	96.66%	0.637	100%
Average	0.275	93.78%	0.249	95.17%	0.239	94.07%	0.335	94.85%
100% Pass Rate		12		12		11		9



## E Avalanche Criterion Analysis Results



















## F ANF of AES

$$\begin{aligned}
y_0 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2x_7 \oplus x_2 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_6x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_1 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_2 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5 \oplus \\
& x_6x_7 \oplus x_7
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_3 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_6 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_4x_5 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_6 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_6x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_4 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_5 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_5 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_5 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_6x_7
\end{aligned}$$

$$y_5 = x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_5 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus x_4 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_6 \oplus x_7 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_6 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_4 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_3x_7 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus \\
& x_4x_6 \oplus x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_6 \oplus 1
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
y_7 = & x_0x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_3x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_1x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_4 \oplus x_0x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_1x_5 \oplus x_0x_1x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_2x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_0x_2x_4x_7 \oplus x_0x_2x_5 \oplus x_0x_2x_7 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_4x_7 \oplus \\
& x_0x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_5 \oplus x_0x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_3x_6 \oplus x_0x_3x_7 \oplus x_0x_4x_5 \oplus \\
& x_0x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_5x_6 \oplus x_0x_6x_7 \oplus x_0x_6 \oplus x_0x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_3x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_5 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_1x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_2x_6 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus \\
& x_1x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_5 \oplus x_1x_3x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_3x_6 \oplus x_1x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_1x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_4x_7 \oplus x_1x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_1x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_3x_4x_7 \oplus x_2x_3x_5 \oplus \\
& x_2x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_4x_6 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_5x_6 \oplus x_2x_6x_7 \oplus x_2x_6 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus \\
& x_3x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_3x_4x_5 \oplus x_3x_5x_7 \oplus x_3x_5 \oplus x_4x_5x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_5x_6 \oplus x_4x_5x_7 \oplus x_4x_6x_7 \oplus x_4x_6 \oplus \\
& x_4 \oplus x_5x_7 \oplus x_5 \oplus x_7
\end{aligned}$$

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