Paper 2023/1906
Exploring SIDH-based Signature Parameters
Abstract
Isogeny-based cryptography is an instance of post-quantum cryptography whose fundamental problem consists of finding an isogeny between two (isogenous) elliptic curves $E$ and $E'$. This problem is closely related to that of computing the endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve. Therefore, many isogeny-based protocols require the endomorphism ring of at least one of the curves involved to be unknown. In this paper, we explore the design of isogeny based protocols in a scenario where one assumes that the endomorphism ring of all the curves are public. In particular, we identify digital signatures based on proof of isogeny knowledge from SIDH squares as such a candidate. We explore the design choices for such constructions and propose two variants with practical instantiations. We analyze their security according to three lines, the first consists of attacks based on KLPT with both polynomial and superpolynomial adversary, the second consists of attacks derived from the SIDH attacks and finally we study the zero-knowledge property of the underlying proof of knowledge.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. ACNS 2024
- Keywords
- Isogeny-based cryptographySigma protocolsSignatures
- Contact author(s)
-
andrea basso @ bristol ac uk
m chen 1 @ bham ac uk
tako fouotsa @ epfl ch
p kutas @ bham ac uk
abel laval @ ulb be
laurane marco @ epfl ch
gustavesaah @ gmail com - History
- 2023-12-15: approved
- 2023-12-12: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1906
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1906, author = {Andrea Basso and Mingjie Chen and Tako Boris Fouotsa and Péter Kutas and Abel Laval and Laurane Marco and Gustave Tchoffo Saah}, title = {Exploring {SIDH}-based Signature Parameters}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1906}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1906} }