A Single-Trace Message Recovery Attack on a Masked and Shuffled Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber

Sönke Jendral; Kalle Ngo; Ruize Wang; Elena Dubrova

Paper 2023/1587

A Single-Trace Message Recovery Attack on a Masked and Shuffled Implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber

Sönke Jendral

, KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Kalle Ngo

, KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Ruize Wang

, KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Elena Dubrova

, KTH Royal Institute of Technology

Abstract

Last year CRYSTALS-Kyber was chosen by NIST as a new, post-quantum secure key encapsulation mechanism to be standardized. This makes it important to assess the resistance of CRYSTALS-Kyber implementations to physical attacks. Pure side-channel attacks on post-quantum cryptographic algorithms have already been well-explored. In this paper, we present an attack on a masked and shuffled software implementation of CRYSTALS-Kyber that combines fault injection with side-channel analysis. First, a voltage fault injection is performed to bypass the shuffling. We found settings that consistently glitch the desired instructions without crashing the device. After the successful fault injection, a deep learning-assisted profiled power analysis based on the Hamming weight leakage model is used to recover the message (shared key). We propose a partial key enumeration method that allows us to significantly increase the success rate of message recovery (from 0.122 without enumeration to 0.887 with 32 enumerated bits).

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info: Published elsewhere. 2024 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST)
DOI: 10.1109/HOST55342.2024.10545390
Keywords: Fault injection Side-channel attack CRYSTALS-Kyber ML-KEM Post-quantum cryptography
Contact author(s): jendral @ kth se
kngo @ kth se
ruize @ kth se
dubrova @ kth se
History: 2024-11-12: revised; 2023-10-13: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1587
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1587,
      author = {Sönke Jendral and Kalle Ngo and Ruize Wang and Elena Dubrova},
      title = {A Single-Trace Message Recovery Attack on a Masked and Shuffled Implementation of {CRYSTALS}-Kyber},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1587},
      year = {2023},
      doi = {10.1109/HOST55342.2024.10545390},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1587}
}