

On Constructing One-Way Quantum State Generators, and More

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Abstract. As a quantum analogue of one-way function, the notion of one-way quantum state generator is recently proposed by Morimae and Yamakawa (CRYPTO'22), which is proved to be implied by the pseudorandom state and can be used to devise the one-time secure digital signature. Due to Kretschmer's result (TQC'20), it's believed that pseudorandom state generator requires less than post-quantum secure one-way function. Unfortunately, it remains to be unknown how to achieve the one-way quantum state generator without the existence of post-quantum secure one-way function. In this paper, we mainly study that problem and obtain the following results:

- Two variants of one-way quantum state generator are proposed, called the weak one-way quantum state generator and distributionally one-way quantum state generator. Then the equivalence between weak and strong one-way state generator is obtained, and the equivalence between weak and distributionally one-way quantum state generator is shown in the symmetric setting.
- We construct the symmetric distributionally one-way quantum state generator from average-case hardness assumption of a promise problem belongs to QSZK.
- We construct quantum bit commitment with statistical binding (sum-binding) and computational hiding directly from the average-case hardness of QSZK.
- To show the non-triviality of the constructions above, a quantum oracle \mathcal{U} is devised relative to which such promise problem in QSZK doesn't belong to $\text{QMA}^{\mathcal{U}}$.

Our results present the first non-trivial construction of one-way quantum state generator from the hardness assumption of complexity class, and give another evidence that one-way quantum state generator probably requires less than post-quantum secure one-way function.

1 Introduction

As the most fundamental primitive, one-way function (OWF) plays a crucial role in cryptography. Plenty of cryptographic primitives have been shown equivalent to OWF, including the pseudorandom generator (PRG), pseudorandom

functions (PRFs), pseudorandom permutations (PRPs), digital signature, symmetric encryption, message authentication code (MAC), bit commitment and more ([20,18,26,44,19,37,23,32]). By Impagliazzo’s famous “five worlds” [25], it is called the MiniCrypt that the world OWF exists.

As a quantum analogue to MiniCrypt, the MiniQCrypt represents the world that post-quantum secure one-way function (pqOWF) exists [21]. Many results seem to be consistent with the classical setting [49,10,50]. However, MiniQCrypt may contain some objects that contrast to its classical counterpart. When allowing quantum communication, the celebrated result by Bennett and Brassard showed that the key exchange protocol doesn’t need to rely on any cryptographic assumption in quantum world [7] which seems impossible in classical world due to the negative result [27]. Moreover, two independent works concurrently showed the feasibility for constructing oblivious transfer (OT) protocol, secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols from pqOWFs within a non-black box and black-box manner respectively [21,6]. Whereas, in classical world, no such construction has been found, OT is believed to be a “higher-level” primitive than OWFs due to the black-box barrier [27,33].

It seems that the existence of pqOWFs is probably not necessary for some quantum objects whose classical counterparts are equivalent to (or even “stronger” than) OWFs in classical world. In lieu of outputting a string, Ji, Liu, and Song proposed a quantum analogue of PRGs which is called the pseudorandom states (PRSs) [28]. Taking a random seed as input, PRS outputs a quantum state which masquerades as a real random state (sampled from the Haar measure). It is shown that PRSs can be constructed by quantum pseudorandom functions which indicates that PRSs belongs to MiniQCrypt. But the other direction seems to be infeasible, by constructing a quantum oracle \mathcal{O} relative to which $\text{QMA}^{\mathcal{O}} = \text{BQP}^{\mathcal{O}}$ while PRS (and even pseudorandom unitary) still exists, the result by Kretschmer gave negative evidence for ensuring pqOWF from PRS [31]. By exploiting the nature of PRSs, two recently results by Morimae et al. and Ananth et al. devised constructions of quantum commitment from PRSs [36,5], which further showed that quantum bit commitment may be also “weaker” than pqOWFs. Besides, by considering quantum state as output, Morimae et al. defined a new quantum analogue of pqOWF, which they called the one-way quantum state generator (OWSG), and proved the implication from OWSG to one-time secure digital signatures with quantum public keys [36]. Ananth et al. proposed the notion of pseudorandom function-like quantum states (PRFSs) and obtained several applications such as the pseudo one-time encryption schemes [5]. However, no known construction of these quantum primitives has been found from well-known complexity assumptions “below” pqOWF. That motivates us to study this problem:

Can we achieve these quantum primitives by some computational hardness assumptions which are not sufficient for pqOWF?

One-Way Quantum State Generators. Motivated by that problem, we here focus on the notion of OWSGs by Morimae and Yamakawa [36]. Informally, a quantum polynomial-time (QPT) algorithm \mathbf{f} is OWSGs, if it takes a string x as input, and output a state $|\phi_x\rangle$ (it can also be defined as outputting a mixed state

by the very recent result [35]) which guarantees the computational infeasibility of finding a “plausible” preimage x' for any QPT adversary even given polynomial many copies of the challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$. Here “plausible” means the state output by x' is not far from the challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$, which is characterized by the inner product of these two states. It is obvious that pqOWFs meets the requirement of OWSGs. More precisely, PRS is also OWSG.

OWSGs can be treated as the quantum version of OWFs, not only because of the similarity between their definitions, but also due to the potential relations to other cryptographic objects (e.g. the implication from PRS to OWSG can be treated as the quantum version of the implication from PRG to OWF, and the construction of one-time secure digital signatures with quantum public keys from OWSG can be regarded as the quantum version of Lamport’s one-time signature scheme from OWF). According to Kretschmer’s result, we know that pqOWFs are probably not necessary to OWSGs [31]. But unfortunately, it remains to be unknown that how to devise a non-trivial construction of OWSGs which can not achieve the requirement of pqOWFs simultaneously.

1.1 Overview of Our Results and Techniques

In a nutshell, this work explores the nature of OWSGs, and studies how to construct it with some complexity assumptions which are not known to imply the OWFs. The main results are summarized as follows.

The Equivalence Among Variants of OWSGs. In order to construct OWSG, we consider the weak version of quantum one-wayness. Note that for a QPT algorithm \mathbf{f} which takes a string x as input and outputs a state $|\phi_x\rangle$, the quantum one-wayness of \mathbf{f} is defined by the computational infeasibility of any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} for finding a similar preimage x' [36]. That similarity is characterized by the inner product $|\langle\phi_x|\phi_{x'}\rangle|$ between the fake state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ and the real challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$ which should be negligible when \mathbf{f} is OWSG. Note that OWSG (which we call it the strong OWSG sometimes to make it clear) can be regarded as the quantum analogue of (strong) one-way function. We hence accordingly define the notions of weak one-way state generators (weak OWSGs) and distributionally one-way quantum state generators (distributionally OWSGs), which can be regarded as the quantum analogues of the weak one-way functions (weak OWFs) and distributionally one-way functions (distributionally OWFs) [26,17].

These three notions share the same functionality. The only difference is their security definitions. Similar as the weak OWF, the weak OWSG only requires relaxed version of the one-wayness, which only bounds the success probability to be at most $1 - 1/p(n)$ for any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} and positive polynomial $p(\cdot)$. \mathcal{A} succeeds iff it measures $|\phi_x\rangle$ with the basis $\{|\phi_{x'}\rangle\langle\phi_{x'}|, I - |\phi_{x'}\rangle\langle\phi_{x'}|\}$ generated by the forged x' and gets $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ in result. To define the distributionally OWSGs, note that the distributionally OWF requires the hardness for generating a nearly random preimage for a challenge value, which is characterized by the statistical distance between the real distribution of the input/output and the forged distribution by the adversary. Taking inspiration of that, in quantum

case, we describe that property by the trace distance between the real (mixed) state $|input\ string\rangle \otimes |output\ state\rangle$ and the faked (mixed) state generated by a QPT adversary. More specifically, if we denote by $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}$ the (mixed) state with the form $\sum p_x |x\rangle\langle x|$ which is output by an adversary \mathcal{A} with $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ as its challenge state. Then the distributionally one-wayness is characterized by the existence of some polynomial n^c such that

$$\mathbb{F}\left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|\right) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n^c}$$

for any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} when n is sufficiently large. The expected value \mathbb{E}_x is taken over some distribution $\mathbb{D}(1^n)$.

By the definitions of these variants of OWSGs, it's obvious that strong OWSG is immediately the weak OWSG, and weak OWSG is distributionally OWSG. As for the other direction, the implication from weak OWSG to strong OWSG follows Yao's construction with only minor modification, namely, assuming \mathbf{f} is weak OWSG which takes x as input, and outputs $|\phi_x\rangle$, it's not hard to prove

$$\mathbf{f}'(x_1, \dots, x_m) \rightarrow \otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle^{\otimes \text{poly}(n)}$$

is OWSG by a similar strategy as classical case, where $\text{poly}(n)$ is some polynomial decided by \mathbf{f} . That result is consistent with its classical counterpart [17].

Theorem 1. *The existence of weak OWSG is equivalent to the existence of strong OWSG.*

The implication from the distributionally OWSG to weak OWSG is more complicated and remains to be open. In this paper, we only prove it in a "symmetric" setting. Namely, we call \mathbf{f} the symmetric ε -OWSG if the inner product between the t -copy of challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ and t -copy of the resulting state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle^{\otimes t}$ is larger than $\varepsilon^{1/2}$. Accordingly, \mathbf{f} is *symmetric* distributionally OWSG if

$$\mathbb{F}\left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B},t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}\right) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)}$$

In that case assuming $\mathbf{f}(x) := |\phi_x\rangle$ is symmetric distributionally OWSG, the candidate of symmetric weak OWSG is

$$\mathbf{f}'(x, h_k, k) \rightarrow |\phi_x, k, h_k, h_k(x)\rangle.$$

Here $h_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ is a universal hash function. For ease of notation, h_k also denotes the description of that function, and $k \leq n + O(\log n)$ is the output length.

The construction follows its classical counterpart by Impagliazzo and Luby [26], where original proof strategy, is like that, assuming \mathcal{A} breaks the weak one-wayness of $f'(x) = (f(x), k, h_k, h_k(x))$, then overwhelming parts of the outputs $f'(x)$ can be inverted. However, it would contradict the distributionally one-wayness of f if we find some suitable k (note that k denotes the output length of

h_k , there are at most polynomial many of k) such that the following conditions hold with high probability: (1) h_k is injective on the preimage space of the challenge value (i.e. $f^{-1}(f(x))$); (2) The size of the image space of h_k (i.e. 2^k) is at most $|f^{-1}(f(x))| \cdot n^C$ for some polynomial n^C . Conditioned on these two events, for a random guessing $r \in \{0, 1\}^k$, it holds that $r \in h_k(f^{-1}(f(x)))$ with non-negligible probability, and since h_k is a universal hash and injective on $f^{-1}(f(x))$, the adversary \mathcal{A} would return x' randomly from $f^{-1}(f(x))$ in that case with high probability. That induces an adversary \mathcal{B} for breaking the distributionally one-wayness of f by invoking $\mathcal{A}(f(x), k, h_k, r)$ with some random r (and k goes through $n + O(\log n)$ to $O(\log n)$ until a valid output has been found).

However, a subtle issue appears when we adopt the strategy above. That is, the preimage space $\{x \mid \mathbf{f}(x) \rightarrow |\phi_x\rangle\}$ of the challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$ doesn't necessarily contain all "valid" forgeries. For example, let x' be a forged preimage such that corresponding output state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ is very close to the real challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$ (i.e. $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle| > 1 - \text{negl}(n)$), such an x' should also be considered since it's obviously a "valid" forgery. However, it's a little intractable to decide which kinds of x' is "close" to the challenge state and which are not since $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle|$ can be arbitrary value in $[0, 1]$ (and that problem doesn't bother its classical counterpart because the output of a one-way function f is a string, either $\langle f(x)|f(x')\rangle = 1$ or $\langle f(x)|f(x')\rangle = 0$).

Fortunately, this obstacle can be tackled by a potential nature of the quantum state generator which doesn't satisfy the weak one-wayness. We find that, assuming a quantum state generator \mathbf{f} is not symmetric weak one-way, then for almost all x, x' , the output states $|\phi_x\rangle$ and $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ are either very close, or far enough. We call that property the *polarization* of a quantum state generator. More specifically, we say \mathbf{f} is (k, p) -polarized on I , if for any $x, x' \in I$, either $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle|^k \geq 1 - p(n)$ or $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle|^k \leq p(n)$.

Lemma 1 (informal). *If \mathbf{f} is not symmetric weak OWSG, then for any positive polynomial $\text{poly}(\cdot)$, there exists a positive polynomial $t(\cdot)$ and subspace I_n of the domain, such that \mathbf{f} is $(2t(n), 1/\text{poly}(n))$ -polarized on I_n and I_n takes overwhelming part of the domain.*

Assuming \mathbf{f} is not symmetric weak OWSG, by the lemma above, we can hence divide I_n into several equivalent classes according to their trace distance. Then the collection $f^{-1}(f(x))$ in the classical setting can be replaced by the collection of x' whose output state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ is very close to the challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$. Then by similar strategy (but different technique) as the result in [26], we hence show the implication from the distributionally OWSG to weak OWSG.

Theorem 2. *The existence of symmetric distributionally OWSG is equivalent to the existence of symmetric weak OWSG.*

However, proving the equivalence between symmetric weak OWSG and symmetric strong OWSG is also challenging because the success probability is highly related to the number of copies that gives to the adversary. We believe the quantum non-cloning principle is the main reason for causing this obstacle, because

in classical setting it is natural to copy a string which is nearly impossible in quantum case.

Constructing Symmetric OWGs from Hard Problem in QSZK. Note that it's possible to construct (distributionally) OWF from any average-case hard problem in statistical zero-knowledge (SZK) [41]³. Therefore, to instantiate OWGs, we consider the average-case hardness of the quantum statistical zero-knowledge (QSZK). Since the quantum state distinguishability (QSD) problem is complete for QSZK (even in average-case) [46], it's sufficient to investigate the average hardness of the QSD problem.

Informally, the QSD problem is a promise problem, that given a pair of quantum circuit Q_0 and Q_1 , which is promised the distance of output (mixed) states from these two circuits is either close enough or pretty far, the problem is to decide which case it is. The QSD problem can be regarded as the quantum analogue of the statistical difference (SD) problem, a complete promise problem for SZK, which is given a pair of classical circuits C_0 and C_1 , promised that the output distributions of these two circuits are either close or far from each other for a random input.

It's easy to realize the distributionally OWF from the average-case hardness of SD problem. If we denote by $\mathcal{S}(r) \rightarrow (C_0^r, C_1^r)$ the procedure that the sampler \mathcal{S} generates a hard-on-average instance (C_0^r, C_1^r) of the SD problem with r as the internal random number, then $f(r, b, x) := (C_0^r, C_1^r, C_b^r(x))$ is naturally a distributionally OWF⁴. Assuming there is a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary generates preimages of $f(r, b, x)$ randomly, it's nearly impossible to generate a valid preimage with $b \oplus 1$ when the distributions of C_0^r and C_1^r are far enough, whereas a preimage with $b \oplus 1$ would appear more often when these two distributions are close. That induces a distinguisher for that SD problem.

However, it's more challenging to construct (symmetric) distributionally OWG from a hard-on-average QSD problem. The output states by the instance Q_0, Q_1 are mixed with unknown distribution, which makes the purification procedure hard to handle. Therefore, to get around this obstacle, we consider a purified version of the QSD problem, which we call it the semi-classical quantum state distinguishability (semi-classical QSD or scQSD) problem. Given a pair of unitary operators (U_0, U_1) along with two samplers $(\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1)$, it is promised that these two states $\sum_x p_{0,x} |\phi_x^{U_0}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_0}|$ and $\sum_x p_{1,x} |\phi_x^{U_1}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_1}|$ are either very close, or far enough, where $U_b|0, x\rangle = |\phi_x^{U_b}, x\rangle$ and $\Pr[\mathcal{S}_b(1^n) \rightarrow x] = p_{b,x}$. The problem is to decide which case it is. It is easy to see that the semi-classical QSD problem is a special case of the QSD problem which specifies the purification progress and the distributions.

For ease of notation, we still use (Q_0^r, Q_1^r) to represent the instance of scQSD problem, but in this case $Q_b^r := (U_b^r, \mathcal{S}_b^r)$ denotes the set of unitary circuit with sampler under the random index r , and $U_b^r|0, x\rangle = |\phi_x^{U_b^r}, x\rangle$. Then assuming the

³ The existence of OWF can further rely on the non-triviality (i.e. average-case hardness) of the computational zero-knowledge (CZK) [42].

⁴ Detailed description and other applications of the average-case hardness of the SD problem may refer to [30,9].

semi-classical QSD problem is hard-on-average for a sampler $S(r) \rightarrow (Q_0^r, Q_1^r)$, we ensure the existence of symmetric distributionally OWSGs by the following construction

$$\mathbf{f}(r, b, x) := |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle = |Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle \otimes |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle.$$

That is because, assuming there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} breaks the distributionally one-wayness of \mathbf{f} , when the mixed states by Q_0^r, Q_1^r are pretty far, it's infeasible for \mathcal{A} to generate a valid preimage $(r^*, b \oplus 1, x^*)$ for $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_b^r}|^{\otimes t}$ as input state (here the expectation of x is taken over the distribution of $\mathbf{S}_b(1^n)$). Because in that case, the trace distance between $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_b^r}|$ and $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}|$ is very far, by the definition of the distributionally OWSG, it's nearly impossible for a successful adversary \mathcal{A} to find another case's preimage. On the other hand, when the mixed states by Q_0^r, Q_1^r are close enough, then the trace distance between $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_b^r}|^{\otimes t}$ and $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}|^{\otimes t}$ is negligibly small. Therefore the output of \mathcal{A} should only change slightly when replacing $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_b^r}|^{\otimes t}$ by $\mathbf{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_{b \oplus 1}^r}|^{\otimes t}$. That indicates \mathcal{A} would output another bit $b \oplus 1$ with noticeable probability, and hence we can devise a distinguisher of the semi-classical QSD problem.

Theorem 3. *Assuming the semi-classical QSD problem is hard-on-average in quantum case, then there exists a symmetric distributionally one-way state generator.*

As a special case, when $\{|\phi_x^{U_b}\rangle\}_x$ are initialized as an (almost) orthogonal set for any U_b , we can then deduce that the polarization lemma is naturally held, which means we can further derive a OWSG from such an special case semi-classical QSD problem.

Besides, since semi-classical QSD problem is a special case of the QSD problem, we can prove it is also a promise problem of QSZK. Hence we derive a construction of distributionally OWSG from a hard-on-average promise problem of QSZK, and therefore achieve the OWSG according to the constructions from weak OWSG to OWSG, and distributionally OWSG to weak OWSG.

Constructing Quantum Commitment from Hardness of QSZK. Although we face the problem for handling the purification progress when constructing the distributionally OWSG from the standard QSD problem, but as a by-product and another cryptographic application, we can construct the quantum bit commitment with statistical binding (sum-binding) and computational hiding directly from the average-case hardness of the QSD problem.

Informally, note that the hardness of the QSD problem ensures that any QPT adversary can not distinguish whether the mixed states by a given instance of the QSD problem Q_0^r, Q_1^r are close enough or pretty far. That implies if we send one of the mixed states from Q_0^r, Q_1^r as a commitment and reveal it by sending the entangled part of this state. Then the verification can be achieved by checking whether this state is output by the purification circuit of Q_b (here we fix the progress of purification as a deterministic algorithm). The computational

hiding holds because of the hardness of the QSD problem, it's infeasible to tell which one it comes from. The binding property is supported by the following fact: When the mixed states by Q_0^r, Q_1^r are far enough, it is impossible for any malicious committer to convince the receiver with opening 0 and 1 as the message simultaneously. Therefore the implication from the average-case hardness of the QSD problem to the quantum commitment is obtained.

Theorem 4. *Assuming QSD problem is hard-on-average in quantum case, then there exists a statistical binding (sum-binding) and computational hiding quantum commitment.*

Note that the average-case QSD problem is also complete for average-case QSZK, our result actually gives a construction of quantum bit commitment from the average-case hardness of QSZK.

Oracle Separation. To show the non-triviality of our constructions above, we want to prove the semi-classical QSD problem is probably not contained in QMA relative to some quantum oracles.

To show that, we adopt Aaronson's technique for separating the SZK and QMA [2], the strategy is like that, we construct the quantum oracle \mathcal{U} which can be treated as the quantum version of the permutation testing problem (PTP) oracle. Then we reduce the hardness for deciding \mathcal{U} to the quantum lower bound of the permutation testing problem, which is $q \cdot w = \Omega(2^{n/3})$ for the query number q and the length of witness w .

More specifically, the oracle $\mathcal{U} := \{U_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is defined as follows, let $\mathcal{U}_n := (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(2^{n+1})})$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, where $\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(i)}$ is chosen from the Haar measure over $\mathbb{U}(2^n)$ independently for all $i \in [2^{n+1}]$. Here \mathcal{F}_n is either (1) a random permutation on $\{0, 1\}^{n+1}$ or (2) a random function that differs from every permutation on at least $2^{n+1} \cdot 2/3$ coordinates (here the factor $2/3$ can change by other constant, we choose it for aesthetic reasons). Each of these two cases occurs with probability $1/2$. Then the semi-classical QSD relative to \mathcal{U} can be constructed as $U_b^{\mathcal{U}}|0, x\rangle := \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(b\|x)}|0\rangle \otimes |x\rangle$, and the sampler \mathbb{S}_b is trivially the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^n$. It doesn't belong to $\text{QMA}^{\mathcal{U}}$ due to the quantum lower bound of the permutation testing problem. By the property of Haar measure and the randomness of $\mathcal{F}_n(\cdot)$, we can deduce that construction is scQSD with probably 1.

Theorem 5. *There exists a quantum oracle \mathcal{U} such that $\text{scQSD}^{\mathcal{U}} \notin \text{QMA}^{\mathcal{U}}$.*

Since OWSGs and quantum bit commitment can be both implemented by the average-case hardness of the scQSD problem, we thus achieve these two quantum cryptographic primitives with complexity assumptions probably beyond QMA.

1.2 Related Works

Concurrent Works. Few days before our paper was published online, a related work by Brakerski, Canetti and Qian appeared. They considered to establish cryptographic primitives from complexity assumption as well [11]. More

specifically, they showed the efficiently samplable, statistically far but computationally indistinguishable pairs of distributions (EFI pairs) are necessary and sufficient for a large class of quantum-cryptographic applications including the quantum commitments schemes, oblivious transfer, and general secure multi-party computation, where EFI pairs have been shown to be equivalent to the quantum commitment by Yan [48,47]. They also constructed EFI pairs from any non-trivial quantum computationally zero-knowledge (QCZK). That seems to be overlapped with (and also stronger than) our construction of quantum commitment because the equivalence between quantum commitment and non-trivial QCZK by [48,11] and the fact that QSZK \subseteq QCZK imply naturally a quantum commitment from non-trivial QSZK. However, we believe our construction of quantum commitment still be of interesting because it achieves quantum commitment directly from non-trivial QSZK. Besides, comparing with [11], the more different part is that we mainly focus on constructing the OWSGs from some specific non-trivial problem in QCZK. That is not included in [11] because it's unknown whether the EFI pairs can be used to construct the OWSGs.

Besides, we remark another very recent result by Morimae and Yamakawa also discusses about the properties of OWSGs [35]. They give the generalized definition of OWSGs which allows the output state to be a mixed state and provides an additional verification algorithm for checking the validity, and show the equivalence between OWSGs and weak OWSG by the amplification theorem for weakly verifiable puzzles which is applicable to the secretly verifiable case of OWSGs.

Quantum Primitives below MiniQCrypt. The initiated work by Ji, Liu and Song proposed the notions of PRS and pseudorandom unitary (PRU) [28]. They showed the implication of PRSs from the pqOWFs, and gave application on quantum money. Then Brakerski and Shmueli showed that random binary phase suffices for the indistinguishability from a Haar random state [12]. They also gave construction of scalable pseudorandom quantum states from pqOWFs in their following work [13]. Then Morimae et al. and Ananth et al. concurrently gave constructions of statistically binding and computationally hiding quantum commitment from PRSs in their independent works [36,5], which also indicate the feasibility for constructing OT and MPC according to [21,6]. Besides, Morimae and Yamakawa defined the notion of OWSGs and gave construction of one-time secure signature from it [36], and Ananth, Qian and Yuen also gave the notion of PRFSs and obtained several applications [5].

Cryptographic Primitives from Non-Triviality of (Q)SZK. By giving a construction of distributionally OWF, Ostrovsky showed that if SZK contains any hard-on-average problem, then OWFs exist [41]. Subsequently, Ostrovsky and Wigderson further proved the existence of a hard-on-average problem in CZK implies the existence of OWFs in infinitely-often case [42]. Ong and Vadhan studied the equivalence between CZK and instance-dependent commitments [45,40]. A recent work by Komargodski and Yaguev implemented the distributional collision-resistant hashes from the average-case hardness of SZK [30]. In quantum case, Kashefi and Kerenidis gave pqOWFs from the circuit quantum

sampling (CQS) problem [29]. That induces a construction of pqOWFs from the average-case hardness of SZK because any SZK language can be reduced to the CQS problem [4]. Then Chailloux, Kerenidis and Rosgen devised computationally hiding and statistically binding auxiliary-input quantum commitment schemes by the worst-case complexity assumptions such as $\text{QSZK} \not\subseteq \text{QMA}$ [14] and even much weaker assumption $\text{QIP} \not\subseteq \text{QMA}$ (with quantum advice in the commitment scheme).

Oracle Separations. There are lots of works about the oracle separations of (Q)SZK, we only refer to those highly related. Aaronson and Chen defined the oracle \mathcal{O} relative to which $\text{BQP}^{\mathcal{O}} \not\subseteq \text{BPP}_{\text{path}}^{\mathcal{O}}$ and $\text{BQP}^{\mathcal{O}} \not\subseteq \text{SZK}^{\mathcal{O}}$ [1,15]. Then Aaronson showed that $\text{SZK}^{\mathcal{O}} \not\subseteq \text{QMA}^{\mathcal{O}}$ by giving a quantum lower bounded for PTP [2]. Chailloux et al. devised computationally hiding and statistically binding auxiliary-input quantum commitment schemes by the worst-case complexity assumptions and also separated the QSZK and QMA by a quantum oracle [14]. Menda and Watrous showed an oracle separation between QSZK and $\text{UP} \cap \text{coUP}$ [34], where the hardness of the later one yields the existence of one-way permutation in worst case [24]. As the relations between cryptographic primitives, Fischlin extended the Simon's result [43] and devised an oracle relative to which injective trapdoor functions and one-way permutations exist, while SZK collapses to P [16]. Due to a series of works [42,40,22], the black-box reduction from hard-on-average problems in SZK to OWPs has also been ruled out. Subsequently, Bitansky et al. showed that even OWPs along with the indistinguishability obfuscators (and the collision-resistant hash functions) do not imply hard problems in SZK via black-box reductions [8,9]. Recently, by taking advantage of the concentration of Haar measure, Kretschmer gave a quantum oracle \mathcal{O} relative to $\text{QMA}^{\mathcal{O}} = \text{BQP}^{\mathcal{O}}$ while PRS (and even PRU) still exists which gives negative evidence for reducing pqOWF from PRS [31].

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

Here are some basic notations used later. \mathbb{N} and \mathbb{R} denote the set of positive integers and real numbers respectively. $[n]$ is the set of integers $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. The mathematical expectation of a random variable X is $\mathbb{E}[X]$. A function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ is negligible if for any $c > 0$, $\text{negl}(n) < 1/n^c$ for all sufficiently large n .

We let $\mathbb{S}(N)$ denote the N -dimensional pure quantum states, and $\mathbb{U}(N)$ be the group of $N \times N$ unitary operators. For $U \in \mathbb{U}(N)$, U^\dagger denotes the adjoint of U , and $I_n \in \mathbb{U}(2^n)$ is the identity map. $\text{Tr}(\rho)$ is the trace of ρ , and $\text{Tr}_A(\rho)$ is the partial trace over A .

2.2 Quantum Computation

This part includes some background information on quantum computation, we assume the familiarity with basic notions, the detail may refer to [39].

For two n qubits mixed states (density matrices) ρ_0, ρ_1 , we let $\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1)$ and $\text{F}(\rho_0, \rho_1)$ be the trace distance and fidelity respectively, which are defined

by $\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) := \text{Tr}\sqrt{(\rho_0 - \rho_1)^\dagger(\rho_0 - \rho_1)}/2$ and $F(\rho_0, \rho_1) := \text{Tr}\sqrt{\sqrt{\rho_0}\rho_1\sqrt{\rho_0}}$. For pure states $|\phi_0\rangle, |\phi_1\rangle$, we denote by $\text{TD}(|\phi_0\rangle, |\phi_1\rangle)$ and $F(|\phi_0\rangle, |\phi_1\rangle)$ the trace distance and fidelity of $|\phi_0\rangle\langle\phi_0|, |\phi_1\rangle\langle\phi_1|$ for simplicity. Then the following two lemmas are used widely in this paper.

Lemma 2 (Uhlmann's Theorem). *For any pair of states ρ_0 and ρ_1 , let $|\phi_0\rangle$ and $|\phi_1\rangle$ denote the purifications of ρ_0 and ρ_1 respectively. The fidelity $F(\cdot)$ between ρ_0 and ρ_1 can be given by*

$$F(\rho_0, \rho_1) = \max_{|\phi_0\rangle, |\phi_1\rangle} |\langle\phi_0|\phi_1\rangle|. \quad (1)$$

Where the maximization is taken over all purifications $|\phi_0\rangle, |\phi_1\rangle$.

Lemma 3 (Fuchs-van de Graaf Inequalities). *For any pair of states ρ_0 and ρ_1 , we have*

$$1 - F(\rho_0, \rho_1) \leq \text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) \leq \sqrt{1 - F(\rho_0, \rho_1)^2}. \quad (2)$$

Where $\text{TD}(\cdot)$ is the trace distance.

A quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} is a collection of quantum circuits $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n>0}$, it is quantum polynomial-time (QPT) if the running time is bounded by some polynomial. We say \mathcal{A} is uniform QPT algorithm if $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n>0}$ is polynomial-time uniform family of quantum circuits, which means there is a polynomial time deterministic Turing machine $M(1^n)$ outputs \mathcal{A}_n for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Without specific mention, the constructions we considered in this work are all uniform.

Moreover, we denote by PQ the purification of a general quantum circuit Q which simulates the functionality of Q and satisfies the unitary property simultaneously. The existence of such simulation is justified in [3] by allowing some additional ancillary qubits (which can be initialized as $|0\rangle$) as its input and tracing-out the residual (or garbage) qubits. This simulation of circuit purification can be done efficiently.

2.3 Average-Case Hardness of QSZK

The hardness of QSZK can be captured by its complete problem, the quantum state distinguishability (QSD) problem. Let ρ_0 and ρ_1 denote the mixed state obtained by running Q_0 and Q_1 on state $|0\rangle$ and discarding (tracing out) the non-output qubits. Then the QSD problem is defined as follows.

Definition 1 (Quantum State Distinguishability (QSD)). *Given a pair of quantum circuits (Q_0, Q_1) , and ρ_0, ρ_1 denote the states produced by Q_0, Q_1 with $|0\rangle$ as input respectively, it's promised either $\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) > 2/3$ or $\text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) < 1/3$, the problem is to decide which is the case.*

Note that the parameters $1/3$ and $2/3$ are optional, it can be replaced by 2^{-n} and $1 - 2^{-n}$ due to the technique of manipulating the trace distance [46].

Therefore we usually adopt the parameters of the QSD problem as 2^{-n} and $1 - 2^{-n}$ in the following text. For simplicity, we introduce the following notations

$$\begin{aligned}\text{QSD}_1 &:= \{(Q_0, Q_1) \mid \text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) > 1 - 2^{-n}\}, \\ \text{QSD}_0 &:= \{(Q_0, Q_1) \mid \text{TD}(\rho_0, \rho_1) < 2^{-n}\}.\end{aligned}$$

Then $\text{QSD} := \text{QSD}_1 \cup \text{QSD}_0$.

Similar as the notion of average-case hardness of statistical distance problem in [30,9], which is known as a SZK complete promise problem, we formalize the average-case hardness of QSD problem as follows.

Definition 2 (Average-Case Hardness of QSD). *For a promise problem QSD, it is quantum hard-on-average if there exists an efficient sampler $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$ for QSD such that any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} can not distinguish an instance generated from $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$ with non-negligible advantage, namely it holds that*

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q_0, Q_1) = b, (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_b : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n) \quad (3)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$.

Note that, when we assume the average-case hardness of QSD, it holds that

$$\frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}(n) \leq \Pr[(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ (otherwise there is a trivial distinguisher breaks the average-case hardness for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$). Therefore an equivalent definition of the average-case hardness of QSD can be defined as the non-existence of QPT adversary \mathcal{A} such that

$$\begin{aligned}& \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0] \right. \\ & \left. - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(n)\end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$. Sometimes, we denote by $\mathbf{S}(r) = (Q_0^r, Q_1^r)$ the progress of $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$ when we specify the internal random number $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$.

Moreover, due to the reduction by Watrous [46], it is easy to see that the average-case QSD is also complete for average-case QSZK, which means the construction from the average-case hardness of QSD could be adjusted to suit other hard-on-average languages in QSZK.

2.4 One-Way Quantum State Generator and Its Variants

In this part, we will introduce the notion of one-way quantum state generator (OWSG) by Morimae and Yamakawa [36], and define its variants. To describe the strong (weak) one-way quantum state generator, we firstly give a generalized version of OWSG which we call it $\varepsilon(n)$ -OWSG.

Definition 3 ($\varepsilon(n)$ -OWSG). Let \mathbf{f} be a QPT algorithm that takes a string $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ as its input, and outputs a state $|\phi_x\rangle_Y \otimes |\eta_x\rangle_Z$, where the registers Y stores the output state and Z the ancilla state⁵. For any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we consider the following experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n)$:

- The challenger generates $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)$ by some sampleable $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$, then runs $\mathbf{f}(x) \rightarrow |\phi_x\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle$ about $t(n)$ times and sends the resulting state $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t(n)}$ to \mathcal{A} , where $t(n)$ is a polynomial of n , and we denote by t for simplicity when there is no confusion.
- \mathcal{A} receives the state $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ and outputs a guess x' .
- The challenger measures the state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle$ by $\{|\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|, I - |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|\}$ and returns 1 if the measurement is $|\phi_x\rangle$, and returns 0 otherwise⁶.

Let $\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1$ when the measurement is $|\phi_x\rangle$, and $\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 0$ otherwise. \mathbf{f} is called $\varepsilon(n)$ -one-way state generator ($\varepsilon(n)$ -OWSG) on $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$ if

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f},\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \right] \leq \varepsilon(n) \quad (5)$$

for function $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ and all sufficiently large $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Sometimes we denote the event as $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n)$ for convenience when \mathbf{f} is clear from the context.

When $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ is a negligible function, the definition of $\varepsilon(n)$ -OWSG is exactly the OWSG defined in [36], and we call it the *strong one-way quantum state generator* (strong OWSG) sometimes for clarity. When $\varepsilon(n) = 1 - 1/n^c$ for some constant $c > 0$, we call it the *weak one-way quantum state generator* (weak OWSG).

The original notion of strong (weak) OWSG is hard to capture, so here we give an equivalent definition by the trace distance. Let $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} = \text{Tr}_N \mathcal{A}(|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t})$ be the mixed state after tracing out all the non-output registers by \mathcal{A} with $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ as input. Without loss of generality, we assume $\text{Tr}_N \mathcal{A}(|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t})$ has the form $\sum p_x |x\rangle\langle x|$ because if not, we can “measure” the output register by performing the CNOT on those x to an additional auxiliary part before tracing out.

⁵ In this definition, $|\eta_x\rangle$ is the garbage part which is not non-entangled with $|\phi_x\rangle$, the reason for that is explained in [36]. However, the states in Y, Z could be entangled in mixed state version [35] by adding a verification algorithm.

⁶ If we consider $\mathbf{f}(x)$ as a unitary operator that takes $|0\rangle$ as input, and outputs $|\phi_x\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle$, then this process can be achieved by invoking the $\mathbf{f}(x)^\dagger$ to $|\phi_{x'}\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle$.

In that case, $\mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle})$ denotes the unitary process from $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |0\rangle\langle 0|$ to $\sum p_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x, \eta_x\rangle\langle \phi_x, \eta_x|$. Then it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\text{TD} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \right) \right] &\leq \mathbb{E}_x \left[\sqrt{1 - \text{F} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \right)^2} \right] \\ &\leq \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_x \left[1 - \text{F} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \right)^2 \right]} \\ &\leq \sqrt{1 - \mathbb{E}_x \left[\langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) | \phi_x \rangle \right]} \\ &= \sqrt{1 - \Pr_x [\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1]}. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_x \left[\text{TD} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \right) \right] &\geq \mathbb{E}_x \left[1 - \text{F} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \right) \right] \\ &\geq 1 - \sqrt{\mathbb{E}_x \left[\langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) | \phi_x \rangle \right]} \\ &= 1 - \sqrt{\Pr_x [\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1]}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ is negligible (or $1 - 1/n^c$ for some $c > 0$), iff the trace distance between $|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|$ and $\text{Tr}_Z \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle})$ is negligible (resp. $1 - 1/n^{c'}$ for some $c' > 0$) that hence derives the equivalent definition of strong (resp. weak) OWSG. We call the strong OWSG the OWSG for convenience when it's clear from the context. Inspired of that, we give the definition of distributionally one-way quantum state generator which is also characterized by the trace distance as follows.

Definition 4 (Distributionally OWSG). *Let \mathbf{f} be a QPT algorithm that takes a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ as its input, and outputs a state $|\phi_x\rangle_Y \otimes |\eta_x\rangle_Z$. Then \mathbf{f} is called distributionally one-way quantum state generator (OWSG) on sampleable $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$, if for any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} in the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n)$ (which is defined in Definition 3) it holds that*

$$\text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \right) \geq \frac{1}{n^c}$$

for some constant $c > 0$. The expectation \mathbb{E}_x is taken over the distribution $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$, and $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} = \text{Tr}_N \mathcal{A}(|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t})$ is the mixed state after tracing out all the non-output registers by \mathcal{A} with $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ as input.

Remark 1. Note that the concurrent work by Morimae and Yamakawa generalized OWSGs to the mixed state version [35], it remains to be open how to lift such notion to the mixed state setting, because a large fidelity forgery state is not the necessary condition for getting a valid verification.

3 The Equivalence among Variants of OWSGs

In this section, we show the equivalence among these three kinds of OWSGs. Firstly, we show the equivalence between weak OWSG and strong OWSG.

Theorem 6. *The existence of weak OWSG is equivalent to the existence of strong OWSG.*

Proof. Note that the strong OWSG implies the weak OWSG trivially. Therefore the rest of this proof aims to show the other direction. Here we adopt Yao's original construction with minor modification. Let \mathbf{f} be a weak OWSG on $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$, such that $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1$ occurs with probability at most $1 - 1/\mathbf{q}(n)$ for some positive polynomial $\mathbf{q}(\cdot)$ and any QPT adversary \mathcal{B} . Then for some suitable polynomial $m(n)$ (which is determined by $\mathbf{q}(n)$), the following construction of \mathbf{f}' is strong OWSG:

$$\mathbf{f}'(x_1, \dots, x_m) = \otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle_Y^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)} \otimes_{i=1}^m |\eta_{x_i}\rangle_Z^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)} \quad (6)$$

The strategy of proof is very similar to its classical counterpart [17]. Here we give a sketch to note the different part, and leave the detailed proof in A.1.

Assuming \mathcal{A} breaks the strong one-wayness of \mathbf{f}' with probability $1/\mathbf{p}(n)$, then for a random challenge state $\otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)}$, the probability that \mathcal{A} outputs (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) satisfying $\prod_{i=1}^m |\langle \phi_{x_i} | \phi_{x'_i} \rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ is noticeable. Therefore, for a challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ of \mathbf{f} , we just embed it into $\otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)}$ for some suitable position $j \in [m]$. Then give this state to \mathcal{A} and repeat it for polynomial many times. We can prove that \mathcal{A} would output x'_j satisfying $|\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle|^2 \geq (1/2m\mathbf{p}(n))^{1/n\mathbf{q}(n)}$ with high probability. By Chernoff bound, such x'_i can be detected with overwhelming probability by measuring $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ with basis $\{|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|, I - |\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|\}$ for polynomial many times.

Remark 2. Note that this result is shown in the pure state version of OWSG, it can be adjusted to fit the mixed state version as well. Assuming the output state of mixed state version of weak OWSG is Φ_x , then $\mathbf{f}'(x_1, \dots, x_m) = \otimes_{i=1}^m \Phi_{x_i}^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)}$ is a mixed state version of strong OWSG, the proof strategy is almost the same as the pure state one, we just replace the inner product of two states by the fidelity, and consider the verification algorithm instead of measuring the resulting state with basis $\{|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|, I - |\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|\}$.

Then we give the equivalence between distributionally OWSG and weak OWSG by the following theorem.

Theorem 7. *The distributionally OWSG is implied by weak OWSG.*

Proof. Since the distance is invariant under unitary operator, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \right) \\ &= \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \text{Tr}_Z \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \right), \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{f}(|x\rangle\langle x|)$ denotes the unitary process from $|x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |0\rangle\langle 0|$ to $|x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x, \eta_x\rangle\langle \phi_x, \eta_x|$. Since \mathbf{f} is weak OWSG such that

$$\mathbb{E}_x \left[\langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) | \phi_x \rangle \right] = \Pr_x [\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{n^c} \quad (7)$$

for some constant $c > 0$. Without loss of generality, we still assume $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}$ has the form $\sum_x p_x |x\rangle\langle x|$. If we denote by \mathbf{G} the collection of x that is “hard-to-find”, namely $\mathbf{G} := \{x \mid \langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z}(\mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle})) | \phi_x \rangle \leq 1 - 1/2 \cdot n^c\}$. According to (7) we have $\sum_{x \in \mathbf{G}} p_x \geq \frac{1}{2 \cdot n^c}$. That hence implies

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \right) \\ & \geq \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|, \mathbb{E}_x \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \right) \\ & = \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x \text{SWAP} \left(|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |0\rangle\langle 0| \right) \right. \\ & \quad \left. , \mathbb{E}_x \text{SWAP} \left(\text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x| \otimes |0\rangle\langle 0| \right) \right) \\ & \geq \text{Tr} \left(\mathbb{E}_x \left(\frac{1 - \langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) | \phi_x \rangle}{2} \right) \right) \\ & \geq \text{Tr} \left(\sum_x^{x \in \mathbf{G}} p_x \left(\frac{1 - \langle \phi_x | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \mathbf{f}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle}) | \phi_x \rangle}{2} \right) \right) \\ & \geq \frac{1}{2 \cdot n^c} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{4 \cdot n^c} \right) = \frac{1}{8 \cdot n^{2c}}, \end{aligned}$$

where SWAP is the swap test on the first two parts, and stores the result in the additional qubit $|0\rangle$. That hence justifies the implication from weak OWSGs to distributionally OWSGs ⁷.

The other direction is more involved, in fact only a compromised version can be shown. We call a quantum state generator \mathbf{f} the *symmetric* weak (resp., strong) OWSG, if the following experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f},\mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-owsg}}(n) = 1$ with probability at most $1 - 1/\text{poly}(n)$ (resp., $\text{negl}(n)$) :

- The challenger generates $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)$ by some sampleable $\mathcal{D}(1^n)$, then runs $\mathbf{f}(x) \rightarrow |\phi_x\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle$ about $t(n)$ times and sends the resulting state $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t(n)}$ to \mathcal{A} , where $t(n)$ is a polynomial of n , and we denote by t for simplicity when there is no confusion.
- \mathcal{A} receives the state $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$ and outputs a guess x' .
- The challenger measures the state $|\phi_{x'}\rangle^{\otimes t}$ by $\{|\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, I - |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}\}$ and returns 1 if the measurement is $|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t}$, and returns 0 otherwise.

⁷ When considering the mixed state version of OWSG [35], similar result can be achieved by replacing the operator \mathbf{f} and the swap test by the verification algorithm.

Besides, \mathbf{f} is *symmetric* distributionally OWSG if

$$F\left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B},t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}\right) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)}$$

for some polynomial $\mathbf{p}(n)$. In that case, we can show the equivalence between the symmetric distributionally OWSG and symmetric weak OWSG as follows:

Theorem 8. *The existence of symmetric distributionally OWSG is equivalent to the existence of symmetric weak OWSG.*

Proof (of Theorem 8). Since one direction follows directly from Theorem 7, here we focus on the implication from symmetric distributionally OWSG to symmetric weak OWSG, we adopt the construction by Impagliazzo and Luby. Assuming $\mathbf{f}(x) \rightarrow |\phi_x\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle$ is symmetric distributionally OWSG such that for any QPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$F\left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B},t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}\right) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)}$$

for some positive polynomial $\mathbf{p}(\cdot)$ when $n \in \mathbb{N}$ is sufficiently large. Then we construct \mathbf{f}' as follows:

$$\mathbf{f}'(x, h_k, k) \rightarrow |\psi_{x,h_k,k}\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle := |\phi_x, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle \otimes |\eta_x\rangle \quad (8)$$

where $h_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ is a universal hash function (we assume those keys h_k have the same length), and $k \leq n + O(\log n)$ denotes the output length of h_k .

Before delving into the correctness of this construction, we firstly introduce a notion of *polarization*, we say quantum state generator \mathbf{f} is (k, p) -*polarized* on I_n , if for any $x, x' \in I_n$, either $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle|^k \geq 1-p$ or $|\langle\phi_{x'}|\phi_x\rangle|^k \leq p$ (alternatively, when considering the mixed state, it is characterized by the fidelity $F(\Phi_x^{\otimes k}, \Phi_{x'}^{\otimes k})$ between two mixed states $\Phi_x^{\otimes k}, \Phi_{x'}^{\otimes k}$). Then the following lemma shows that the polarization property for any \mathbf{f} which is not weak OWSG.

Lemma 4. *Assuming \mathbf{f} is not symmetric weak OWSG. For any positive polynomial $\mathbf{p}(\cdot)$, let \mathcal{A} breaks the one-wayness with probability at least $1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-5}$ with $t(n)$ input copies, then \mathbf{f} is $(2t(n), 1/\mathbf{p}(n))$ -polarized on a collection $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$, where $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ is*

$$I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2) := \left\{ x' \mid \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-ows}}(n) = 1 \mid x = x'] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{16\mathbf{p}(n)^2} \right\}.$$

The proof of Lemma 4 may refer to A.2.

It is easy to note that $|I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)|/2^n > 1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-2}$. Lemma 4 indicates that for any polynomial $\mathbf{p}(\cdot)$, there is an $|I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)|/2^n > 1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-2}$, such that for any $x_0, x_1 \in I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$, either

$$\text{TD}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle, |\phi_{x_1}\rangle) \leq \sqrt{1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}}, \text{ or } \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle, |\phi_{x_1}\rangle) \geq \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}},$$

for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$. That inspired us to consider a family of pairwise disjoint sets $\{\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))\}_{x \in X}$ covering all elements in $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$, namely, for $x \in I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$, the “ $2t$ -degree neighbor” of x is

$$\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}\left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)t(n)}\right) := \{x' \mid |\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_x \rangle|^{2t} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\}.$$

The strategy for generating that collection is simple, we just find such $x \in I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ which are not contained in the former union $\cup_{x \in X} \mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))$, then add these x in X recursively, until all elements of $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ have been included. Therefore the collections in $\{\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))\}_{x \in X}$ cover all elements in $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$. The pairwise disjoint property can be justified by making a contradiction, assuming there exist $x, x' \in I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ such that

$$\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n)) \cap \mathbf{N}_{x'}^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n)) \neq \emptyset$$

Then it holds that

$$\sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}} \leq \text{TD}(|\phi_x\rangle, |\phi_{x'}\rangle) \leq 2\sqrt{1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}} < \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}}$$

which is contradictory to that lemma 4.

Then we get back to the proof of Theorem 8. We show \mathbf{f}' satisfies the symmetric weak one-wayness by making a contradiction. Assuming \mathbf{f}' is not symmetric weak OWSG, then for any positive polynomial $\mathbf{p}(n)$, there exists a QPT adversary \mathcal{A} and a polynomial $t(n)$ such that \mathcal{A} breaks the symmetric weak one-wayness of \mathbf{f}' with advantage $1 - 1/\mathbf{p}(n)$ by using $t(n)$ copies of challenge state. Namely

$$\Pr_{x, h_k, k} [\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-owsg}}(n) = 1] > 1 - 1/\mathbf{q}(n) \quad (9)$$

for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then we construct an adversary \mathcal{B} breaks the symmetric distributionally one-wayness of \mathbf{f} as follows:

- \mathcal{B} takes as input a challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle^{\otimes t'}$ where $t' = (n^3 + n) \cdot m \cdot t$. It then repeats the following steps from $k = n + C \cdot \log n$ to $k = C \cdot \log n$ (note that k is the output length of the universal hash $h_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, $C > 1$ is a constant that will be determined later) ⁸:
 - \mathcal{B} generates the key h_k of the universal hash function and chooses $r_k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ uniformly at random.
 - \mathcal{B} invokes \mathcal{A} with input $|\phi_x, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}$ and gets x' as measurement, then checks if $\mathbf{f}^\dagger(x')|\phi_{x^*}\rangle|\eta_{x'}\rangle$ equals to 0 for $n^2 \cdot t$ times ⁹, if all the $n^2 \cdot t$ measurements are 0, \mathcal{B} would accept that output x' and stop. Otherwise, it repeats that step with a new generated random h_k, r_k about m times until finds some x' , if it still fails to find such x' , it would continue to the case $k - 1$ until $k = C \cdot \log n$.

⁸ We call the following steps k -th round when the output length in this iteration is k .

⁹ Here $\mathbf{f}(x')$ denotes the unitary operator that takes $|0\rangle$ as input state and outputs $|\phi_{x'}, \eta_{x'}\rangle$, it is equivalent to measure it with $\{|\phi_{x'}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'}|, I - |\phi_{x'}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'}|\}$.

- If \mathcal{B} doesn't find an acceptable output in the iterations above until $k = C \cdot \log n$, it would output \perp .

Note that some parts of \mathcal{B} is described in classical setting, but it's equivalent to analyze it as a unitary operation (such as replacing $|\phi_x, r_k, h_k, k\rangle$ by the state $\sum_{r_k} |r_k\rangle \otimes |\phi_x, r_k, h_k, k\rangle / 2^{-l/2}$ and tracing out the first register). So here we still use $\rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle}$ to denote the output (mixed) state by \mathcal{B} after tracing out the non-output part.

Then the strategy for proving this part is as follows. Since \mathbf{f} is symmetric distributionally one-way, there should exist a positive polynomial $\mathbf{q}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)}$$

for any QPT adversary \mathcal{B} . Then, we are going to show that, if \mathbf{f}' is not weak one-way, then the adversary \mathcal{B} constructed above should satisfy

$$1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)} < \mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right),$$

which will lead a contradiction.

For that purpose, before estimating the output distribution for each challenge state $|\phi_x\rangle$, we firstly introduce a classification strategy on the input space according to the polarization lemma. Since k , h_k and $h_k(x)$ are given as classical string, we can omit it and just consider the quantum part $|\phi_x\rangle$ when using Lemma 4. In that case, let

$$I_n \left(\frac{1}{16\mathbf{p}(n)^2} \right) := \left\{ x' \mid \bigwedge_k \left(\Pr_{h_k} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-owsg}}(n) = 1 \mid x = x' \right] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{16\mathbf{p}(n)^2} \right) \right\}.$$

Note that $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ is defined a little different as the standard description in Lemma 4, here we require \mathcal{A} wins with high probability for all k , and there is an internal randomness from h_k . However, since there are at most $O(n)$ of k (k denotes the output length of hash h_k), $|I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)|/2^n > 1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-2}$ still holds for sufficiently large $\mathbf{p}(n)$. Hence we can adopt the polarization lemma in that case and show that \mathbf{f} is $(2t, \mathbf{p}(n))$ -polarized on $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$.

Then according to the discussion before, we can derive a family of disjointed collections $\{\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))\}_x$ that covering $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ (note that $I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ and $\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))$ only contain those x , the classical parts generated by (k, h_k) are ignored here because either $|\langle h_k(x), h_k, k | h_{k'}(x'), h_{k'}, k' \rangle| = 0$ or $|\langle h_k(x), h_k, k | h_{k'}(x'), h_{k'}, k' \rangle| = 1$, in other words, we can treat the (k, h_k) as the "evaluation key" of \mathbf{f}').

Then we choose a subset of $\{\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n)) \cap I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)\}_x$, and denote it by $\{\mathbf{G}_{x_i}^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n)), \dots, \mathbf{G}_{x_l}^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))\}$, which satisfies

$$\left(1 + \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)} \right) \cdot \left| \mathbf{G}_{x_i}^{2t} \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)} \right) \right| > \left| \left\{ x \mid \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_i}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) \leq \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)} \right)^{\frac{1}{t}} / 2} \right\} \right|,$$

for all $i = 1, \dots, l$. Namely, we choose x_i such that $\mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n)) \cap I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)$ is not “much smaller” than $\mathbf{N}_{x_i}^{2t}(1/\mathbf{p}(n))$. In the following part, we will drop the parameters and just write \mathbf{G}_{x_i} , \mathbf{N}_{x_i} , and I_n when they are clear from the context. Besides, it’s easy to note that $\{x \mid \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_1}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) \leq \sqrt{1 - (1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{t-1}}/2\} \dots \{x \mid \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_l}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) \leq \sqrt{1 - (1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{t-1}}/2\}$ are pairwise disjointed.

Since the weak one-wayness of \mathbf{f} is broken with advantage $1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-5}$ by \mathcal{A} which requires $t(n)$ copies of challenge state, we can derive that $|I_n(1/16\mathbf{p}(n)^2)| \geq 2^n \cdot (1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-2})$. Therefore some suitable $\{\mathbf{G}_{x_1}, \dots, \mathbf{G}_{x_l}\}$ can be chosen such that the union of those \mathbf{G}_{x_i} are also large. Namely, we observe that, there exists \mathbf{G}_{x_i} such that

$$I'_n := \bigcup_i \mathbf{G}_{x_i},$$

and $|I'_n| > 2^n \cdot (1 - \mathbf{p}(n))$. Otherwise, we can conclude that, $|\{x \notin \mathbf{I}_n\}| > 2^n(1 - \mathbf{p}(n))$ which would also be contradictory to the assumption that \mathcal{A} breaks the weak one-wayness of \mathbf{f} with probability $1 - \mathbf{p}(n)^{-5}$.

According to that classification, we can divide the input space into these disjointed collections $\mathbf{G}_{x_1}, \dots, \mathbf{G}_{x_l}$. By the convexity of the fidelity, we have ¹⁰

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\ & \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in I'_n} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in I'_n} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\ & \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^n} \cdot \mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Then it’s sufficient to consider the lower bound of each \mathbf{G}_{x_i} , we then derive that

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\ & \geq 1 - \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle\phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right). \end{aligned}$$

¹⁰ Here for simplicity, we assume the distribution of x is the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^n$, it’s easy to extend that result to a general distribution.

Due to the triangle inequality of the trace distance, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\
 & \leq \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t} \right) \quad (10) \\
 & \quad + \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t} \right) \\
 & \quad + \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right).
 \end{aligned}$$

Then we can estimate the unwanted two parts of (10) as follows

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\
 & \leq \sqrt{1 - \text{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right)^2} \\
 & \leq \sqrt{1 - \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \text{F} \left(\rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \right)^2} \\
 & \leq \sqrt{1 - \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \text{F}(|\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}) \right)^2} \leq \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Similar, we have

$$\text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \leq \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}}.$$

Therefore, the inequality (10) becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \quad (11) \\
 & \geq 1 - \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_{x_i}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_i}|^{\otimes t} \right) - 2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}} \\
 & \geq 1 - \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x|, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \right) - 2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}}.
 \end{aligned}$$

That implies it's sufficient to consider the trace distance between $\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x|$ and $\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{B}, t'}^{|\phi_x\rangle}$. We now estimate the trace distance above by showing the probability that \mathcal{B} outputs x is not far from $1/|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|$ for any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, and for other

$x \notin \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts and outputs those x only with small probability. We divide these into three claims. The first one gives a lower bound of the success probability of \mathcal{B} in each repetition, and says that \mathcal{B} would succeed with overwhelming probability.

Claim 1. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, let $p_k^{x^*}$ be the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts at one repetition of k -th round¹¹, then for $k \in [n + C \cdot \log n, \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n]$, it holds that

$$p_k^{x^*} \geq \left(1 - \frac{3n^2}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^k} - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}}\right). \quad (12)$$

Hence, when $m \geq 2n^{C+1}$, we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n] \geq 1 - \exp(-n). \quad (13)$$

Namely, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts for some $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ is at least $1 - \exp(-n)$ when $m \geq 2n^{C+1}$.

Then Claim 2 analyzes the probability for each output in detail when \mathcal{B} accepts. Before that, for ease of notation, let \mathbf{B}_{x_i} denote the collection of “bad” x which are not “highly invertible” but “close” to x_i , namely

$$\mathbf{B}_{x_i} := \left\{x \mid \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_i}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) \leq \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t}}/2}\right\} \setminus \mathbf{G}_{x_i}. \quad (14)$$

Note that, by the definition of \mathbf{G}_i , we have $|\mathbf{B}_{x_i}| \leq |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot \mathfrak{p}(n)^{-1}$.

Claim 2. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $p_{k,x}^{x^*}$ denotes the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x from \mathcal{A} at one repetition, then the following four facts hold.

1. For any $x \in I_n \setminus \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x it is at most $p_{k,x}^{x^*} < \mathfrak{p}(n)^{-n^2}$.
2. For any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ and $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ for some suitable $C > 0$, it holds that

$$\frac{(1 - 2n^{-2C} - 3n^2/\mathfrak{p}(n))}{2^k} \leq p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq 1/2^k.$$

3. For any $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, it holds that $p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq 1/2^k$.
4. For any other x , the probability is at most $p_{k,x}^{x^*} < \exp(-n^2/16)$.

The proofs of Claim 1 and Claim 2 may refer to A.3 and A.4.

Then, based on the two claims above, we can show that the output would follow a “nearly uniform” distribution on \mathbf{G}_{x_i}

¹¹ Note that the probabilities that \mathcal{B} accepts are the same in each of these m repetitions of k -th round, so here we drop the number of repetitions, similar reason for $p_{k,x}^{x^*}$.

Claim 3. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $p_x^{x^*}$ denotes the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x , then we have

1. For $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $|p_x^{x^*} - 1/|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|| < 5n^2/(\mathfrak{p}(n) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|)$.
2. For $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, it holds that $p_x^{x^*} \leq 2 \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|^{-1} + O(\exp(-n))$.
3. For $x \notin \mathbf{B}_{x_i} \cup \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, we have $p_x^{x^*} \leq \exp(-n)$.

Due to the limitation of space, we leave the proof of Claim 3 in A.5.

Back to the proof of Theorem 8, it is easy to note that $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x^*}\rangle} = \sum_x p_x^{x^*} |x\rangle\langle x|$, according to Claim 2 and 3, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x|, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \right) \\ &= \max_{0 \leq P \leq I} \text{Tr} \left[P \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| - \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \right) \right] < \sum_{x \in \{0,1\}^n} \left| \mathbb{E}_{x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} p_x^{x^*} - \frac{1}{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} \cdot \delta_x \right| \\ &< \sum_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \left| \mathbb{E}_{x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} p_x^{x^*} - \frac{1}{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} \cdot \delta_x \right| + \sum_{x \notin \mathbf{B}_{x_i} \cup \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \mathbb{E}_{x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} p_x^{x^*} + \sum_{x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}} \mathbb{E}_{x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} p_x^{x^*} \\ &\stackrel{*}{<} \frac{5n^2}{\mathfrak{p}(n)} + \text{negl}(n) + \frac{2}{\mathfrak{p}(n)} \end{aligned}$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$, where $\delta_x = 1$ if $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, and $\delta_x = 0$ otherwise. Here (*) follows the Claim 3, and $|\mathbf{B}_{x_i}| \leq |\mathbf{G}_i|/\mathfrak{p}(n)$.

Therefore, if we let $\mathfrak{p}(n) > 36\mathfrak{q}(n)^2 \cdot n^2$, we can derive that

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\ &\geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^n} \cdot \text{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) \\ &\geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \sum_{i=1}^l \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^n} \cdot \left(1 - \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} |x\rangle\langle x|, \mathbb{E}_{x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \right) - 2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}} \right) \\ &\geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot \mathfrak{q}(n)}\right) \geq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathfrak{q}(n)} \end{aligned}$$

for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$. It is contradictory to the fact that

$$\text{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |x\rangle\langle x| \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t}, \mathbb{E}_x \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_x\rangle} \otimes |\phi_x\rangle\langle \phi_x|^{\otimes t} \right) < \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathfrak{q}(n)}\right),$$

which hence indicates that \mathbf{f}' is a weak one-way state generator. \square

Remark 3. It is easy to note that these *symmetric* objects are “weaker” than the normal primitives, because if \mathbf{f} is not *symmetric* weak (resp., strong, distributionally) OWSG, it is obviously not weak (resp., strong, distributionally)

OWSG. Besides, we believe that property is reasonable not only because of the beauty of symmetry, it is also reasonable in practice. For example, the challenger in the normal definition of OWSG can be “fooled” by a fake x' returned by the adversary $\mathcal{A}(|\phi_x\rangle^{\otimes t})$ such that $|\langle\phi_x|\phi_{x'}\rangle| = 1 - n/t(n)$, however, it can be easily “screened out” by measuring it $t(n)$ times. Moreover, as the most important application of OWSG, in the syntax of digital signature with quantum public keys, it seems to be “too strong” to treat the $1/\text{poly}(n)$ similar *message/signature* as a successful forgery because of the same reason.

4 The Cryptographic Applications of Average-Case Hardness of QSZK

4.1 OWSG from Variant QSD Problem

In this part, we show how to construct symmetric distributionally OWSG from the average-case hardness of a variant QSD problem which we call the semi-classical quantum state distinguishability problem.

Definition 5 (Semi-Classical QSD). *Given a pair of quantum unitary circuits (U_0, U_1) along with two samplers $(\mathcal{S}_0, \mathcal{S}_1)$ such that $U_b|0, x\rangle = |\phi_x^{U_b}, x\rangle_{AB}$ and $\Pr[\mathcal{S}_b(1^n) \rightarrow x] = p_{b,x}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. It is promised that either*

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_x p_{0,x} |\phi_x^{U_0}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_0}|, \sum_x p_{1,x} |\phi_x^{U_1}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_1}| \right) > 1 - 2^{-n},$$

or

$$\text{TD} \left(\sum_x p_{0,x} |\phi_x^{U_0}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_0}|, \sum_x p_{1,x} |\phi_x^{U_1}\rangle \langle \phi_x^{U_1}| \right) > 2^{-n}.$$

The semi-classical quantum state distinguishability problem (semi-classical QSD or scQSD for short) is to decide which is the case.

It is easy to see that scQSD is also a promise problem for QSZK because when we let Q_b be the quantum circuit that outputs $E_x U_b|0, x\rangle \langle 0, x| U_b^\dagger$, the scQSD problem can be treated as a special case of QSD. So in this part, we denote by Q_b the pair (S_b, U_b) for convenience, and scQSD_1 (scQSD_0 resp.) the collection of (Q_0, Q_1) such that the trace distance is at least $1 - 2^{-n}$ (at most 2^{-n} resp).

The average-case hardness of semi-classical QSD problem is defined similarly as the QSD problem, which is characterized by the hardness for any QPT distinguisher to distinguish $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_0$ from $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_1$ over a instance sampler $\mathcal{S}(1^n) \rightarrow (Q_0, Q_1)$. Then we show the implication of distributionally OWSG from the hard-on-average semi-classical QSD problem as follows.

Theorem 9. *Assuming semi-classical QSD problem is hard-on-average in quantum case, then there exists a symmetric distributionally OWSG.*

We justify this theorem by giving the construction as follows:

The construction of symmetric distributionally OWSG: Assuming there exists a efficient sampler $((S_0^r, U_0^r), (S_1^r, U_1^r)) = (Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(r)$ such that the semi-classical QSD problem is hard-on-average on distribution of $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$ ¹², then the following construction

$$\mathbf{f}(r, b, x) := |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle = |Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle \otimes |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \quad (15)$$

is a symmetric distributionally OWSG on the distribution over (r, b, x) , where $|\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle$ is the state for $U_b^r|0, x\rangle = |\phi_x^{U_b^r}, x\rangle$, and $((S_0^r, U_0^r), (S_1^r, U_1^r)) = (Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(r)$. It is apparently a correct implementation of distributionally OWSG. Therefore we aim to show it meets the distributionally one-wayness. The detailed proof please refer to [A.6](#).

4.2 Constructing Quantum Bit Commitment Directly from QSD

To show the application of the average-case hardness of QSZK, we construct a quantum commitment scheme directly from the average-case hardness of the QSD problem.

Theorem 10. *Assuming QSD problem is hard-on-average in quantum case, then there exists a statistical binding (sum-binding) and computational hiding quantum commitment.*

The construction of quantum bit commitment: Assuming there exists a efficient sampler $(Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(r)$ such that the QSD problem is hard-on-average under distribution of $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$, then the quantum bit commitment scheme is as follows:

- **Commit phase:** The commiter generates $|0\rangle \xrightarrow{H^{\otimes l \cdot n}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} |r_i\rangle / 2^{l/2}$, then gets n copies of the superposition state of these circuits by \mathbf{S}

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, 0\rangle}{2^{l/2}} \xrightarrow{\mathbf{S}^{\otimes n}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle}{2^{l/2}}.$$

Let $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the message the commiter intends to commit, it generates

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}, 0\rangle}{2^{l/2}} \xrightarrow{U_b^{\otimes n}} |\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD}^{\otimes n},$$

where

$$|\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD} := \sum_r \frac{|Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle_A \otimes P Q_b^r |0\rangle_{BC} \otimes |r\rangle_D}{2^{l/2}}.$$

¹² Here $r \in \{0, 1\}^{l(n)}$ is the internal randomness of \mathbf{S} which is a polynomial of n , and we denote $l(n)$ by l for short when there is no confusion

- PQ_b^r denotes a purified circuit of Q_b^r (here we fix the purification procedure). Then the committer sends the registers A, B of $|\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD}^{\otimes n}$ to the receiver as the commitment, where A stores the Q_0^r, Q_1^r , the registers B, C store the output/ancilla parts of $PQ_b^r|0\rangle$, and D stores the random number r .
- **Reveal phase:** The committer sends the register C, D and the message b to the receiver. The receiver invokes the operator $(H^{\otimes l} \otimes I_{ABC}) \circ (\mathbf{S}^\dagger \otimes I_{BC}) \circ U_b^\dagger)^{\otimes n}$ to the whole system, then measures the resulting state in the computational basis. The receiver accepts iff the measurement is 0.

It is not hard to derive the correctness of this construction. The remaining aims to discuss the hiding and binding properties, we give a sketch here and leave the detailed version to [A.7](#).

Firstly, we show the computationally hiding property by making a contradiction, assuming there exist a QPT adversary \mathcal{A} breaks it. That implies \mathcal{A} can distinguish one state from another of these commitments with non-negligible advantage. However, when $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \mathbf{QSD}_0$, no adversary can distinguish one from another with advantage larger than $O(2^{-n})$, that hence indicates a QPT distinguisher of these QSD problem. On the other hand, the sum-binding property is guaranteed by the fact that the trace distance between these two states returned by $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \mathbf{QSD}_1$ is pretty far. That indicates these two commitment states are far from each other, therefore no (computational unbounded) cheating committer can both open 0 and 1 for one commitment with non-negligible probability which ensures the sum-binding of this construction.

Remark 4. Note that, the hard-core predicate of OWGs can be realized by the same way as OWFs. Therefore for a one-way state generator \mathbf{f} , when there exist some positive polynomial $\mathbf{p}(\cdot)$ such that $|\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_x \rangle| \leq 1 - 1/\mathbf{p}(n)$ for any $x \neq x'$, we can just send the $\mathbf{p}(n) \cdot n$ copies of $|\phi_x\rangle$ along with its hard-core predicate (or a random bit) as the commitment, which can also achieve the sum-binding and computationally hiding quantum commitment. Since the proof is very similar to the classical counterpart from OWPs to the commitment via the hard-core predicate, so we omit the proof here.

5 Oracle Separation

In this section, we show an evidence of the non-triviality for our constructions above. Note that, the existence of pqOWF at least requires $\mathbf{QMA} \neq \mathbf{BQP}$, and by Kretschmer's result [31], there is a quantum oracle relative to which $\mathbf{QMA}^{\mathcal{O}} = \mathbf{BQP}^{\mathcal{O}}$ while PRS exists. Therefore, to give evidence indicating our result is meaningful, we show scQSD doesn't belong to \mathbf{QMA} relative to a quantum oracle.

Theorem 11. *There exists a quantum oracle \mathcal{U} such that $\text{scQSD}^{\mathcal{U}} \notin \mathbf{QMA}^{\mathcal{U}}$.*

Proof. We Firstly construct the oracle \mathcal{U} as follows:

The description of \mathcal{U} : Let $\mathcal{U} := \{\mathcal{U}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{U}_n := (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1)}, \dots, \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(2^{n+1})})$ for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$, here $\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(i)}$ is chosen from the Haar measure over $\mathbb{U}(2^n)$ independently for all $i \in [2^{n+1}]$. In this case, \mathcal{F}_n is either (1) a random permutation

on $\{0, 1\}^{n+1}$, or (2) a random function that differs from every permutation on at least $2^{n+2}/3$ coordinates, each case occurs with probability $1/2$ respectively. Let $\mathcal{U}_{n,0}$ and $\mathcal{U}_{n,1}$ be the ensembles of these two types of \mathcal{U}_n respectively.

The construction of the hard instance $(Q_0, Q_1) = ((U_0^{\mathcal{U}}, S_U^{\mathcal{U}}), (U_1^{\mathcal{U}}, S_1^{\mathcal{U}}))$ of the semi-classical QSD problem is given directly by

$$U_b^{\mathcal{U}}|0, x\rangle := \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(b\|x)}|0\rangle \otimes |x\rangle,$$

and the S_b is the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^n$. It's easy to see the correctness of this construction. Because when \mathcal{F}_n is a random permutation, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{U}} \left[\mathbb{F} \left(\mathbb{E}_x \left(\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x)}|0\rangle \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x)})^\dagger \right), \mathbb{E}_x \left(\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1\|x)}|0\rangle \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1\|x)})^\dagger \right) \right) \right] \\ & \leq^* \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{U}} \max_V \left| \left(\sum_x \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x)})^\dagger \otimes \langle x| \right) \left(\sum_x \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1\|x)}|0\rangle \otimes V|x\rangle \right) \right| / 2^n \leq^{**} O(1/2^{n/2}) \end{aligned}$$

for any such \mathcal{F}_n , where (*) holds due to the Uhlmann's theorem (Lemma 2), and (**) follows the fact that $\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(i)}$ is chosen from the Haar measure independently.

In the case that \mathcal{F}_n differs from every permutation on at least $2^{n+2}/3$ coordinates, there is at least $2^{n+2}/9$ disjoint pairs¹³. Let $\mathbf{X} := \{(x_0^1, x_1^1), (x_0^2, x_1^2), \dots\}$ be the collections of the pairwise disjoint pairs such that $\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x_0^i) = \mathcal{F}_n(1\|x_1^i)$ and $x_b^i \neq x_{b'}^j$ for all $i \neq j$ and $b = 0, 1$ which achieves the maximum cardinality. Since \mathcal{F}_n is chosen randomly (it's equivalent to the distribution of $\mathcal{F}_n \circ p_n^{-1}$ with random permutation p_n), each disjoint pair contained separately in $0\|\cdot$ and $1\|\cdot$ with probability nearly $1/2$, one may hence deduce that $|\mathbf{X}|$ is smaller than its expected value ($c \cdot 2^n$ for some constant $c > 0$) with negligible probability, which means that

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{\mathcal{U}} \left[\text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x \left(\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x)}|0\rangle \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x)})^\dagger \right), \mathbb{E}_x \left(\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1\|x)}|0\rangle \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(1\|x)})^\dagger \right) \right) \right] \\ & \leq^* \sum_{x_0 \notin \mathbf{X}} \max_P \text{Tr} \left[P \mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x_0)}|0\rangle \langle 0| (\mathcal{U}_n^{\mathcal{F}_n(0\|x_0)})^\dagger \right] \leq 1 - c. \end{aligned}$$

occurs with overwhelming probability. It's obvious that $(1-c) < (1-O(1/2^{n/2}))^2$ for all sufficiently large n which meets the requirement for amplifying the gap [46], and by Borel-Cantelli lemma we can see that it's a correct implementation of scQSD for all but finite $n \in \mathbb{N}$ with probability 1 under the randomness of \mathcal{U} .

Then we show that the semi-classical QSD problem doesn't belong to QMA^U by Aaronson's result [2].

Proposition 1. *For any q -query oracle-aided QMA verifier \mathbb{V} with w qubits witness that decides the scQSD^U problem, it holds that $q \cdot w = \Omega(2^{n/3})$.*

¹³ Here we call $\{(y_0^1, y_1^1), (y_0^2, y_1^2), \dots\}$ collection of disjoint pairs if $\mathcal{F}_n(y_0^i) = \mathcal{F}_n(y_1^i)$ and $y_b^i \neq y_{b'}^j$ for all $i \neq j \vee b \neq b'$.

Proof (of Proposition 1). Let V be the quantum verifier of scQSD problem relative to \mathcal{U} , Note that the choice of \mathcal{U}_m is irrelevant for distinguishing $\mathbf{U}_{n,1}$ from $\mathbf{U}_{n,0}$ when $m \neq n$, therefore

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \Pr_{\mathcal{U}}[V^{\mathcal{U}}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{U}_n \in \mathbf{U}_{n,0}] - \Pr_{\mathcal{U}}[V^{\mathcal{U}}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{U}_n \in \mathbf{U}_{n,1}] \right| \\ &= \left| \Pr_{\mathcal{U}_n}[V^{\mathcal{U}_n}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{U}_n \in \mathbf{U}_{n,0}] - \Pr_{\mathcal{U}_n}[V^{\mathcal{U}_n}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{U}_n \in \mathbf{U}_{n,1}] \right|. \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

However, that induces a quantum distinguisher \mathcal{B} for the permutation testing problem (PTP) in [2]. That is, for a give oracle \mathcal{F}_n , which is either (1) a random permutation on $\{0, 1\}^{n+1}$, or (2) a random function that differs from every permutation on at least $2^{n+2}/3$ coordinates. We can then establish \mathcal{B} as follows:

- \mathcal{B} is quantum accessible to oracle \mathcal{F}_n , it then simulates $\bar{\mathcal{U}}_n^{(\mathcal{F}_n(i))} \leftarrow \mathbb{U}(2^n)$ locally for all $i \in [2^{n+1}]$.
- \mathcal{B} simulates $U_b^{\mathcal{U}}$ by taking $|b, x\rangle$ as input and outputs $\bar{\mathcal{U}}_n^{(\mathcal{F}_n(b\|x))}|0\rangle \otimes |x\rangle$.
- \mathcal{B} invokes V with $\bar{\mathcal{U}}_n$, then outputs V 's decision as result.

We then have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{F}_n}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{F}_n \text{ is case}(b)] = \Pr[\mathcal{A}_0^{\mathcal{U}_n}(1^n) = 1 \mid \mathcal{U}_n \in \mathbf{U}_{n,b}] \quad (17)$$

However, according to the quantum query lower bound of permutation testing problem (Theorem 8 in [2]), the number of queries for such \mathcal{B} is bounded by $q \cdot w = \Omega(2^{n/3})$, which hence justifies the Proposition 1. \square

Therefore, by Proposition 1, any verifier V can not distinguish $\mathbf{U}_{n,0}$ from $\mathbf{U}_{n,1}$ with at most polynomial many queries and witness, which hence completes the proof of Theorem 11. \square

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A Supplementary Materials

A.1 Proof of Theorem 6

We firstly recall Theorem 6 as follows:

Theorem 6. The existence of weak OWSG and strong OWSG are equivalent.

Proof. In this part, let \mathbf{f} be a weak one-way state generator on distribution $\mathbb{D}(1^n)$, satisfying

$$\Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathbb{D}(1^n)} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \right] \leq 1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{q}(n)} \quad (18)$$

where $\mathbf{q}(\cdot)$ is a positive polynomial. For some suitable polynomial $m(n)$ (which is determined by $\mathbf{q}(n)$), the construction \mathbf{f}'

$$\mathbf{f}'(x_1, \dots, x_m) = \otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle_Y^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)} \otimes_{i=1}^m |\eta_{x_i}\rangle_Z^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n)} \quad (19)$$

is a strong OWSGs on distribution $\mathbb{D}(1^n)^m$. We prove it by making a contradiction. Assuming \mathcal{A} breaks the strong one-wayness of \mathbf{f}' with t copies, namely there is a positive polynomial $\mathbf{p}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbb{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \right] \geq \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)} \quad (20)$$

for infinitely many $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Then we construct \mathcal{B} breaks the weak one-wayness of \mathbf{f} as follows:

- \mathcal{B} takes as input the state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle^{\otimes 2n^2 \cdot m^2 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n) \cdot \mathbf{q}(n) \cdot (t + \mathbf{q}(n))}$, it runs the following steps from $j = 1$ to m .
- \mathcal{B} sets $|\phi_{x_j}\rangle = |\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ and generates $|\phi_{x_i}\rangle$ by $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{D}(1^n)$ for all $i \in [m] \setminus \{j\}$.
- \mathcal{B} invokes \mathcal{A} with input state $|\Phi\rangle^{\otimes t} := \otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n) \cdot t}$, and gets outputs (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) . Then it repeats that step for a new generated $|\phi_{x_i}\rangle$ as input for $i \in [m] \setminus \{j\}$ about $2n \cdot m \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)$ times.
- \mathcal{B} checks all the $2nm^2\mathbf{p}(n)$ outputs by measuring $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ with $\{|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle\phi_{x'_j}|, I - |\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle\phi_{x'_j}|\}$ about $n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2$ times for each x'_j and returns the most possible answer (that is, one of those x'_j that gets $|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle$ as measurement with at least $n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3$ times).

To estimate the probability that \mathcal{B} wins, for each $j \in [m]$, let \mathbf{BadX}_j be the collection of x such that

$$\mathbf{BadX}_j := \left\{ x \mid \Pr \left[\prod_{i=1}^m |\langle\phi_{x_i}|\phi_{x'_i}\rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq \frac{1}{2m\mathbf{p}(n)}, |\phi_{x_j}\rangle = |\phi_x\rangle \right] \leq \frac{1}{2m\mathbf{p}(n)} \right\},$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of $\mathcal{A}(|\Phi\rangle^{\otimes t}) \rightarrow (x'_1, \dots, x'_m)$ and $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{D}(1^n)$ for $i \in [m] \setminus \{j\}$. Namely, \mathbf{BadX}_j is the collection of “bad” x_j such that \mathcal{A} outputs those “good” (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) satisfying $|\langle\phi_{x_i}|\phi_{x'_i}\rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ with probability at most $1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ when taking $\otimes_{i=1}^m |\phi_{x_i}\rangle^{\otimes n\mathbf{q}(n) \cdot t}$ as input (note that x_j is fixed, and others are chosen randomly from $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{D}(1^n)$ for $i \in [m] \setminus \{j\}$). Then there is at least one $j \in [m]$ satisfies that

$$\Pr_x [x \in \mathbf{BadX}_j] \leq \frac{1}{2 \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)} \quad (21)$$

for those n satisfying (20). Since if not, when let $m = 2 \cdot \mathbf{q}(n) \cdot n$, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)} &\leq \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{owsq}(n) = 1 \right] \\
 &= \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{owsq}(n) = 1 \wedge \bigwedge_{i=1}^m x_i \notin \mathbf{BadX}_i \right] \\
 &\quad + \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{owsq}(n) = 1 \wedge \left(\bigvee_{i=1}^m x_i \in \mathbf{BadX}_i \right) \right] \\
 &\leq \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\bigwedge_{i=1}^m x_i \notin \mathbf{BadX}_i \right] \\
 &\quad + m \cdot \max_j \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{owsq}(n) = 1 \wedge x_j \in \mathbf{BadX}_j \right] \\
 &\leq \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)} \right)^m + m \cdot \max_j \Pr_{(x_1, \dots, x_m) \leftarrow \mathbf{D}(1^n)^m} \left[\mathbf{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}', \mathcal{A}}^{owsq}(n) = 1 \mid x_j \in \mathbf{BadX}_j \right] \\
 &\stackrel{*}{\leq} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)} \right)^m + m \cdot \frac{1}{2 \cdot m \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)} < \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}
 \end{aligned}$$

which is a contradiction. Here (*) follows the definition of \mathbf{BadX}_j . We denote by j_0 the index that \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0} satisfies (21). Since we run all possible j (i.e. from 1 to m), we could get that $j = j_0$ with probability 1.

Conditioned on $x^* \notin \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0}$, and \mathcal{B} chooses $j = j_0$ ($|\phi_{x_{j_0}}\rangle = |\phi_{x^*}\rangle$), the probability \mathcal{A} outputs some (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) satisfying $\prod_{i=1}^m |\langle \phi_{x_i} | \phi_{x'_i} \rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ is at least $1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$. Since \mathcal{B} repeats each round j for $2nm\mathbf{p}(n)$ times, it has output some (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) satisfying $\prod_{i=1}^m |\langle \phi_{x_i} | \phi_{x'_i} \rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ with probability at least $1 - (1 - 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n))^{2nm\mathbf{p}(n)} \geq 1 - O(\exp(-n))$.

That implies \mathcal{B} would get some (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) satisfying $\prod_{i=1}^m |\langle \phi_{x_i} | \phi_{x'_i} \rangle|^{2n\mathbf{q}(n)} \geq 1/2m\mathbf{p}(n)$ with probability at least $1 - O(\exp(-n))$. In that case, it holds that

$$\left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle \right|^2 = \left| \langle \phi_{x_{j_0}} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle \right|^2 \geq (1/2m\mathbf{p}(n))^{1/n\mathbf{q}(n)} > 1 - \frac{1}{4\mathbf{q}(n)}.$$

That implies \mathcal{B} finds some returns such that $|\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle|^2 > 1 - 1/4\mathbf{q}(n)$ with probability at least $1 - O(\exp(-n))$ when $x^* \notin \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0}$. The remaining problem is how to find it among the polynomial many (i.e. $2nm^2\mathbf{p}(n)$) candidates x'_j . That can be settled by measuring $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ with $\{|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|, I - |\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|\}$ polynomial times (i.e. $n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2$) for each output x'_j . To show that, for any output x'_j , we let X'_j be the number that \mathcal{B} measures $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ with $\{|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|, I - |\phi_{x'_j}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'_j}|\}$ and gets $|\phi_{x'_j}\rangle$ in result among this $n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2$ measurements. Since each measurement is independent, by Chernoff bound, the result is close to its expected value (for some polynomial amount) with probability

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Pr \left[\left| X'_j - \left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 \right| \leq \left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 \cdot \delta \right] & \quad (22) \\
 \geq 1 - 2 \cdot \exp \left(-\delta^2 \cdot \left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 / 3 \right). &
 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, in the case that $\left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 > 1 - 1/4\mathbf{q}(n)$, X'_j should be at least $n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3$ with overwhelming probability, namely

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[X'_j > n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3] \\ & \geq 1 - 2 \cdot \exp\left(-\left(\frac{1}{12\mathbf{q}(n) - 3}\right)^2 \cdot |\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2/3\right) \\ & > 1 - 2 \cdot \exp(-n/432). \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, in the case that $\left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \leq 1 - 1/2\mathbf{q}(n)$, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[X'_j \leq n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3] \\ & \geq 1 - 2 \exp\left(-\left(\frac{n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3}{|\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2} - 1\right)^2 \cdot |\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle|^2 \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2/3\right) \\ & \geq 1 - 2 \exp\left(-\left(\frac{1}{6\mathbf{q}(n) - 3}\right)^2 \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2\mathbf{q}(n)}\right) \cdot n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2/3\right) \\ & > 1 - 2 \cdot \exp(-n/108). \end{aligned}$$

Since there are at most polynomial many outputs, all results would follow that rules with probability $1 - \mathbf{negl}(n)$. Namely, if we denote by **Good** the event that all the outputs x'_j by \mathcal{A} meet the following conditions:

- If $\left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \leq 1 - 1/2\mathbf{q}(n)$, then $X'_j < n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3$.
- If $\left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_j} \rangle \right|^2 \geq 1 - 1/4\mathbf{q}(n)$, then $X'_j > n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)^2 - n \cdot \mathbf{q}(n)/3$.

Then by the argument above, we can conclude that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\mathbf{Good}] & > (1 - \exp(-C \cdot n))^{2nm^2\mathbf{p}(n)} \\ & > 1 - 2nm^2\mathbf{p}(n) \cdot \exp(-C \cdot n) > 1 - \mathbf{negl}(n). \end{aligned}$$

In that case, \mathcal{B} would find some satisfactory x'_{j_0} only if $|\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle|^2 > 1 - 1/2\mathbf{q}(n)$, because all these “bad” outputs can be distinguished with overwhelming probability.

Overall, \mathcal{B} would output some x'_{j_0} such that $|\langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle|^2 > 1 - 1/2q(n)$ with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(n) - O(\exp(-n))$. Namely

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr_{x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \right] \\
 & \geq \Pr_{x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \wedge x^* \notin \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0} \right] \\
 & \geq \Pr_{x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)} \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{owsg}}(n) = 1 \mid x^* \notin \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0} \right] \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)} \right) \\
 & \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)} \right) \cdot \left| \langle \phi_{x^*} | \phi_{x'_{j_0}} \rangle \right|^2 \cdot \Pr_{x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(1^n)} \left[\mathcal{B} \text{ finds a such } x'_{j_0} \wedge \right. \\
 & \quad \left. \mathcal{A} \text{ has output a satisfactory output } (x'_1, \dots, x'_m) \mid x^* \notin \mathbf{BadX}_{j_0} \right] \\
 & \geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{2q(n)} \right)^2 \cdot (1 - \text{negl}(n) - O(\exp(-n))) > 1 - \frac{1}{q(n)}.
 \end{aligned}$$

That is contradictory to the weak one-wayness of \mathbf{f} (namely the inequality (18)) which hence completes the proof of Theorem 6. \square

A.2 Proof of The Adjusted Lemma 4

Let

$$I_n(\delta) := \left\{ x' \mid \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathbf{f}, \mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-owsg}}(n) = 1 \mid x = x' \right] \geq 1 - \delta \right\}.$$

$\mathbf{N}_x^k(\varepsilon)$ be the set of the “ k -degree neighbor” of x such that

$$\mathbf{N}_x^k(\varepsilon) := \left\{ x' \mid |\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_x \rangle|^k \geq 1 - \varepsilon \right\}. \quad (23)$$

We show that lemma by making a contraction, assuming there are $x_0, x_1 \in I_n(\delta)$, such that

$$\frac{1}{p(n)} < |\langle \phi_{x_0} | \phi_{x_1} \rangle|^{2t} < 1 - \frac{1}{p(n)}. \quad (24)$$

Since $x_0, x_1 \in I_n(\delta)$, by the definition of $I_n(\delta)$, we have

$$\langle \phi_{x_b} | \text{Tr}_{X,Z} \left(\mathbf{f} \left(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_b}\rangle} \right) \right) | \phi_{x_b} \rangle \geq (1 - \delta)^{1/t},$$

for $b = 0, 1$. If we denote $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_b}\rangle}$ by $\sum \alpha_x^b |x\rangle\langle x|$ for $b = 0, 1$, that hence implies the coefficient of those x satisfying $|\langle \phi_{x_b} | \phi_x \rangle|^{2t} \geq 1 - \sqrt{\delta}$ should not be small, namely

$$\sum_{x \in \mathbf{N}_{x_b}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})} \alpha_x^b \geq 1 - \sqrt{\delta}, \quad (25)$$

On the other hand, for any x' , it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_b \sqrt{1 - |\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_{x_b} \rangle|^{2t}} &= \sum_b \text{TD}(|\phi_{x'}\rangle\langle \phi_{x'}|^{\otimes t}, |\phi_{x_b}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_b}|^{\otimes t}) \\ &\geq \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_0}|^{\otimes t}, |\phi_{x_1}\rangle\langle \phi_{x_1}|^{\otimes t}) \\ &\geq \sqrt{1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if $x' \in \mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta}) \cap \mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})$, we should have

$$2 \cdot \delta^{1/4} \geq \sum_b \sqrt{1 - |\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_{x_b} \rangle|^{2t}} > \sqrt{\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}}.$$

That means $\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta}) \cap \mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta}) = \emptyset$ when $\sqrt{\delta} \leq 1/4\mathbf{p}(n)$. Therefore if we denote by $\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_b}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}$ the projection map of the space generated by $\{|x\rangle \mid x \in \mathbf{N}_{x_b}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})\}$, the trace distance between these two cases can be estimated as follows

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{TD}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}, \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) \tag{26} \\ &= \text{TD}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}) + g_{x_0}, \Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) + g_{x_1}\right) \\ &\stackrel{*}{\geq} \text{TD}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}) / \text{Tr}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle})\right), \Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) / \text{Tr}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle})\right)\right) \\ &\quad - \text{TD}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) + g_{x_1}, \Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) / \text{Tr}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_1}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle})\right)\right) \\ &\quad - \text{TD}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}) + g_{x_0}, \Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}) / \text{Tr}\left(\Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_0}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle})\right)\right) \\ &\stackrel{**}{\geq} 1 - 2 \cdot \sqrt{\delta} \geq 1 - \frac{1}{2 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)} \end{aligned}$$

where g_{x_b} is the ‘‘garbage’’ part such that $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_b}\rangle} = \Pi_{\mathbf{N}_{x_b}^{2t}(\sqrt{\delta})}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_b}\rangle}) + g_{x_b}$. (*) follows the triangle inequality, and (**) holds due to the convexity of the trace distance and the fact that $\text{Tr}(g_{x_b}) \leq \sqrt{\delta}$ (by the inequality (25)).

However, since we assume $1/\mathfrak{p}(n) < |\langle \phi_{x_0} | \phi_{x_1} \rangle|^{2t}$ in (24), we can also derive an upper bound of that trace distance

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{TD}(\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_0}\rangle}, \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\phi_{x_1}\rangle}) & \quad (27) \\
 &= \text{TD}(\text{Tr}_Z \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle^{\otimes t} \otimes |0\rangle), \text{Tr}_Z \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x_1}\rangle^{\otimes t} \otimes |0\rangle)) \\
 &\leq \text{TD}(\mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle^{\otimes t} \otimes |0\rangle), \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x_1}\rangle^{\otimes t} \otimes |0\rangle)) \\
 &= \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_0}\rangle^{\otimes t}, |\phi_{x_1}\rangle^{\otimes t}) \\
 &\leq \sqrt{1 - 1/\mathfrak{p}(n)}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Combining the inequalities (26) and (27) would lead to a contradiction, which completes the proof of Lemma 4. \square

A.3 Proof of Claim 1

We recall Claim 1 as follows:

Claim 1. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, let $p_k^{x^*}$ be the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts at one repetition of k -th round¹⁴, then for $k \in [n + C \cdot \log n, \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n]$, it holds that

$$p_k^{x^*} \geq \left(1 - \frac{3n^2}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^k} - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}}\right). \quad (28)$$

Hence, when $m \geq 2n^{C+1}$, we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n] \geq 1 - \exp(-n). \quad (29)$$

Namely, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts for some $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ is at least $1 - \exp(-n)$ when $m \geq 2n^{C+1}$.

Proof. Before delving into the proof, we firstly recall that $\mathbf{N}_x^k(\varepsilon)$ is the set of the “ k -degree neighbor” of x such that

$$\mathbf{N}_x^k(\varepsilon) := \left\{x' \mid |\langle \phi_{x'} | \phi_x \rangle|^k \geq 1 - \varepsilon\right\}, \quad (30)$$

and $\mathbf{G}_x^{2t}(1/\mathfrak{p}(n)) := \mathbf{N}_x^{2t}(1/\mathfrak{p}(n)) \cap I_n(1/16\mathfrak{p}(n)^2)$ for

$$I_n\left(\frac{1}{16\mathfrak{p}(n)^2}\right) := \left\{x' \mid \bigwedge_k \left(\Pr_{h_k}[\text{Exp}_{\mathfrak{F}', \mathcal{A}}^{s\text{-ows}g}(n) = 1 \mid x = x'] \geq 1 - \frac{1}{16\mathfrak{p}(n)^2}\right)\right\},$$

which are simplified as \mathbf{G}_x and \mathbf{N}_x .

¹⁴ Note that the probabilities that \mathcal{B} accepts are the same in each of these m repetitions of k -th round, so here we drop the number of repetitions, similar reason for $p_{k,x}^{x^*}$.

For each $k \in [n + C \cdot \log n, \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n]$, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts in one repetition at the k -th round is at least the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with some measurement in \mathbf{N}_{x_i} , namely

$$\begin{aligned} p_k^{x^*} &\geq \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}] \\ &\stackrel{*}{\geq} \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i} \wedge r_k \in h_k(\mathbf{G}_{x_i})]. \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

Here (*) holds because any measurement $x \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}$ returned by \mathcal{A} accepted by \mathcal{B} only if $r_k = h_k(x)$, otherwise, it would reject by \mathcal{B} with probability 1.

We now estimate the probabilities above. By the Bonferroni's inequality, conditioned on the fact that $h_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$ is a universal hash function, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k \in h_k(\mathbf{G}_{x_i})] \\ &\geq \sum_{x \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}} \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k = h_k(x)] - \sum_{x, x' \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}} \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k = h_k(x) = h_k(x')] \\ &\geq \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^k} - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}}. \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

Consider any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, due to the definition of I'_n , it holds that

$$\Pr_{h_k} [\mathcal{A}(|\phi_x, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}^{2t}(1/4\mathfrak{p}(n))] \geq 1 - 1/4\mathfrak{p}(n).$$

Since $\mathbf{N}_{x_i}^{2t}(1/4\mathfrak{p}(n)) \subseteq \mathbf{N}_{x_i}$ (because \mathbf{N}_{x_i} is simply $\mathbf{N}_{x_i}^{2t}(1/\mathfrak{p}(n))$), we further have

$$\Pr_{h_k} [\mathcal{A}(|\phi_x, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}] \geq 1 - 1/4\mathfrak{p}(n).$$

Since

$$|(\mathcal{A}(|\phi_x, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}))^\dagger \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t})|^2 = |\langle \phi_x | \phi_{x^*} \rangle|^{2t} \geq 1 - 1/\mathfrak{p}(n),$$

for any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, therefore if we change the input state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ by some state $|\phi_x\rangle$ satisfying $h_k(x) = r_k$ the output is similar as the former one except with $O(1/\mathfrak{p}(n))$ probability. More specifically

$$\Pr_{h_k} [\mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}] \geq 1 - \frac{5}{4 \cdot \mathfrak{p}(n)}. \quad (33)$$

Note that for any measurement $x \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}$, \mathcal{B} accepts with probability at least $(1 - n^2/\mathfrak{p}(n))$, therefore

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i}] \\ &\geq \left(1 - \frac{n^2}{\mathfrak{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{5}{4 \cdot \mathfrak{p}(n)}\right). \end{aligned} \quad (34)$$

Then we get back to estimate the inequality (31) as follows. Since conditioned on $r_k \in h_k(x)$ for some $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, the distribution of (r_k, h_k) is identical to the real distribution $(h_k(x), h_k)$, therefore according to inequalities (32) and (34), it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i} \wedge r_k \in h_k(\mathbf{G}_{x_i})] \\
 & \geq \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \in \mathbf{N}_{x_i} \mid r_k \in h_k(\mathbf{G}_{x_i})] \\
 & \quad \cdot \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k \in h_k(\mathbf{G}_{x_i})] \\
 & \geq \left(1 - \frac{n^2}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \left(1 - \frac{5}{4 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^k} - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}}\right) \\
 & > \left(1 - \frac{3n^2}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}{2^k} - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}}\right).
 \end{aligned}$$

That hence finish the first part of this claim. To show the other part, we let $a(n) := 1 - 3n^2/\mathbf{p}(n)$, and g be the integer such that $2^g \leq |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| < 2^{g+1}$. Then $p_k \geq a(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g}} - \frac{1}{2^{2k-2g+1}}\right)$, therefore the probability that \mathcal{B} rejects for all the $k \in [\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n, n + C \cdot \log n]$ is at least

$$\begin{aligned}
 \prod_{k=\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n}^{\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n} (1 - p_k^*)^m & \leq \prod_{k=n+C \cdot \log n}^{g+1+C \cdot \log n} \left(1 - a(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g}} - \frac{1}{2^{2k-2g+1}}\right)\right)^m \\
 & \leq \prod_{k=n+C \cdot \log n}^{g+1+C \cdot \log n} \left(1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g}}\right)\right)^m
 \end{aligned}$$

where $b(n) := a(n) \cdot (1 - 1/(2 \cdot n^{2C}))$. Since the fact that

$$\left(1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g}}\right)\right)^2 > 1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g-1}}\right),$$

we can further estimate the inequality as

$$\begin{aligned}
& \prod_{k=n+C \cdot \log n}^{g+1+C \cdot \log n} (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{k-g}}\right))^m \\
& \leq \prod_{i=0}^{n-g-1} (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{n-i+C \log n-g}}\right))^m \\
& \leq \prod_{i=0}^{n-g-1} (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{n+C \log n-g}}\right))^{2^i \cdot m} \\
& = (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{n+C \log n-g}}\right))^{\sum_{i=0}^{n-g-1} 2^i \cdot m} \\
& < (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{n+C \log n-g}}\right))^{2^{n-g} \cdot m} \\
& < (1 - b(n) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2^{n+C \log n-g}}\right))^{\frac{2^{n-g+C \log n}}{b(n)} \cdot m \cdot 2^{-C \log n} \cdot b(n)} \\
& < \frac{1}{e} \stackrel{m \cdot 2^{C \log n} \cdot b(n)}{=} \frac{1}{e} \stackrel{m \cdot n^{-C} \cdot b(n)}{=} \frac{1}{e}
\end{aligned}$$

That shows, if \mathcal{B} repeats $m > n^{C+1}/b(n)$ times for each $k \in [\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n, n + C \cdot \log n]$, it would accept with probability at least $1 - \exp(-n)$ for those given state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$ (which satisfies $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$). It's easy to see that when $n^2/\mathfrak{p}(n) = o(1)$, then m can be $2 \cdot n^{C+1}$ for all sufficiently large $n \in \mathbb{N}$. That completes the proof of Claim 1. \square

A.4 Proof of Claim 2

We firstly recall Claim 2 as follows:

Claim 2. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $p_{k,x}^{x^*}$ denotes the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x from \mathcal{A} at one repetition, then the following four facts hold.

1. For any $x \in I_n \setminus \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x it is at most $p_{k,x}^{x^*} < \mathfrak{p}(n)^{-n^2}$.
2. For any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ and $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ for some suitable $C > 0$, it holds that

$$\frac{(1 - 2n^{-2C} - 3n^2/\mathfrak{p}(n))}{2^k} \leq p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq 1/2^k.$$

3. For any $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, it holds that $p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq 1/2^k$.
4. For any other x , the probability is at most $p_{k,x}^{x^*} < \exp(-n^2/16)$.

Proof. It's easy to derive the Fact 1, since \mathbf{f}' is “polarized” when it's not weak one-way, Lemma 4 implies that $|\langle \phi_x | \phi_{x^*} \rangle|^{2t} \leq 1/\mathfrak{p}(n)$ for any $x \in I_n \setminus \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$. That

implies if \mathcal{B} gets an $x \in I_n \setminus \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ as a measurement returned by \mathcal{A} , it would accept by $t \cdot n^2$ times of measuring with probability at most $|\langle \phi_x | \phi_{x^*} \rangle|^{2t \cdot n^2} \leq 1/\mathbf{p}(n)^{n^2}$. That immediately justifies the Fact 1.

The Fact 2 is the most important part, to prove that, we first show that h_k is injective on \mathbf{G}_{x_i} with high probability when $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ for some suitable $C > 0$. Since h_k is universal hash, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [|h_k^{-1}(r_k) \cap \mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \geq 2] \\ & \leq \sum_{x_0, x_1 \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}} \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [h_k(x_0) = h_k(x_1) = r_k] \\ & \leq \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{2k+1}} \leq n^{-2C} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore h_k is injective on \mathbf{G}_{x_i} with probability at least $1 - n^{-2C}$. Note that conditioned on h_k is injective on \mathbf{G}_{x_i} , the probability that $\mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t})$ outputs $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ is at least $1 - 5/(4 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)) - n^{-2C}$. That is because, by inequality (33), for a random h_k , $\mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, h_k(x), h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t})$ outputs $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$ with probability at least $1 - 5/(4 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n))$, and there are at most $1/n^{2C}$ of h_k is not injective. Hence we have

$$\begin{aligned} p_{k,x}^{x^*} &= \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \rightarrow x \wedge r_k = h_k(x)] \quad (35) \\ &\geq \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}, r_k, h_k, k\rangle^{\otimes t}) \rightarrow x \wedge r_k = h_k(x) \wedge h_k \text{ is injective on } \mathbf{G}_{x_i}] \\ &\geq \frac{(1 - n^2/\mathbf{p}(n))(1 - 5/4 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n) - n^{-2C})(1 - n^{-2C})}{2^k} \\ &> \frac{(1 - 2n^{-2C} - 5/(4 \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)) - n^2/\mathbf{p}(n))}{2^k}. \end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, since when \mathcal{A} returns x as a measurement, it's necessary to have $r_k \in h_k(x)$ for \mathcal{B} to accept, that implies

$$p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k = h_k(x)] = 1/2^k \quad (36)$$

Combining the (36) with (36), we thus have

$$\frac{(1 - 2n^{-2C} - 3n^2/\mathbf{p}(n))}{2^k} \leq p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq 1/2^k.$$

which completes the proof of the Fact 2.

The Fact 3 also follows directly from (36), namely

$$p_{k,x}^{x^*} \leq \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [r_k = h_k(x)] = 1/2^k$$

for any $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$.

Then we turn to the final part, since $x \notin I_n \cup \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, that implies

$$x \in \{x \mid \text{TD}(|\phi_{x_i}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) > \sqrt{1 - \left(\frac{1}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right)^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}/2}\} \setminus I_n,$$

then in the case that \mathcal{B} gets such an x as a measurement, the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts it is at most

$$\begin{aligned} |\langle \phi_x | \phi_{x^*} \rangle|^{2t(n) \cdot n^2} &\leq \left(1 - (\text{TD}(|\phi_{x_i}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle) - \text{TD}(|\phi_{x^*}\rangle, |\phi_x\rangle))^2\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \\ &\leq \left(1 - \left(\frac{\sqrt{1 - (1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}} - \sqrt{1 - (1 - 1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}}}{2}\right)^2\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \\ &\leq \left(1 - \left(\frac{\sqrt{1 - (1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}}}{4}\right)^2\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \\ &\leq \left(1 - \frac{1 - (1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}}{16}\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \\ &\leq \left(\frac{15}{16} + \frac{(1/\mathbf{p}(n))^{\frac{1}{t(n)}}}{16}\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \stackrel{*}{\leq} \left(1 - \frac{1}{16 \cdot t(n)}\right)^{t(n) \cdot n^2} \\ &\leq \exp(-n^2/16), \end{aligned}$$

where (*) holds because $1/\mathbf{p}(n) < (1 - 1/t(n))^{t(n)}$ for all sufficiently large $n \in \mathbb{N}$. That hence completes the proof of Fact 4. That finishes the proof of Claim 2. \square

A.5 Proof of Claim 3

We recall Claim 3 as follows:

Claim 3. For a given challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, where $x^* \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $p_x^{x^*}$ denotes the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with the measurement x , then we have

1. For $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, $|p_x^{x^*} - 1/|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|| < 5n^2/(\mathbf{p}(n) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|)$.
2. For $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, it holds that $p_x^{x^*} \leq 2 \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|^{-1} + O(\exp(-n))$.
3. For $x \notin \mathbf{B}_{x_i} \cup \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, we have $p_x^{x^*} \leq \exp(-n)$.

Proof. Combining the facts in Claim 2, we can get an upper bounded of $p_k^{x^*}$ as follows

$$\begin{aligned} p_k^{x^*} &\leq \sum_x \Pr_{r_k, h_k} [\mathcal{B} \text{ accepts} \wedge \mathcal{A}(|\phi_{x^*}\rangle, r_k, h_k, k)^{\otimes t} \rightarrow x] = \sum_x p_{k,x}^{x^*} \quad (37) \\ &< \mathbf{p}(n)^{-n} \cdot 2^n + |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot \mathbf{p}(n)^{-1} \cdot 2^{-k} + |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot 2^{-k} + \exp(-n^2/16) \cdot 2^n \\ &< 2^{-2n} + |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (\mathbf{p}(n)^{-1} + 1) \cdot 2^{-k}. \end{aligned}$$

For a challenge state $|\phi_{x^*}\rangle$, if we denote by $p_x^{x^*}$ the probability that \mathcal{B} accepts with a measurement x , then it holds that

$$p_x^{x^*} = \sum_{k=n+C \log n}^{C \log n} \sum_{m'=0}^{m-1} q_{k,m'}^{x^*} p_{k,x}^{x^*}, \quad (38)$$

where $q_{k,m'}^{x^*} := \prod_{j=n+C \log n}^{k+1} (1 - p_j^{x^*})^m \cdot (1 - p_k^{x^*})^{m'}$ is the probability that \mathcal{B} doesn't accept from $n + C \log n$ to $k + 1$ and the first m' repetitions of the k -th round. Then by (37) and Claim 1 and Claim 2, for any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, and $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ for some suitable $C > 0$, we have

$$\left(1 - \frac{3n^2}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{k+1}}\right) < \frac{p_k^{x^*}}{p_{k,x}^{x^*}} < \frac{2^{k-2n} + |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|(\mathbf{p}(n)^{-1} + 1)}{(1 - 2n^{-2C} - 3n^2/\mathbf{p}(n))}$$

Namely, if we let $C > (\deg \mathbf{p}(n))/2$, it holds that

$$\frac{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2)}{(2 + \mathbf{p}(n)) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} < \frac{p_{k,x}^{x^*}}{p_k^{x^*}} < \frac{\mathbf{p}(n)}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} \quad (39)$$

for any $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \log n$.

Then still by Claim 1, \mathcal{B} would succeed for some $k \geq \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n$ with overwhelming probability, which means

$$\sum_{k=n+C \log n}^{\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n} \sum_{m'=0}^{m-1} q_{k,m'}^{x^*} p_k^{x^*} \geq 1 - O(\exp(-n))$$

and

$$\sum_{k < \log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n} \sum_{m'=0}^{m-1} q_{k,m'}^{x^*} p_k^{x^*} \leq O(\exp(-n)).$$

Combining them with (39), we get

$$\sum_{k=n+C \log n}^{\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n} \sum_{m'=0}^{m-1} q_{k,m'}^{x^*} p_k^{x^*} \cdot \frac{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2)}{(2 + \mathbf{p}(n)) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} < p_x^{x^*},$$

and

$$p_x^{x^*} < \sum_{k=n+C \log n}^{\log |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| + C \cdot \log n} \sum_{m'=0}^{m-1} q_{k,m'} p_k \cdot \frac{\mathbf{p}(n)}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} + O(\exp(-n)).$$

That hence implies

$$\frac{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2)}{(2 + \mathbf{p}(n)) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} - O(\exp(-n)) < p_x^{x^*} < \frac{\mathbf{p}(n)}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} + O(\exp(-n))$$

for any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$. Then for any $x \in \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| p_x^{x^*} - 1/|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \right| \\ & < \max \left\{ \frac{4n^2}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} + O(\exp(-n)), \frac{(4n^2 + 2)}{(2 + \mathbf{p}(n)) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} + O(\exp(-n)) \right\} \\ & < \frac{5n^2}{\mathbf{p}(n) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}, \end{aligned}$$

when the degree of $\mathbf{p}(n)$ is larger than 2, that completes the proof of Fact 1.

Similarly, for $x \in \mathbf{B}_{x_i}$, we have

$$\frac{p_{k,x}^{x^*}}{p_k^{x^*}} < \frac{\mathbf{p}(n)}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|}, \quad (40)$$

therefore the Fact 2 follows

$$p_x^{x^*} < \frac{\mathbf{p}(n)}{(\mathbf{p}(n) - 4n^2) \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|} + O(\exp(-n)) \leq 2 \cdot |\mathbf{G}_{x_i}|^{-1} + O(\exp(-n)),$$

when the degree of polynomial $\mathbf{p}(n)$ is larger than 2.

In the case $x \notin \mathbf{B}_{x_i} \cup \mathbf{G}_{x_i}$, by Claim 2, we have

$$\left(1 - \frac{3n^2}{\mathbf{p}(n)}\right) \cdot \left(|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - \frac{|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| \cdot (|\mathbf{G}_{x_i}| - 1)}{2^{k+1}}\right) \cdot \exp(n^2/16) < \frac{p_k^{x^*}}{p_{k,x}^{x^*}},$$

Therefore

$$p_x^{x^*} < \exp(-n^2/16) < \exp(-n).$$

That completes the proof of that claim. \square

A.6 Proof of Theorem 9

We firstly recall the construction of Theorem 9 as follows:

The construction of symmetric distributionally OWSG: Assuming there exists a efficient sampler $((S_0^r, U_0^r), (S_1^r, U_1^r)) = (Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(r)$ such that the semi-classical QSD problem is hard-on-average on distribution of $\mathbf{S}(1^n)$, then the following construction

$$\mathbf{f}(r, b, x) := |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle = |Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle \otimes |\phi_x^{U_b^r}\rangle \quad (41)$$

is a distributionally one-way state generator on the distribution over (r, b, x) .

Proof. We justify the symmetric distributional one-wayness of that construction by making a contradiction. Assuming there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} that takes t copies of a challenge state as input, and breaks the distributional one-wayness of $\mathbf{f}(r, b, x)$ efficiently. Namely, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} |r, b, x\rangle \langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \langle \psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right. \\ \left. , \mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \langle \psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \leq \text{negl}(n), \quad (42)$$

where $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle}$ is the (mixed) state output by \mathcal{A} with $|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle^{\otimes t}$ as input. Similarly, we assume it is the state after tracing out all irrelevant part except the input register of \mathbf{f} (which only contains r, b, x).

We now give a QPT algorithm \mathcal{B} decides $(Q_0^r, Q_1^r) = \mathbf{S}(r)$ as follows:

- \mathcal{B} is given $(Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n)$ as its input, it firstly generates the state $\mathbb{E}_x |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle^{\otimes t}$ for a random $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^k$.
- \mathcal{B} invokes \mathcal{A} with the input state $|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle^{\otimes t}$ and gets output (r^*, b^*, x^*) in result.
- \mathcal{B} returns 1 if $b \neq b^*$, otherwise, \mathcal{B} outputs a random decision $d \in \{0, 1\}$.

Note that some part of \mathcal{B} is described in classical setting, but it's equivalent to consider it as a quantum operation. To estimate the success probability of \mathcal{B} , we further derive the following relation by inequality (42) and Lemma 3

$$\begin{aligned} \text{negl}(n) &\geq \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} |r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right. \\ &\quad \left. , \mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \\ &= \max_P \text{Tr} \left[P \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} \left(|r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| - \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \right) \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \right] \end{aligned} \quad (43)$$

Then we let P_0 and P_1 be some projections on the space spanned by $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0$ and $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1$ respectively¹⁵, then by average-case hardness of scQSD , we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{negl}(n) &\geq \left| \text{Tr} \left[P_d \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x} \left(|r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| - \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \right) \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \right] \right| \\ &\geq \left(\frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}_0(n) \right) \cdot \left| \text{Tr} \left[P_d \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_d} \left(|r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| - \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \right) \right. \right. \right. \\ &\quad \left. \left. \left. \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \right] \right| \end{aligned}$$

for any possible projections space spanned by $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_d$. That hence implies

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_d} |r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right. \\ \left. , \mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_d} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \leq \text{negl}'(n) \end{aligned} \quad (44)$$

for both $d = 0, 1$, and some negligible function $\text{negl}'(\cdot)$.

Then we consider the $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0$ and $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1$ separately. In the case that $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0$, since it holds that

$$\text{TD}(|\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t+1}, |\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t+1}) \leq (t+1)/2^{-n} \quad (45)$$

¹⁵ Namely, P_d is the projection on the space that generated by $\{|r, b, x, Q_0, Q_1, \phi\rangle \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_0, r \in \{0, 1\}^l, b \in \{0, 1\}, x \in \{0, 1\}^k, \phi \in \{0, 1\}^m\}$

for any $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0$, hence when we replace the challenge state $|\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t}$ by the $|\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t}$, the output of \mathcal{A} would only change slightly, more specifically, according to (44) and (45), it holds that

$$\text{TD} \left(\begin{array}{c} \mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} |r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \\ , \mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} \otimes |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \end{array} \right) \leq \text{negl}'(n) + (t+1)/2^{-n}.$$

That implies, when tracing out the all the registers except the decision bit b (we denote by these registers the W_0) of $\rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle}$, we can get

$$\left| \langle 1 | \text{Tr}_{W_0} \mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{|\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle} | 1 \rangle - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \text{negl}_1(n)$$

for some negligible $\text{negl}_1(\cdot)$.

Therefore, when \mathcal{A} takes $\mathbb{E}_{x,r}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t}$ as input state, it would output $b^* = 1$ with probability nearly equals to $1/2$. By a similar argument, we can get the same conclusion for the case that \mathcal{A} takes the state $\mathbb{E}_x^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} |\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t}$ as input. Therefore we have

$$\Pr_{(Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n)} [\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_0] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_1(n) \quad (46)$$

On the other hand, when $Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1$, by the definition of scQSD_1 , it holds that

$$\text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|, \mathbb{E}_x |\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \geq 1 - 2^{-n/2}$$

We then denote by $P_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}$ the projection that maximizes the trace distance between $\mathbb{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_0^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_0^r}|$ and $\mathbb{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_1^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_1^r}|$, namely

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Tr} \left[P_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r} \left(\mathbb{E}_x (|\phi_x^{U_0^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_0^r}| - |\phi_x^{U_1^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_1^r}|) \right) \right] \\ & = \text{TD} \left(\mathbb{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_0^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_0^r}|, \mathbb{E}_x |\phi_x^{U_1^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_1^r}| \right) \geq 1 - 2^{-n}. \end{aligned}$$

That indicates $\text{Tr} P_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r} \mathbb{E}_x (|\phi_x^{U_1^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_1^r}|) \leq 2^{-n}$ and $\text{Tr} P_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r} \mathbb{E}_x (|\phi_x^{U_0^r}\rangle\langle\phi_x^{U_0^r}|) \geq 1 - 2^{-n}$. Then we denote by P' the projection that operates on the whole registers as follows

$$P' := \sum_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |0\rangle\langle 0| \otimes |Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle\langle Q_0^r, Q_1^r| \otimes P_{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}.$$

After tracing out the registers W_0 (which contains all the registers except the decision bit b), the trace distance can be further estimated as

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{TD} & \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right. \\
 & \quad \left. , \mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r} \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \\
 & \geq \text{TD} \left(\text{Tr}_{W_0}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |r, b, x\rangle\langle r, b, x| \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right. \\
 & \quad \left. , \text{Tr}_{W_0}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \rho_{\mathcal{A},t}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r} \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right) \\
 & \geq \text{Tr} \left[P' \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} (|b\rangle\langle b| - \text{Tr}_{W_0} |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|) \right) \otimes |\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{b,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right] \\
 & \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \text{Tr} \left[P \left(\mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} (|0\rangle\langle 0| - \text{Tr}_{W_0} |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|) \right) \otimes |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}| \right] - 2^{-n} \\
 & \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) \cdot \left(1 - \mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} \langle 0 | \text{Tr}_{W_0} |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \langle 0 | \right).
 \end{aligned} \tag{47}$$

According to (43) and (47), we have

$$\mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} \langle 0 | \text{Tr}_{W_0} |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle \langle 0 | \geq 1 - \text{negl}_2(n) \tag{48}$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}_2(\cdot)$.

That implies, when taking $\mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_1} |\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{0,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|^{\otimes t}$ as input state, the output decision b^* by \mathcal{A} would equal to the real b with overwhelming probability. By a similar argument, we can get the same conclusion for the case that \mathcal{A} takes $\mathbb{E}_{r,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r \in \text{scQSD}_0} |\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}\rangle\langle\psi_{1,x}^{Q_0^r, Q_1^r}|$ as input. Therefore we have

$$\Pr_{(Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n)} [\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_1] \geq 1 - \text{negl}_2(n) \tag{49}$$

Combining the inequalities (46) and (49), we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr_{(Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n)} [\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_0] \\
 & \quad - \Pr_{(Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(1^n)} [\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{scQSD}_1] \\
 & \geq \frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}_3(n)
 \end{aligned} \tag{50}$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}_3(\cdot)$. That hence contradicts the average-case hardness of the **scQSD** problem, which justifies our result. \square

A.7 Proof of Theorem 10

We firstly recall the construction of Theorem 10 as follows:

The construction of quantum bit commitment: Assuming there exists a efficient sampler $(Q_0^r, Q_1^r) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(r)$ such that the QSD problem is hard-on-average under distribution of $\mathcal{S}(1^n)$, then the quantum bit commitment scheme is as follows:

- **Commit phase:** The commiter generates $|0\rangle \xrightarrow{H^{\otimes l-n}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} |r_i\rangle / 2^{l/2}$, then gets n copies of the superposition state of these circuits by \mathcal{S}

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, 0\rangle}{2^{l/2}} \xrightarrow{\mathcal{S}^{\otimes n}} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle}{2^{l/2}}.$$

Let $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the message the commiter intends to commit, it generates

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \sum_{r_i} \frac{|r_i, Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}, 0\rangle}{2^{l/2}} \xrightarrow{U_b^{\otimes n}} |\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD}^{\otimes n},$$

where

$$|\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD} := \sum_r \frac{|Q_0^r, Q_1^r\rangle_A \otimes |PQ_b^r|0\rangle_{BC} \otimes |r\rangle_D}{2^{l/2}}.$$

PQ_b^r denotes a purified circuit of Q_b^r (here we fix the purification procedure). Then the commiter sends the registers A, B of $|\Psi_b\rangle_{ABCD}^{\otimes n}$ to the receiver as the commitment, where A stores the Q_0^r, Q_1^r , the registers B, C store the output/ancilla parts of $PQ_b^r|0\rangle$, and D stores the random number r .

- **Reveal phase:** The commiter sends the register C, D and the message b to the receiver. The receiver invokes the operator $(H^{\otimes l} \otimes I_{ABC}) \circ (\mathcal{S}^\dagger \otimes I_{BC}) \circ U_b^\dagger)^{\otimes n}$ to the whole system, then measures the resulting state in the computational basis. The receiver accepts iff the measurement is 0.

It is not hard to derive the correctness of this construction. The remaining aims to discuss the hiding and binding properties.

We firstly show that any efficient adversary can't break the computational hiding property unless it breaks the average-case hardness of the QSD problem. We prove it by making a contradiction, let \mathcal{A} be the adversary that breaks the computational hiding, instead of considering it as a unitary operator, without loss of generality, we assume \mathcal{A} is a linear trace-preserving CP maps which takes $\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_0\rangle\langle\Psi_0|^{\otimes n}$ as input, outputs one qubit (mixed) state $u_0|0\rangle\langle 0| + u_1|1\rangle\langle 1|$ as its decision, and when refer to $\mathcal{A}(\rho) \rightarrow b$, we denote the event that \mathcal{A} gets a measurement b with ρ as its input. It then holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}}(0) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}}(1) = 1 \right] \right| \\ & \leq \text{TD} \left(\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_0\rangle\langle\Psi_0|^{\otimes n} \right), \mathcal{A} \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_1\rangle\langle\Psi_1|^{\otimes n} \right) \right) \\ & \leq \sqrt{1 - \text{F} \left(\mathcal{A} \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_0\rangle\langle\Psi_0|^{\otimes n} \right), \mathcal{A} \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_1\rangle\langle\Psi_1|^{\otimes n} \right) \right)^2}. \end{aligned}$$

If we denote by $P_{b,b'}^{\mathcal{A}}$ the probability that \mathcal{A} takes $\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_b\rangle\langle\Psi_b|^{\otimes n}$ as input, and outputs b' . Then it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & 1 - \text{F}(\mathcal{A}(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_0\rangle\langle\Psi_0|^{\otimes n}), \mathcal{A}(\text{Tr}_{C,D}|\Psi_1\rangle\langle\Psi_1|^{\otimes n})) \\ & \leq 1 - \left(\sqrt{P_{0,0}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}}} + \sqrt{P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}}} \right)^2 \\ & = 1 - P_{0,0}^{\mathcal{A}} + P_{0,0}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}} - P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}} + P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}} - 2\sqrt{P_{0,0}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}}} \\ & = \left(\sqrt{P_{0,0}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}}} - \sqrt{P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}} \cdot P_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}}} \right)^2 \leq \left(\sqrt{P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}}} - \sqrt{P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}}} \right)^2 \leq 2 \cdot |P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}} - P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}}|. \end{aligned}$$

Here (*) and (**) holds because $P_{b,b'}^{\mathcal{A}} \leq 1$ and $P_{b,b'}^{\mathcal{A}} = 1 - P_{b,b'\oplus 1}^{\mathcal{A}}$ for any $b, b' \in \{0, 1\}$. Note that if we let ρ_b^r be the (mixed) state produced by the quantum circuit Q_b^r , it holds that

$$P_{b,b'}^{\mathcal{A}} = \Pr_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle\langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_b^{r_i} \right) = b' \right].$$

Therefore, if \mathcal{A} breaks the computational hiding property with non-negligible advantage, we can derive that there exist $c > 0$ such that

$$|P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}} - P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}}| \geq \frac{1}{n^c} \quad (51)$$

for infinitely $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

Then for $j \in \{0, \dots, n\}$, we denote by $\text{Hyb}_j = b$ the following event:

- Choose r_1, \dots, r_n uniformly at random and generate $\mathbf{S}(r_i) = (Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i})$.
- \mathcal{A} is given $\bigotimes_{i=1}^{n-j} |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle\langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_0^{r_i} \otimes_{i=n-j+1}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle\langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_1^{r_i}$ as input state, and output b as the measurement.

Note that the Hyb_0 and Hyb_n represent the two cases of in the inequality (51), therefore

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_j |\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j+1} = 1]| \\ & \geq \left| \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j+1} = 1]) \right| / n \\ & = |P_{1,1}^{\mathcal{A}} - P_{0,1}^{\mathcal{A}}| \geq \frac{1}{n^{c+1}} \end{aligned} \quad (52)$$

Let j_{max} be the index that maximizes $|\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j_{max}} = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j_{max}+1} = 1]|$, and without loss of generality, we assume $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j_{max}+1} = 1] > \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j_{max}} = 1]$. Based the inequality above, we construct an adversary \mathcal{B} for the QSD as follows:

- \mathcal{B} receives a pair of circuits (Q_0, Q_1) as its input, its task is to determine whether $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1$ or not.

- \mathcal{B} chooses $j \leftarrow \{1, \dots, n\}$ randomly, and generates $r_1, \dots, r_{j-1}, r_{j+1}, \dots, r_n$ uniformly at random. Then it invokes $\mathbf{S}(r_i) = (Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i})$ for those $i \neq j$, and sets $(Q_0^{r_j}, Q_1^{r_j}) = (Q_0, Q_1)$.
- \mathcal{B} tosses $t \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ randomly, if $t = 0$, it runs \mathcal{A} with input state

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^{n-j} |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_0^{r_i} \bigotimes_{i=n-j+1}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_1^{r_i}$$

if $t = 1$, it runs \mathcal{A} with input state

$$\bigotimes_{i=1}^{n-j-1} |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_0^{r_i} \bigotimes_{i=n-j}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \rho_1^{r_i}.$$

- \mathcal{B} returns 1 if \mathcal{A} outputs t , otherwise, it returns 0.

Therefore, we can deduce that

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left| \mathbb{E}_j (\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 0 \mid t = 0] + \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j+1} = 1 \mid t = 1]) - 1 \right| \quad (53) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left| \mathbb{E}_j (\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j+1} = 1]) \right| \geq \frac{1}{n^{c+1}} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, either $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \geq 1/2 + 1/n^{c+1}$, or $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \leq 1/2 - 1/n^{c+1}$, and hereon we assume the first case, the conclusion of other case can be derived accordingly.

Since $\text{TD}(\rho_0^{r_j}, \rho_1^{r_j}) \leq 2^{-n}$ when $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0$, that implies the difference is negligible if we replace the $\rho_1^{r_j}$ by $\rho_0^{r_j}$, namely

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0] \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot \mathbb{E}_j (\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 0 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0 \wedge t = 0] \\ &\quad + \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{j+1} = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0 \wedge t = 1]) \quad (54) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \mathbb{E}_j (\Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 0 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0 \wedge t = 0] \\ &\quad + \Pr[\text{Hyb}_j = 1 \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0 \wedge t = 0] + \text{negl}_1(n)) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + \text{negl}_1(n)) \end{aligned}$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}_1(\cdot)$. Note that $(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0$ with probability nearly equals to $1/2$, namely

$$\frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}_0(n) \leq \Pr[(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_b : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_0(n)$$

for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_0(0)\right) \\
 & \geq \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \cdot \Pr[(Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \\
 & \geq \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \\
 & \quad - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_0(n)\right) \cdot \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0] \\
 & \stackrel{*}{\geq} \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] - \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 + \text{negl}_1(n)) \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_0(n)\right) \\
 & \stackrel{**}{\geq} \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{n^{c+1}} - \text{negl}_2(n)
 \end{aligned}$$

for infinitely many n , where (*) comes from the inequality (54), and (**) holds because we assume the case $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \geq 1/2 + 1/n^{c+1}$ of the inequality (53)¹⁶. That inequality indicates there is a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \quad (55) \\
 & \geq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{2}{n^{c+1}} - \text{negl}(n)
 \end{aligned}$$

for infinitely many n .

Therefore, combining the inequality (54) with (55), we thus have

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \left| \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1] \right. \\
 & \quad \left. - \Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_0] \right| \\
 & \geq \frac{2}{n^{c+1}} - \text{negl}'(n)
 \end{aligned}$$

for some negligible function $\text{negl}'(\cdot)$, which breaks the average-case hardness of QSD problem. That hence proves the computational hiding of this construction.

Then we discuss the sum-binding property, we denote by p_b the probability that the receiver accepts with message b . Let $\text{Tr}_{C,D,E}|\Psi\rangle\langle\Psi|$ be the commitment sent by a cheating commiter, where $|\Psi\rangle\langle\Psi|$ is the whole “fake” state, and E stores the auxiliary qubits of the cheating commiter. Then the cheating commiter invokes the operator U_{CDE}^b when it intends to open that with b . Since the

¹⁶ In the other case that $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n)] \leq 1/2 - 1/n^{c+1}$, we can estimate the lower bound of that probability in the inequality (53), which is $1/2 - \text{negl}_1(n)$, and the upper bound of $\Pr[\mathcal{B}(Q_0, Q_1) = 1 : (Q_0, Q_1) \leftarrow \mathbf{S}(1^n) \mid (Q_0, Q_1) \in \text{QSD}_1]$ is $1/2 - 2/n^{c+1} + \text{negl}(n)$ accordingly.

monotonicity of the fidelity under trace-preserving CP maps, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
p_0 + p_1 &= \sum_b \langle \Psi_b |^{\otimes n} \text{Tr}_E \left[I \otimes U_{CDE}^b |\Psi\rangle \langle \Psi| I \otimes (U_{CDE}^b)^\dagger \right] | \Psi_b \rangle^{\otimes n} \quad (56) \\
&= \sum_b F \left(| \Psi_b \rangle \langle \Psi_b |^{\otimes n}, \text{Tr}_E \left[I \otimes U_{CDE}^b |\Psi\rangle \langle \Psi| I \otimes (U_{CDE}^b)^\dagger \right] \right)^2 \\
&\leq \sum_b F \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D} | \Psi_b \rangle \langle \Psi_b |^{\otimes n}, \text{Tr}_{C,D,E} \left[I \otimes U_{CDE}^b |\Psi\rangle \langle \Psi| I \otimes (U_{CDE}^b)^\dagger \right] \right)^2 \\
&\leq \sum_b F \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D} | \Psi_b \rangle \langle \Psi_b |^{\otimes n}, \text{Tr}_{C,D,E} | \Psi \rangle \langle \Psi | \right)^2 \\
&\stackrel{*}{\leq} 1 + F \left(\text{Tr}_{C,D} | \Psi_0 \rangle \langle \Psi_0 |^{\otimes n}, \text{Tr}_{C,D} | \Psi_1 \rangle \langle \Psi_1 |^{\otimes n} \right) \\
&\leq 1 + \left(1 - \text{TD} \left(\text{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes \rho_0^{r_i} \right. \right. \\
&\quad \left. \left. , \text{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes \rho_1^{r_i} \right) \right)^{\frac{1}{2}},
\end{aligned}$$

where (*) holds because $F(\eta_0, \eta_1)^2 + F(\eta_0, \eta_2)^2 \leq 1 + F(\eta_1, \eta_2)$ for any state η_0, η_1, η_2 (refer to [38,36]).

Then we further estimate the trace distance above. Since it holds that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\text{TD} \left(\text{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes \rho_0^{r_i}, \text{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes \rho_1^{r_i} \right) \\
&\geq \text{Tr} \left[P \text{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) \right]
\end{aligned}$$

for any $0 \leq P \leq I$. We hence let

$$P := \sum_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n | Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} | \otimes P_{r_1, \dots, r_n},$$

where P_{r_1, \dots, r_n} is the projection that maximizes the trace of $\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i}$, namely

$$\text{TD} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i}, \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) = P_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right).$$

In the case that there exists i satisfying $(Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}) \in \text{QSD}_1$, we have

$$P_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) = \text{TD} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i}, \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) \geq 1 - 2^{-n}.$$

Since the event $\exists i : (Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}) \in \text{QSD}_1$ occurs with overwhelming probability

$$\Pr_{r_1, \dots, r_n} [\exists i : Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \in \text{QSD}_1] \geq 1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}_0(n)\right)^n > 1 - \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^n$$

for all sufficiently large $n \in \mathbb{N}$. We further have

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Tr} \left[P \left(\mathbb{E}_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) \right) \right] & (57) \\ & \geq \text{Tr} \left[\sum_{r_1, \dots, r_n}^{\exists i: Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i} \in \text{QSD}_1} \bigotimes_{i=1}^n |Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}\rangle \langle Q_0^{r_i}, Q_1^{r_i}| \otimes P_{r_1, \dots, r_n} \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_0^{r_i} - \bigotimes_{i=1}^n \rho_1^{r_i} \right) / 2^l \right] \\ & \geq \left(1 - \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^n\right) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}). \end{aligned}$$

Combining the inequality (57) with (56), we thus have

$$\begin{aligned} p_0 + p_1 &= 1 + \sqrt{1 - \left[\left(1 - \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^n\right) \cdot (1 - 2^{-n}) \right]^2} \\ &\leq 1 + \text{negl}(n) \end{aligned}$$

for some negligible $\text{negl}(\cdot)$, that hence completes the proof of the sum-binding property. \square