# Mutual Accountability Layer: Accountable Anonymity within Accountable Trust

Vanesa Daza<sup>1,3</sup>, Abida Haque<sup>2\*</sup>, Alessandra Scafuro<sup>2\*</sup>, Alexandros Zacharakis<sup>1\*\*</sup>, and Arantxa Zapico<sup>1\*\*</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Pompeu Fabra University {vanesa.daza,alexandros.zacharakis, arantxa.zapico}@upf.edu <sup>2</sup> North Carolina State University, Raleigh, USA {ahaque3, ascafur}@ncsu.edu <sup>3</sup> Cybercat

**Abstract.** Anonymous cryptographic primitives reduce the traces left by the users when interacting over a digital platform. However, they also prevent a platform owner to hold users accountable in case of malicious behaviour. Revocable anonymity offers a compromise by allowing only the manager (and not the other users) of the digital platform to de-anonymize user's activities when necessary. However, such de-anonymization power can be abused too, as a misbehaving manager can de-anonymize all the activities without user's awareness. Previous work propose to mitigate this issue by distributing the de-anonymization power across several entities. However, there is no comprehensive and formal treatment where both accountability and non-frameability (i.e., the inability to falsely accuse a party of misbehavior) for *both* the user and the manager are *explicitly* defined and provably achieved.

In this paper we formally define *mutual accountability*: a user can be held accountable for her otherwise anonymous digital actions and a manager is held accountable for *every* de-anonymization attempt; plus, no honest party can be framed – regardless of what malicious parties do.

Instead of distributing the de-anonymization power across entities, instead, we decouple the power of de-anonymization from the power of monitoring de-anonymization attempts. This allows for greater flexibility, particularly in the choice of the monitoring entities.

We show that our framework can be instantiated generically from threshold encryption schemes and succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge. We also show that the highly-efficient threshold group signature scheme by Camenisch et al.(SCN'20) can be modified and extended to instantiate our framework.

# 1 Introduction

We target *accountable* anonymity: an authorized user of a digital platform can generate a value anonymously<sup>1</sup>, but when deemed necessary, a value can be de-anonymized and linked to the identity of its creator. The right balance between the two desirable properties is an important and difficult task to achieve and recently, there are regulatory attempts on the matter. The Council of the European Union recently published a document on the matter [1] that states: "Protecting the privacy and security of communications through encryption and at the same time upholding the possibility for competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate, clearly defined purposes [...] are extremely important."

However, accountability is naturally in tension with perfect anonymity because it is achieved via a master trapdoor that enables a designated party to de-anonymize *any* message exchanged through the platform. Anonymity then holds conditionally on how the designated party *uses the trapdoor*.

Shouldn't the designated party be accountable for their de-anonymization activities? Shouldn't users at least be aware when de-anonymization activities take place?

<sup>\*</sup> Research Supported by NSF grants #1012798,#1764025

<sup>\*\*</sup> Research Supported by fellowships from "la Caixa" Foundation (ID 100010434). The fellowship codes are LCF/BQ/DI18/11660052 and LCF/BQ/DI18/11660053. Funding is also from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 713673.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This work focuses on the *application* layer and not on the network layer. We assume that all users communicate over anonymous channels.

Accountability: What is Missing from Previous Work. Earlier works have recognized that the manager can abuse a master trapdoor [2,3,4,5,6,7]. The countermeasures proposed in the literature rely on distributing the role of the manager across n parties. That way, any de-anonymization can be performed only if a minimum number of parties agree (e.g., [8,9]). Other solutions [6,7] instead introduce a new party whose task is to allow the manager to de-anonymize the message. However, all existing definitions either lack generality or formality of the security goals for manager accountability. Consequently, the definitions and constructions can be applied only to specific scenarios. In particular,

- Weak Manager-Accountability Guarantees. Most work (e.g., [2,9]) splits the manager into n parties. This approach lessens the manager's ability to abuse de-anonymization since multiple parties must agree to conduct the process. However, these works do not introduce any formal accountability guarantee against the managers, and often omit discussion on how the n parties are selected so that the underlying trust assumption can be satisfied.
- Lack of Comprehensive Definitions. Works such as [6,7] introduce a third entity (called "admitters" in [6]) that enables the manager to perform a de-anonymization. This introduces an added layer of protection for the users, but the formal security definition provided leaves out any protection for the manager. Specifically, it does not consider the non-frameability of the manager, making an implicit assumption on the good behavior of the admitters and users.
- Lack of Generality. Even in the more general framework where two separate entities control the deanonymization power ([6]), the de-anonymization activity has a pre-defined granularity and is, therefore, suitable only in specific applications. For instance, in [6] the admitters give the manager a messagedependent trapdoor to de-anonymize *all messages* that have the same value (e.g., all messages that have the same date). This is useful for the application proposed in [6], where one wishes to de-anonymize all messages signed at a specific time with a single trapdoor, but not in general.
- Lack of Flexibility. In earlier work, the manager accountability property is achieved by using parties who are also involved in the functioning of the platform (e.g., [8]), hence they might not be *independent of* the platform. Furthermore, there is an underlying assumption that these parties are fixed for the entire lifetime of the system. There is little discussion on how such parties are chosen and why they would be trustworthy and active throughout the lifetime of the system.

#### 1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we provide a general framework, the *mutual accountability layer*, to capture accountability guarantees for *both* the users and the managers. We believe that our definitions can enable the designing of mutually accountable systems for a wider set of applications than the ones considered so far in literature. We summarize our contributions and then elaborate on each in the following sections.

- 1. A Formal Definition for Mutual Accountability. We introduce the Mutual Accountability Layer (MUTAL), a cryptographic primitive that captures the properties of anonymity for the users, accountability and non-frameability for both the users and the manager. Our new definitions sharpen the ones provided in previous works, providing flexibility and verifiability properties. To guarantee accountability to all parties, we introduce guardians, a set of (potentially malicious) monitoring parties that oversees every de-anonymization process, but it does not learn anything about the de-anonymized users. Security is guaranteed if the number of malicious guardians is below a threshold.
- 2. Instantiations. We provide a general template to construct a Mutual Accountability Layer that is based on a two-layer encryption: one for the guardians and one for the manager. Only if both collaborate, the identity of a user can be reconstructed. Besides our general construction, we show how to change the group signature scheme of [9] so that it can be used to instantiate a MUTAL scheme. The second approach is less general and uses bilinear maps.
- 3. Evolving Monitoring Parties. We consider a dynamic setting where the monitoring parties, that is, the guardians, can change over time, and we discuss methods to *change the guard*. These are based on results on proactive secret sharing [10] and its more recent implementations [11].

#### 1.2 Formal Definition for Mutual Accountability (MUTAL)

We start the formal treatment of *Mutual Accountability Layer* (MUTAL) where both the users and the manager are accountable. This layer can be added to any content that members of a digital platform generate, and thus is not tied to any specific application. In contrast to previous work, we do not distribute the manager's role among n parties. We model two separate entities with separate roles. The platform manager is the entity exclusively entitled to de-anonymize users, while the set of *guardians* are solely entitled to give permission to de-anonymize. The manager is unable to de-anonymize unless he generates a *publicly verifiable request of de-anonymization* for the guardians, declaring what value he wants to de-anonymize<sup>2</sup>, and the guardians agree to collaborate. Even though the guardians must agree, they do not learn the identity of the misbehaving user. While the guardians could be composed of many parties, they are represented by a single public key. As we explain later, this allows for generality and applicability of this framework to the arbitrary designation of the guardians.

Threat Model and Security Guarantees. In our model, every party could act maliciously and collude. Specifically, the users, the manager, and **up to** t guardians can be fully malicious and can collude (for certain properties such as non-frameability, we even assume that all guardians are malicious). Within this threat model, we target the following security properties. **User anonymity:** Even if a malicious manager colludes with up to t malicious guardians, a message cannot be de-anonymized without a publicly verifiable request made by the manager. Moreover, even if all guardians are corrupted and collude, they still cannot de-anonymize any message when the manager is honest. **User non-frameability:** an honest user cannot be falsely accused of being the creator of a value v that she did not generate. This should be true even if all the parties are malicious and collude (except the party who enrolls the users, though this can be avoided whenever the real identity can be proven cryptographically, we discuss this below). **User accountability:** a manager can de-anonymize any value if enough guardians cooperate. **Manager accountability:** it should be infeasible for a manager to de-anonymize a value v without leaving a publicly verifiable trace in the system. This property is guaranteed if at most t guardians are malicious. **Manager non-frameability:** even if users and guardians are malicious and collude, they should not be able to fabricate a de-anonymization request for which the manager will be held accountable.

*Flexibility.* Decoupling the manager role from the monitoring role is crucial for allowing great flexibility in the implementation of the system. First, in our definition, guardians are only involved in handling deanonymization requests and take no role in the functioning of the system. They are "platform independent" and hence one could even use the same set of guardians for multiple platforms managed by distinct managers. This is in contrast with previous proposals [12] where the parties performing the guardians' activity were also responsible for the functioning of the platform. Second, our definition identifies the set of guardians with a single public key and makes no assumption on the actual identity of the guardians. Specifically, the set of guardians can change over time – so long the same public key is maintained.

### 1.3 MUTAL: Instantiations

A General Instantiation of MUTAL We provide a general instantiation of MUTAL based on a threshold public-key encryption scheme (TES)<sup>3</sup> and a simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. Assume that a set of n guardians has been chosen (we describe selection mechanisms in Sec. 1.4) and assume that a threshold of them is honest (up to t could be arbitrarily malicious). First, the guardians will engage in a (non-interactive) protocol to compute a public key for the threshold encryption scheme  $pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}$ . Next, assume that the manager of the digital platform has published her public key  $pk^{\mathcal{GM}}$  for a CPA-secure encryption scheme. At high-level, a MUTAL is instantiated as follows. A user  $U_i$  becomes a member of the platform by enrolling with the key issuer using her "real identity", along with a new, freshly picked key  $vk_i$ that the user will use to be identified as a member of the platform. Here the meaning of "real identity"

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$  In some applications, the request should not be made public immediately.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A threshold public-key encryption scheme is an encryption scheme where the secret key is split among n parties, and a cipher text can be decrypted only if at least t shares of the secret keys are used.

depends on the application. For generality, we assume that there exists a procedure Valid(ID) that is applied to the real identity provided by the user. Once the ID is validated, the key issuer provides a signature  $\sigma_i$ on the pair (ID,  $vk_i$ ). The tuple cert = (ID,  $vk_i, \sigma_i$ ) is then communicated to the manager of the platform. When the user generates a value v for the platform, she will send v along with an encryption of the identity  $c_1 = \text{Enc}_{pk^{\mathcal{GM}}}(\text{cert}_i)$  using the public key of the manager  $pk^{\mathcal{GM}}$  and a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the secret associated to  $vk_i$  and valid signatures  $\sigma_i$  computed by the key issuer. The size of the proof is *independent* of the number of authorized users enrolled in the digital service. To ensure *mutual* accountability, the ciphertext  $c_1$  is wrapped inside another layer of encryption  $c_2$ , where  $c_2$  was computed using the threshold encryption scheme under the public key of the guardians.

Thus, the final message posted by the user is  $(\mathbf{m}, c_2, \mathbf{proof})$  where  $\mathbf{proof}$  is a zero-knowledge proof that everything was computed correctly. We instantiate the TES with ElGamal Threshold Encryption Scheme [13,14], where the size of the public key is independent of the number of shares, n. Hence, the extra layer  $c_2$  is succinct and independent of the number of guardians. If more than one set of guardians is available, the user can select the set of guardians that she trusts the most<sup>4</sup> and can add this to the tuple. By looking at the tuple  $(\mathbf{m}, c_2, \mathbf{proof})$ , the manager alone is unable to learn  $c_1$  (and thus decrypt the identity  $\mathbf{vk}_i$ ), without having the guardians remove the layer of threshold decryption. This is true even if the manager colludes with up to t guardians. To de-anonymize a message, the manager must provide a publicly verifiable request for de-anonymization that at least t+1 guardians accept. We note that even if all guardians are fully malicious and decrypt every single instance, they still cannot de-anonymize any user without the secret key of the manager. While this approach is natural and is outlined in previous work, they did not provide formal definitions or proofs for accountability and non-frameability. We are the first to provide formal guarantees. The scheme is described in Sec. 5.

An Efficient Instantiation from Threshold Group Signature Camenisch et al. [9] provide a practical t-out-of-n group signature scheme based on bilinear maps. Recall, in a group signature, a member of the group can sign anonymously within the group, but a group manager can de-anonymize any signature. In the scheme of Camenisch et al. [9], the manager is split into n parties, hence a signature can be de-anonymized if any subset of t managers agrees. This scheme does not directly fit our setting, where we want only the manager to de-anonymize and the guardians should only allow this action. To fit our setting, we change their t-out-of-n scheme so that any subset of t guardians will only be able to remove one layer from the group signature. The other layer can be removed solely by the manager, and no other party will learn the decryption. More discussion is provided in Sec. 6.

#### 1.4 Monitoring Committee: Selection and Evolution

The suitability of a selection procedure for guardians depends on the application. We outline some possibilities below.

(a) Selection among the users (only trust in your peers). When no external party is trusted, the guardians can be elected among the users enrolled in the platform using cryptographic sortition techniques. This can be implemented using a Verifiable Random Function (VRF) [15]. When a user registers in the system, she will choose a public key for a VRF. Then in each "epoch" e, each user checks if she is elected as a guardian for the next epoch, by evaluating the VRF on input e, and check if the output is below a threshold  $\rho$ . This technique is used in Algorand [16] to select the committees that run the underlying consensus protocol. In our setting, we do not need a blockchain; we only need that the users of the digital platform have access to the public VRF keys of all users.

(b) Selection of external parties through voting mechanisms or by platform designers. When external parties that can be trusted exist, guardians could be selected through some voting mechanism among the platform designers. For instance, guardians can be chosen among nonprofit organizations that monitor citizen's rights in the US (such as the ACLU), etc. We stress that in our proof, we do not need all the guardians to be honest. We tolerate up to t completely malicious guardians.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For simplicity in this paper, we consider only one set of guardians.

(c) Selection through a public permissionless blockchain. Any blockchain that satisfies chain quality<sup>5</sup> can be used to select a committee of n guardians with the guarantee that at most t parties are malicious (with high probability), where the parameters n, t are tied to the chain quality parameter [17,18,11]. The idea is the following: people who wish to be part of the guardians try to add a block to the blockchain containing a transaction with a public key that they want to use if they are selected. When enough blocks containing such transactions are stored on the blockchain, the public keys that appear in the first N blocks are automatically selected to be part of the guardians.

On Guardians' Incentives. The incentive for external parties to participate in MUTAL comes from the application. For example, if guardians are chosen among nonprofit organizations, their incentive for following the protocol follows from their social responsibility and reputation.

**Evolving Committee.** For more robustness of the system, the set of guardians changes periodically at epochs. To change the guardians, we propose to use a proactive secret-sharing mechanism for re-sharing the secret key sk among the new set of guardians using fresh shares which are independent than those of the old guardians. Proactive secret sharing techniques allow a secret to be *handed-off* between two sets of parties [10,19]. The procedure where we specifically use the dynamic proactive secret sharing (DPSS) scheme of Goyal et al. [11], is described in Section 7.

In [11] the hand off works as follows: To hand off the shares of the secret, the old and new guardians first perform an initial computation that allows them to hold two independent sharings of the same random value r. The old committee can use the sharing of s and the sharing of r to reconstruct the value s - r and publish it. Since r is random, the value s - r leaks no information. Next, each member of the new committee adds s - r to their own share of r. As a result, each member holds shares of s - r + r = s, the original secret. The new set of shares is independent of the old set of shares. This completes the hand-off of the secret from the old committee to the new committee. It is assumed that the old committee erases the old sharing after this phase is complete. Else, an adversary could slowly eventually corrupt the old committee afterwards and learn the secret. To end up with different sharings of r, each member  $C_i$  of the new committee picks a random value  $r_i$  and creates two different sharings of it. Then  $C_i$  shares one of the shares with the old committee and the other with the new committee. Each party will then obtain a share for each  $r_i$ , it will sum their local shares and hold a sharing of  $r = r_1 + \ldots + r_n$ , which is guaranteed to be random if one party provided a random  $r_i$ . To ensure that no party misbehaves, a polynomial commitment scheme is used to guarantee that all shares are well-formed. For details see Sec. 7.

# 2 Related Work

Several works [12,4,8] have explored the concept of accountable anonymity, but lack formal definitions of accountability and thus provable guarantees and are suitable only to the communication layer. In such works, trusted mixers maintain the communication channel and are responsible for anonymization and deanonymization.

More recently, Corrigan-Gibbs and Ford [20] targeted a closed group of people that self-manages the communications of its members and guarantees anonymity and some form of accountability. This work is specific for settings where the digital platform itself is decentralized, and it is not clear how one might extend it to other settings (e.g., where there is a platform manager).

Von Ahn et al. [2] note the threat of abuse of the de-anonymization power and proposes an anonymous and accountable system where the master secret key is not known by a single manager but is distributed (using some threshold schemes [21,22]) to a set of parties. This idea reduces the threat of abuse since the deanonymization power is not concentrated in one entity. However, in [2], they provide only informal guarantees and do not discuss traceability or transparency of the de-anonymization process. Indeed, a later work by Danezis and Sassaman [23] highlights that it could be arbitrary which messages get to remain anonymous and which ones will be censured. More importantly, it is unclear under what circumstances the parties are provably accountable for their de-anonymization activities.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Chain quality  $\alpha_l$  means that in any sequence of l consecutive block at least  $\alpha$  fraction of them are added by honest parties.

More recently, Camenisch et al. [9] proposed dynamic group signatures. These are anonymous signatures that can be de-anonymized by a set of designated parties non-interactively (providing some form of public traceability). This approach also lacks the generality provided by our framework. Also, this line of work simply distributes the platform manager among several parties. We want manager accountability to be independent of the platform manager and to be enforced by a crowd.

Frankle et al. [3] discuss accountability within the context of electronic surveillance of platforms such as Facebook. Here the goal is to track secret law enforcement requests to digital platforms. This work is tailored to this specific setting where all parties (i.e., Facebook, FBI, judges) are assumed to act in good faith. In particular in this setting users have no anonymity to begin with, with respect to group manager (i.e., Facebook).

Libert and Joye [6], building on Sakai et al. [7], presented a group signature scheme with messagedependent opening. A dedicated committee, called the admitters, jointly decides if a message should be de-anonymized. If so, they jointly generate a *per-message* trapdoor that allows the manager to de-anonymize all instances that contain message *m*. As we mentioned earlier, there are significant differences with our approach. First, in [6] there is no focus on the traceability guarantees of the de-anonymization procedure. Thus, users can still be de-anonymized unknowingly. Second, the de-anonymization is message-dependent instead of instance-dependent. Third, manager non-frameability is not considered, suggesting that admitters and manager are the same authority, working towards the same goal, thus, admitters would not frame the manager. Like MUTAL, the signature has two layers of encryption, which must be removed by different entities. Message-dependent opening relies on *identity-based encryption* (IBE) scheme, specifically a fully collusion-resistant partially structure-preserving IBE, which is a variant of Waters' IBE scheme [24]. In IBE systems, a trusted party owns a master public and private key and private keys are signatures on the corresponding message [25]. A user asks for a private key from the key issuer, who can derive it from the master private key. Usually, the signature is on the user's identity [25], but here, the *messages* are the public key.

To sign, a user generates a two-level signature on their ID and the message they wish to sign m. Later, for de-anonymization, the guardians first remove the message layer and the authority removes the *identity* layer. The guardians generate a token  $t_m$  that depends on the message m. The fact that the admitters can generate a message dependent token inherently relies on using IBE. Upon receiving  $t_m$ , the authority can remove the other layer of encryption and then use  $t_m$  to decrypt the identity. The authority can then reuse the token  $t_m$  to de-anonymize any signatures on the message m. Deviating from our work, the presence of a trusted key issuer is crucial to their system. [6] only achieve full traceability, while we have non-frameability. In full traceability, the adversary is passive, meaning she only receives keys. Meanwhile, non-frameability allows the adversary to make her own keys. This means it is important that the key issuer not be able to learn the private group keys of each user. Libert and Joye just assume that the key issuance is done honestly and that the private key is *erased* after all the members join. The adversary only gets secret keys off the admitter/guardians and opener/authority.

# **3** Preliminaries

Notation. Let [n] denote the set  $\{1, 2, ..., n\}$ . We use  $y \leftarrow \mathsf{F}(x)$  to say y is the output of a randomized algorithm  $\mathsf{F}$  on input x and write  $y \leftarrow \mathsf{F}(x; r)$  to explicitly refer to the randomness r used. We use  $y := \mathsf{F}(x)$  if  $\mathsf{F}$  is a deterministic algorithm. PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. A function  $\mathsf{negl}(n)$  is negligible if for every positive polynomial p there is an N such that for all integers n > N it holds that  $\mathsf{negl}(n) \le \frac{1}{p(n)}$ . We denote the security parameter by  $\lambda$ .

We use  $(z, (y_i)_{U_i \in S}) \leftarrow \mathsf{F}\langle U_i(x_i) \rangle_{U_i \in S}(w)$  to denote a protocol between parties in a set S. Here, each party holds a secret input  $x_i$  and receives secret output  $y_i$ , z is the public output and w is the public input. In the context of our security games, to denote the execution of protocol  $\mathsf{F}$  where an adversary, with auxiliary input u, takes part in the execution and adaptively corrupts parties we write:  $(z, \mathsf{st}_A, (y_i)_{U_i \in H}) \leftarrow$  $\mathsf{F}(\mathcal{A}(u))\langle U_i(x_i) \rangle_{U_i \in H}(w)$  where the parties in H are the honest parties,  $y_i$  denotes the output of honest party  $U_i$ , and  $\mathsf{st}_A$  denotes the output of the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ . Cryptographic Primitives. To instantiate our generic construction, we use standard cryptographic primitives such as a one-way function f, a secure signature scheme S, and a public key encryption scheme E. Their syntax and definitions can be found in any reference textbook (e.g., [26,27,28]). We also use non-interactive zero knowledge arguments of knowledge (NIZK) that satisfy the stronger notions of simulation extractability and succinctness (SNARK) [29, Def. 2.10]. Finally, we use a threshold encryption scheme TE which satisfies the property of simulatable decryption.

For the threshold dynamic group signature (DGS) based construction in 6, following [9], we use Pointcheval-Sanders signature scheme [30], various sigma protocols made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir transform [31], and a signature of knowledge [32].

We present the less standard definitions for simulation extractable nizk and threshold encryption with simulatable decryption in App. A.

# 4 Formal Definition of Mutual Accountability Layer

In this section, we present MUTAL: first, we identify the parties in the protocol, then introduce its syntax in Definition 1, and finally describe the corresponding security properties.

- Users: The parties that generate messages. A user U can (1) join the platform with a valid identity (JoinUser<sup>Valid</sup>) and obtain a public key for the platform; (2) generate authorized message m in anonymously (MemberAuth).
- Key issuer: This party, denoted by  $\mathcal{KI}$ , checks the identity of users and registers them (i.e., it helps execute JoinUser<sup>Valid</sup>).
- Manager: This party, denoted by GM, can request de-anonymization for a certain message (ReqDeanon).
   If the request is granted, it learns the identity of the message creator (Deanon). The manager's requests are publicly verifiable.
- **Guardians:** The set of parties that grants access to a de-anonymization. These parties, denoted by  $\{C_1, \ldots, C_n\}$ , collectively protect the users against a potentially misbehaving group manager. They perform a one-time joint computation to compute a public key (KeyGenGu), and then monitor the de-anonymization requests generated by  $\mathcal{GM}$ . Once a request associated with m is validated, the guardians perform a joint computation to generate a value that allows the group manager to trace the identity of the user who created m (GrantDeanon). The output provided by the guardians is publicly verifiable.

# **Definition 1 (Mutual Accountability Layer Syntax).** A Mutually Accountable Layer MUTAL consists of the following PPT procedures:

- 1.  $pp \leftarrow SetupParams(1^{\lambda})$ . On input security parameter  $\lambda$ , it outputs the parameters pp for the scheme. We assume pp implicitly contains the information about the message space  $\mathcal{M}$ , key space, etc.
- (pk<sup>KI</sup>, sk<sup>KI</sup>, st<sup>KI</sup>) ← KeyGenlssuer(pp). On input the parameters pp outputs a key pair (pk<sup>KI</sup>, sk<sup>KI</sup>) for KI. It also initializes a state st<sup>KI</sup> used to maintain information of the members that join a group.
- (pk<sup>GM</sup>, sk<sup>GM</sup>, st<sup>GM</sup>) ← KeyGenManager(pp). On input the parameters pp, it outputs a key pair for the group manager (sk<sup>GM</sup>, pk<sup>GM</sup>) and an initialized state st<sup>GM</sup> used to manage the group.
- 4.  $\left(\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}, (\mathsf{sk}_{l}^{\mathcal{GU}})_{\mathsf{C}_{l}\in\mathcal{GU}}\right) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenGu} \langle \mathsf{C}_{\ell}(\cdot) \rangle_{\mathsf{C}_{l}\in\mathcal{GU}} (\mathsf{pp}).$  This is an interactive protocol between parties in a set  $\mathcal{GU} := \mathsf{C}_{1}, \ldots, \mathsf{C}_{n}$ . These parties, called guardians, have as a common public input the parameters  $\mathsf{pp}$ . At the end of the protocol, each guardian receives as output a secret key  $\mathsf{sk}_{l}^{\mathcal{GU}}$ . All parties receive as output a public key  $\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}$ . We denote with PK the set public keys of the authorities, i.e.,  $\mathsf{PK} = \{\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}}\}$ .
- 5.  $(\operatorname{cert}_i, (\operatorname{sk}_i, \operatorname{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \operatorname{st}^{\mathcal{GM}})) \leftarrow \operatorname{JoinUser}^{\operatorname{Valid}} \langle U_i (\operatorname{ID}_i), \mathcal{KI}(\operatorname{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \operatorname{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}), \mathcal{GM}(\operatorname{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \operatorname{st}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \rangle$  (pp, PK). An interactive protocol run between a user,  $\mathcal{KI}$ , and  $\mathcal{GM}$ . User participates with a public identity  $\operatorname{ID}_i$  that can be validated according to a predicate  $\operatorname{Valid}$ .  $\mathcal{KI}$  and  $\mathcal{GM}$  participate with their secret keys and their states. At the end of the protocol, the user gets a secret member key  $\operatorname{sk}_i$  for a member identity  $\operatorname{ID}_i$ , the public output is a certificate  $\operatorname{cert}_i$  that is added to key issuer and group manager's states.

- 6.  $\pi \leftarrow \text{MemberAuth}(pp, PK, m, \text{cert}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ . The user  $U_i$  executes MemberAuth to create an authorization for a message  $\mathbf{m} \in \mathcal{M}$ . On input the parameters pp, public keys PK, the message  $\mathbf{m}$ , the secret key  $sk_i$ , and the associated certificate cert<sub>i</sub>, it outputs a proof of membership  $\pi$  that proves his eligibility to produce m.
- 7.  $b \leftarrow AuthVrfy(pp, PK, m, \pi)$ . On input parameters pp, public keys PK, a message m, a proof of membership  $\pi$  outputs a bit b indicating whether the message is authorized.
- 8. req  $\leftarrow$  ReqDeanon(pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ , sk<sup> $\mathcal{GM}$ </sup>). On input the parameters pp, the public keys PK, a message m, a proof of membership  $\pi$ , and the secret key of the group manager  $\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}$  produces a request req to deanonymize the member who posted m.
- 9.  $b \leftarrow \mathsf{JudgeReq}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req})$ . On input the parameters  $\mathsf{pp}$ , the public keys  $\mathsf{PK}$ , a message  $\mathsf{m}$ , a mem-
- bership proof  $\pi$  and a request req, it outputs a bit b indicating whether  $\mathcal{GM}$  produced the request. 10.  $\perp/\operatorname{access} \leftarrow \operatorname{GrantDeanon}\langle C_{\ell}(\operatorname{sk}_{\ell}^{\mathcal{GU}})\rangle_{C_{\ell}\in\mathcal{GU}}$  (pp,PK,req,m, $\pi$ ). This is an interactive protocol between the guardians  $\mathcal{GU}$ . Guardian  $C_{l}$  has as secret input its secret key  $\operatorname{sk}_{l}^{\mathcal{GU}}$ , and all parties have common input the parameters pp, the public keys PK, a message m, a membership proof  $\pi$ , and a request req; the result of the protocol is a common output, which is either a value access that will allow group managerto de-anonymize the message or  $\perp$ .
- 11.  $\perp/(\text{cert}_{\text{ID}}, \text{proof}_{\text{ID}}) \leftarrow \text{Deanon}(\text{pp}, \text{PK}, \text{m}, \pi, \text{access}, \text{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}})$ . On input the parameters pp, the public keys PK, a message m, a membership proof  $\pi$ , a string access, and the secret key of the group manager sk<sup>GM</sup>  $outputs cert_{ID}$  and a publicly verifiable proof proof  $_{ID}$  that this was the cert\_{ID} accountable for m. Otherwise, it outputs the special symbol  $\perp$ .
- 12.  $b \leftarrow Judge(pp, PK, m, \pi, access, cert_{ID}, proof_{ID})$  On input the public parameters pp, the public keys PK, and information about the authenticated message  $(m, \pi)$ , the string access from the quardians and a pair  $(cert_{ID}, proof_{ID})$  from the group manager; it outputs a bit denoting whether the user assigned with  $cert_{ID}$ is indeed accountable for the pair  $(m, \pi)$ .

#### 4.1**Threat Model and Security Properties**

For each security property of MUTAL, we describe a security game where the power of the adversary is modeled via oracles. The oracles and their behavior are described below.

- OHonJoin(ID<sub>i</sub>): When the adversary queries this oracle, an honest user is enrolled in the system. Formally, the oracle executes JoinUser for a user with identity  $ID_i$ , and outputs  $cert_i$  to the adversary; it maintains a set  $\mathcal{U}_h$  which is updated with  $(\operatorname{cert}_i, \operatorname{token}_i)$ .
- $\mathsf{OMalJoin}(\mathrm{ID}_i, \mathsf{vk}_i)$ : When queried, this oracle allows the adversary to create and control a malicious user by interacting with the adversary in protocol JoinUser, participating as key issuer. It maintains a set of malicious users containing  $cert_i$ .
- OGuKeyGen: This is a one-time oracle that, when queried, lets the adversary cooperate in the protocol to generate the keys of the guardians. The guardians the adversary controls are denoted as  $\mathcal{GU}_{cor}$  and the oracle plays on behalf of the remaining, denoted  $\mathcal{GU}_{hon}$ . Formally, this oracle consists of running  $\begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}, \mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}, (\mathsf{sk}_{\ell}^{\mathcal{GU}})_{\mathsf{C}_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}_{\mathrm{hon}}} \end{pmatrix} \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenGu}(\mathcal{A}(\cdot)) \langle \mathsf{C}_{\ell}(\cdot) \rangle_{\mathsf{C}_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}} (\mathsf{pp}). \\ - \mathsf{OGetGuKeys}(i): \text{ When queried on input } i, \text{ outputs the secret key of the } i\text{-th guardian, which is added to}$
- $\mathcal{GU}_{\rm cor}$ .
- OMemberAuth(m, cert<sub>i</sub>): Upon query, outputs membership proof  $\pi \leftarrow$  MemberAuth (pp, PK, m, cert<sub>i</sub>, sk<sub>i</sub>), produced by honest user with  $(\mathsf{cert}_i, \cdot) \in \mathcal{U}_h$  for message  $\mathsf{m} \in \mathcal{M}$ . If the user is not honest, the oracle returns  $\perp$ . A set  $\mathcal{T}$  is updated with  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{cert}_i)$ .
- $\mathsf{OReg}(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$ : The oracle returns  $\mathsf{reg} \leftarrow \mathsf{RegDeanon}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}})$ ; a set  $\mathcal{Q}$  is updated with  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{reg})$ .
- OGrant(m,  $\pi$ , req): When queried, a GrantDeanon protocol execution starts, i.e.,

$$\mathsf{GrantDeanon}(\mathcal{A}(\cdot)) \left\langle \mathsf{C}_{\ell}(\mathsf{sk}_{\ell}^{\mathcal{GU}}) \right\rangle_{\mathsf{C}_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}} (\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{req},\mathsf{m},\pi)$$

a set  $\mathcal{G}$  is updated with  $(m, \pi, reg, access)$ .

ODeanon(m,  $\pi$ , access): this oracle models the ability of an adversary to learn the identity of the creator of a message. When queried, the oracle runs  $\mathsf{Deanon}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{access},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}})$ ; a set  $\mathcal{D}$  is updated with each query with  $(m, \pi, access, \cdot)$  where  $\cdot$  denotes the value returned by the oracle.

**Completeness.** If all parties behave honestly (i) any user with a *valid* ID can join the system and create membership authorizations that verify; (ii) the group manager will be able to create de-anonymization requests that verify and, in collaboration with a majority of the guardians, will also manage to de-anonymize any message; and (iii) the de-anonymization process will lead to the creator of the message and the group manager will be capable to create a proof of identity that verifies. Completeness holds if the output of the experiment of Fig. 1 is 1:

$$\begin{split} & \underbrace{Completeness_{\Pi}(1^{\lambda},m,\mathrm{ID})}{- \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda})} & \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenIssuer}(pp), \quad (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenManager}(pp), \\ & (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{SU}},\mathsf{sk}_{l}^{\mathcal{EI}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenGu} \langle \mathsf{C}_{\ell}(\cdot) \rangle_{\mathsf{C}_{l} \in \mathcal{GU}}(pp). \quad \mathsf{PK} := \{\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}\} \\ & - (\mathsf{cert}, (\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{GM}})) \leftarrow \mathsf{JoinUser}^{\mathsf{Valid}} \langle U(\mathrm{ID}), \mathcal{KI}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}), \mathcal{GM}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \rangle (\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK}) \\ & - \pi \leftarrow \mathsf{MemberAuth}(pp,\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\mathsf{cert},\mathsf{sk}) \\ & - \mathsf{req} \leftarrow \mathsf{ReqDeanon}(pp,\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \\ & - \mathsf{access} \leftarrow \mathsf{GrantDeanon} \langle \mathsf{C}_{\ell}(\mathsf{sk}_{\ell}^{\mathcal{GU}}) \rangle_{\mathsf{C}_{l} \in \mathcal{GU}} (\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{req},\mathsf{m},\pi) \\ & - (\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}},\mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Deanon}(pp,\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{access},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \\ & - \mathsf{The} \mathsf{ output} \mathsf{ of the experiment} \mathsf{ is 1 iff AuthVrfy}(pp,\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi) = 1, \mathsf{ JudgeReq}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req}) = 1, \\ & \mathsf{Judge}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{access},\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}},\mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}) = 1, \mathsf{ and cert} = \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}. \end{split}$$

**Fig. 1.** Completeness<sub> $\Pi$ </sub>(1<sup> $\lambda$ </sup>, m, ID)

**Definition 2 (Completeness).** A MUTAL scheme  $\Pi$  satisfies completeness if, for any message  $m \in M$  and identity ID,

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Completeness}_\Pi(1^\lambda,\mathsf{m},\mathrm{ID})=1\right]=1.$$

Unforgeability. It captures the property that anyone (even group manager and guardians) who is not enrolled in the system (i.e., has not executed protocol JoinUser) cannot produce valid membership authorizations. We capture this in a game where an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  controls group manager and guardians, and has access to oracles OHonJoin(ID) and OMemberAuth, meaning it can create new users (but does not control them), and see honestly generated membership authorizations of her choice. The adversary wins the game if she can produce a pair (m,  $\pi$ ) that verifies, without controlling any user and without querying m in the OMemberAuth oracle. The game is presented in Fig. 2.

 $\frac{\mathsf{Exp-Unforge}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})}{\mathcal{A} \text{ has access to } \mathcal{O} = \{\mathsf{OHonJoin}, \mathsf{OMemberAuth}\}. \ \mathcal{A} \text{ fully controls the group manager } \mathcal{GM}, \text{ and the guardians } \mathcal{GU}.$ 

- Initialization: (1) Parameters  $pp \leftarrow \mathsf{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda})$ . (2) Sets for the oracles:  $\mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{T} := \emptyset$ . (3) key issuer's keys:  $(\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenIssuer}(\mathsf{pp})$ .

$$- (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}); \, \mathsf{PK} := \big\{\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}\big\}$$

- (m,  $\pi$ )  $\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{A}}).$ 

- The output of the experiment is 1 iff AuthVrfy(pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ ) = 1, and (m,  $\pi$ ,  $\cdot$ )  $\notin \mathcal{T}$  (the proof  $\pi$  was not computed by the challenger).

**Fig. 2.** Exp-Unforge $_{\Pi,A}$ 

**Definition 3 (Unforgeability).** A MUTAL scheme  $\Pi$  satisfies unforgeability if for any PPT adversary A, there is a negligible function  $\mu$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Exp-Unforge}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

User non-frameability demands that no one can falsely accuse a user  $U_i$  of being the creator of a certain value. Even if all guardians, the manager, and some other users are malicious and colluding, user  $U_i$  cannot be framed (if  $\mathcal{KI}$  is honest). Formally, the adversary controls the group manager, the guardians, and malicious users; she wins if she can provide a valid pair  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$  that opens to the identity of an honest user. This property is shown in Fig. 3.

$$\begin{split} & \underbrace{\mathsf{Exp-UserNonFrame}_{II,\mathcal{A}}}_{\mathcal{A}} (1^{\lambda}) \\ & \overline{\mathcal{A} \text{ has access to } \mathcal{O} = \{ \overline{\mathsf{O}} \mathsf{HonJoin}, \mathsf{O} \mathsf{MemberAuth}, \mathsf{O} \mathsf{MalJoin} \}. \ \mathcal{A} \text{ fully controls the group manager } \mathcal{G} \mathcal{M}, \text{ and the guardians } \mathcal{G} \mathcal{U}. \\ & - \text{ Initialization: (1) Parameters } \mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda}). \ (2) \text{ Sets for the oracles: } \mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{T}, := \emptyset. \ (3) \text{ key issuer's keys: } (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenlssuer}(\mathsf{pp}). \\ & - (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{M}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{U}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}); \ \mathsf{PK} := \{\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{U}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{G} \mathcal{M}} \}. \\ & - (\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{A}}). \\ & - \text{ The output of the experiment is 1 iff } \operatorname{AuthVrfy}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{m}, \pi) = 1, \ (\mathsf{m}, \pi, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{T} \ (\text{the proof } \pi \text{ was not computed by the challenger}), \ \mathsf{Judge}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{access}, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}) = 1, \ \mathrm{and} \ (\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \cdot) \in \mathcal{U}_h. \end{split}$$



**Definition 4.** (User Non-frameability) A MUTAL scheme  $\Pi$  satisfies user non-frameability if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Exp-UserNonFrame}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

User accountability captures the fact that, when de-anonymized, a pair  $(m, \pi)$  must trace back to *some* user.  $\mathcal{A}$ 's goal is to create a pair  $(m, \pi)$  that is not correctly de-anonymized while having control over malicious users and the guardians. It can also ask for honest users' membership proofs, requests, and de-anonymizations. The formal game for user accountability is in Fig. 4.

t-Exp-UserAccountability<sub> $\Pi, \mathcal{A}$ </sub>(1<sup> $\lambda$ </sup>)

 $\begin{array}{l} \hline \mathcal{A} \text{ has access to } \mathcal{O} &= \{ \text{OHonJoin, OMemberAuth, OMalJoin, OReq, OGuKeyGen, OGetGuKeys, ODeanon} \}. \\ \text{Namely, } \mathcal{A} \text{ can create malicious users, control } t \text{ malicious guardians, and learn the keys of honest guardians.} \\ &- \text{ Initialization: (1) Parameters } pp \leftarrow \text{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda}); (2) \text{ Public Keys } (pk^{\mathcal{KI}}, sk^{\mathcal{KI}}, st^{\mathcal{KI}}) \leftarrow \\ \text{KeyGenIssuer}(pp); (pk^{\mathcal{GM}}, sk^{\mathcal{GM}}, st^{\mathcal{GM}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGenManager}(pp); (3) \text{ Oracle Sets: } \mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{D} := \emptyset. \\ &- (m, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(pp, pk^{\mathcal{GM}}, pk^{\mathcal{GU}}, pk^{\mathcal{KI}}). \\ &- \text{ The output of the experiment is 1 iff} \\ &\quad \text{AuthVrfy}(pp, PK, m, \pi) = 1 \\ &\quad \text{ereq} \leftarrow \text{ReqDeanon}(pp, PK, m, \pi, sk^{\mathcal{GM}}) \\ &\quad \text{access} \leftarrow \text{GrantDeanon}(\mathcal{A}(st_{\mathcal{A}})) \left< C_{\ell}(sk_{\ell}^{\mathcal{GU}}) \right>_{C_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}_{hon}} (pp, PK, req, m, \pi) \\ &\quad \text{etall of Cert_{ID}, \cdot) \in \mathcal{U}_h \cup, z \neq (cert_{ID}, \cdot) \end{array}$ 



**Definition 5 (User Accountability).** A MUTAL scheme  $\Pi$  has User Accountability if, for all PPT adversaries A, there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that

 $\Pr[t\text{-}\mathsf{Exp}\text{-}\mathsf{User}\mathsf{Accountability}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda).$ 

Manager Non-Frameability guarantees that no one can accuse  $\mathcal{GM}$  of creating a de-anonymization request, even if all guardians and users are malicious and collude. The adversary has full control of users and guardians and can ask for requests/deanonymizations; her goal is to craft a de-anonymization request that verifies. The formal game is in Fig. 5.

$$\begin{split} & \underbrace{\mathsf{Exp-ManagerNonFrame}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})}{\mathcal{A} \text{ has access to the oracle }\mathcal{O} = \{\mathsf{OHonJoin},\mathsf{OMalJoin},\mathsf{OMemberAuth},\mathsf{OReq},\mathsf{ODeanon}\}\\ & \text{The experiment works as follows:} \\ & - \text{ Initialization: (1) Parameters }\mathsf{pp} \leftarrow \mathsf{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda}); \ (2) \text{ Public Keys }(\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenIssuer}(\mathsf{pp}); \ (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGenManager}(\mathsf{pp}); \ (3) \text{ Oracle Sets: }\mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{D} := \emptyset \\ & - (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}}) \\ & - \text{ The output of the experiment is 1 iff JudgeReq}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req}) = 1 \text{ and }(\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req}) \notin \mathcal{Q} \end{split}$$

**Fig. 5.** Exp-ManagerNonFrame<sub> $\Pi, A$ </sub>(1<sup> $\lambda$ </sup>)

**Definition 6.** (Manager Non-Frameability) A MUTAL scheme  $\Pi$  has Manager Non-Frameability if, for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Exp}\text{-}\mathsf{ManagerNonFrame}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda).$ 

Anonymity guarantees that no one can extract information about the creator of a pair  $(m, \pi)$ , unless  $\mathcal{GM}$  and the guardians collaborate. To capture this, we consider two cases: (1)  $\mathcal{GM}$  and a minority of the guardians are corrupted, (2) only the guardians are corrupted. In both, the anonymity property is captured by an indistinguishability definition. The formal games are presented in Fig. 6,7

*Remark 1.* Anonymity also implicitly covers the property of *manager accountability*: manager cannot open messages on its own, it must ask for permission and if it wants to blame a user for a message, needs to present a proof.

$$\begin{split} & \underbrace{\mathsf{Exp-UAnon\&MalGM}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})}{\mathcal{A} \text{ has to the oracles } \mathcal{O} = \{\mathsf{OHonJoin,OMalJoin,OMemberAuth,OGuKeyGen,OGetGuKeys,OGrant}\}. \\ & - \text{ Initialization: (1) Parameters } pp \ \leftarrow \ \mathsf{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda}); \ (2) \ \text{Public Keys } (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \ \leftarrow \\ & \mathsf{KeyGenlssuer}(\mathsf{pp}); \ (3) \ \text{Oracle Sets: } \mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{G} := \emptyset \\ & - (\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}},\mathsf{m},\mathsf{cert}_0,\mathsf{cert}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \\ & - \ \text{The challenger checks:} \\ & \bullet \ \text{If } (\mathsf{cert}_0,\cdot) \ \text{or } (\mathsf{cert}_1,\cdot) \notin \mathcal{U}_h \ \text{output } \bot. \\ & \bullet \ \text{Else, let token}_0, \mathsf{token}_1 \ \text{ be the corresponding secret states. Compute } b \ \leftarrow \ \{0,1\}; \ \pi \ \leftarrow \\ & \mathsf{MemberAuth}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\mathsf{cert}_b,\mathsf{sk}_b). \\ & - \ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{st},\pi) \\ & - \ \text{The output of the experiment is 1 iff } (b = b') \land (\mathsf{m},\pi,\cdot,\cdot) \notin \mathcal{G} \land |\mathcal{G}\mathcal{U}_{\mathrm{cor}}| \leq t \end{split}$$

**Fig. 6.** Exp-UAnon&MalGM<sub> $\Pi, A$ </sub> $(1^{\lambda})$ 

 $\begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \textbf{t-Exp-UAnon\&MalGuard}_{\varPi,\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) \\ \hline \mathcal{A} \text{ has access to the oracles } \mathcal{O} = \left\{ O \text{HonJoin}, O \text{MemberAuth}, O \text{MalJoin}, O \text{Req}, O \text{Deanon} \right\} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} - & \text{Initialization:} & (1) \text{ Parameters } pp \ \leftarrow \ \text{SetupParams}(1^{\lambda}); & (2) \text{ Public Keys } (pk^{\mathcal{KI}}, sk^{\mathcal{KI}}, st^{\mathcal{KI}}) \end{array} \\ \hline \text{KeyGenlssuer}(pp); & (pk^{\mathcal{GM}}, sk^{\mathcal{GM}}, st^{\mathcal{GM}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGenManager}(pp). \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \left( 4 \right) \text{ Oracle Sets: } \mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{D} := \emptyset \end{array} \\ \hline \left( pk^{\mathcal{GU}}, \mathsf{m}, \mathsf{cert}_0, \mathsf{cert}_1 \right) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(pp, pk^{\mathcal{KI}}, pk^{\mathcal{GM}}) \end{array} \\ \hline \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \\ \text{Figure} \\ \text{Figure} \\ \text{Figure} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Oracle Sets: } \mathcal{U}_h, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{Q}, \mathcal{D} := \emptyset \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \text{Figure} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array}$ 

**Fig. 7.** t-Exp-UAnon&MalGuard<sub> $\Pi, A$ </sub> $(1^{\lambda})$ 

**Definition 7 (Anonymity).** A MUTAL scheme has t-Anonymity if, for all PPT adversaries  $A_1, A_2$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that both the following hold:

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Exp}\mathsf{-}\mathsf{UAnon}\&\mathsf{MalGM}_{\varPi,\mathcal{A}_1}(1^\lambda) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(\lambda), \quad \Pr\left[\mathsf{t}\mathsf{-}\mathsf{Exp}\mathsf{-}\mathsf{UAnon}\&\mathsf{MalGuard}_{\varPi,\mathcal{A}_2}(1^\lambda) = 1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mu(\lambda).$$

# 5 Instantiation of MUTAL

We describe an instantiation  $\Pi$ -MUTAL of MUTAL in three phases: generation of keys, creation and verification of membership proofs, and de-anonymization, presented in Figures 8, 9 and 10 respectively.

The security primitives underlying our protocols are a one-way function f, a signature scheme S, a public key encryption scheme TE with *decryption simulatability*, a succinct simulation-extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument (nizk), and a (simulation-extractable) succinct nizk [29] (snark). Definitions and properties of such primitives can be found in Appendix A.

At a high-level, the scheme works as described in Sec. 1. First, the setup parameters are generated. Using these public parameters, the key issuer, the group manager, and the guardians create their keys.  $\mathcal{KI}$  creates a signing key pair,  $\mathcal{GM}$  creates a public key encryption key pair and signing key pair, and the guardians execute the threshold encryption scheme to create their secret keys and a common public key.

To join the platform, a user needs to receive a certificate from  $\mathcal{KI}$ . To do so, she samples a random value  $\mathsf{sk}$  from the domain of a one-way function f and sends  $\mathsf{vk} \leftarrow f(\mathsf{sk})$  and her "real" identity ID to  $\mathcal{KI}$ . Upon verification of ID,  $\mathcal{KI}$  sends a signature  $\sigma$  on the value (ID|| $\mathsf{vk}$ ) to the user. The user's certificate is the tuple cert := (ID,  $\mathsf{vk}, \sigma$ ).  $\mathcal{KI}$  keeps a list of the users as Members. Multiple lists can be initialized if multiple applications use the same key issuer.

To anonymously post a message  $\mathbf{m}$ , the user proves she is authorized by creating a membership proof  $(c_2, \operatorname{proof})$ . The first item,  $c_2$ , is a valid encryption under the public key of the guardians of message  $\mathbf{m}$  and a ciphertext  $c_1$ , which itself is an encryption under the public key of  $\mathcal{GM}$  of a certificate cert := (ID, vk,  $\sigma$ ). The second item, proof, must be a proof of well formation of the ciphertext. To prove  $c_2$  is well formed, the user produces proof, which is a succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of the secret key associated with the key vk contained in cert.

To de-anonymize a tuple (m, proof),  $\mathcal{GM}$  signs (m, proof) and broadcasts the signature. The guardians first assert that the request was made by the group manager, then publish the request<sup>6</sup> and proceed to the threshold decryption protocol. The output of such protocol is the decryption of  $c_2$  (i.e., the value  $c_1$ ) along

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Application dependent conditions can be additionally included, e.g., rules on which messages should be deanonymized.

with a proof that the decryption is valid.  $\mathcal{GM}$  can then use his secret key to decrypt  $c_1$  and retrieve the certificate cert associated with the pair (m, proof).

To achieve public verifiability of an opening,  $\mathcal{GM}$  provides a nizk proof of knowledge that a specific user's certificate cert was the output of decrypting the ciphertext  $c_1$ .

Zero-Knowledge Relation. The relation  $\mathcal{R}$  for a statement  $(\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK})$  is described below:

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l} ((\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}), (r_2, c_1, r_1, \mathsf{cert}_i, \mathsf{sk}_i)) \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{PK} = ((\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathcal{KI}}), (\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathcal{GM}}), (\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{\mathcal{GU}})) \\ \wedge \mathsf{cert}_i = (\mathsf{vk}_i, \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma_i) \wedge \mathsf{S.Vrfy}_{\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathcal{KI}}} (\mathrm{ID}_i \| \mathsf{vk}_i, \sigma_i) = 1 \\ \wedge c_1 = \mathsf{E.Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}}} (\mathsf{cert}_i; r_1) \wedge \mathsf{vk}_i = f(\mathsf{sk}_i) \wedge c_2 = \mathsf{TE.Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{\mathcal{GU}}} (\mathsf{m} \| c_1; r_2) \end{array} \right\}$$

We also use a nizk proof for the relation  $\mathcal{VD} = \{(\mathsf{pk},\mathsf{m},c),(\mathsf{sk}) \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{m} = \mathsf{E}.\mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(c)\},$  for correct decryption.




Fig. 8. Protocol *II*-MUTAL: Parameter setup and Key Generation Protocols and Algorithms.

```
<u>MemberAuth</u>(pp, PK, m, cert<sub>i</sub>, sk_i)
• Parse pp as (pp_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})
• Parse PK as ((vk_{S}^{\mathcal{KI}}), (pk_{E}^{\mathcal{GM}}, vk_{S}^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}))
• c_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{E}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathcal{G}\mathcal{M}}}(\mathsf{cert}_i; r_1); \ c_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TF}}^{\mathcal{G}\mathcal{U}}}(\mathsf{m}||c_1; r_2)
```

proof  $\leftarrow \operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}$ .Prove(crs, (m,  $c_2$ , PK), ( $r_2$ ,  $\dot{c_1}$ ,  $r_1$ , cert<sub>i</sub>, sk<sub>i</sub>))

• Output  $\pi := (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$ 

AuthVrfy(pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ )

- Parse pp as  $(p_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})$  Parse PK as  $((vk_S^{\mathcal{KI}}), (pk_E^{\mathcal{GM}}, vk_S^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}))$

```
• Parse \pi = (c_2, \text{proof})
```

• Output  $b \leftarrow \mathsf{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\mathsf{crs}, (\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}), \mathsf{proof})$ 

Fig. 9. Protocol  $\Pi$ -MUTAL: Anonymous Membership Proof Generation and Verification Algorithms

```
\mathsf{ReqDeanon}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}})
• Parse pp as (pp_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})
• Parse sk<sup>\mathcal{GM}</sup> as (sk_E^{\mathcal{GM}}, sk_S^{\mathcal{GM}})
• Output req \leftarrow S.Sign_{sk_{s}^{\mathcal{G}M}}(m \| \pi)
JudgeReq(pp, PK, m, \pi, req)
• Parse pp as (p_E, p_P, p_S, p_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})
• Parse PK as ((vk_S^{\mathcal{KI}}), (pk_E^{\mathcal{GM}}, vk_S^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}))
• Output b \leftarrow \mathsf{S}.\mathsf{Vrfy}_{\mathsf{vk}_{c}^{\mathcal{G}\mathcal{M}}}(\mathsf{m} \| \pi, \mathsf{req})
\underline{\mathsf{GrantDeanon}}\left\langle\mathsf{C}_1(\mathsf{sk}_1^{\mathcal{GU}}),\ldots,\mathsf{C}_n(\mathsf{sk}_n^{\mathcal{GU}})\right\rangle(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{req},\mathsf{m},\pi)
Upon receiving request (req, m, \pi) each party C_l in \mathcal{GU} proceeds as follow:
• Parse pp as (pp_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})
• Parse PK as ((vk_S^{\mathcal{KI}}), (pk_E^{\mathcal{GM}}, vk_S^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}))
• If JudgeReq(pp, PK, m, \pi, req) = 0 \lor AuthVrfy(pp, PK, m, \pi) = 0 it aborts.
• Run protocol (\text{proof}_m, m \| c_1) \leftarrow \text{TE}.\text{ProveValidDec } \langle C_\ell(sk_{\text{TE}}^\ell) \rangle_{\ell=1}^n(c_2) \text{ and output access} := (\text{proof}_m, m \| c_1)
<u>Deanon(pp</u>, PK, m, \pi, access, sk<sup>\mathcal{GM}</sup>).
 \begin{array}{l} \bullet \ \mathrm{Parse} \ pp \ \mathrm{as} \ (pp_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}}) \\ \bullet \ \mathrm{Parse} \ \mathsf{PK} \ \mathrm{as} \ ((\mathsf{vk}_S^{\mathcal{KL}}), (pk_E^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{vk}_S^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}})) \end{array} 
• Parse access as (\text{proof}_m, m \| c_1) If TE.ValidDec(m \| c_1, c_2, \text{proof}_m) = 0 output \perp
• Parse \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}} = (\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}_\mathsf{E}, \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}_\mathsf{S})
• cert<sub>ID</sub> \leftarrow E.Dec<sub>sk<sup>G</sup> M</sub>(c<sub>1</sub>)
• Parse cert_{ID} = (\overline{ID}, vk, \sigma)
• If \mathsf{S}.\mathsf{Vrfy}_{\mathsf{vk}_c^{\mathcal{KI}}}(\mathrm{ID} \| \mathsf{vk}, \sigma) = 0, output \bot
• \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}} \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{VD}}.\mathsf{Prove}\;(\mathsf{crs}_{\mathcal{VD}},(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}},c_1,\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}),\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}})
• Output (cert<sub>ID</sub>, proof<sub>ID</sub>)
\mathsf{Judge}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{access},\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}},\mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}})
• Parse pp as (pp_E, pp_S, pp_{TE}, crs_{\mathcal{R}}, crs_{\mathcal{VD}})
• Parse PK as ((vk_{S}^{\mathcal{KI}}), (pk_{E}^{\mathcal{GM}}, vk_{S}^{\mathcal{GM}}), (pk_{TE}^{\mathcal{GU}}))
• Parse access as (proof_m, m || c_1)
• Parse cert_{ID} = (ID, vk, \sigma)
• If TE.ValidDec(m||c_1, c_2, proof_m) = 0 or
       \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{VD}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\mathsf{crs}_{\mathcal{VD}},(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}},c_1,\mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}),\mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}) = 0 \text{ output } 0
• Output b \leftarrow \mathsf{S}.\mathsf{Vrfy}_{\mathsf{vk}_{\varepsilon}^{\mathcal{KI}}}(\mathrm{ID} \| \mathsf{vk}, \sigma)
```



#### 5.1 Efficiency

We discuss the costs of  $\Pi$ -MUTAL when instantiated with concrete primitives. We use ElGamal for the IND-CPA encryption scheme, Threshold ElGamal [33] with a verifiable secret sharing scheme for key generation (e.g., [34]), the Chaum-Pedersen [35] protocol for verifiable decryption, succinct non-interactive argument of Groth-Maller [29] for relation  $\mathcal{R}$ , ECDSA digital signature [36] for the signature scheme, and SHA-256 [37] for the one-way function on a domain defined by the security parameter. We also use SHA-256 to instantiate the random oracle for the non-interactive version of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol.

The cost of user authentication is dominated by the cost of computing a SNARK proof. Generating the SNARK proof depends on the complexity of the verification circuit for the underlying relation  $\mathcal{R}$ .

The work of the guardians is dominated by setting up and executing threshold ElGamal. Threshold ElGamal uses a verifiable secret sharing scheme, so each party must non-interactively send a constant number of messages to every other party (thus in total  $\mathcal{O}(n^2)$  messages are sent). Each message is  $\mathcal{O}(\lambda)$  – constant in the size of the share. The cost of producing/processing these messages is dominated by  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  group operations per party. To decrypt a message, each guardian broadcasts their decryption share along with a nizk proof that their decryption is consistent with their secret share (a Chaum-Pedersen proof). The guardians must verify the zk proofs from the others and get at least t + 1 valid proofs. Each verification requires a SHA-256 computation and a constant number of group operations. Now, given at least t + 1decryption shares, the guardians can decrypt the message by doing  $\mathcal{O}(t)$  group operations overall. Since the de-anonymization activities are supposed to be sporadic and are done off-line, the communication and computational cost incurred in this operation is not a bottleneck for deployment.

Finally, the complexity of the judge procedures only requires verification of the correctness of the two layers of encryption. This boils down to the verification of t + 2 Chaum-Pedersen proofs and  $\mathcal{O}(t)$  group operations. for the inner, it just needs to verify one Chaum-Pedersen proof. In summary, the only online operation done by the user when computing a membership proof is a snark computation. All guardians' operations can be performed off-line, and hence are not a bottleneck for the system.

	Communication	Time complexity
	complexity/size	complexity
$\mathcal{KI}/\mathcal{GM}$ generation	-	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$
Join User	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$
$\mathcal{GU}$ generation	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(n)$ per party	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(n)$ per party
Proof generation	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}( \mathcal{C} \log \mathcal{C} )$
Proof verification	-	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$
Request	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$
Grant	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$ per party	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(t)$
De-anonymization	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(1)$	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(t)$
Judge	_	$\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(t)$

**Table 11.** Costs for  $\Pi$ -MUTAL instantiation.  $\lambda$  denotes the security parameter, n the size of the guardians committee, t the desired corruption threshold, and  $|\mathcal{C}|$  the number of multiplication gates of the circuit for verifying  $\mathcal{R}$ . We denote with  $\mathcal{O}_{\lambda}(\cdot)$  asymptotic terms which hide a multiplicative, linear factor  $\lambda$ .

#### 5.2 Security

In this sections we present the theorems that capture the security property of the construction and give some intuition for the proofs. The full proofs can be found in App. B.

**Theorem 1.** Given that the signature scheme S satisfies unforgeability,  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}$  has zero-knowledge and simulation-extractability and f is a one-way function, the Mutual Accountability Protocol  $\Pi$ -MUTAL satisfies Unforgeability (Def. 3).

Intuition:  $\mathcal{A}$  wins Exp-Unforge if she produces  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$  such that AuthVrfy(pp, PK,  $\mathsf{m}, \pi) = 1$  and  $\pi$  is not the output of a query on OMemberAuth, without knowing any user's secret key. Because  $\pi = (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  can provide a valid proof of knowledge proof of the secret sk associated to a cert = (ID, vk,  $\sigma$ ) without executing any JoinUser procedure. Hence,  $\mathcal{A}$  can (i) provide a proof that verifies but was not constructed with a valid witness (thus violating Simulation Extractability), or (ii) invert one of the vk in the pool of all honest certificates (thus violating one-wayness of f), or (iii) forge a signature  $\sigma$  on a public key vk that she picked (violating unforgeability of the Signature Scheme).

**Theorem 2.** Given that the signature scheme S satisfies unforgeability,  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}$  has zero-knowledge,  $\operatorname{NIZK}_{\mathcal{VD}}$  and  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}$  both have simulation-extractability, TE is a sound Threshold Signature Scheme and f is a one-way function, the Mutual Accountability Protocol  $\Pi$ -MUTAL satisfies User Non-Frameability (Def. 4).

Intuition: The only difference from Th. 1 is that  $\mathcal{A}$  can create malicious users and thus the winning condition changes from being able to compute a pair  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$  that passes verification, to providing a tuple  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}})$  that opens to the identity ID of an honest user. Thus, if  $\mathcal{A}$  wins User Non-Frameability, it either wins Unforgeability or is able to (i) produce a valid proof  $\mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}$  for the relation  $\mathcal{VD}$  without a witness (thus, breaking simulation extractability of  $\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{VD}}$ ), or (ii) provide two different cert, cert\_{\mathrm{ID}} that are part of a valid witness for  $\mathcal{R}$  and  $\mathcal{VD}$ , respectively (breaking soundness of the Threshold Scheme).

**Theorem 3.** Construction  $\Pi$ -MUTAL satisfies User Accountability (Def. 5).

Intuition:  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if she provides a pair  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$  that, upon going through the de-anonymization process, does not yield to a cert belonging to any user. Intuitively  $\mathcal{A}$  could (i) forge a signature on the key of  $\mathcal{KI}$ , or (ii) create a proof of Membership without holding any valid certificate violating simulation extractability of snark<sub> $\mathcal{R}$ </sub>.

**Theorem 4.** Assuming a secure Signature Scheme S, the Protocol II-MUTAL satisfies Manager Non-Frameability (Def. 6).

Intuition:  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if she can produce a valid  $\mathsf{req} = \mathsf{Sign}_{\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{S}}^{\mathcal{G}\mathcal{M}}}(\mathsf{m},\pi)$  that was not outputted by OReq. Since req is a signature,  $\mathcal{A}$  can be reduced to an adversary breaking the unforgeability of the Signature Scheme S.

**Theorem 5.** Assuming a secure Encryption scheme E, a secure Threshold Encryption Scheme TE and secure NIZK<sub>R</sub>, NIZK<sub>VD</sub>, Protocol  $\Pi$ -MUTAL satisfies Anonymity (Def. 7).

Intuition: In both cases of anonymity  $\mathcal{A}$  must distinguish between membership permissions generated by different users. For both proofs, we replace real memberships by simulated ones. Then, we can extract a witness and do a reduction to Indistinguishability of Encryption either in the plain, or the threshold setting.

# 6 Instantiation based on t-out-of-n Group Signatures (Camenisch et al. [9])

Camenisch et al. [9] build a dynamic group signature where committees control both enrollments in the group and de-anonymization, thus distributing trust. Their scheme is based on the Pointcheval-Sanders signature scheme, which features efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of a verifying message-signature pair, and some sigma protocols to ensure honest behavior of the parties involved. Importantly, no generic nizk is used which makes the construction very efficient.

In this section, we introduce an adapted version of the scheme in [9] that fits our framework. Below, we first present the tools for the Camenisch et al. construction, then we give a high-level overview of the construction and the modifications that are needed to adapt their scheme to the MUTAL framework, and finally, we describe the modified protocol.

#### 6.1 Preliminaries for Camenisch et al.

Cryptographic Assumptions. The security of this instantiation relies on the modified q-strong Diffie-Hellman assumption [30], the symmetric discrete logarithm assumption, and the symmetric external decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. We give the corresponding definitions for the former two and omit the latter which essentially states that in a pairing group, the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in both  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

**Definition 8.** Let  $\mathcal{G}$  be a type-3 pairing group generator. The q-MSDH assumption [30] holds with respect to  $\mathcal{G}$  if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  the probability that  $\mathcal{A}\left(\mathsf{gk}, g^a, h^a, h^{ax}, (g^{x^{\ell}}, h^{x^{\ell}})_{\ell=0}^q\right)$  where  $\mathsf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^{\lambda}), g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1, h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $a, x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ , outputs a tuple  $(w, P, \hat{g}^{1/x+w}, \hat{g}^{a/P(x)})$ with  $\hat{g} \in \mathbb{G}_1^*, P \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$  of degree at most q and w such that the polynomials X + w and P are co-prime is negligible in  $\lambda$ .

**Definition 9.** Let  $\mathcal{G}$  be a type-3 pairing group generator. The SDL assumption holds with respect to  $\mathcal{G}$  if for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$  the probability that  $\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{gk}, g, h, g^x, h^x)$  outputs x when  $\mathsf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^{\lambda}), g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1, h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2$  and  $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$  is negligible in  $\lambda$ .

*Pointcheval Sanders Signatures.* Pointcheval Sanders (PS) signature [30] is an efficient signature scheme in the bilinear group setting. The structure of PS signatures makes it easy to create a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) of a verifying message-signature pair. The ZKPoK does not reveal information about the message or the signature. While this can be done for any signature scheme using generic zero-knowledge proofs, the ZKPoK of the PS scheme relies on a sigma protocol, which is far more efficient. We next present a high-level description of the PS construction and the ZKPoK.

The PS signature scheme is used to enroll users in the system. The user communicates with the key issuer to enroll itself in the system. Briefly, the user chooses as a private a message m and sends it to the key issuer, who signs it. To explain this more thoroughly, we need to introduce the notation and setting of the PS signature scheme, which uses bilinear pairings. For reference, we describe the PS scheme in Figure 13 and the reader can cross-check our text description below with the figure.

The signature scheme is constructed in a bilinear group, described by  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$  and a bilinear map  $e: \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$ . All groups have order p and g, h are the generators of  $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$  respectively. The user chooses as its private key a message m and sends it to the key issuer in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . The key issuer signs m. Using the vector  $(x, y_0, y_1)$  as the signing key, the key issuer samples a random value a and computes  $x + my_0 + ay_1$ . The signature is thus the tuple  $(a, g, g^{x+my_0+ay_1})$ , while the public key is  $(X, Y_0, Y_1) = (h^x, h^{y_0}, h^{y_1})$ .

To verify the signature  $(a, \sigma_1 = g, \sigma_2 = g^{x+my_0+ay_1})$  has been correctly computed, the user checks first  $e(\sigma_1, XY_0^m Y_1^a) = e(g, h)^{x+y_0m+y_1a}$  and then computes  $e(\sigma_2, h)$  and compares the two values. It is easy to see that the values are equal for valid signatures, which ensures completeness.

#### $\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}}(gk)$ :

- Sample  $x, y_0, y_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $h \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ . Compute  $X := h^x, Y_0 := h^{y_0}, Y_1 := h^{y_1}$ .
- Output (sk, pk) where  $sk := (x, y_0, y_1)$  and  $vk := (X, Y_0, Y_1)$ .

 $\underbrace{\mathsf{Sign}}_{p}(gk,\mathsf{sk},m): \text{Sample } g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1 \text{ and } a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, \text{ and output } \sigma := (a, \sigma_1 := g, \sigma_2 := g^{(x+my_0+ay_1))}).$ Vrfy(vk, m,  $\sigma$ ): parse  $\sigma := (a, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  and output 1 iff  $e(\sigma_1, XY_0^mY_1^a) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\sigma_2, h).$ 

#### Fig. 12. Pointcheval-Sanders signature scheme.

ZKPoK of verifying PS message-signature. The user can prove without revealing its secret key that it has been enrolled in the group. Using a sigma protocol, the user proves that it knows exponents m, a that satisfy the verification equation  $e(g, XY_0^m Y_1^a) = e(\sigma_2, h)$ , for given values  $h, X, Y_0, Y_1, g', \sigma_2$ . This works, but  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2$ still leak information about the group elements of the signature. To avoid such information leakage, the prover first re-randomizes the signature by computing  $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2) = (\sigma_1^z, \sigma_2^z)$  for a fresh  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ . The re-randomized signature is valid and only replaces g with  $g^z$ . Furthermore, by the DDH assumption in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , the new values are pseudorandom and thus reveal no information about  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2$ . The user publishes these values and uses the mentioned sigma protocol to prove that it knows a verifying message-signature pair and is thus an authorized member of the group. Finally, the sigma protocol can be made non-interactive via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The user can then turn the ZKPoK of a verifying PS message-signature pair into a signature of knowledge (SoK) of the pair. A SoK means that a user can issue a signature on behalf of any NP statement proving that it knows the witness associated with a statement in the language and that it has signed message m.

NIZK Protocols used in threshold-DGS. Above, we described the joining procedure and the procedure through which a user can prove it belongs to the group, and thus give validity to its messages. As we mentioned before, an important feature of Camenisch et al. construction is that users can be de-anonymized but that the power to perform such a procedure is distributed among many parties, using a Threshold Encryption Scheme.

At high-level, [9] uses a modified version of the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [35] to prove that pairs of elements in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_T$  have the same discrete logarithm. In other words, these look like standard proofs of knowledge for El Gamal encryption/decryption, but operations are performed under a homomorphism in the target group. For example, consider an El Gamal ciphertext  $(C_1, C_2) = (C_1, MC_1^2)$  under public key  $Z = h^z$  in group  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . Let the element  $T = e(\Sigma, M)$  be a mapping f of the plaintext M in  $\mathbb{G}_T$  such that  $f: M \mapsto e(\Sigma, M)$ . One can prove that T is the f-mapping of the decryption by proving knowledge of z such that  $Z = h^z$  and  $T' = e(\Sigma, C_1)^z$  where  $T' = e(\Sigma, C_2) \cdot T^{-1}$ .

More specifically, we are interested in the following relations regarding El Gamal:

- 1. Proving correct computation of an encryption  $(C_1, C_2)$  of a message M when a homomorphism f(M) is given, namely, for a given  $\Sigma$ ,  $f(M) = e(\Sigma, M)$
- 2. Proving correct computation of a homomorphism of a decryption f(M) of a ciphertext  $(C_1, C_2)$  namely, for some given  $\Sigma$ ,  $f(M) = e(\Sigma, M)$ .

To go into further detail, we list all the  $\Sigma$ -protocols used. In the following list, NIZK<sub>(.)</sub> to denotes a non-interactive zero-knowledge protocol for a language  $\mathcal{L}_{(.)}$ .

- $\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{PS}}: \mathcal{L}_{\mathsf{PS}} = \big\{ \mathsf{pk} \mid \exists (m, \sigma) \text{ s.t. } \mathsf{Vrfy}_{\mathsf{pk}}(\mathsf{gk}, m, \sigma) = 1 \big\}$
- NIZK<sub>DDH</sub>:  $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DDH}} = \{a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{G}_1 \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } b = a^w \land d = c^w\}$

- $-\operatorname{NIZK}_{\mathsf{T}}: \mathcal{L}_{\mathsf{T}} = \{a, b \in \mathbb{G}_2, c, d \in \mathbb{G}_T \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } b = a^w \land d = c^w\} \\ -\operatorname{NIZK}_{\mathsf{enc}}: \mathcal{L}_{\mathsf{Enc}} = \{\Sigma \in \mathbb{G}_1, H, Z, C_1, C_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2, T \in \mathbb{G}_T \mid \exists r \text{ s.t. } C_1 = H^r \land e(\Sigma, C_2) \cdot T^{-1} = e(\Sigma, Z)^r\} \\ -\operatorname{NIZK}_{\mathsf{Dec}}: \mathcal{L}_{\mathsf{Dec}} = \{\Sigma \in \mathbb{G}_1, H, Z, C_1, C_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2, T \in \mathbb{G}_T \mid \exists r \text{ s.t. } Z = H^z \land e(\Sigma, C_2) \cdot T^{-1} = e(\Sigma, C_1)^z\}$

Note the last two proofs are simple instantiations of NIZK<sub>T</sub>, specifically,

- For NIZK<sub>Enc</sub> we can set  $a = H, b = C_1, c = e(\Sigma, Z), d = e(\Sigma, C_2)T^{-1}$  and use NIZK<sub>T</sub>.
- For NIZK<sub>Dec</sub> we can set  $a = H, b = C_1, c = e(\Sigma, C_1), d = e(\Sigma, C_2)T^{-1}$  and use NIZK<sub>T</sub>.

Now, one can prove knowledge of field elements m, a such that  $T_m^m T_a^a = T$  where  $T_m = e(\sigma_1, Y_0), T_a =$  $e(\sigma_1, Y_1)$  and  $T = e(\sigma_2, h)e(\sigma_1, X)^{-1}$ .

#### 6.2Overview of Camenisch et al. Construction

We next present a final overview of the construction due to Camenisch et al. [9], which we refer to as DGS. As mentioned before, [9] focuses on solving the trust issue that arises in group signature constructions, namely, the power of the party who enrolls users in a group and the one the entity that can de-anonymize users has.

For both cases, [9] distribute these roles by using threshold cryptography techniques and solve both issues simultaneously: their scheme has two different committees – one for each task – and a number of parties in each can be corrupted without compromising the security of the scheme.

We briefly discuss how the schemes presented above are used in the algorithms for enrolling users in the group, signing a message (which corresponds to generating a membership authorization in our general setting), and de-anonymization.

To join the group, a user U generates its secret key sk and asks the key issuer<sup>7</sup> to blindly signing it, and the latter generates a PS signature  $(a, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  on sk that U sampled.

To generate a proof of membership, U creates a signature of knowledge (SoK) of a valid message/PS signature pair under the key issuer's verification key, as explained above. The SoK guarantees no information is revealed about the message/PS signature and therefore about the user secret key. Furthermore, only group members can create proofs of membership: this follows by the fact that signing a message involves issuing a signature of knowledge on this message which in turn implies knowing a verifying PS message-signature pair issued by the key issuer.

In the following, we explain how the de-anonymization procedure for a message **m** works, namely the ability of a designated party to identify the signer of a specific message. Note that the designated party, in this case, is a committee. The user secret-shares the value  $Y_0^{sk}$  with the committee, where  $Y_0 = h^{y_0}$  is part of the PS signature public key as described in the previous section. The de-anonymization procedure requires the committee, to recover  $Y_0^{sk_i}$  for each user  $U_i$  in the system and perform the test of the verification equation with **m** to see which specific user signed it. If the openers compute  $Y_0^{sk_i}$  for every user (as required to do de-anonymization), say to de-anonymize one specific malicious message, they can individually use these values to de-anonymize every message. This is prevented by requiring that the committee never recovers  $Y_0^{sk_i}$ . They instead compute the values  $e(\sigma'_1, Y_0^{sk_i})$ . Using these values, they can still do the check against a signature  $(a, \sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$ . However, these values are useless for other messages since they are "tied" to the value  $\sigma'_1$ . Verifiable secret sharing techniques and sigma protocols are used to perform the above actions verifiably, both from the side of the users as well as the openers.

On the efficiency of the construction. The SoK based on Pointcheval-Sander's signature scheme uses a sigma protocol as proof of knowledge and, because sigma protocols are efficient, the resulting membership proofs in this construction are small and signing requires only lightweight computation from users. In contrast, opening signatures is expensive: each opener needs to do work linear in the size of the group itself. However, [9] assumes that de-anonymization is far rarer than signing, so this trade-off is acceptable. Furthermore, the latter task can afford to be performed using stronger hardware, while for many real-world applications one would want proving membership to be lightweight and efficient.

Modifications for MUTAL. The main goal of our MUTAL framework is to hold the manager accountable, and thus it is crucial to separate the tasks of de-anonymizing and granting for de-anonymization. The construction of Camenisch et al. can be easily modified to fit this framework by using a more sophisticated access structure -namely, a policy for which a subset of parties can reconstruct a shared secret- for secret sharing the value  $Y_0^{sk}$  for each user.

Specifically, we require that a shared secret can be reconstructed if at least t out of n parties in the committee (guardians) and a special party (group manager) collaborate, and any other subset of parties learns no information about it. This is achieved as follows: first, each user U samples, after sampling its secret key sk, a uniform element  $sk_1$  and sets  $sk_2 = sk - sk_1$ , then gives  $sk_2$  to the group manager and it uses a standard (t, n)-secret sharing scheme to share  $sk_1$  between the guardians (as done in [9]).

Now, upon a valid de-anonymization request, for each user  $U_i$  the guardians reconstruct the second part of the secret key  $\mathsf{sk}_{i,2}$  by collectively computing  $e(\sigma'_1, Y^{\mathsf{sk}_{i,2}})$  as in the Camenisch et al. case, and they send these values as the "authorization" to the manager. Then the manager can compute on its own  $e(\sigma'_1, Y^{\mathsf{sk}_i})$  by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> While in [9] it is possible to distribute the role of the key issuer, this is out of the scope of our work, so we will only assume a single key issuer. However, our modified construction can be adapted straightforwardly for such a feature.

using its share  $Y^{\mathsf{sk}_{i,1}}$  and perform the final de-anonymization by checking for which value the PS signature associated with the message verifies.

Intuitively, neither the guardians nor the manager alone can reconstruct  $e(\sigma'_1, Y_0^{sk})$  and so de-anonymization only happens when an appropriate subset of guardians *and* the group managercollaborate as required by MUTAL. Also, because group manager is the only party that reconstructs the above value, it is the only party that learns the identity of an issuer of a message. Finally, to ensure manager accountability, the guardians only grant de-anonymization to the group manager if the latter first signs a request; this request proves that the group manager indeed intended to de-anonymize some specific message.

For efficiency, from the user's perspective (enrolling, signing, and verifying openings) nothing changes compared to the protocol by Camenisch et al. The situation is like de-anonymization with one change: while in the original DGS, the openers could stop "brute-forcing" users when a signer is identified, in the modified version the guardians never learn the signer and so they always need to brute force all the users.

The full description of the scheme is presented in Fig. 13,14,15,16,17.

$$\begin{split} \underline{\mathsf{Setup}}(1^{\lambda}, t, n) \\ &- \mathsf{gk} := (q, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g, h, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^{\lambda}), \, \mathsf{pp} := (\mathsf{gk}, n, t) \\ \underline{\mathsf{KeyGenIssuer}}(\mathsf{pp}) : \mathcal{KI} \text{ generates a key pair for PS signature scheme in } \mathbb{G}_2. \\ &- \operatorname{Sample} x, y_0, y_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q. \text{ Compute } X := h^x, Y_0 := h^{y_0}, Y_1 := h^{y_1}. \\ &- \operatorname{Output}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}) \text{ where } \mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}} = (x, y_0, y_1) \text{ and } \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}} = (X, Y_0, Y_1). \\ \underline{\mathsf{KeyGenManager}}(\mathsf{pp}) : \mathcal{GM} \text{ generates an El-Gamal key pair on } \mathbb{G}_2. \\ &- \operatorname{Sample} z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q. \text{ Compute } Z := h^z. \\ &- \operatorname{Output}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}}) = (z, Z) \\ \underline{\mathsf{KeyGenGu}}(\mathsf{C}_\ell(\cdot))_{\mathsf{C}_\ell \in \mathcal{GU}}(\mathsf{pp}) : \text{ Each guardian } \mathsf{C}_\ell \text{ generates an El-Gamal key pair on } \mathbb{G}_2. \\ &- \operatorname{Sample} z_\ell \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q. \text{ Compute } Z_\ell := h^{z_\ell}. \\ &- \operatorname{Output}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathsf{C}_\ell}, \mathsf{pk}^{\mathsf{C}_\ell}) = (z_\ell, Z_\ell) \end{split}$$

Fig. 13. Parameter setup and Key Generation Protocols and Algorithms. We assume that all parties have as well a signature key pair for authenticated communication, which we omit in the description of the protocol.

## 6.3 Security

**Theorem 6.** In the random oracle model, DGS-MUTAL achieves Unforgeability (Def. 3) under  $n_U$ -MSDH and the SDL assumption, where  $n_U$  is an upper bound on the number of users.

Intuition:  $\mathcal{A}$  wins Exp-Unforge if it can provide a pair  $(m, \pi)$  such that AuthVrfy(pp, PK,  $m, \pi) = 1$  and  $\pi$  is not the output of a query on OMemberAuth. Thus,  $\mathcal{A}$  either (i) creates a certificate on its own, which means it forges a PS signature, or (ii) manages to create a valid signature of knowledge, which means it can break knowledge soundness of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> or learn sk of one honest user, which is encoded as a discrete logarithm.

**Theorem 7.** In the random oracle model, construction DGS-MUTAL achieves User Non-Frameability (Def. 4) under the SDL assumption.

Intuition: If  $\mathcal{A}$  wins Exp-UserNonFrame, managing to "blame" an honest user for a message/signature pair, means that it either wins unforgeability or fakes the decryption of the share of the user, namely, the adversary breaks soundness of NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.

 $\mathsf{JoinUser}\langle U_i(\mathrm{ID}), \mathcal{KI}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{KI}}\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{KI}}), \mathcal{GM}(\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}}, \mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{GM}})\rangle(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{PK})$  $\mathcal{KI}$ : Sample and send  $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, \hat{g} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ .  $U_i$ : - Parse the key issuer's key  $\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}$  as  $(X, Y_0, Y_1)$ - Sample secret key shares  $\mathsf{sk}_1, \mathsf{sk}_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . Set  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2$ . - Set  $\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1} := \hat{g}^{\mathsf{sk}_1}; g_{\mathsf{sk}_2} := g^{\mathsf{sk}_2}; \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2} := \hat{g}^{\mathsf{sk}_2}$ . - Compute  $\pi_{\mathsf{DDH},1} \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{ddh}}.\mathsf{Prove}((g, g_{\mathsf{sk}_1}, \hat{g}, \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1}), \mathsf{sk}_1); \pi_{\mathsf{DDH},2} \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{ddh}}.\mathsf{Prove}((g, g_{\mathsf{sk}_2}, \hat{g}, \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2}), \mathsf{sk}_2)$ Share Y<sub>0</sub><sup>sk1</sup> to the guardians in a verifiable manner as follows:
Sample p<sub>1</sub>,..., p<sub>t</sub> ← Z<sub>q</sub>. Let P(X) = sk<sub>1</sub> + ∑<sub>i=1</sub><sup>t</sup> p<sub>i</sub>X<sup>i</sup>.
For i ∈ {1,...,t} compute a commitment to the coefficients of P as P<sub>i</sub> := ĝ<sup>p<sub>i</sub></sup>. • For each  $C_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}$ , compute encrypted shares  $C_{\ell} := (C_{\ell,1}, C_{\ell,2}) := (h^r, Z_{\ell}^{r_{\ell}} Y_0^{P(\ell)})$ , value  $T_{\ell} =$  $e(\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^t P_i^{\ell^i}, Y_0), \ ^a \text{ and proof } \pi_{\mathsf{enc},\ell} \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{enc}}.\mathsf{Prove}((\hat{g}, h, Z_\ell, C_{\ell,1}, C_{\ell,2}, T_\ell), r)).$ - Verifiably secret share the value  $Y_0^{\mathsf{sk}_2}$  to the manager as follows: • Compute encrypted share for the group manager  $C := (C_1, C_2) := (h^r, Z^r Y_0^{\mathsf{sk}_2})$  and value T = $e(\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2}, Y_0).$ • Compute proof  $\pi_{enc} \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{enc}.\mathsf{Prove}(\hat{g}, H, Z, C_1, C_2, T), r)).$ - Output  $(\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1}, g_{\mathsf{sk}_2}, \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2}, \pi_{\mathsf{DDH},1}, \pi_{\mathsf{DDH},2}, \{P_\ell, C_\ell, \pi_{\mathsf{enc},\ell}\}_{C_\ell \in \mathcal{GU}} C, \pi_{\mathsf{enc}})$  $\mathcal{KI}$ : - For  $i \in \{1, ..., t\}$  compute  $T = e(\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1} \cdot \prod_{i=1}^t P_i^{\ell^i}, Y_0)$ . If  $\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{enc}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}((\hat{g}, H, Z, C_1, C_2, T), \pi_{\mathsf{enc}, \ell}) = 0$ , abort. - If NIZK<sub>enc</sub>.Vrfy $(\hat{g}, H, Z, C_1, C_2, T), \pi_{enc}) = 0$ , abort. - If NIZK<sub>ddh</sub>.Vrfy( $(g, g_{\mathsf{sk}_1}, \hat{g}, \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1}), \pi_{\mathsf{ddh},1}$ ) = 0 or NIZK<sub>ddh</sub>.Vrfy( $(g, g_{\mathsf{sk}_2}, \hat{g}, \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2}), \pi_{\mathsf{ddh},1}$ ) = 0, abort. - Blindly sign sk by computing  $\sigma_2 = \hat{g}^{x+y_1a}(\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1}\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2})^{y_0}$ - Send to all parties the user certificate cert :=  $(ID, a, \hat{g}, \{C_\ell\}_{C_\ell \in GU}, C)$  and  $\sigma_2$  to  $U_i$ .  $U_i$ : Set  $\sigma_1 := \hat{q}$  and  $\sigma =: (a, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  and output  $\mathsf{sk}_i := (\mathsf{sk}, \sigma)$ . <sup>*a*</sup> Product of  $P^{\ell^i}$  is just a polynomial evaluation of  $p(\ell)$  in the exponent



 $\underline{\mathsf{MemberAuth}}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\mathsf{sk}_i =: (\mathsf{sk},\sigma))$ 

- From PK parse  $\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}$  as the PS signature scheme public key.
- Compute  $\pi \leftarrow \text{SoK}_{PS}$ .Sign( $pk^{\mathcal{KI}}, m, (sk, \sigma)$ ). Note that  $\pi = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_{PS})$  where  $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2)$  is a rerandomization of the signature given by  $\mathcal{KI}$  and  $\pi_{PS}$  a Sigma protocol proof and output  $\pi$ .

 $\mathsf{AuthVrfy}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi):$ 

- From PK parse  $\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}}$  as the PS signature scheme public key and output 1 iff  $\mathsf{SoK}_{\mathsf{PS}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{m},\pi) = 1$ .



 $\mathsf{ReqDeanon}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{sk}^{\mathcal{GM}})\text{:}$ 

 $- \text{ Output } \mathsf{req} \leftarrow \mathsf{S}.\mathsf{Sign}_{\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{c}}^{\mathcal{G}}\mathcal{M}}(\mathsf{m} \| \pi).$ 

 $\mathsf{JudgeReq}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{PK},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req})$ 

- Output  $b \leftarrow \mathsf{S}.\mathsf{Vrfy}_{\mathsf{vk} \in \mathcal{M}}(\mathsf{m} \| \pi, \mathsf{req})$ 

Fig. 16. De-anonymization Request Algorithms.

<u>GrantDeanon</u>  $\langle C_1(\mathsf{sk}_1^{\mathcal{GU}}), \ldots, C_n(\mathsf{sk}_n^{\mathcal{GU}}) \rangle$  (pp, PK, req, m,  $\pi$ ). Each  $C_\ell \in \mathcal{GU}$  proceeds as follows: - If JudgeReq(pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ , req) = 0, abort. - Parse  $\pi := (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_{PS}).$ - Let  $n_U$  be the number of users at the time. For each  $i \in [n_U]$  in some fixed (e.g., lexicographic w.r.t. ID) order • Let  $\operatorname{cert}_i := \left( \operatorname{ID}_i, a_i, \hat{g}_i, \{ C_{i,\ell} = (C_{i,\ell,1}, C_{i,\ell,2}) \}_{\mathsf{C}_\ell \in \mathcal{GU}}, C_i = (C_{i,1}, C_{i,2}) \right).$ Compute B<sub>i,ℓ</sub> = e(σ'<sub>1</sub>, C<sub>i,ℓ,2</sub>C<sup>-z<sub>ℓ</sub></sup><sub>i,ℓ,1</sub>).
Compute π<sub>i,ℓ</sub> = NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.Prove((σ'<sub>1</sub>, h, Z<sub>ℓ</sub>, C<sub>i,ℓ,1</sub>, C<sub>i,ℓ,2</sub>, B<sub>i,ℓ</sub>), z<sub>ℓ</sub>) where (C<sub>i,ℓ,1</sub>, C<sub>i,ℓ,2</sub>) is the share of  $Y_0^{\mathsf{sk}_1}$  from user *i* to  $\mathsf{C}_\ell$ - Output access<sub> $\ell$ </sub> := { $(B_{i,\ell}, \pi_{i,\ell})$ }<sup> $n_U$ </sup><sub>i=1</sub>. Deanon $(C_{i,1}, C_{i,2})$ , pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ , access, sk<sup> $\mathcal{GM}$ </sup>). - Parse  $\pi := (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_{\mathsf{PS}})$  and  $\mathsf{access}_{\ell} := \{(B_{i,\ell}, \pi_{i,\ell})\}_{i=1}^{n_U}$  for all  $\ell$ . - For  $i \in [n_U]$ : • Let  $\operatorname{cert}_i := \left( \operatorname{ID}_i, a_i, \hat{g}_i, \{ C_{i,\ell} = (C_{i,\ell,1}, C_{i,\ell,2}) \}_{\mathsf{C}_\ell \in \mathcal{GU}}, C_i = (C_{i,1}, C_{i,2}) \right).$ • Let  $B_{i,j_1}, \ldots, B_{i,j_{t+1}}$  be t+1 values such that NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.Vrfy $((\sigma'_1, H, Z_{j_k}, C_{i,j_k,1}, C_{i,j_k,2}, B_{i,j_k}), \pi_{i,j_k}) = 1.$ and compute  $\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_{t+1}$  the Lagrange coefficients corresponding to the points  $(j_k, B_{i,j_k})$  for  $1 \leq j_k$  $k \leq t+1$ • Compute  $B_i = e(\sigma'_1, C_{i,2}C_{i,1}^{-z})$  and  $\pi_i = \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{Dec}}.\mathsf{Prove}((\sigma'_1, H, Z, C_i, C_i, B_i), z).$ • If  $e(\sigma'_2, h) = e(\sigma'_1, XY_1^{a_i}) B_i \prod_{j=k}^{t+1} B_{i,j_k}^{\lambda_j}$ , \* set  $\text{proof}_{\text{ID}} = (\{B_{i,j_k}, \pi_{i,j_k}\}_{k=1}^{t+1}, B_i, \pi_i)$ \* output  $(ID_i, proof_{ID})$ . • Else, continue to next *i*. - If the check does not hold  $\forall i \in n_U$  then output  $\perp$ .  $Judge(pp, PK, m, \pi, access, cert_{ID}, proof_{ID})$ - Parse cert<sub>i</sub> :=  $(ID_i, a_i, \hat{g}_i, \{C_{i,\ell}\}_{C \in \mathcal{GU}}, C_i), \pi := (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_{PS}), \text{ and } \mathsf{proof}_{ID} = (\{B_{i,j_k}, \pi_{i,j_k}\}_{k=1}^{t+1}, B_i, \pi_i).$ - Output 1 iff 1. For all  $1 \le k \le t+1$ , NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.Vrfy $((\sigma'_1, H, Z_{j_k}, C_{i,j_k,1}, C_{i,j_k,2}, B_{i,j_k}), \pi_{i,j_k}) = 1$ .

2. NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.Vrfy $((\sigma'_1, H, Z, C_{i,1}, C_{i,2}, B_i), \pi_i) = 1$ .

Fig. 17. De-anonymization Algorithms.

**Theorem 8.** In the random oracle model, construction DGS-MUTAL achieves User Accountability (Def.5) under the  $q_{\mathcal{H}}$ -MSDH, where  $q_{\mathcal{H}}$  is the number of queries to  $\mathcal{H}$  made by the adversary.

Intuition: An adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  wins if she provides a pair  $(\mathfrak{m}, \pi)$  that, upon going through the de-anonymization process, does not open to an ID belonging to any user. This means  $\mathcal{A}$  should be able to (i) forge PS message signature pair on the key of  $\mathcal{KI}$ , or (ii) create a proof of membership without holding any valid certificate, forging a signature of knowledge, i.e., breaking knowledge soundness of NIZK<sub>PS</sub>.

**Theorem 9.** Construction DGS-MUTAL achieves Manager Non-Frameability (Def. 6).

Intuition: The proof goes exactly as the one for the general instantiation (Section 5) and thus we omit it.

**Theorem 10.** In the random oracle model, construction DGS-MUTAL achieves User Anonymity (Def. 7) under the DDH assumption in  $\mathbb{G}_1$  and  $\mathbb{G}_2$ .

Intuition: In each of the two cases of anonymity the adversary does not have enough shares to de-anonymize. Further, the shares are encrypted, so it is infeasible for the adversary to use them under indistinguishability of El Gamal in  $\mathbb{G}_2$ . The proof itself has a rerandomized signature  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2$  and a proof for NIZK<sub>PS</sub>. NIZK<sub>PS</sub> satisfies zero knowledge, and therefore reveals no information. Similarly, the re-randomized part is pseudorandom, so neither does it reveal any information. More specifically, since  $\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma'_1 = \sigma_1^z, \sigma'_2 = \sigma_1^z$  is a DDH tuple, and no PPT distinguisher can distinguish a DDH tuple under the DDH assumption in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ .

# 7 Evolving Committees

The security properties introduced in this work require the participation of the committee of guardians. However, in real life, a committee of parties may only be available short-term and may also become corrupted over time. One solution is to allow guardians to change via the dynamic proactive secret sharing scheme (DPSS) by Goyal et al. [11] to our setting. DPSS allows a set of n parties, who hold n shares of a secret, to hand off the secret to another set of n parties. The n shares of the secret in our setting are those corresponding to the secret key associated with  $pk_{TE}^{GU}$ . The public and secret keys of the guardians remain the same, but the shares of the secret key are updated. Users always sign their messages with the same public key and the changing of the committee does not affect them.

The DPSS protocol [11] consists of *setup*, *hand-off*, and *reconstruction* phases. In our instantiations (Sections 5, 6) the three phases for DPSS are as follows: (1) In the *setup*, an initial committee produces ElGamal distributed keys. We denote the shared secret s and the public encryption key  $g^s$ ; (2) in the *hand-off* the old committee transfers the secret to the new committee, and we present this phase in Fig. ??; (3) rather than reconstruction, in our setting, the new committee work together to grant de-anonymizations. The current set of guardians removes the outer layer of decryption using the shared secret key s in a standard execution of verifiable decryption of ElGamal.

The system tolerates adaptive corruptions as soon as the adversary is not able to corrupt t + 1 parties in the lifetime of one committee. If this is the case, namely, the adversary is capable of corrupting at most t parties from each committee, it learns nothing about the secret (*secrecy*), nor can prevent parties from reconstructing the secret (*robustness*).

The hand-off. We denote by  $C_{\ell}^{(i)}$  member  $\ell$  of committee *i*, where each member holds a secret of a value  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ . Concretely, the secret shares are created by Shamir secret sharing: the share  $s_{\ell}$  of party  $\ell$  is  $p(\ell)$ , where p(X) is a random polynomial of degree *t* s.t. p(0) = s. We denote  $[s]_t$  the secret shares of *s* and  $[g^s]_t$  the same values but in the exponent of a group generator *g* used for the ElGamal cryptosystem. Essentially, including these values is the only modification we do in [11] to account for the case of threshold decryption.

Below, we shortly describe the hand-off phase of [11], i.e., the procedure through which committee iand committee i + 1 exchange and update their secret keys; parties of the old committee  $\mathcal{GU}^{(i)}$  hold a secret sharing of  $[s]_t$  which they want to "hand-off" to parties in  $\mathcal{GU}^{(i+1)}$ . The procedure consists of two sub-phases:

- In the preparation phase, the new committee prepares two independent degree-t sharings of a random value, denoted by  $[r]_t$  and  $[\tilde{r}]_t$  respectively, such that  $r = \tilde{r}$ , The old committee holds  $[r]_t$  and the new committee  $[\tilde{r}]_t$ .
- In the *refresh phase*, committee *i* computes the sharing  $[s-r]_t = [s]_t [r]_t$  and reconstructs the secret s-r. Members of committee i+1 then calculate the secret sharing of  $[\tilde{s}]_t = [\tilde{r}]_t + (s-r)$ , which is an independent sharing of *s*, namely  $[\tilde{s}]_t$ .

After the hand-off phase is completed, each member of the old committee  $C^{(i)}$  erases the old shares  $[s]_d$  to avoid future corruptions. To ensure that the shares exchanged between parties are well-formed and to allow honest parties to identify misbehaving ones (meaning they cannot create malformed shares), the protocol relies on a polynomial commitment scheme. Finally, to achieve verifiable decryption the protocol makes use of a nizk argument of knowledge. For simplicity, we omit the above descriptions in the presentation of the protocol. Our protocol closely follows the one introduced in [11] and we present it in Fig. ??.

#### 7.1 Evolving Committees in the instantiation of Section 6.

When instantiating our framework with the signature scheme by Camenisch et al., we have that each user generates a secret key and distributes its shares with the guardians (and manager). Namely, the guardians store not one but multiple secret shares, one for each user in the system. In this case, the protocol of Goyal et al. can easily be adapted, as presented in [11]. Basically, parties in  $\mathcal{GU}^{(i+1)}$  create two independent secrets  $(r_i, \tilde{r}_i)$  for each user and batch them and the shares  $([r_i]_t, [\tilde{r}_i]_t)$  through a random linear combination that is also used by the parties of  $\mathcal{GU}^{(i)}$  with  $\{[s_i]_t\}$  to reconstruct  $\{[s_i - r_i]_t\}$ . As a result, the amortized cost of communication per pair is O(n) elements.

Security Overview. The hand-off phase is particularly challenging since an adversary can corrupt t parties in the old committee and t parties in the new committee. However, after the hand-off phase, guardians from the old committee have the instruction to delete their shares, and thus, while corrupting t + 1 guardians from any previous committee is enough for the adversary to recover the secret key, it can happen with only a small probability.

For security in the semi-honest case, parties distribute consistent shares. An adversary controls t parties of the old committee and t parties of the new committee. If the two coupled sharings are random, then an adversary having t shares of each sees only the share s masked with a random value r as s - r, and thus cannot learn anything about s.

In [11], the approach used is to have each member of the new committee create an individual random coupled share  $[r_j]_t, [\tilde{r}_j]_t$  and then all parties collectively compute the coupled sharing  $([r]_t, [\tilde{r}]_t) =$  $([\sum r_j]_t, [\sum r_j]_t)$ . Since at least one party is honest, say party  $\ell$ , the value  $r_\ell$  is uniformly distributed, and thus, so is r. To achieve security in the malicious case, the authors in [11] use the polynomial commitment scheme of Kate et. al. [38] to ensure that the values shared by each party are consistent, namely, that party  $\ell$  receives the share  $p(\ell)$  for a committed polynomial p of degree t. They also take advantage of the linearhomomorphic properties of [38] to improve efficiency and create efficient accuse-response protocols to identify misbehaving parties. We refer the reader to [11, Sec. 4, 5] for the details.

## References

- Security through encryption and security despite encryption council resolution on encryption. https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13084-2020-REV-1/en/pdf, 2020. Accessed: 2021-09-20.
- Luis von Ahn, Andrew Bortz, Nicholas J. Hopper, and Kevin O'Neill. Selectively traceable anonymity. In George Danezis and Philippe Golle, editors, *PET 2006*, volume 4258 of *LNCS*, pages 208–222, Cambridge, UK, June 28–30, 2006. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Jonathan Frankle, Sunoo Park, Daniel Shaar, Shafi Goldwasser, and Daniel J. Weitzner. Practical accountability of secret processes. In William Enck and Adrienne Porter Felt, editors, USENIX Security 2018, pages 657–674, Baltimore, MD, USA, August 15–17, 2018. USENIX Association.

- 4. Stefan Köpsell, Rolf Wendolsky, and Hannes Federrath. Revocable anonymity. In International Conference on Emerging Trends in Information and Communication Security, pages 206–220. Springer, 2006.
- Benoît Libert, Fabrice Mouhartem, and Khoa Nguyen. A lattice-based group signature scheme with messagedependent opening. In Mark Manulis, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, and Steve Schneider, editors, ACNS 16, volume 9696 of LNCS, pages 137–155, Guildford, UK, June 19–22, 2016. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Benoît Libert and Marc Joye. Group signatures with message-dependent opening in the standard model. In Josh Benaloh, editor, CT-RSA 2014, volume 8366 of LNCS, pages 286–306, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 25–28, 2014. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Yusuke Sakai, Keita Emura, Goichiro Hanaoka, Yutaka Kawai, Takahiro Matsuda, and Kazumasa Omote. Group signatures with message-dependent opening. In Michel Abdalla and Tanja Lange, editors, *PAIRING 2012*, volume 7708 of *LNCS*, pages 270–294, Cologne, Germany, May 16–18, 2013. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- 8. Joris Claessens, Claudia Diaz, Caroline Goemans, Jos Dumortier, Bart Preneel, and Joos Vandewalle. Revocable anonymous access to the internet? *Internet Research*, 2003.
- Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, Anja Lehmann, Gregory Neven, and Patrick Towa. Short threshold dynamic group signatures. In Clemente Galdi and Vladimir Kolesnikov, editors, SCN 20, volume 12238 of LNCS, pages 401–423, Amalfi, Italy, September 14–16, 2020. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Amir Herzberg, Stanisław Jarecki, Hugo Krawczyk, and Moti Yung. Proactive secret sharing or: How to cope with perpetual leakage. In Don Coppersmith, editor, CRYPTO'95, volume 963 of LNCS, pages 339–352, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 27–31, 1995. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Vipul Goyal, Abhiram Kothapalli, Elisaweta Masserova, Bryan Parno, and Yifan Song. Storing and retrieving secrets on a blockchain. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2020/504, 2020. https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/ 504.
- 12. Claudia Diaz and Bart Preneel. Accountable anonymous communication. In Security, Privacy, and Trust in Modern Data Management, pages 239–253. Springer, 2007.
- 13. Dan Boneh, Rosario Gennaro, Steven Goldfeder, Aayush Jain, Sam Kim, Peter M. R. Rasmussen, and Amit Sahai. Threshold cryptosystems from threshold fully homomorphic encryption. In Hovav Shacham and Alexandra Boldyreva, editors, *CRYPTO 2018, Part I*, volume 10991 of *LNCS*, pages 565–596, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19–23, 2018. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- 14. Dan Boneh, Rosario Gennaro, Steven Goldfeder, and Sam Kim. A lattice-based universal thresholdizer for cryptographic systems. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/251, 2017. http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/251.
- Silvio Micali, Michael O. Rabin, and Salil P. Vadhan. Verifiable random functions. In 40th FOCS, pages 120–130, New York, NY, USA, October 17–19, 1999. IEEE Computer Society Press.
- Yossi Gilad, Rotem Hemo, Silvio Micali, Georgios Vlachos, and Nickolai Zeldovich. Algorand: Scaling byzantine agreements for cryptocurrencies. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/454, 2017. http://eprint.iacr.org/ 2017/454.
- Rafael Pass and Elaine Shi. Hybrid consensus: Efficient consensus in the permissionless model. In 31st International Symposium on Distributed Computing (DISC 2017). Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik, 2017.
- Fabrice Benhamouda, Craig Gentry, Sergey Gorbunov, Shai Halevi, Hugo Krawczyk, Chengyu Lin, Tal Rabin, and Leonid Reyzin. Can a public blockchain keep a secret? In *Theory of Cryptography Conference*, pages 260–290. Springer, 2020.
- David A. Schultz, Barbara Liskov, and Moses Liskov. Mobile proactive secret sharing. In Rida A. Bazzi and Boaz Patt-Shamir, editors, 27th ACM PODC, page 458, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 18–21, 2008. ACM.
- Henry Corrigan-Gibbs and Bryan Ford. Dissent: accountable anonymous group messaging. In Ehab Al-Shaer, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Vitaly Shmatikov, editors, ACM CCS 2010, pages 340–350, Chicago, Illinois, USA, October 4–8, 2010. ACM Press.
- Yvo Desmedt. Society and group oriented cryptography: A new concept. In Carl Pomerance, editor, CRYPTO'87, volume 293 of LNCS, pages 120–127, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16–20, 1988. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- 22. Adi Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 22(11):612–613, November 1979.
- 23. George Danezis and Len Sassaman. How to bypass two anonymity revocation schemes. In Nikita Borisov and Ian Goldberg, editors, *PETS 2008*, volume 5134 of *LNCS*, pages 187–201, Leuven, Belgium, July 23–25, 2008. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Brent R. Waters. Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles. In Ronald Cramer, editor, EURO-CRYPT 2005, volume 3494 of LNCS, pages 114–127, Aarhus, Denmark, May 22–26, 2005. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.

- Dan Boneh and Matthew K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. In Joe Kilian, editor, CRYPTO 2001, volume 2139 of LNCS, pages 213–229, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 19–23, 2001. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Tools, volume 1. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001.
- 27. Oded Goldreich. Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Applications, volume 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004.
- 28. Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition. CRC Press, 2014.
- Jens Groth and Mary Maller. Snarky signatures: Minimal signatures of knowledge from simulation-extractable SNARKs. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, CRYPTO 2017, Part II, volume 10402 of LNCS, pages 581–612, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20–24, 2017. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- David Pointcheval and Olivier Sanders. Short randomizable signatures. In Kazue Sako, editor, CT-RSA 2016, volume 9610 of LNCS, pages 111–126, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 29 – March 4, 2016. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, *CRYPTO'86*, volume 263 of *LNCS*, pages 186–194, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 1987. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Melissa Chase and Anna Lysyanskaya. On signatures of knowledge. In Cynthia Dwork, editor, CRYPTO 2006, volume 4117 of LNCS, pages 78–96, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20–24, 2006. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- 33. Yvo Desmedt and Yair Frankel. Threshold cryptosystems. In Gilles Brassard, editor, CRYPTO'89, volume 435 of LNCS, pages 307–315, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 20–24, 1990. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Paul Feldman. A practical scheme for non-interactive verifiable secret sharing. In 28th FOCS, pages 427–437, Los Angeles, CA, USA, October 12–14, 1987. IEEE Computer Society Press.
- David Chaum and Torben P. Pedersen. Wallet databases with observers. In Ernest F. Brickell, editor, CRYPTO'92, volume 740 of LNCS, pages 89–105, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 16–20, 1993. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.
- Don Johnson, Alfred Menezes, and Scott Vanstone. The elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ecdsa). International journal of information security, 1(1):36–63, 2001.
- 37. Wouter Penard and Tim van Werkhoven. On the secure hash algorithm family. Cryptography in Context, pages 1–18, 2008.
- Aniket Kate, Gregory M. Zaverucha, and Ian Goldberg. Constant-size commitments to polynomials and their applications. In Masayuki Abe, editor, ASIACRYPT 2010, volume 6477 of LNCS, pages 177–194, Singapore, December 5–9, 2010. Springer, Heidelberg, Germany.

# **A** Cryptographic Primitives

## A.1 Threshold Encryption Scheme

A (t, n)-Threshold Encryption Scheme TE consists on a tuple of algorithms and protocols (TE.Setup, TE.KeyGen, TE.Enc, TE.ProveValidDec, TE.ValidDec) executed by n parties:

- $-pp_{\mathsf{TE}} \leftarrow \mathsf{TE.Setup}(n, t, 1^{\lambda})$ : On input the number of parties n, a threshold t, and the security parameter  $1^{\lambda}$ , it outputs parameters for the scheme  $pp_{\mathsf{TE}}$ .
- $(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}, (\mathsf{sk}^{i}_{\mathsf{TE}})^{n}_{i=1}) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}\langle U_{i}(\cdot)\rangle_{i=1}^{n}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}})$ : An *n*-party protocol with public input the parameters  $\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  and no secret input. The common output is  $\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  and party *i* receives a secret output  $\mathsf{sk}^{i}_{\mathsf{TE}}$ .
- $-c \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m})$ . On input the public key  $\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  and a message  $\mathsf{m}$ , it outputs a ciphertext c.
- $(\text{proof}_{m}, m) \leftarrow \text{TE.ProveValidDec}\langle U_{i}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{i}) \rangle_{i=1}^{n}(c)$ : on input a ciphertext c, the *n*-party protocol produces a decryption and a publicly verifiable proof that the decryption was done correctly
- $-b \leftarrow \mathsf{TE.ValidDec}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m}, c, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}})$ : On input a ciphertext c, a message  $\mathsf{m}$ , and a proof  $\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}}$ , it outputs a bit b indicating whether  $\mathsf{m}$  is the correct decryption of c.

We require a threshold encryption scheme to satisfy correctness, computational soundness, indistinguishability of encryptions, and decryption simulatability. We omit correctness which states that t + 1 honest can always decrypt.

Soundness states that it should be infeasible to produce fake proofs of correct decryption.

$$\begin{split} \underline{\mathsf{Soundness}_{\mathsf{TE},\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})} \\ &- \mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}} \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Setup}(n,t,1^{\lambda}) \\ &- (\mathsf{m},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}}) \\ &- c \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m}) \\ &- (\mathsf{m}',\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}) \\ &- \operatorname{Output} 1 \text{ iff } \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ValidDec}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m}',c,\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}'}) = 1 \text{ and } \mathsf{m} \neq \mathsf{m}'. \end{split}$$



**Definition 10.** [Computational Soundness] For all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , all  $\lambda, n, t \in \mathbb{N}$ , with  $t \leq n$ ,

 $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Soundness}_{\mathsf{TE},\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$ 

Indistinguishability of encryptions captures that no adversary can distinguish ciphertexts even when he is able to control up to t parties, selected adaptively during key generation and decryption.

 $\begin{array}{l} \underbrace{(t,n)\text{-Ind}_{\mathsf{TE},\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})}{- \mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}} \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Setup}\ (n,t,1^{\lambda})} \\ - \mathcal{A} \text{ controls a set } M \text{ of parties chosen adaptively.} \\ - (\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}},(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{i})_{i=1}^{n}) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathcal{A})\langle U_{i}(\cdot)\rangle_{i\notin M}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}}). \\ - (\mathfrak{m}_{0},\mathfrak{m}_{1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{A}}). \\ - c_{b} \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathfrak{m}_{b}) \text{ for uniform } b \leftarrow \{0,1\}. \\ - b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c_{b},\mathsf{st}^{\mathcal{A}}). \\ - \text{ Output 1 iff } |M| \leq t \text{ and } b = b'. \end{array}$ 

**Fig. 19.** (t, n)-Ind<sub>TE.A</sub>

**Definition 11.** [(t,n)-Indistinguishability of Encryption] For all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ ,

$$\Pr\left[(t,n)\operatorname{-Ind}_{\mathsf{TE},\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \operatorname{negl}(\lambda).$$

Finally, decryption simulatability means that given a message and its encryption, it is possible to simulate the proof that the decryption was properly computed.

**Definition 12** (t-Decryption Simulatability). A Threshold Encryption Scheme has t-Decryption Simulatability if there exists a PPT algorithm S, such that for all PPT A, messages  $\mathfrak{m}$ , randomnesses r, and sets  $S_1 \subseteq S_2 \subseteq [n]$  with  $|S_2| \leq t$ , the following distributions are perfectly indistinguishable:

$$\begin{cases} (\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}},\mathsf{m}) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec} \\ (\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}))\langle U_{i}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{i})\rangle_{U_{i}\in[n]\setminus S_{2}}(c) \end{cases} \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}},\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}, \left(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{i}\right)_{U_{i}\in[n]\setminus S_{1}}\right) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathcal{A}(\cdot))\langle U_{i}(\cdot)\rangle_{U_{i}\in[n]\setminus S_{1}}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}}) \\ c \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m};r) \end{cases} \\ \\ \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{sim}},\mathsf{m}) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec} \\ (\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}), \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{m}, r))(c) \end{cases} \begin{pmatrix} \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}, \mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}, \left(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{i}\right)_{U_{i}\in[n]\setminus S_{1}}\right) \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathcal{A}(\cdot))\langle U_{i}(\cdot)\rangle_{U_{i}\in[n]\setminus S_{1}}(\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{TE}}) \\ c \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m};r) \end{cases} \end{cases}$$

#### A.2 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument

Let  $\mathcal{R}$  be an NP relation, with pairs  $(u, w) \in \mathcal{R}$  where u is known as the *statement* and w is known as the *witness*.

**Definition 13 (Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge).** A Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge NIZK<sub>R</sub> for  $\mathcal{R}$ , is a tuple of algorithms (NIZK<sub>R</sub>.Setup, NIZK<sub>R</sub>.Prove, NIZK<sub>R</sub>.Vrfy, NIZK<sub>R</sub>.Sim) such that:

- $(crs, \tau) \leftarrow NIZK_{\mathcal{R}}.Setup(\lambda): on input a security parameter \lambda, it outputs a common reference string crs and a simulation trapdoor <math>\tau$ .
- proof  $\leftarrow$  NIZK<sub>R</sub>.Prove(crs, u, w): on input crs and a pair  $(u, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ , it outputs a proof proof.
- $-b \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\mathsf{crs}, u, \mathsf{proof}):$  on input  $\mathsf{crs}$ , a statement u and an argument  $\mathsf{proof}$ , it returns a bit b indicating acceptance (1) or rejection (0).
- $\operatorname{proof}_{sim} \leftarrow \operatorname{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\operatorname{Sim}(\tau, u)$ : on input the simulation trapdoor  $\tau$  and a statement u, it returns a simulated proof  $\operatorname{proof}_{sim}$ .

for which the following properties hold:

**Definition 14 (Completeness).** For all  $(u, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ , if  $(\sigma, \tau) \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Setup}(\lambda)$  and proof  $\leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Prove}(\sigma, u, w)$ , then  $\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\sigma, u, \mathsf{proof}) = 1$  with probability 1.

**Definition 15 (Knowledge-Soundness).** For all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a PPT extractor  $\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}$  and a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that,

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\sigma, u, \mathsf{proof}) = 1 \land (u, w) \notin \mathcal{R} \middle| \begin{array}{c} (\mathsf{crs}, \tau) \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Setup}(\lambda) \\ (u, \mathsf{proof}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{crs}; r), \\ w \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathsf{crs}; r) \end{array} \right] \le \mu(\lambda)$$

**Definition 16.** (Zero-Knowledge.) For all adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that,

$$\Pr\left[\left.b'=b\right|\left(\mathsf{crs},\tau\right)\leftarrow\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Setup}(\lambda)\wedge b\leftarrow\{0,1\}\ \wedge b'\leftarrow\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_b}(\mathsf{crs})\right]\leq\frac{1}{2}+\mu(\lambda)$$

where

$$\mathcal{O}_0(u,w) \leftarrow \begin{cases} \bot & (u,w) \notin \mathcal{R} \\ \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Prove}(\mathsf{crs},u,w) & otherwise \end{cases}, \qquad \mathcal{O}_1(u,w) \leftarrow \begin{cases} \bot & (u,w) \notin \mathcal{R} \\ \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Sim}(\tau,u) & otherwise \end{cases}$$

Additionally,  $NIZK_{\mathcal{R}}$  can satisfy the following property:

**Definition 17 (Simulation-extractability).** For all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a PPT extractor  $\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}$  and a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that,

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{c|c}\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Vrfy}(\sigma, u, \mathsf{proof}) = 1 & (\mathsf{crs}, \tau) \leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathsf{Setup}(\lambda) \\ \land (u, w) \notin \mathcal{R} \land (u, \mathsf{proof}) \notin Q \middle| (u, \mathsf{proof}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{crs}; r), w \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathsf{crs}; r) \right] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

where  $\mathcal{O}(\cdot)$  is an oracle to NIZK.Sim  $(\tau, \cdot)$  and Q is the set of all oracle query-answer pairs.

When a NIZK argument satisfies Simulation-extractability, we will call it a SNARK, as in [29], and denote  $snark_{\mathcal{R}} = (snark_{\mathcal{R}}.Setup, snark_{\mathcal{R}}.Prove, snark_{\mathcal{R}}.Vrfy, snark_{\mathcal{R}}.Sim).$ 

# **B** Security of the generic construction

#### B.1 Proof of Thm. 1

*Proof.* We prove unforgeability via hybrid arguments and a reduction to One Wayness.  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}}$ : We denote the real unforgeability game (Def. 2), instantiated with  $\Pi$ -MUTAL as  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}}$ . Then  $Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}}$  but when simulating the OMemberAuth oracle, proof is replaced with proof<sub>Sim</sub>  $\leftarrow$  snark<sub> $\mathcal{R}$ </sub>.Sim( $\tau_{\mathcal{R}}$ , (m,  $c_2$ , PK)).

Suppose  $\mathcal{A}$  is such that  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{0}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{1}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \geq p(\lambda)$ , for a non-negligible function p. Note that the only difference in the two games is how the snark's proofs are constructed. Thus, distinguishing between the two games, directly implies distinguishing honestly generated versus simulated proofs with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the zero knowledge property of the snark.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$ :  $\mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}}$  but upon receiving forgery  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ , parse  $\pi$  as  $(c_2, \mathsf{proof})$ , invoke the snark extractor  $\mathsf{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}(\mathsf{crs}_{\mathcal{R}})$  and output a witness  $(r_2, c_1, r_1, \mathsf{cert}, \mathsf{sk})$ . Abort if  $((\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{proof}), (r_2, c_1, r_1, \mathsf{cert}, \mathsf{sk})) \notin \mathcal{R}$ .

These games are indistinguishable conditioned on the extractor outputting a valid witness. Suppose this is not the case and all PPT algorithms  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}$  fail, with non-negligible probability, to output  $w = (r_2, c_1, r_1, \operatorname{cert}, \operatorname{sk})$  s.t.  $((\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}), w) \in \mathcal{R}$ .

We construct  $\mathcal{B}_{snark}$ , an adversary against simulation extractability ([29, Def. 2.10]) that behaves as follows:

**Reduction 1:**  $\mathcal{B}(\operatorname{crs}_{\mathcal{R}}; r)$ 

- $\mathcal{B}_{snark}$  activates  $\mathcal A$  on pp and  $vk_S$  and proceeds as the challenger faithfully.
- When  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $(m, c_2, \mathsf{PK})$  and proof,  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{snark}}$  forwards it to its challenger.

Note that for every PPT algorithm snark. $\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{B}}$  that can successfully produce a witness for a statement outputted by  $\mathcal{B}_{snark}$ , it also produces a witness for the (same) statement outputted by  $\mathcal{A}$ . Assuming there is no such algorithm for the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_{snark}$  would win simulation extractability with non-negligible probability.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_2$ , but the challenger additionally checks if  $(\mathsf{cert}, \cdot) \in \mathcal{U}_h$ .

The games are identically distributed conditioned on the checking  $(\text{cert}, \cdot) \in U_h$  not failing. Assume it fails and consider  $\mathcal{B}_S$ , an adversary against the unforgeability of S that acts as follows:

**Reduction 2:** $\mathcal{B}_{S}(vk_{S})$ 

- $-\mathcal{A}$  acts as  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})$  challenger with  $vk_{\mathcal{KI}} := vk_s$ . On OHonJoin queries, use the signing oracle.
- If any check fails output  $\bot.$
- Let  $(\mathbf{m}^*, \pi^*)$  be  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output and  $(r_2, c_1, r_1, \text{cert}, \mathbf{sk})$  the extracted witness. Parse  $\text{cert} = (\mathsf{vk}_i, \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$  and output  $(\mathsf{vk}_i || \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$ .

Conditioned on  $\mathcal{A}$  winning, the extractor outputs a valid witness. Moreover, since we assume that  $(\operatorname{cert}, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{U}_h$ , the final output of  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{S}}$  is a valid message-signature pair such that the signature was never queried to the signing oracle, meaning it succeeds in forging a signature.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  to One Wayness: Finally, let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary to  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ , and let  $q = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$  the number of  $\mathsf{OHonJoin}$  queries.

**Reduction 3:** $\mathcal{B}_{OWF}(1^{\lambda}, vk)$ 

- Receive vk from her challenger and uniformly picks  $c \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, q\}$ .
- For all queries,  $\mathcal{B}_{OWF}$  answers as the challenger does, except that, in the *i*-th query of OHonJoin, it returns the vk received.
- When  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $(\mathsf{m}^*, \pi^*)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  parses  $\pi^* = (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$  and runs  $\mathsf{NIZK}.\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{R}}(\mathsf{crs}_{\mathcal{R}})$ .
- Let  $(r_2, c_1, r_1, \text{cert}, sk)$  be the extracted witness. If cert corresponds to the c-th OHonJoin query,  $\mathcal{B}_{OWF}$ outputs  $\mathsf{sk}$  and  $\perp$  otherwise.

Assuming that  $\mathcal{A}$  wins in Hyb<sup> $\mathcal{A}$ </sup>, cert corresponds to one of the q queries made to OHonJoin. Since  $vk = vk_c$  is sampled by the OWF challenger in the exact way as all the  $vk_i$  are sampled by  $\mathcal{B}_{OWF}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$ has no information about c. Thus, with probability  $\frac{1}{q}$ , cert corresponds to the vk and f(sk) = vk and  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{3}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \leq q \cdot \Pr\left[\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{OWF}}(1^{|x|}, f(x)) \in f^{-1}(f(x))\right].$  Since q is polynomial in  $\lambda$ , the probability of winning  $Hyb_3$  is negligible.

We conclude that for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , Pr  $[\mathsf{Exp-Unforge}_{\Pi-\mathsf{MUTAL},\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ .

П

#### **B.2** Proof of Thm 2

*Proof.*  $\mathsf{Hyb}_0^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$ : In this case,  $\mathsf{Hyb}_0^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the real Non-Frameability experiment (Fig. 3) instantiated with  $\Pi$ -MUTAL, and  $\mathsf{Hyb}_1$ ,  $\mathsf{Hyb}_2$  perform the same changes as in the case of unforgeability.  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ :  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  but the challenger additionally checks if  $c_1' = c_1$ , and output 1 if this condition holds. Then, the games are identical if the decryption of the outer layer  $c_1$  is equal to the element  $c'_1$  outputted by the extractor. Conditioned on the extractor succeeding, we can construct an adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  against the Soundness of Threshold Encryption Scheme (Def. 10) as follows:

Reduction 4:  $\mathcal{B}_{TE}(pp_{TE})$ 

- $-\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  initializes  $\mathcal{A}$  as the challenger in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  and uses the received parameters for the TE. It creates a public key for the TE by interacting with  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- Upon  $\mathcal{A}$ 's forgery  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{access}, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}), \mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  parses  $\mathsf{access} := (\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}}, \mathsf{m} \| c_1)$  and  $\mathsf{outputs}$  $(\mathsf{m} \| c_1, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}})$

Because we assume snark<sub>*R*</sub>.  $\mathcal{X}$  does not fail, we have  $c_2 = \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}^{\mathcal{GU}}}(\mathsf{m} \| c_1'; r_2)$ . If  $\mathsf{m} \| c_1 \neq \mathsf{m} \| c_1', \mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$ breaks soundness of TE (Def. 10), and thus we conclude that for all  $\mathcal{A}$ , there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ such that  $\left| \Pr \left[ \mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ \mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda)$ 

 $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $Hyb_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ . This is  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  with the additional check  $cert' = cert_{ID}$ ; the final output is 1 if this equality also holds. Note that  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $Hyb_4^{\mathcal{A}}$  are identical conditioned on cert = cert'. If this is not the case, we can construct an adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{NIZK}$  against simulation extractability that acts as follows:

Reduction 5:  $\mathcal{B}_{NIZK}(crs_{\mathcal{VD}})$ 

- $\begin{array}{l} \ \mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{NIZK}} \ \text{initializes} \ \mathcal{A} \ \text{as the challenger in } \mathsf{Hyb}_4^{\mathcal{A}}. \\ \ \mathrm{Upon} \ \mathcal{A} \ \text{'s output} \ (\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{access}, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}, \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}), \ \mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{NIZK}} \ \text{outputs} \ ((\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}}, c_1, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}), \mathsf{proof}_{\mathrm{ID}}). \end{array}$

Because  $(c'_1, \mathsf{cert}', r_1)$  is part of a valid witness for  $\mathcal{R}, c_1 = c'_1 = \mathsf{E}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{F}}^{\mathcal{G}\mathcal{M}}}(\mathsf{cert}'; r_1)$ . If  $\mathsf{cert}' \neq \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}$ , then  $(\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}^{\mathcal{GM}}, c_1, \mathsf{cert}_{\mathrm{ID}}) \notin \mathcal{VD}$  and there is no witness for this statement; thus, every extractor fails. We conclude the games are indistinguishable.

 $Hyb_4$  to One Wayness: Finally, recall that, from the previous game, we have cert' = cert<sub>ID</sub> and, from the real game, the winning condition of  $\mathcal{A}$  implies (cert<sub>ID</sub>,  $\cdot) \in \mathcal{U}_h$ . Conditioned on this two facts, the reduction from  $Hyb_4$  to One Wayness is the same as the reduction from  $Hyb_3$  to One Wayness in Theorem 1.

We conclude that, for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , Pr [Exp-UserNonFrame<sub> $\Pi$ -MUTAL, $\mathcal{A}$ </sub> $(1^{\lambda}) = 1$ ]  $\leq \mu(\lambda)$ .

#### B.3 Proof of Thm 3

*Proof.*  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the real accountability game of Def. 4 instantiated with  $\Pi$ -MUTAL;  $Hyb_1$ ,  $Hyb_2$ ,  $Hyb_3$  apply the same sequence of changes as in the proof of Thm. 2.  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ . The latter is the same as  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  except it also checks: cert' = cert and the output is 1 if and

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ . The latter is the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  except it also checks:  $\mathsf{cert}' = \mathsf{cert}$  and the output is 1 if and only if this condition also holds. Note that here we simply rely on correctness of the encryption scheme:  $\mathsf{cert}$  is the decryption of  $c_1$  by construction and  $\mathsf{cert}'$  is a part of a valid witness for  $\mathcal{R}$  so, with non-negligible probability, it is a decryption of  $c_1$  and then  $\mathsf{cert} = \mathsf{cert}'$ .

 $Hyb_4$  to Unforgeability: Next, we show that an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  winning  $Hyb_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ , implies an adversary  $\mathcal{B}_5$  that breaks the unforgeability of the signature scheme  $\mathcal{B}_5$  works as follows:

 $\mathbf{Reduction} \ \mathbf{1:} \mathcal{B}_S(\mathsf{vk}_S)$ 

- Initialize  $\mathcal{A}$  by acting as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_4^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})$ ; set  $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathcal{KI}} := \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{S}}$  and use the signing oracle to simulate  $\mathsf{OHonJoin}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a pair  $(\mathbf{m}^*, \pi^*)$ .
- Let  $(r_2, c_1, r_1, \text{cert}', \text{sk})$  be the extracted witness, parse  $\text{cert}' = (\mathsf{vk}_i, \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$  and output  $(\mathsf{vk}_i || \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$ .

Assuming  $\mathcal{A}$  wins  $\mathsf{Hyb}_4^{\mathcal{A}}$ , the pair  $(\mathsf{vk}_i || \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$  is a valid message-signature pair under the key  $\mathsf{vk}_S$ , as we already have the extractor outputs a valid witness. Furthermore, we are guaranteed that the honestly computed cert, does not belong to the set  $\mathcal{U}_h \cup$  which implies that cert' = cert  $\notin \mathcal{U}_h \cup$ . Thus,  $(\mathsf{vk}_i || \mathrm{ID}_i, \sigma)$  was not a query-answer pair to the signing oracle, so it constitutes a valid forgery. We conclude that, for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , Pr [t-Exp-UserAccountability<sub>II-MUTAL.A</sub>(1<sup> $\lambda$ </sup>) = 1]  $\leq$  negl( $\lambda$ ).

#### B.4 Proof of Thm. 4

*Proof.* Assume an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  against Manager Non-Frameability (Def. 6). We construct an adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{S}$  against the Signature Scheme.

 $\mathbf{Reduction}~\mathbf{1}{:}\mathcal{B}_{S}(\mathsf{pp}_{S},\mathsf{vk}_{S})$ 

-  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{S}}$  answers all oracles honestly, using its secret keys, except for OReq which it answers as follows: On input  $(\mathsf{m}_i, \pi_i)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{S}}$  queries it's signing oracle with  $\mathsf{m}_i || \pi_i$  and gets a signature  $\sigma_i$ . It gives  $\mathsf{req}_i := \sigma_i$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  and updates the request set  $\mathcal{Q}$  with  $(\mathsf{m}_i, \pi_i, \mathsf{req}_i)$ .

- Upon receiving  $(\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}},\mathsf{m},\pi,\mathsf{req}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}(\mathsf{pp},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{KI}},\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GM}})$  from  $\mathcal{A}$ , outputs  $(\mathsf{m} \| \pi,\mathsf{req})$  as its forgery.

Assume  $\mathcal{A}$  wins Manager Non-Frameability. Then: (i) JudgeReq(pp, PK, m,  $\pi$ , req) = 1 and (ii) (m,  $\pi$ , req)  $\notin \mathcal{Q}$ . Noting that JudgeReq is signature verification, and that  $\mathcal{Q}$  contains all the queries  $\mathcal{B}_{S}$  made to its Signing Oracle, we conclude that  $\mathcal{B}_{S}$  succeeds in forging a signature, thus, for all PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ , Pr [Exp-ManagerNonFrame<sub>*II*-MUTAL, $\mathcal{A}$ </sub>(1<sup> $\lambda$ </sup>) = 1]  $\mu(\lambda)$ .

#### B.5 Proof of Thm. 5

*Proof.* Case 1: Malicious group manager. For the first case, we apply the following sequence of hybrids.  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}} : Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the real Exp-UAnon&MalGM game from Fig. 6, instantiated with  $\Pi$ -MUTAL.  $Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same except that when  $\mathcal{A}$  sends its challenge (m, cert<sub>0</sub>, cert<sub>1</sub>), we compute the response  $\pi := (c_2, \text{proof})$  by replacing proof with proof<sub>Sim</sub>  $\leftarrow$  snark<sub> $\mathcal{R}$ </sub>.Sim. By the Zero Knowledge property of the snark the proofs are identically distributed and, thus, so are the two hybrid games.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}} \to \mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $\mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}}$ , but when replying to  $\mathsf{OGrant}(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \mathsf{req})$ , parse  $\pi = (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$ ; if  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{T}$ , run  $\mathsf{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}(\mathsf{crs})$ . Let  $(r'_2, c'_1, r_1, \mathsf{cert}, \mathsf{sk})$  be the output and abort if  $((\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}), (r'_2, c'_1, r_1, \mathsf{cert}, \mathsf{sk})) \notin \mathcal{R}$ .

We use a standard hybrid argument for proving both games are indistinguishable. Let Q be an upper bound on the queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  on OGrant. For  $i \in \{0, \ldots, Q\}$ , let  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{1,i}^{\mathcal{A}}$  be the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{1}^{\mathcal{A}}$  with the following change: for the first i queries to OGrant, (i) let  $\mathsf{m}, \pi$  be the query. Parse  $\pi = (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$ . If  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi, \cdot) \notin$   $\mathcal{T}, \text{ run snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}(\text{crs}). \text{ Let } (r'_2, c'_1, r_1, \text{cert}, \text{sk}) \text{ be the output; } (ii) \text{ abort if for any witness outputted by snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{R}((\mathsf{m}, c_2, \mathsf{PK}), (r'_2, c'_1, r_1, \text{cert}, \text{sk})) = 0. \text{ By construction, } \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_1^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right]$ and  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_2^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{1,Q}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right].$ 

 $Hyb_{1,i-1}$ ,  $Hyb_{1,i-1}$  can differ only if in the *i*-th OGrant query, we attempt to extract a satisfying witness. Conditioned on this step being successful, the games are identical. If this is not the case, we can break simulation extractability as in the case of Th. 1

Thus, by simulation extractability of  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}$ ,  $\operatorname{Hyb}_{1,i-1}^{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\operatorname{Hyb}_{1,i}^{\mathcal{A}}$  are indistinguishable for all  $i \in \{1, \ldots, Q\}$ . In particular, it is the case for  $\operatorname{Hyb}_{1,0}^{\mathcal{A}}$  ( $\operatorname{Hyb}_{1}^{\mathcal{A}}$ ) and  $\operatorname{Hyb}_{1,Q}^{\mathcal{A}}$  ( $\operatorname{Hyb}_{2}^{\mathcal{A}}$ ).

 $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}} \to Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  with the following changes: (i) when  $\mathcal{A}$  queries OMemberAuth on (m, cert), we keep with the query kept in  $\mathcal{T}$  the randomness  $r_2$  used to compute  $\mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}\mathfrak{Su}(\mathsf{m}||c_1; r_2)$ . (ii) to answer to OGrant, use the decryption simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  to output ( $\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}}, \mathsf{m}||c_1$ )  $\leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec}(\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}), \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{m}||c_1, r_2))(c_2)$ , where  $(\mathsf{m}||c_1, r_2)$  is either in the set  $\mathcal{T}$ , or by the invocation of  $\mathsf{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}$ .

Let Q be an upper bound on the queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  on OGrant. For  $i \in \{0, \ldots, Q\}$ , let  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,i}^{\mathcal{A}}$  be the same as  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2}^{\mathcal{A}}$  with the following change: for the first i queries to OGrant, (i) let  $\mathsf{m}, \pi$  be the query. Parse  $\pi = (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$  and  $\mathsf{m} \| c_1, r_2$  be the corresponding decryption obtained by either computing  $\pi$ , or by querying the extractor; (ii) use the decryption simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  and output  $(\mathsf{proof}_{\mathsf{m}}, \mathsf{m} \| c_1') \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec}(\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}_{\mathcal{A}}), \mathcal{S}(\mathsf{m} \| c_1, r_2))(c_2)$  by using  $(\mathsf{m} \| c_1, r_2)$  that is either in the set  $\mathcal{T}$ , or from the invocation of  $\mathsf{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}_{\mathcal{A}}$ . Observe that  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{2}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,0}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right]$  and  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{3}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right] = \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,Q}^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda}) = 1\right]$ .

Also, note that the only difference between  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,i-1}^{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,i}^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the way the proof proof is computes: in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,i-1}^{\mathcal{A}}$ , it is computed by executing  $\mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec}$  with the honest users, who have as inputs the corresponding secret keys, while in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,i}^{\mathcal{A}}$  it is computed by executing  $\mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{ProveValidDec}$  with the simulator  $\mathcal{S}$  who only knows the decryption and the randomness used. Since these distributions are identical by Decryption Simulatability, the games are indistinguishable. Because Q is polynomial in  $\lambda$ , this in particular means that  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,0}^{\mathcal{A}}$  ( $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,0}^{\mathcal{A}}$ ) and  $\mathsf{Hyb}_{3}^{\mathcal{A}}$  ( $\mathsf{Hyb}_{2,Q}^{\mathcal{A}}$ ) are indistinguishable.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  to (t, n)-Indistinguishability. Finally, assuming  $\mathcal{A}$  wins  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$ , we create an adversary  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  that behaves as follows:

Reduction  $1: \underline{\mathcal{B}}_{TE}$ 

- $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  receives the parameters for the TE and activates  $\mathcal{A}$ , participating with  $\mathcal{A}$  to create keys for the TE. For any requests to OGrant,  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  acts as the challenger in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .
- On  $\mathcal{A}$ 's challenge  $(pk^{\mathcal{GM}}, m, cert_0, cert_1), \mathcal{B}_{TE}$  sets  $m_0 = m \|Enc_{pk_{E}^{\mathcal{GM}}}(cert_0)$  and  $m_1 = m \|Enc_{pk_{E}^{\mathcal{GM}}}(cert_1)$  as its own challenge.
- Gets  $c = \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{TE}}}(\mathsf{m}_b)$  and gives  $\pi := (c, \mathsf{proof})$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ , with  $\mathsf{proof}$  computed as in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  and outputs the same value  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs.

We have that  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  wins the indistinguishability game iff  $\mathcal{A}$  wins in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ . So we conclude that, for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_0^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ ,  $\Pr\left[\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}(1^{\lambda})=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ . Case 2: Malicious guardians. In this case, the adversary fully controls the guardians. We proceed analogously to the previous case by applying the following sequence of hybrids.

 $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $Hyb_0^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the real t-Exp-UAnon&MalGuard game from Fig. 7, instantiated with  $\Pi$ -MUTAL;  $Hyb_1^{\mathcal{A}}$  and  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  produce the same changes as in anonymity against a Malicious group manager so we refer the reader to the former case for the reductions.

 $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}} \rightarrow Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .  $Hyb_3^{\mathcal{A}}$  is the same as  $Hyb_2^{\mathcal{A}}$  but to answer to ODeanon on input  $(\mathfrak{m}, \pi, \operatorname{access})$ , instead of running cert  $\leftarrow E.\operatorname{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{E}}}(c_1)$ , (1) use the value cert that is either saved in  $\mathcal{T}$  if  $(\mathfrak{m}, \pi, \operatorname{cert}) \in \mathcal{T}$ , or computed by  $\operatorname{snark}_{\mathcal{R}}.\mathcal{X}$ , (2) run proof  $\leftarrow \mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathcal{VD}}.\operatorname{Sim}(\tau_{\mathcal{VD}}, (\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}, \operatorname{cert}, c_1))$ , (3) output (cert, proof). We can argue exactly as in the corresponding games with the relation  $\mathcal{R}$  of the malicious manager case that the games are indistinguishable.

 $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  to Indistinguishability. Finally, we can create a reduction from  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  to Indistinguishability of Encryption.

## Reduction $2:\mathcal{B}_{E}$

- $\mathcal{B}_E$  receives the parameters pp and a public key  $pk_E$  for E. It creates the other parameters for the protocol.
- $-\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{E}}$  activates  $\mathcal{A}$  and acts as the challenger for  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ .
- When  $\mathcal{A}$  gives its challenge  $(pk^{\mathcal{GU}}, m, cert_0, cert_1)$ , then  $\mathcal{B}_E$  sets  $m_0 = cert_0$  and  $m_1 = cert_1$ , as its own challenge.
- It gets  $c = \mathsf{E}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{E}}}(\mathsf{m}_b)$  and computes  $c_2 \leftarrow \mathsf{TE}.\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}^{\mathcal{GU}}}(\mathsf{m} \| c)$ . It computes  $\pi$  as in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  (by using the NIZK simulator). It sets  $\pi := (c_2, \mathsf{proof})$  and gives  $\pi$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{TE}}$  outputs the same value  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs.

Then,  $\mathcal{B}_{\mathsf{E}}$  wins the indistinguishability game iff  $\mathcal{A}$  wins in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3^{\mathcal{A}}$ . We conclude that, for all PPT adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$ ,

$$\begin{split} &\Pr\left[\mathsf{Exp-UAnon\&MalGM}_{\varPi-\mathsf{MUTAL},\mathcal{A}_1}(1^\lambda)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda), \\ &\Pr\left[\mathsf{t-Exp-UAnon\&MalGuard}_{\varPi-\mathsf{MUTAL},\mathcal{A}_2}(1^\lambda)=1\right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda). \end{split}$$

# C Security of the DGS based construction

## C.1 Proof of Thm. 6

*Proof.* To prove unforgeability we proceed by hybrids to modify the Exp-Unforge game.  $Hyb_0 \rightarrow Hyb_1 : Hyb_0$  is the Exp-Unforge game and  $Hyb_1$  is the same as  $Hyb_0$  with the following differences: (1) we use simulated proofs for NIZK<sub>ddh</sub> and NIZK<sub>Enc</sub> and (2) when the adversary queries OMemberAuth(m, cert<sub>ID</sub>) we simulate the signature of knowledge. Both have outputs that are statistically close by the zero knowledge property of the underling NIZKs.

 $Hyb_1 \rightarrow Hyb_2$ :  $Hyb_2$  is the same as  $Hyb_1$  except that, when the adversary outputs the forgery  $(m, \pi = (\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_{PS}))$ , if  $(m, \pi)$  was not queried to OMemberAuth, we also run the extractor of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> to extract a witness for  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2$ , and output  $\perp$  if the extraction fails. These games proceed identically unless the extraction fails. This happens only with negligible probability by simulation extractability of NIZK<sub>PS</sub>.

 $Hyb_2 \rightarrow Hyb_3$ :  $Hyb_3$  is the same as  $Hyb_2$  except that if the extracted witness contains a message/signature pair sk,  $\pi = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \pi_{PS})$  for which  $(\cdot, sk) \notin U_h$  the game outputs  $\perp$  and aborts. Both games proceed identically unless the extractor outputs some message/signature pair which does not correspond to an honest user's secret.

Assume for the sake of contradiction that the extractor outputs a message/signature pair that does not correspond to an honest user's secret with non-negligible probability. Then we show how to construct a a reduction  $\mathcal{B}$  that can break unforgeability of PS signature scheme.

 $\mathcal{B}$  takes input parameters gk and a PS signature public key  $(X, Y_0, Y_1)$ , it uses  $\mathcal{A}$  and proceeds as in Hyb<sub>3</sub> except that when  $\mathcal{A}$  makes a query for adding a user with ID, it samples a secret sk and queries its signing oracle to get the signature  $(a, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  and programs  $\mathcal{H}$  to output  $(a, \sigma_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{ID})$ . Finally, when the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the forgery  $(\mathsf{m}, \pi)$ ,  $\mathcal{B}$  runs the extractor and gets a message/signature pair sk,  $(a, \sigma_1, \sigma_2)$  which it outputs as its forgery. By assumption, the signing oracle never answered a query on sk, and by simulation extractability of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> the extractor outputs a valid witness, namely, a verifying message/signature pair w.r.t.  $(X, Y_0, Y_1)$ , so  $\mathcal{B}$  succeeds in making the forgery. Since the PS signature scheme is secure under q-MSDH assumption, where q is the number of signing queries made and q corresponds to the number of honest users requested by  $\mathcal{A}$ , the PS forgery happens with negligible probability under  $n_U$ -MSDH.

Finally, if the SDL assumption holds, no adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  can win Hyb<sub>3</sub> with non-negligible probability. Assume otherwise and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be such an adversary. We build an adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  solving SDL with non-negligible probability.  $\mathcal{B}$  works as follows:

#### Reduction 1:

- $\mathcal{B}$  takes as input  $\mathsf{gk}, (g_1, h_1, g_2, h_2) = (g, h, g^{\mu}, h^{\mu})$  and uses  $\mathsf{gk}, g, h$  as the public parameters for the scheme. Let  $x, y_0, y_1$  be the PS signature signing key and  $X, Y_0, Y_1$  the corresponding verification key sampled in  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$ .
- It samples  $i \in [n_U]$ .
- It answers oracle queries of  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows:
  - OHonJoin. It onlyanswers honestly except for the query  $ID_i$ . In that case, if such a query has not been explicitly made, it first queries  $\mathcal{H}(ID_i) = (a, g^r)$  and then samples  $\mathsf{sk}_1, \mathsf{sk}_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . It then implicitly sets as the secret key of this user the value  $\mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2)$  as follows: it sets  $\hat{g} = g^r$  and

\* 
$$g_{\mathsf{sk}_1} = g_2^{\mathsf{sk}_1} = g^{\mu\mathsf{sk}_1}, \ g_{\mathsf{sk}_2} = g_2^{\mathsf{sk}_2} = g^{\mu\mathsf{sk}_2}.$$

\*  $\hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_1} = g_2^{r\mathsf{sk}_1} = g^{r\mu\mathsf{sk}_1} = \hat{g}^{\mu\mathsf{sk}_1}, \ \hat{g}_{\mathsf{sk}_2} = g_2^{r\mathsf{sk}_2} = g^{r\mu\mathsf{sk}_2} = \hat{g}^{\mu\mathsf{sk}_2}.$ 

It then computes the secret shares for the guardians and group manager using the values  $h_1, h_2$ . It first samples uniform coefficients  $p_1, \ldots, p_t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , computes the commitments  $P_i = \hat{g}^{p_i} = g_2^{rp_i}$ , computes the shares

$$Y_0^{p(\ell)} := h_2^{y_0 \mathsf{sk}_1} h^{y_0 \sum p_i \ell^i} = h^{\mu y_0 \mathsf{sk}_1} h^{y_0 \sum p_i \ell^i} = h^{y_0 (\mu \mathsf{sk}_1 + \sum p_i \ell^i)} = h^{y_0 p(\ell)} \text{ for } \mathsf{C}_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}$$

$$Y_0^{\mu sk_2} := h_2^{y_0 sk_2} = h^{\mu y_0 sk_2}$$

It keeps in its state the values  $\sigma_1 = \hat{g} = g^r$ ,  $\sigma_2 = g^{r(x+y_0\mu(\mathsf{sk}_1+\mathsf{sk}_2)+y_1a)}$  to later answer OMemberAuth queries. The latter can be computed given  $g^{\mu} = g_2$ .

OMemberAuth. It works honestly as in Hyb<sub>3</sub>. Specifically, for the signatures of knowledge issued for user *i*, it samples α ← Z<sub>p</sub>, computes (σ'<sub>1</sub>, σ'<sub>2</sub>) = (σ<sup>α</sup><sub>1</sub>, σ<sup>α</sup><sub>2</sub>) and simulates a PoK for NIZK<sub>PS</sub>, that is a PoK of (μ(sk<sub>1</sub> + sk<sub>2</sub>), a) such that e(σ'<sub>1</sub>, Y<sub>0</sub>)<sup>m</sup>e(σ'<sub>1</sub>, Y<sub>1</sub>)<sup>a</sup> = e(σ'<sub>2</sub>, h)e(σ'<sub>1</sub>, X)<sup>-1</sup>.

When  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a forgery  $\mathfrak{m}, \pi$ , the extractor outputs a witness which corresponds to one of the secret keys of an honest user by assumption. With probability at least  $\frac{1}{n_U}$  this corresponds to user *i*. If this is the case,  $\mathcal{B}$  gets a message signature pair  $(\mathsf{sk}, \cdot)$  where  $\mathsf{sk} = \mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2)$  from which it can compute  $\mu$  such that  $g_2 = g_1^{\mu}$  and  $h_2 = h_1^{\mu}$ , thus solving the SDL challenge.

#### C.2 Proof of Thm. 7

*Proof.* We proceed a sequence of hybrids that modifies the Exp-UserNonFrame game.

 $Hyb_0 \rightarrow Hyb_1$ :  $Hyb_0$  is the Exp-UserNonFrame game and  $Hyb_1$  is the same as  $Hyb_0$  except that it: (1) uses simulated proofs for NIZK<sub>ddh</sub> and NIZK<sub>Enc</sub> and (2) simulates the proof of knowledge NIZK<sub>PS</sub> when the adversary queries OMemberAuth(m, cert<sub>ID</sub>). Both games have outputs that are statistically close by the knowledge soundness property of NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.

 $Hyb_1 \rightarrow Hyb_2$ : is the same as  $Hyb_1$  except that when the adversary outputs  $(m, \pi, cert_{ID}, proof_{ID})$ , we also run the extractor of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> to extract a witness for  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2$ , and output  $\perp$  if the extraction fails. Note that  $Hyb_1$  and  $Hyb_2$  proceed identically by the zero-knowledge property of the underlying NIZKs.

 $Hyb_2 \rightarrow Hyb_3$ :  $Hyb_3$  is the same as  $Hyb_2$  except that we output  $\perp$  and abort if we run the extractor and extract a witness that contains a value  $(\cdot, sk) \in U_h$ .  $Hyb_2$  and  $Hyb_3$  proceed identically, or equivalently  $Hyb_3$  does not abort.

To see that  $Hyb_3$  does not abort, we show that we never extract a witness corresponding to an honest user if this has not been queried to OMemberAuth. The proof is the same as the last case of the unforgeability property.

Assume that there exists an adversary that, with non-negligible probability causes  $\mathsf{Hyb}_3$  to abort conditioned on the extractor not failing. We construct an adversary  $\mathcal{B}$  against the SDL assumption.  $\mathcal{B}$  works as follows:

#### **Reduction 1:**

- $\mathcal{B}$  takes as input  $gk, (g_1, h_1, g_2, h_2) = (g, h, g^{\mu}, h^{\mu})$  and uses gk, g, h as the public parameters for the scheme. Let  $x, y_0, y_1$  be the PS signature signing key and  $X, Y_0, Y_1$  the corresponding verification key sampled in  $Hyb_3$ .
- It samples  $i \in [n_U]$ .
- It answers oracle queries of  $\mathcal{A}$  as follows:
  - OHonJoin only answers honestly except for the query  $ID_i$ . For this query, it first queries  $\mathcal{H}(ID_i) =$  $(a, g^r)$  if such a query has not been made yet, then it samples  $\mathsf{sk}_1, \mathsf{sk}_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ . It then implicitly sets as the secret key of this user the value  $\mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2)$  as follows: it sets  $\hat{g} = g^r$  and

1.  $g_{sk_1} = g_2^{sk_1} = g^{\mu sk_1}, g_{sk_2} = g_2^{\mu sk_2}, g_{sk_1} = g_2^{r \mu s k_1} = \hat{g}_2^{\mu s k_1}, \hat{g}_{sk_2} = g_2^{\mu s k_2}, \hat{g}_{sk_1} = g_2^{r r \mu s k_1} = \hat{g}^{\mu \mu s k_1}, \hat{g}_{sk_2} = g_2^{r \mu s k_2} = \hat{g}^{\mu \mu s k_2}.$ It then computes the secret shares for the guardians, group manager using the values  $h_1, h_2$ . It first samples uniform coefficients  $p_1, \ldots, p_t \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ , computes the commitments  $P_i = \hat{g}^{p_i} = g_2^{rp_i}$ , computes the shares

$$Y_0^{p(\ell)} := h_2^{y_0 \mathsf{sk}_1} h^{y_0 \sum p_i \ell^i} = h^{\mu y_0 \mathsf{sk}_1} h^{y_0 \sum p_i \ell^i} = h^{y_0 (\mu \mathsf{sk}_1 + \sum p_i \ell^i)} = h^{y_0 p(\ell)} \text{ for } \mathsf{C}_{\ell} \in \mathcal{GU}$$

$$Y_0^{\mu s k_2} := h_2^{y_0 s k_2} = h^{\mu y_0 s k_2}$$

It keeps in its state the values  $\sigma_1 = \hat{g} = g^r$ ,  $\sigma_2 = g^{r(x+y_0\mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2) + y_1a)}$  to later answer OMemberAuth queries. The latter can be computed given  $g^{\mu} = g_2$ .

- OMalJoin. It works honestly as in Hyb<sub>3</sub>.
- OMemberAuth. It works honestly as in Hyb<sub>3</sub>. Specifically, for the signatures of knowledge issued for user i, it samples  $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ , computes  $(\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2) = (\sigma_1^{\alpha}, \sigma_2^{\alpha})$  and simulates a PoK for NIZK<sub>PS</sub>, that is a PoK of  $\mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2)$ , a such that  $e(\sigma'_1, Y_0)^m e(\sigma'_1, Y_1)^a = e(\sigma'_2, h)e(\sigma'_1, X)^{-1}$ .

When A outputs a forgery  $(m, \pi)$ , the extractor outputs a witness which corresponds to one of the secret keys of an honest user by assumption. With probability at least  $\frac{1}{n_U}$  this corresponds to user *i*. If this is the case,  $\mathcal{B}$  gets a message signature pair  $(\mathsf{sk}, \cdot)$  where  $\mathsf{sk} = \mu(\mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2)$  from which it can compute  $\mu$  such that  $g_2 = g_1^{\mu}$  and  $h_2 = h_1^{\mu}$ , thus solving the SDL challenge.

 $Hyb_3 \rightarrow Hyb_4 : Hyb_4$  is the same as  $Hyb_3$  except that when the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs  $(m, \pi, cert_{ID}, proof_{ID})$ where  $\text{proof}_{\text{ID}} = \left( \{B_{i,j_k}, \pi_{i,j_k}\}_{k=1}^{t+1}, B_i, \pi_i \right)$  we also run the extractor of NIZK<sub>Dec</sub> for the statement corresponding to  $\pi_{i,j_k}, \pi_i$  to extract witnesses  $z_{j_k}, z$ . Hyb<sub>4</sub> outputs  $\perp$  if any extraction fails to extract a valid witness.  $Hyb_3$  and  $Hyb_4$  are indistinguishable due to knowledge soundness of NIZK<sub>Dec</sub>.

Finally, no adversary can win  $\mathsf{Hyb}_4$  except with negligible probability. Let  $\mathsf{cert}_i := (\mathrm{ID}_i, \{C_{i,\ell}\}_{C \in GU}, C_i)$ . Since  $\mathcal{A}$  wins, we have that cert<sub>i</sub> corresponds to an honest user. Also, by the fact that extraction for NIZK<sub>Dec</sub> fails, the signature opens to this user. But this means that the extractor of Hyb<sub>3</sub> extracted a witness for an honest user, which happens only with negligible probability.

#### **C.3** Proof of Thm. 8

*Proof.* We show the property by a sequence of hybrids described next.

 $Hyb_0 \rightarrow Hyb_1$ :  $Hyb_0$  is the t-Exp-UserAccountability game and  $Hyb_1$  is the same as  $Hyb_0$  except that when the adversary queries  $\mathsf{OMalJoin}$ , we also run the extractor of  $\mathsf{NIZK}_{\mathsf{ddh}}$  to extract the secrets  $\mathsf{sk}_1$ ,  $\mathsf{sk}_2$  used by  $\mathcal{A}$ . We output  $\perp$  and abort if the extraction fails to output a valid witness. Hyb<sub>0</sub> and Hyb<sub>1</sub> have outputs that are statistically close by the knowledge soundness property of NIZK<sub>ddh</sub>.

 $Hyb_1 \rightarrow Hyb_2$ :  $Hyb_2$  is the same as  $Hyb_1$  except that in the case of OMalJoin we also use the extractor of  $NIZK_{Enc}$  and abort if the shares given by the adversary are inconsistent w.r.t the values  $sk_1, sk_2$ . Both have outputs that are statistically close under the knowledge soundness of NIZK<sub>PS</sub>

 $Hyb_2 \rightarrow Hyb_3$ :  $Hyb_3$  is the same as  $Hyb_2$  except that when the adversary outputs  $(m, \pi)$ , we also run the extractor of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> to get the value sk used for the signature of knowledge. Their outputs are statistically close under the knowledge soundness of  $NIZK_{Enc}$ .

We next claim that  $Hyb_3$  does not abort, that is, the extracted witness from the adversary during its challenge is the correct key of either an honest or a malicious user. This follows by the unforgeability of PS signature scheme. We can build a reduction  $\mathcal{B}$  that works as in the case of Exp-Unforge. Indeed, the only difference is the handling of OMalJoin. In this case, we use the value  $sk = sk_1 + sk_2$  extracted from NIZK<sub>ddh</sub> and make a signing query to the PS signature pair that we did not queried in the signing oracle.

To conclude the proof, it is enough to note that since the adversary behaves honestly (which is verified by the extracted witnesses in the previous hybrids) a valid  $(m, \pi)$  pair is always correctly de-anonymized.

## C.4 Proof of Thm. 10

*Proof.* We show the two properties property by a sequence of hybrids described next. We show the case for t-Exp-UAnon&MalGuard and describe the changes needed for Exp-UAnon&MalGM.

 $Hyb_0 \rightarrow Hyb_1 : Hyb_0$  is the t-Exp-UAnon&MalGuard game and  $Hyb_1$  is the same as  $Hyb_0$  with the following changes: when an honest user is registered through OHonJoin, we compute honestly the guardians shares, but we sample two random elements  $(C_1, C_2) \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_2^2$  as the share given to the manager. We also sample uniform  $T \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ . We simulate a proof  $\pi_{Enc}$  to convince the adversary about the correctness of the shares. We answer the oracle queries of the adversary as follows:

- OMemberAuth(m, cert<sub>i</sub>): We sample random  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1$  and simulate the proof of knowledge  $\pi_{PS}$ . We save the tuple (m, cert<sub>i</sub>,  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2$ ) for future reference.
- ODeanon(m,  $\pi = \sigma'_1, \sigma'_2, \pi_P$ , access): if there is an no saved entry containing (m, cert<sub>i</sub>\*,  $\sigma'_1, \sigma'_2$ ) act honestly. Otherwise, parse cert<sub>i</sub>\* = (ID<sub>i</sub>\*, { $C_{i^*,\ell}$ }<sub>C<sub>\ell</sub>  $\in \mathcal{GU}$ </sub>,  $C_{i^*}$ ), and access = { $(B_{i,\ell}, \pi_{i,\ell})$ }<sup>n<sub>U</sub></sup><sub>i=1</sub> and abort if there are no t + 1 indices with correct proofs for all parties. If such indices exist, let { $(B_{i,\ell_j}, \pi_{i,\ell_j})$ }<sup>n<sub>U</sub>,t+1</sup> be these indices. For  $i \neq i^*$  sample a random value  $B_i$  and for  $i^*$ , set  $B_i = e(\sigma'_2, h)e(\sigma'_1, XY_1^{a^*_i})^{-1}\prod_{j=1^t+1} B_{i,j_k}^{-\lambda_j}$ . Simulate the proofs of knowledge  $\pi_{\text{Dec}}$ .

For the challenge query, we sign the message as in OMemberAuth. Signing is independent of the choice of b. First, in the second hybrid, whenever  $\mathcal{A}$  queries ODeanon on a valid signature, it can never be a signature that opens to an honest party not previously queried to OMemberAuth, otherwise  $\mathcal{A}$  breaks user non-frameability. This means that all signatures queried are opened as in Hyb<sub>0</sub>. Now, by ddh in group  $\mathbb{G}_2$ , the (encrypted) manager shares reveal no information to the adversary. It is enough to note that the messaged signed,  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2$ , is a uniform message and the adversary can only decrypt and recover  $\mathsf{sk}_1$ . Similarly, by ddh in  $\mathbb{G}_1$ , and zero knowledge of NIZK<sub>PS</sub> the signatures issued during queries to OMemberAuth or the challenge query are indistinguishable to honestly computed ones. Finally, because the challenge signature is independent of b, no adversary can win the latter game with non-negligible advantage.

For the case of Exp-UAnon&MalGM, we act respectively but we simulate the shares issued to the guardians. More concretely, we give random encryptions for the honest guardians and find values  $P_1, \ldots, P_t$  that convince the adversary – this can be done by solving a linear system in the exponent as done in [9, Lemma 3]. To de-anonymize a signature, for user  $i^*$  we simply compute random values  $B_{i,\ell_j}$  conditioned on  $e(\sigma'_2, h) = e(\sigma'_1, XY_1^{a_i^*}) \prod_{j=1}^{t+1} B_{i,j_k}^{\lambda_j} e(\sigma'_1, Y_0^{\mathsf{sk}_1})$  and simulate proofs of knowledge  $\pi_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ . When the adversary de-anonymizes this message, it will open to ID<sup>\*</sup>. Arguing as before, in this case the first part of the secret key  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{sk}_1 + \mathsf{sk}_2$  is random since the adversary does not have enough shares to get this value and compare with the commitment given.