Post-Quantum One-Time Linkable Ring Signature and Application to Ring Confidential Transactions in Blockchain (Lattice RingCT v1.0) (*Cryptography ePrint Archive Version*)

Wilson Abel Alberto Torres (✉)[1] , Ron Steinfeld (✉)[1], Amin Sakzad (✉)[1], Joseph K. Liu (✉)[1], Veronika Kuchta[1], Nandita Bhattacharjee[1], Man Ho Au[2], and Jacob Cheng[3]

[1] Faculty of IT, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
{Wilson.Torres,Ron.Steinfeld,Amin.Sakzad,Joseph.Liu,Veronika.Kuchta,
Nandita.Bhattacharjee}@monash.edu
[2] Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hung Hom, Hong Kong
csallen@comp.polyu.edu.hk
[3] Collinstar Capital, Melbourne, Australia
jacob@collinstar.com

Abstract. In this paper, we construct a Lattice-based one-time Linkable Ring Signature (L2RS) scheme, which enables the public to verify if two or more signatures were generated by same signatory, whilst still preserving the anonymity of the signatory. The L2RS provides unconditional anonymity and security guarantees under the Ring Short Integer Solution (Ring-SIS) lattice hardness assumption. The proposed L2RS scheme is extended to be applied in a protocol that we called *Lattice Ring Confidential transaction (Lattice RingCT) RingCT v1.0*, which forms the foundation of the privacy-preserving protocol in any post-quantum secure cryptocurrency such as Hcash.

Keywords: Linkable Ring Signature, Lattice-Based Cryptography, Post-Quantum Cryptography, Cryptocurrencies

1 Introduction

The notion of a *Ring Signature* scheme was initially formalised in [1]. This scheme allows signing a message on behalf of a spontaneous group of signers, while preserving the anonymity of the signer. The creation of a ring signature does not require members of a group to cooperate, meaning that this scheme will not longer have a manager who eventually can reveal the identity of the signer, and thus the anonymity will be unconditionally preserved. This approach was a remarkable security improvement when compared with the group signature scheme [2] where a group manager was part of its construction. Later, an extended property called *Linkability* was introduced in a ring signature scheme, under the name

of *Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group* but is now known as *Linkable Ring Signature* [3]. The linkability property of ring signatures allows one to detect if two signatures were generated by the same signer (using the same private-key) whilst still preserving their anonymity. This scheme was proved to be secure under the discrete logarithm assumption and in Random Oracle Model (ROM). In comparison with previous unlinkable ring signature schemes, this scheme adds an efficient algorithm to verify the linkability property. Each signature (σ) is accompanied by a label (or tag), which is computed based on the signer's private key and a hash function modelled as a random oracle in a deterministic manner. The label can be used by the linking algorithm the check whether two signatures are created by the same signer. Specifically, if the labels accompanying two signatures are the same, it means that the two signatures are created by the same signer. This particular feature opens the possibility of many practical scenarios [3–5], such as, cryptocurrency, in particular the RingCT confidential transaction protocol adapted in Monero cryptocurrency [6], and e-voting applications.

Nevertheless, the above ring signature schemes are based on classical number-theory mathematical assumptions, for instance, the hardness of discrete logarithm [7, 8] and factoring large numbers [9]. As a consequence, they are believed to be vulnerable with the onset of powerful quantum computers [10]. This situation has sparked the primarily motivation of researchers in the area of post-quantum cryptography to construct secure approaches against these type of computers. Among the alternatives, lattice-based cryptography has attracted the attention of this field due to its distinguishing features and new applications. Algorithms based on lattices tend to be efficient, simple, highly parallelisable and provide strong provable security guarantees [11, 12].

1.1 Contribution

- We construct a Lattice-based one-time Linkable Ring Signature (**L2RS**) scheme. Our L2RS is a generalisation of the BLISS [13] scheme which is currently one of the practical lattice digital signatures. L2RS provides unconditional anonymity as well as unforgeability security guarantees under the hardness of standard lattice assumptions.
- We devise a new cryptocurrency privacy-preserving protocol that we call **Lattice RingCT v1.0**. This protocol employs our proposed post-quantum L2RS as a fundamental building block along with a homomorphic commitment primitive to provide post-quantum secure confidential transactions which forms the foundation of the privacy-preserving protocol for blockchain cryptocurrencies, such as Hcash.

This paper is organised in eight parts, including the introduction. Section 2 gives a brief background of the current linkable ring signature approaches. After describing the technical description used in Section 3 and the security model in Section 4, this research shows the construction of the L2RS scheme in Section 5 along with the security analysis in Section 6. In Section 7, we present an application of this L2RS in a cryptocurrency protocol that we called Lattice

RingCT v1.0. Finally, a performance analysis of these proposals is presented in Section 8.

2 Related Work

Linkable Ring Signature (LRS) primitive is receiving attention thanks to its distinguishing capabilities of anonymously detecting if two linkable ring signatures are being signed by same signatory. Most of the current linkable ring signature schemes along with different variants [3, 5, 14–25] rely on the hardness assumptions of classical cryptography. Technically, this primitive uses a linkability tag that has a secure relationship with the signer's publick-key, then the LRS uses this tag to verify whether or not a singer signs two signatures. Monero, a cryptocurrency application, exploits this property to prevent double spending while keeping the user's anonymity [6].

However, this primitive and its variants will be vulnerable to quantum attacks [10, 26, 12]. This situation has led to a new area in the field of cryptography called *Post-Quantum Cryptography*, aimed at constructing new cryptographic algorithms that are intractable even in the presence of powerful quantum computers. Among the current post-quantum cryptographic proposals [12, 27], lattice-based cryptography has attracted the attention of cryptographers. It is a candidate to be standardised as a post-quantum cryptography solution due to its efficiency, parallelism, uniqueness and strong security assurances under the *worst-case hardness* of lattice problems, which is significantly better than the *average-case hardness* of other cryptographic constructions [28, 11].

Digital signatures which are constructed based on lattice-based cryptography can be categorised into GGH/NTRUSign [29, 30], Hash-and-sign [31] and Fiat-Shamir signatures [32]. Fiat-Shamir transformation [33, 34] is used by the Bimodal Lattice Signature Scheme (BLISS) [13], which is currently one of the most practical lattice-based digital signature schemes. BLISS has been constructed using the following well known lattice-based cryptography problems, the Short Integer Solution (SIS) [35], Ring-SIS [36] and the Ring-LWE (Learning With Errors) [37] problems [4]. The Ring-SIS version of BLISS offers practical runtime and key sizes. Moreover, this scheme uses a probabilistic test based on rejection sampling technique to make the distribution of the private-key independent, an important property that completely hides the private-key from any adversary.

Several lattice-based ring signatures schemes have been proposed in [38–43] and there were recently three LRS proposals based on lattice-based cryptography. The first of these constructions [44], is based on the development of a lattice-based weak Pseudo Random Function (wPRF), an accumulator scheme (Acc) and a framework named as Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge (ZKAoK). These techniques are used to construct LRS schemes where the security guarantees for the LRS properties' *unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability* rely on the lattice problems. The second lattice LRS scheme

[4] The *Ring*-SIS and *Ring*-LWE refer to the *Ring* mathematical structure and differ from the *Ring* in the *Ring Signature* scheme.

[45], uses ideal lattices along with a lattice-based homomorphic commitment in its construction. The security properties are based on the hardness of lattices; however, there is no discussion as to how to secure the scheme in terms of *non-slanderability*. This scheme is shown to be used in a cryptocurrency application. The last lattice LRS proposal [46], is devised using lattice-based variants named Module-SIS and Module-LWE problems and its security properties rely on the lattice assumptions.

Our (L2RS) scheme was designed independently and concurrently with [46]. The schemes share similar features, but our scheme offers unconditional anonymity. The construction of this work, which we call Lattice-based one-time Linkable Ring Signature (L2RS), is an extension of BLISS, a demonstrated practical lattice-based digital signature [13]. It is secure in terms of *unforgeability, linkability and non-slanderability* under the lattice hardness of the Ring-SIS problem and unlike the above Lattice-based LRS schemes [44, 45] and [46], the L2RS scheme achieves *unconditional anonymity*, meaning that this scheme will be secure even if an adversary has unlimited computational resources and time. As an application of this construction, we designed the Lattice RingCT v1.0, a cryptocurrency protocol that provides confidential transactions and which its security guarantees rely on our post-quantum cryptographic L2RS scheme.

3 Preliminaries

The ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/f(x)$ is a degree-n polynomial ring, where $f(x)$ is a polynomial of degree of n. The ring $\mathcal{R}_q$ is then defined to be the quotient ring $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathcal{R}/(q\mathcal{R}) = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/f(x)$, where $\mathbb{Z}_q$ denotes the set of all positive integers modulo q (a prime number $q = 1 \bmod 2n$) in the interval $[-q/2, q/2]$ and $f(x) = x^n + 1$ where n is a power of 2. The challenge $\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$, is the set of all binary vectors of length n and weight κ. Two hash functions modeled as Random Oracle Model (ROM), H_1 with range $\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{2q}$, and H_2 with range $\mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$. When we use $x \leftarrow D$, it means that x is chosen from the distribution D, and $y \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q$ means that y is chosen uniformly at random according to $\mathcal{R}_q$. Matrices are written in bold upper case letters whereas vectors are represented in bold lower case letters, where vectors are column vectors and $\mathbf{v}^T$ is the transpose of the vector $\mathbf{v}$. The hardness assumption of this work is the Ring-SIS (Short Integer Solution) problem and this is defined as follows.

Definition 1 ($\mathcal{R}$-SIS$^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem). (Based on [13], Def. 2.3). *Let $\mathcal{K}$ be some uniform distribution over the ring $\mathcal{R}_q^{1\times m}$. Given a random matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times m}$ sampled from $\mathcal{K}$ distribution, find a non-zero vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{m\times 1}$ such that $\mathbf{Av} = \mathbf{0}$ and $\|\mathbf{v}\|_2 \leq \beta$, where $\|\cdot\|_2$ denotes the Euclidean norm.*

Lemma 1 (Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL)). (Based on [13], Lemma B.1). *Let $\mathcal{H}$ be a universal hash family of hash functions from X to Y. If $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$ and $x \leftarrow X$ are chosen uniformly and independently, then the statistical distance between (h,h(x)) and the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{H} \times Y$ is at most $\frac{1}{2}\sqrt{|Y|/|X|}$.*

Remark 1. We use this lemma for a SIS family of hash function $H(\mathbf{S}) = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, with $\mathbf{S} \in \mathsf{Doms}_{\mathbf{S}}$, where each function is indexed by $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathsf{Doms}_{\mathbf{S}} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ consists of vectors of $\mathcal{R}_q$ elements with coefficients in $\Gamma \triangleq (-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)$. This is a universal hash family if for all $\mathbf{S} \neq \mathbf{S}'$, we have

$$\Pr\left[\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}'\right] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{R}_q|}.$$

This is a universal hash family if there exists $1 \leq i \leq m-1$ such that $s_i - s_i'$ is invertible in $\mathcal{R}_q$ with $s_i, s_i' \in \Gamma^n$. This can be guaranteed by appropriate choice of q, e.g. as shown in ([47], Corollary 1.2), it is sufficient to use q such that $f(x) = x^n + 1$ factors into k irreducible factors modulo q and $2^\gamma < \frac{1}{\sqrt{k}} \cdot q^{1/k}$. We assume that $\mathcal{R}_q$ is chosen to satisfy this condition.

Lemma 2 (Rejection Sampling). (Based on [13], Lemma 2.1). *Let V be an arbitrary set, and $h : V \to \mathbb{R}$ and $f : \mathbb{Z}^m \to R$ be probability distributions. If $g_v : \mathbb{Z}^m \to R$ is a family of probability distributions indexed by $v \in V$ with the property that there exists a $M \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $\forall v \in V, \forall \mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}^m, M \cdot g_v(\mathbf{z}) \geq f(\mathbf{z})$. Then the output distributions of the following two algorithms are identical:*

1. *$v \leftarrow h, z \leftarrow g_v, output(\mathbf{z}, v)$ with probability $f(\mathbf{z})/(M \cdot g_v(\mathbf{z}))$.*
2. *$v \leftarrow h, z \leftarrow f, output(\mathbf{z}, v)$ with probability $1/M$.*

Definition 2 (Gaussian Distribution). *The discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^m$ with standard deviation $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$ and center at zero, is defined by $D_\sigma^m(\boldsymbol{x}) = \rho_\sigma(\boldsymbol{x})/\rho_\sigma(\mathbb{Z}^m)$, where ρ_σ is m dimensional Gaussian function $\rho_\sigma(\boldsymbol{x}) = \exp\left(\frac{-\|\boldsymbol{x}\|^2}{2\sigma^2}\right)$.*

4 Security model

4.1 Structure of Lattice-based one-time Linkable Ring Signature (L2RS)

An L2RS scheme has five PPT algorithms (L2RS.Setup, L2RS.KeyGen, L2RS.SigGen, L2RS.SigVer, L2RS.SigLink). In addition, the correctness of this scheme is satisfied by the Signature correctness L2RS.SigGen Correctness and the Linkability correctness L2RS.SigLink Correctness. These algorithms are defined as follows:

- L2RS.Setup: a PPT algorithm that takes the security parameter λ and produces the Public Parameters (Pub-Params).
- L2RS.KeyGen: a PPT algorithm that by taking the Pub-Params, it produces a pair of keys: the public-key pk and the private-key sk.
- L2RS.SigGen: a PPT algorithm that receives the Pub-Params, a singer π's sk, a message μ and the list L of users' pk's in the ring signature, and outputs a signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$.

- L2RS.SigVer: a PPT algorithm that takes Pub-Params, a signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$, a list L of pk's and the message μ, and it verifies if this signature was legitimately created, this algorithm outputs either: **Accept** or **Reject**.
- L2RS.SigLink: a PPT algorithm that inputs two valid signatures $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$ and it anonymously determines if these signatures were produced by same signer π. Thus, this algorithm has a deterministic output: **Linked** or **Unlinked**.

Correctness requirements:

- L2RS.SigGen Correctness: this guarantees that valid signatures signed by honest signers will be accepted by a verifier with overwhelming probability.
- L2RS.SigLink Correctness: this ensures that if two signatures $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$ are signed by an honest signer π, SigLink will output **Linked** with overwhelming probability.

4.2 Oracles for adversaries

The following oracles are available to any adversary who tries to break the security of an L2RS scheme:

- $\mathsf{pk}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{JO}(\perp)$. The *Joining Oracle*, on request, adds new user(s) to the system. It returns the public-key(s) pk_i.
- $\mathsf{sk}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{CO}(\mathsf{pk}_i)$. The *Corruption Oracle*, on input a pk_i that is a query output of $\mathcal{JO}$, returns the corresponding sk_i.
- $\sigma'_L(\mu) \leftarrow \mathcal{SO}(w, L, \mathsf{pk}_\pi, \mu)$. The *Signing Oracle*, on input a group size w, a set L of w pk's, the signer's pk_π, and a message μ, this oracle returns a valid signature $\sigma'_L(\mu)$.

4.3 Threat Model

- One-time Unforgeability. One time unforgeability for the L2RS scheme is defined in the following game between a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ who has access to the oracles $\mathcal{JO}$, $\mathcal{CO}$, $\mathcal{SO}$ and the random oracle:
  1. $\mathcal{S}$ generates and gives the list L of pk's to $\mathcal{A}$.
  2. $\mathcal{A}$ may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy.
  3. $\mathcal{A}$ gives $\mathcal{S}$ a ring signature size w, a set L of w pk's, a message μ and a signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$.

  $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game if:
  - L2RS.SigVer$(\sigma_L(\mu))$=**Accept**.
  - pk's in the L are outputs from $\mathcal{JO}$ oracle.
  - No pk in L has been input to $\mathcal{CO}$.
  - $\sigma_L(\mu)$ is not an output of $\mathcal{SO}$.
  - No signing key pk_π was queried more than once to $\mathcal{SO}$.

  The advantage of the one-time unforgeability in the L2RS scheme is denoted by

$$\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{ot-unf}(\lambda) = \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins the game }]$$

Definition 3 (One-Time Unforgeability). *The L2RS scheme is one-time unforgeable if for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,* $\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{ot-unf}(\lambda)$ *is negligible.*

– Unconditional Anonymity. It should be infeasible for an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish a signer's pk with probability 1/2, even if the adversary has unlimited computing resources. This property for L2RS schemes is defined in the following game between a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ and an unbounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$.
  1. $\mathcal{A}$ may query $\mathcal{JO}$ according to any adaptive strategy.
  2. $\mathcal{A}$ gives $\mathcal{S}$ the $L = \{\mathsf{pk}_0, \mathsf{pk}_1\}$, which is the output of the $\mathcal{JO}$, and a message μ.
  3. $\mathcal{S}$ flips a coin $b = \{0, 1\}$, then $\mathcal{S}$ computes the signature $\sigma_b = \mathsf{L2RS.SigGen}(L, \mathsf{sk}_b, \mu, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params})$. This signature is given to $\mathcal{A}$.
  4. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit b'.
  5. The output of this experiment is defined to be 1 if $b = b'$, or 0 "zero" otherwise.

  $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game if:
  - pk_0 and pk_1cannot be used by $\mathcal{CO}$ and $\mathcal{SO}$.
  - Outputs 1, where $b = b'$, with $\Pr = 1/2$.

  The unconditional anonymity advantage of the L2RS scheme is denoted by

$$\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{Anon}(\lambda) = \Big| \Pr[b = b'] - \frac{1}{2} \Big|.$$

Definition 4 (Unconditional Anonymity). *The L2RS scheme is unconditional anonymous if for any unbounded adversary $\mathcal{A}$,* $\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{Anon}(\lambda)$ *is zero.*

– Linkability. It should be infeasible for an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ to **unlinked** two valid L2RS signatures which were correctly generated with same sk_π. To describe this, we use the interaction between a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}$:
  1. The $\mathcal{A}$ queries the $\mathcal{JO}$ multiple times.
  2. The $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two signatures $\sigma_L(\mu)$ and $\sigma'_{L'}(\mu')$ and two lists L and L' of pk's.

  $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game if:
  - The pk's in L and L' are outputs of $\mathcal{JO}$.
  - Queried $\mathcal{CO}$ only once to get the sk_π, corresponding to pk_π.
  - By calling $\mathsf{L2RS.SigVer}$ on input $\sigma_L(\mu)$ and $\sigma'_{L'}(\mu')$, it outputs **Accept** on both inputs.
  - Finally, it gets **Unlinked**, when calling $\mathsf{L2RS.SigLink}$ on input $\sigma_L(\mu)$ and $\sigma'_{L'}(\mu')$.

  Thus the advantage of the linkability in the L2RS scheme is denoted by

$$\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{Link}(\lambda) = \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins the game}].$$

Definition 5 (Linkability). *The L2RS scheme is linkable if for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,* $\mathbf{Advantage}_{\mathcal{A}}^{Link}$ *is negligible.*

– Non-slanderability. It should be infeasible for an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ to **linked** two valid L2RS signatures which were correctly generated with different sk's. This means that an adversary can frame an honest user for signing a valid signature so the adversary can produce another valid signature such that the L2RS.SigLink algorithm outputs **Linked**. To describe this, we use the interaction between a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ and an adversary $\mathcal{A}$:
  1. The $\mathcal{S}$ generates and gives the list L of pk's to $\mathcal{A}$.
  2. The $\mathcal{A}$ queries the $\mathcal{JO}$ and $\mathcal{CO}$ to obtain pk_π and sk_π, respectively.
  3. $\mathcal{A}$ gives the generated parameters to $\mathcal{S}$.
  4. $\mathcal{S}$ uses the sk_π and calls the $\mathcal{SO}$ to output a valid signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$, which is given to $\mathcal{A}$.
  5. The $\mathcal{A}$ uses the remaining keys of the ring signature $(w-1)$ to create a second signature $\sigma'_L(\mu)$ by calling the $\mathcal{SO}$ algorithm.

  $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game if:
  - The L2RS.SigVer, on input $\sigma_L(\mu)$ and $\sigma'_L(\mu)$, outputs **Accept**.
  - The keys pk_π and sk_π were not used to generated the second signature $\sigma'_L(\mu)$.
  - When calling the L2RS.SigLink on input $\sigma_L(\mu)$ and $\sigma'_L(\mu)$, it outputs **Linked**.

  Thus the advantage of the non-slanderability in the L2RS scheme is denoted by

$$\mathbf{Advantage}^{NS}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins the game}].$$

  Definition 6 (Non-Slanderability). *The L2RS scheme is* non-slanderable *if for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,* $\mathbf{Advantage}^{NS}_{\mathcal{A}}$ *is negligible.*

5 L2RS Scheme description

The scheme L2RS = (L2RS.Setup, L2RS.KeyGen, L2RS.SigGen, L2RS.SigVer, L2RS.SigLink) works as follows.

5.1 L2RS.Setup

By receiving the security parameter λ, this L2RS.Setup algorithm randomly chooses $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_{m-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{H} = (\mathbf{h}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{h}_{m-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$. This outputs the public parameters (Pub-Params): $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{H}$.

Remark 2. To prevent malicious attack, L2RS.Setup incorporates a trapdoor in $\mathbf{A}$ or $\mathbf{H}$, in practice L2RS.Setup would generate $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{H}$ based on the cryptographic Hash function H_2 evaluated at two distinct and fixed constants.

Definition 7 (Function L2RS.Lift). *This function maps $\mathcal{R}_q^{1\times m}$ to $\mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$ with respect to a public parameter $\boldsymbol{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$. Given $\boldsymbol{a} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, we let L2RS.Lift$(\boldsymbol{A}, \boldsymbol{a}) \triangleq (2 \cdot \boldsymbol{A}, -2 \cdot \boldsymbol{a} + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.*

5.2 Key Generation - L2RS.KeyGen

This algorithm receives the public parameter Pub-Param: $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$, then it generates a key pair in $\mathcal{R}_q$, we:

- Pick $(\mathbf{s}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_{m-1})$ with every component chosen uniformly and independently with coefficients in $(-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)$.
- Define $\mathbf{S}^T = (\mathbf{s}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_{m-1}) \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$.
- Compute $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S} \bmod q \in \mathcal{R}_q$. The $\mathbf{a}$ and $\mathbf{S}$ are the public-key pk and the private-key sk, respectively.

This L2RS.KeyGen algorithm is described in the following **Algorithm 1**:

Algorithm 1 L2RS.KeyGen - Key-pair Generation $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$

Input: Pub-Param: $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$.
Output: $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$, being the public-key and the private-key, respectively.
1: **procedure** L2RS.KeyGen($\mathbf{A}$)
2: Let $\mathbf{S}^T = (\mathbf{s}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_{m-1}) \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$, where $\mathbf{s}_i \leftarrow (-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)^n$, for $1 \le i \le m-1$
3: Compute $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S} \bmod q \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
4: **return** $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$.

5.3 Signature Generation - L2RS.SigGen

The L2RS.SigGen algorithm inputs the user's private-key $\mathbf{S}_\pi$, the message μ, the list of user's public-keys L and the public parameters Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$. This algorithm outputs the signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$. We call π the index in $\{1, \ldots, w\}$ of the user or signatory who wants to sign a message μ. For a message $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$, the fixed list of public-keys $L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$ and the private-key $\mathbf{S}_\pi$ which corresponds to $\mathbf{a}_\pi$ with $1 \le \pi \le w$; the following computations are performed:

1. We define the linkability tag as $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, where $\mathbf{H}$ is the fixed public parameter for all users, and $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \in \mathcal{R}_q$. We consider $\mathbf{S}_\pi^T \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ as an element in $\mathcal{R}_{2q}$ and let $\mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi}^T = \big(\mathbf{S}_\pi^T, 1\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, such that $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} = q \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}$.
2. The π's public-key is lifted from $\mathcal{R}_q^{1\times m}$ to $\mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, so by calling the lift function L2RS.Lift$(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_\pi)$, we get $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
3. Note that $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} = q \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}$
4. By choosing a random vector $\mathbf{u}_\pi = (u_1, \ldots, u_m)^T$, where $u_i \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le i \le m$, we calculate $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}_\pi, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u}_\pi\Big)$.
5. We choose random vector $\mathbf{t}_i = (t_{i,1}, \ldots, t_{i,m})^T$, where $t_{i,j} \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le j \le m$, then for $(i = \pi+1, \ldots, w, 1, 2, \ldots, \pi-1)$, after lifting from $\mathcal{R}_q^{1\times m}$ to $\mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, using L2RS.Lift$(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_i)$, we obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_i + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$. Then, we compute $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i\Big)$.

6. Select a random bit $b \in \{0,1\}$ and finally compute $\mathbf{t}_\pi = \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b$ using rejection sampling (Definition 2).
7. Output the signature $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

A formal description of this algorithm is shown in **Algorithm 2**.

Algorithm 2 L2RS.SigGen - Signature Generation $\sigma_L(\mu)$

Input: $\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$, Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$.
Output: $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params}\Big)$

procedure L2RS.SigGen($\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L,$ Pub-Params)
  Set $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, where $\mathbf{h} = \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
  Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_\pi$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
  Let $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \ldots, u_m)^T$, where $u_i \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le i \le m$.
  Compute $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u}\Big)$.
  for $(i = \pi+1, \pi+2, \ldots, w, 1, 2, \ldots, \pi-1)$ **do**
    Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_i$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_i + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$
    Let $\mathbf{t}_i = (t_{i,1}, \ldots, t_{i,m})^T$, where $t_{i,j} \leftarrow D_\sigma$, for $1 \le j \le m$.
    Compute $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i\Big)$.
  Choose $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.
  Let $\mathbf{t}_\pi \leftarrow \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b$.
  Continue with probability $\dfrac{1}{\left(M \exp\left(-\dfrac{\|\mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi\|^2}{2\sigma^2}\right) \cosh\left(\dfrac{\langle \mathbf{t}_\pi, \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \rangle}{\sigma^2}\right)\right)}$
  otherwise **Restart**.
  return $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

5.4 Signature Verification - L2RS.SigVer

The L2RS.SigVer algorithm receives the signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$ along with the message μ, the fixed list $L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$ and the Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$, and it outputs a decisional verification answer: accept or reject (see **Algorithm 3**). The signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$ can be publicly validated by computing $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$ in $\mathbf{c}_{i+1}$ for $(i = 1, \ldots, w)$, and it is verified and only accepted under the following conditions: $\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_2 \le B_2$ and $\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_\infty < q/4$ for $1 \le i \le w$, where B_2 is the acceptance bound [13], $\mathbf{c}_1 = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,w} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w\Big)$.

Theorem 1. *Let* $B_2 = \eta\sigma\sqrt{nm}$ *and* $q/4 > \big(\sqrt{2(\lambda+1)\ln 2 + 2\ln(nm)}\big)\sigma$ *and* $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\boldsymbol{c}_1, \boldsymbol{t}_1, \ldots, \boldsymbol{t}_w, \boldsymbol{h}\Big)$ *be generated based on* ***Algorithm 2****. Then the output of* ***Algorithm 3*** *on input* $\sigma_L(\mu)$ *is* ***Accept*** *with probability* $1 - 2^{-\lambda}$.

Algorithm 3 L2RS.SigVer - Signature Verification

Input: $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$, $L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$, μ, Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$
Output: Accept or Reject

procedure L2RS.SigVer($\sigma_L(\mu)$, Pub-Params)
  if $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2\cdot\mathbf{H}, -2\cdot\mathbf{h}+q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$ **then** Continue
    for $(i = 1, \ldots, w)$ **do**
      Call L2RS.Lift$(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_i)$ to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} = (2\cdot\mathbf{A}, -2\cdot\mathbf{a}_i + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
      if $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i}\cdot\mathbf{t}_i + q\cdot\mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q}\cdot\mathbf{t}_i + q\cdot\mathbf{c}_i\Big)$ **then** Continue
      else if $\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_2 \leq B_2$ **then** Continue
      else if $\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_\infty < q/4$ **then** Continue
  else if $\mathbf{c}_1 = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,w}\cdot\mathbf{t}_w + q\cdot\mathbf{c}_w, \mathbf{H}_{2q}\cdot\mathbf{t}_w + q\cdot\mathbf{c}_w\Big)$ **then** Accept
  else Reject
  return Accept or Reject

Proof. In this proof, we use [lemma 4.4, parts 1 and 3, in [48]]. The part 3 of this lemma shows that the bound on Euclidean norm $B_2 = \eta\sigma\sqrt{nm}$, for a given $\eta > 1$, has a probability $\Pr[\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_2 > \eta\sigma\sqrt{nm}] \geq 1 - 2^{\lambda}$. In addition, the bound on infinity norm ($\|\mathbf{t}_i\|_\infty < q/4$) is analysed in part 1 of this lemma where its union bound is also considered. It turns out that η is required such $q/4 > \eta\sigma > \big(\sqrt{2(\lambda+1)\ln 2 + 2\ln(nm)}\big)\sigma$, except with probability of $2^{-\lambda}$. □

5.5 Signature Linkability - L2RS.SigLink

The L2RS.SigLink algorithm, illustrated in **Algorithm 4**, takes two signatures as input: $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$, and it outputs either **Linked** if these signatures were generated by same signatory, or **Unlinked**, otherwise. For a fixed list of public-keys L and given two signatures: $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$, with the list L which can be described as: $\sigma_L(\mu_1) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_{1,\mu_1}, \mathbf{t}_{1,\mu_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1}, \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1}\Big)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_{1,\mu_2}, \mathbf{t}_{1,\mu_2}, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}, \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2}\Big)$.

These two signatures must be successfully accepted by the L2RS.SigVer algorithm, then one can verify that the linkability property is achieved if the linkability tags ($\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1}$ and $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_2}$) of the above signatures $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$ are equal.
The correctness proofs of L2RS.SigGen and L2RS.SigLink are given in Appendix A.

6 Security Analysis

Theorem 2 (One-Time Unforgeability). *Suppose* $\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$ *is negligible in* n *and* $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}$ *is negligible and* $y = h$ *is polynomial in* n*, where* h *denotes the*

Algorithm 4 L2RS.SigLink - Signature Linkability

Input: $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$
Output: Linked or Unlinked
1: **procedure** L2RS.SigLink($\sigma_L(\mu_1), \sigma_L(\mu_2)$)
2: **if** $\Big($L2RS.SigVer($\sigma_L(\mu_1)$) = Accept **and** L2RS.SigVer($\sigma_L(\mu_2)$) = Accept$\Big)$ **then** Continue [
3: **else if** $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2}$ **then** Linked
4: **else** Unlinked]
5: **return** Linked or Unlinked

*number of queries to the random oracle H_1. If there is a PPT algorithm against one-time unforgeability of L2RS with non-negligible probability δ, then there exist a PPT algorithm that can extract a solution to the $\mathcal{R}$-**SIS**$^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem (for $\beta = 2B_2$) with non-negligible probability $\left(\delta - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\delta - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}}{y} - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}\right) - \sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$.*

Proof. The proof is given in Appendix B. □

Theorem 3 (Anonymity). *Suppose $\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$ is negligible in n with an attack against the unconditional anonymity that makes h queries to the random oracle H_1, where h, w are polynomial in n, then the L2RS scheme is unconditionally secure for anonymity as defined in Def. 4.*

Proof. The proof is given in Appendix C. □

Theorem 4 (Linkability). *The L2RS scheme is linkable in the random oracle model if the $\mathcal{R}$-**SIS**$^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem is hard.*

Proof. The proof is given in Appendix D. □

Theorem 5 (Non-Slanderability). *For any linkable ring signature, if it satisfies unforgeability and linkability, then it satisfies non-slanderability.*

Proof. The proof is given in Appendix E. □

Corollary 1 (Non-Slanderability). *The L2RS scheme is non-slanderable under the assumptions of **Theorem 2** and **Theorem 4**.*

7 Lattice RingCT v1.0 Protocol (LRCT)

This LRCT protocol is an extension of the original Ring CT protocol described in [49], and is constructed based on the L2RS scheme. Its algorithms are defined as follows:

- LRCT.Setup: this PPT algorithm uses L2RS.Setup where it takes the security parameter λ and outputs the public parameters Pub-Params.
- LRCT.KeyGen: this PPT algorithm uses the L2RS.KeyGen to produce a pair of keys, the public-key pk and the private-key sk.
- LRCT.Mint: a PPT algorithm that generates new coins. This algorithm receives the public-key pk and the amount \$, it outputs a coin **cn** along with its associated coin-key **ck**.
- LRCT.Spend: a PPT algorithm that receives the Pub-Params, a set of input wallets IW_i with $1 \leq i \leq w$, a user π's input wallet IW_π along with its set of secret keys K_π, a set of output addresses OA, some transaction string $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$ and the set of output wallets OW. Then, this algorithm outputs the transaction $TX = (\mu, IW, OW)$, uses L2RS.SigGen to generate and output the signature $\sigma(\mu)$, and finally output a set of transaction/serial numbers TN, which is used to prevent the double spending.
- LRCT.Verify: a deterministic PPT algorithm that takes as input the Pub-Params, the signature $\sigma(\mu)$, the TX, and the TN, it then uses L2RS.SigVer and outputs either: **Accept (1)** or **Reject (0)**.

7.1 Scheme construction

Our Lattice RingCT scheme requires homomorphic commitment (Com) as an additional primitive. It is a cryptographic technique used to provide confidential transactions, in particular cryptocurrencies [6]. This primitive allows one party to commit to a chosen value while keeping it secret to other parties, then this committed value can be revealed later. This model is restricted to have a Single-Input Single-Output (SISO) wallets, meaning that an Input Wallet will be spent into an Output Wallet (OW) only. We use the structure of the L2RS.KeyGen scheme **Algorithm 1**, where the public parameter $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ is used to commit to a scalar message $\mathrm{m} \in \mathsf{Dom}_\mathrm{m} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_q$ with $\mathsf{Dom}_\mathrm{m} = [0, \ldots, 2^{\ell-1}] \subseteq \mathbb{Z}$. This property is defined as $\mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}, \mathsf{sk}) = \mathbf{A}\cdot\mathsf{sk}+\mathrm{m} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, where the randomness $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathsf{Dom}_\mathsf{sk} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_q^{(m-1)\times 1}$. The properties of the homomorphic operations are also defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}_1, \mathsf{sk}) \boxed{\pm} \mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}_2, \mathsf{sk}') &\triangleq \mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}_1, \mathsf{sk}) \pm \mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}_2, \mathsf{sk}') \bmod q \\ &\triangleq \mathsf{Com}_\mathbf{A}(\mathrm{m}_1 \pm \mathrm{m}_2, \mathsf{sk} \pm \mathsf{sk}') \bmod q, \quad (1)\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathrm{m}_1, \mathrm{m}_2 \in \mathcal{R}_q$; and $\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{sk}' \in \mathcal{R}_q^{(m-1)\times 1}$. The integers $\mathrm{m}_1, \mathrm{m}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}$ are encoded in binary as coefficient vectors $\mathbf{m}_1 = (\mathrm{m}_{1,0}, \ldots, \mathrm{m}_{1,\ell-1}, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \{0,1\}^n$ and $\mathbf{m}_2 = (\mathrm{m}_{2,0}, \ldots, \mathrm{m}_{2,\ell-1}, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \{0,1\}^n$ where $\mathbf{m}_j = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1}(\mathrm{m}_{j,i} \cdot 2^i)$, with $\mathrm{m}_{j,i} \in \{0,1\}$ and $j \in \{0,1\}$, and $\mathbf{m} = \mathbf{m}_1 - \mathbf{m}_2 = (\mathrm{m}_{1,0} - \mathrm{m}_{2,0}, \ldots, \mathrm{m}_{1,\ell-1} - \mathrm{m}_{2,\ell-1}, 0, \ldots, 0) \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^n$. The difference between these vectors is zero $\in \mathcal{R}_q$ if $\mathbf{m}_1 = \mathbf{m}_2$, non-zero otherwise. Hence the commitment is done to bits.

The SISO scheme using the protocol Lattice RingCT v1.0, LRCT = (LRCT.Setup, LRCT.KeyGen, LRCT.Mint, LRCT.Spend, LRCT.Verify) works as follows.

1. (Pub-Params) $\leftarrow$ LRCT.Setup(λ): On input security parameter λ, this algorithm calls L2RS.Setup and outputs the public parameters, $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ and $\mathbf{H} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$.
2. $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S}) \leftarrow$ LRCT.KeyGen($\mathbf{A}$): Given the public parameter $\mathbf{A}$, it outputs a pair of keys, the public-key pk: $\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ and the private-key sk: $\mathbf{S} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{(m-1)\times 1}$. Then we define the commitment of the LRCT.KeyGen as $\mathbf{a} = \mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{S}+0 \bmod q \in \mathcal{R}_q = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}\big(0, \mathbf{S}\big)$.
3. $(\mathbf{cn}, \mathbf{ck}) \leftarrow$ LRCT.Mint($\mathbf{a}, \$$): This is illustrated in **Algorithm 5**. It receives a valid one-time address $\mathbf{a}$ as well as an input amount $\$ \in \big[0, \ldots, 2^{\ell_\$} - 1\big]$. Then, to create a coin $\mathbf{cn}$, this algorithm chooses a coin-key $\mathbf{ck} \in \mathsf{Dom}_{\mathbf{S}}$. Then, the commitment of Mint is computed as $\mathbf{cn} = \mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{ck} + \$ \bmod q \in \mathcal{R}_q = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}(\$, \mathbf{ck})$. This algorithm returns $(\mathbf{cn}, \mathbf{ck})$.

Algorithm 5 LRCT.Mint

Input: $\big(\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{R}_q, \$ \in \mathbb{B}_w^n\big)$, being the Public-key, the amount and the public parameter, respectively.

Output: $(\mathbf{cn}, \mathbf{ck})$, where they are the coin and the coin key, respectively.

1: **procedure** LRCT.Mint($\mathbf{a}, \$$)
2: Let $\mathbf{ck}^T = (\mathbf{ck}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{ck}_{m-1}) \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$with $\mathbf{ck}_i \leftarrow (-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)^n$, for $1 \le i \le m-1$
3: $\mathbf{cn} = \mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{ck} + \$ \bmod q \in \mathcal{R}_q = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}(\$, \mathbf{ck})$, where $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$ is the public parameter and a component of $\mathbf{a}$.
4: **return** $(\mathbf{cn}, \mathbf{ck})$

4. $(TX, \sigma_{L'}(\mu), TN) \leftarrow$ LRCT.Spend($\mu, IW, IW_\pi, K_\pi, OA$, Pub-Params): Described in **Algorithm 6**, this follows the steps:
   (a) The IW and IW_π were properly constructed. In this SISO protocol a user π spends one IW into one OW, this means that as we defined in **Table ??**, the π's number of wallets to be spent $N_{in} = 1$.
   (b) We denote the π's input wallet to be spent as $IW_\pi^{(1)} = \big\{\mathbf{a}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}\big\} \in \mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$, with the corresponding private part $K_\pi^{(1)} = \big\{\mathbf{S}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}, \mathbf{ck}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}\big\} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)} \times \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$, and the one ($N_{out} = 1$) output valid address $OA = \mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}$ where π intends to spend his money. Then, π selects $\$_{(out)}^{(1)} \in \big[0, \ldots, 2^{\ell_\$} - 1\big]$, such balances satisfy: $\$_{(in),\pi}^{(1)} = \$_{(out)}^{(1)}$. The LRCT.Mint$\big(\mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \$_{(out)}^{(1)}\big)$ is called to obtain $\big(\mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \mathbf{ck}_{(out)}^{(1)}\big)$, this defines an output wallet as $OW = OW^{(1)} = \big\{\mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)}\big\}$. Then, the coin-key $\mathbf{ck}_{(out)}^{(1)}$ and $\$_{(out)}$ are securely sent to the user holding the output valid address $OA = \mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}$.

(c) π selects $w-1$ (or the L2RS list L) of input wallets $IW = IW_i^{(1)} = \left\{\mathbf{a}_{(in),i}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(in),i}^{(1)}\right\}_{i\in[w]}$, to anonymously spend $IW_\pi^{(1)}$, with w being the ring signature size.

(d) A new list is constructed as $L' = \left\{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}^{(1)}\right\}_{i\in[w]} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, where $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}^{(1)}$ is the homomorphic commitment with randomness $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i}^{(1)}$ that we define as follows:
- $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}^{(1)} = \mathbf{a}_{(in),i}^{(1)} + \mathbf{cn}_{(in),i}^{(1)} - \mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)} = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}\left(\$_{(in),i}^{(1)} - \$_{(out)}^{(1)}, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i}^{(1)}\right)$, such that for the user's π this is a zero commitment: $\mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}\left(0, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}\right)$.
- $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i}^{(1)} = \left(\mathbf{S}_{(in),i}^{(1)} + \mathbf{ck}_{(in),i}^{(1)} - \mathbf{ck}_{(out)}^{(1)}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_q$.

(e) To create the proof of knowledge, we use the π's private-key: $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}$, the list L' and a transaction string $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$. Then, the signature of knowledge is generated by calling the $\mathsf{L2RS.SigGen}\left(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}, L', \mu, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params}\right)$, **Algorithm 2**, which outputs $\sigma_{L'}(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

(f) We set the transaction TX as (μ, IW, OW) and $TN = \mathbf{h}$.

(g) This algorithm ultimately outputs TX, TN, and $\sigma_{L'}(\mu)$.

Algorithm 6 LRCT.Spend - SISO

Input: $(\mu, IW, IW_\pi, OA, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params})$, being the message, the Input Wallets, π's Input Wallet, the Output Address and the public parameters, respectively.

Output: $\left(TX, \sigma_{L'}(\mu), TN\right)$

1: **procedure** LRCT.SPEND($\mu, IW, IW_\pi OA, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params}$)

2: Define π's $IW_\pi^{(1)} = \left\{\mathbf{a}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}\right\} \in \mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$and $K_\pi^{(1)} = \left\{\mathbf{S}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}, \mathbf{ck}_{(in),\pi}^{(1)}\right\} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)} \times \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$.

3: Define a valid output address $OA = \mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}$ and $\$_{(out)}^{(1)} \in \left[0, \ldots, 2^{\ell_\$} - 1\right]$ such $\$_{(in),\pi}^{(1)} = \$_{(out)}^{(1)}$, then compute $\left(\mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \mathbf{ck}_{(out)}^{(1)}\right) \leftarrow \mathsf{LRCT.Mint}\left(\mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \$_{(out)}^{(1)}\right)$.

4: Define $OW^1 = \left\{\mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)}\right\} \in \mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$.

5: Send securely coin-key $\mathbf{ck}_{(out)}^{(1)}$ to user's $\mathbf{a}_{(out)}^{(1)}$.

6: Create the list of input wallets $IW_i^{(1)}\left\{\mathbf{a}_{(in),i}^{(1)}, \mathbf{cn}_{(in),i}^{(1)}\right\}_{i\in[w-1]}$ (Ring Confidential Transaction).

7: Set $L' = \left\{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}\right\}_{i\in[w]} \in \mathcal{R}_q$, where $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}$ is the homomorphic commitment with randomness $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i}$.

8: Define $\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}^{(1)} = \mathbf{a}_{(in),i}^{(1)} + \mathbf{cn}_{(in),i}^{(1)} - \mathbf{cn}_{(out)}^{(1)} = \mathsf{Com}_{\mathbf{A}}\left(\$_{(in),i}^{(1)} - \$_{(out)}^{(1)}, \widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i}^{(1)}\right)$.

9: Define $\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),i} = \left(\mathbf{S}_{(in),i} + \mathbf{ck}_{(in),i} - \mathbf{ck}_{(out)}\right) \in \mathcal{R}_q$.

10: Call $\mathsf{L2RS.SignGen}\left(\widehat{\mathbf{S}}_{(in),\pi}, L', \mu, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params}\right)$ and retrieve $\sigma_{L'}(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

11: Set $TX = (\mu, IW, OW)$, $TN = \mathbf{h}$.

12: **return** $\left(TX, \sigma_{L'}(\mu), TN\right)$

---

5. (**Accept**/**Reject**) $\leftarrow$ $\mathsf{LRCT.Verify}\big(TX, \sigma_{L'}(\mu), TN\big)$: This algorithm calls $\mathsf{L2RS.SigVer}$ (**Algorithm 3**) with $\sigma_{L'}(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$, $TN = \mathbf{h}$, $L' = \big\{\widehat{\mathbf{a}}_{(in),i}\big\}_{i\in[w]} = \big\{\mathbf{a}_{(in),i} + \mathbf{cn}_{(in),i} - \mathbf{cn}_{(out)}\big\} \in \mathcal{R}_q$ and $\mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params}$, this ultimately outputs either **Accept** or **Reject**.

8 Performance Analysis

We proposed a set of parameters (**Table 1**) to implement the L2RS and SISO.LRCT schemes. They are secure against direct lattice attacks in terms of the BKZ algorithm Hermite factor δ, using the value of $\delta = 1.007$, based on the BKZ 2.0 complexity estimates with pruning enumeration-based Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) [50], this might give $90 - 100$ bits of security. We use the conditions stated in the $\mathsf{L2RS.SigVer}$ algorithm and in the security analysis (Section 6). Table 1 illustrates this information for five different versions of both L2RS and SISO.LRCT: I, II, III, IV and V, where these versions vary with the polynomial ring degree n. The figures of this table infer that the signature size grows linear with the number of users in the Ring Signature.

Table 1. Concrete parameters and sizes for L2RS and SISO.LRCT

Parameter	**Description**	I	II	III	IV	V
n	Polynomial ring degree	128	256	512	1024	2048
m	Polynomial ring size	18	10	6	5	5
λ	Security parameter	100	100	100	100	100
δ	Hermite factor	1.007	1.007	1.007	1.007	1.007
$\log(q)$	Modulus q - quotient	123	61	31	26	27
κ	Random Oracle weight	32	21	17	14	12
η	Correctness	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
α	Rejection sampling	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
M	Rejection sampling	1.0027	1.0027	1.0027	1.0027	1.0027
$\gamma \approx \log(2 \cdot n \cdot \kappa)$	Private-key density	13.6	13.6	13.6	13.6	13.6
σ	Gaussian standard deviation	337151	287898	283754	332435	435260
private-key		1.95 KB	1.93 KB	1.96 KB	3.28 KB	6.78 KB
public-key		1.92 KB	1.90 KB	1.93 KB	3.24 KB	6.74 KB
$w = 1$[5]		7.2 KB	7.7 KB	8.9 KB	15 KB	30.9 KB
$w = 5$		28.4 KB	30.9 KB	36.7 KB	62 KB	126 KB
$w = 8$		44.3 KB	48.4 KB	57.6 KB	97.2 KB	198.7 KB
$w = 16$		86.6 KB	94.8 KB	113.2 KB	191.1 KB	390.5 KB
$w = 32$		171.2 KB	187.6 KB	224.5 KB	379 KB	774.1 KB
$w = 64$		340.4 KB	373.3 KB	447.1 KB	754.6 KB	1541.4 KB
$w = 128$		678.9 KB	744.7 KB	892.3 KB	1505.9 KB	3075.9 KB

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[5] w is the Ring Signature size

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A L2RS - Correctness requirements

A.1 Correctness of SigGen

Proof. Beyond the required conditions of L2RS.SigVer, we claim that if $\sigma_L(\mu_1) = (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h})$ is the output of the L2RS.SigGen algorithm on input $(\mu, L, \mathbf{S}_\pi, \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Params})$, then the output of L2RS.SigVer on input $(\mu, L, \sigma_L(\mu_1))$ should be accepted. We need to show that when L2RS.SigVer computes $H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,w} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w)$, the result is equal to $\mathbf{c}_1$. We also show that $H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i) = \mathbf{c}_{i+1}$ for $1 \leq i \leq w-1$ in L2RS.SigVer. In this evaluation, we consider two scenarios, one when $i \neq \pi$ and $i = \pi$:

- For $i \neq \pi$, in L2RS.SigGen we have $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i)$, while in L2RS.SigVer we compute $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i)$. These are equal since $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i$ (in L2RS.SigGen) $= \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i$ (in L2RS.SigVer); and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i$ (in L2RS.SigGen) $= \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i$ (in L2RS.SigVer).

- For $i = \pi$, in L2RS.SigGen we have $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u})$, whereas in L2RS.SigVer we calculate $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi)$. In this case, we need to show that $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1}$ (in L2RS.SigGen) $= \mathbf{c}_{\pi+1}$ (in L2RS.SigVer). In doing so, the following equalities need to be proved:

1. $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi$, which is equivalent to $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot (\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{t}_\pi) = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi$. Here, we replace $\mathbf{t}_\pi$ as defined in **Algorithm 2**, to obtain:

$$\begin{gathered}\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot (\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{u} - \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b) = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \iff \\ -\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \iff \\ -q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi\end{gathered}$$

   We distinguish two cases for b:
   - When b = 0, we verify that -$q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \bmod 2q$.
   - When b = 1, we have $q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \bmod 2q$.
2. $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u} = \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi$, which means that:

$$\begin{gathered}\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot (\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{t}_\pi) = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \iff \\ \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot (\mathbf{u} - \mathbf{u} - \mathbf{S}_\pi \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b) = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \iff \\ -\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \iff \\ -q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi\end{gathered}$$

   We distinguish between two cases:
   - When b = 0, it is verified that $-q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \bmod 2q$.
   - When b = 1, we have $q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi = q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \bmod 2q$.

□

A.2 Correctness of SigLink

Proof. We show that an honest user π who signs two messages μ_1 and μ_2 in the L2RS scheme with the list of public-keys L, obtains a **Linked** output from L2RS.SigLink algorithm with overwhelming probability. As shown in **Algorithm 4**, two signatures $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma_L(\mu_2)$ were created, and then successfully verified by L2RS.SigVer. Therefore, the linkability tags $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1}$ and $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_2}$ must be equal. To prove this, we show that:

$$\begin{gathered}\mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}, \text{where} \\ \mathbf{H} = \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Param} \text{ and } \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_q \\ \mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_2} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}, \text{where} \\ \mathbf{H} = \mathsf{Pub\text{-}Param} \text{ and } \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_q\end{gathered}$$

The first parts of the linkability tag in both L2RS signatures have same equality with following probability:

$$Pr\big[2 \cdot \mathbf{H} = 2 \cdot \mathbf{H}\big] = 1.$$

Ultimately, the second part uses the honest user's private-key $\mathbf{S}_\pi$ is used, so we conclude that:

$$Pr\big[-2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} + q + 2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2} - q = 0\big] = 1.$$

□

B Security Analysis - One-Time Unforgeability

Proof. As stated in [13], this L2RS scheme relies on the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem to be secure against any existential forger. This means that a forgery algorithm succeeds with a negligible probability and so we conclude that under this probability, the attacker will also find a solution to the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem. To prove this, we start replacing the L2RS.SigGen algorithm with L2RS.Hybrid-1 and L2RS.Hybrid-2 algorithms that are used to simulate the creation of the signatures, until we obtain an algorithm that breaks the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem. These Hybrid algorithms are illustrated in **Algorithm 7** and **Algorithm 8**, respectively.

In L2RS.Hybrid-1, the output of the random oracle H_1 is chosen at random from $\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa} \subseteq \mathcal{R}_{2q}$ and then it is programmed, without checking the value of $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ being already set. This equality can be described as:

$$H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,w} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_w + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_w) = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u})$$

Every time the L2RS.Hybrid-1 is called, the probability of generating $\mathbf{u}$ such that $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ are equal to one of the previous output that was queried is at most 2^{-n+1}. We define that the probability of getting a collusion each time is at most $h \cdot 2^{-n+1}$, where "h" is the number of calls to the random oracle H_1, whereas the probability of occurring a collision after "o" queries to the L2RS.Hybrid-1 is at most $o \cdot h \cdot 2^{-n+1}$, which is negligible (Based on [13], Lemma 3.4).

After analyzing how $\mathbf{c}_1$ can be forged, we evaluate the $(\mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w)$ of the L2RS scheme. We claim that these are forgeable when an attacker finds a PPT algorithm $\mathcal{F}$ to solve the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem. This attack can be simulated using the L2RS.Hybrid-2 shown in **Algorithm 8**, where $\mathbf{t}_\pi$ is directly chosen from the distribution D^n_σ (Based on [13], Lemma 3.5).

The public-key $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \in \mathcal{R}^{1\times m}_{2q}$ is generated such $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{S}_{2q} = q \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}$, so finding a vector $\mathbf{v}$ such that $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{v} = 0 \bmod q$. We denote $y = h$ where y is the number of times the random oracle H_1 is programmed during this attack. Then this attack is performed as follows:

1. Random coins are selected for the forger ϕ and signer ψ.
2. The random oracle H_1 is called to generate the responses of the users in the L2RS scheme, $(\mathbf{c}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_w) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$.
3. These create a SubRoutine that takes as input $(\mathbf{A}_{2q}, \phi, \psi, \mathbf{c}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_w)$.
4. $\mathcal{F}$ is initialized and run by providing the $\mathbf{A}_{2q}$ and forger's random coins ϕ.
5. The SubRoutine signs the message μ using the signer's coins ψ in the L2RS.Hybrid-2, this produces a signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$.
6. During the signing process, $\mathcal{F}$ calls the oracle H_1 and answers are placed in the list $(\mathbf{c}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{c}_w)$, the queries are kept in a table in the event that same queries are used in this oracle.
7. $\mathcal{F}$ is stopped and it outputs a forgery that is the SubRoutine's result $(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h})$, with negligible probability δ. This output has to be successfully accepted by the L2RS.SigVer algorithm.

Algorithm 7 One-Time Unforgeability - Signature algorithm of L2RS Hybrid 1

Input: $\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$, Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H}$ and $\mathbf{A}$.
Output: $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$

procedure L2RS.HYBRID-1($\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L$, Pub-Params)
  Set $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, where $\mathbf{h} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
  Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_\pi$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
  Let $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \ldots, u_m)^T$, where $u_i \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le i \le m$.
  Choose at random $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$
  for $(i = \pi+1, \pi+2, \ldots, w, 1, 2, \ldots, \pi-1)$ **do**
    Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_i$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_i + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
    Let $\mathbf{t}_i = (t_{i,1}, \ldots, t_{i,m})^T$, where $t_{i,j} \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le j \le m$.
    Compute $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i\Big)$.
  Choose $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
  Let $\mathbf{t}_\pi \leftarrow \mathbf{u} + \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^b$.
  Continue with probability $\dfrac{1}{\left(M \exp\left(-\dfrac{\|\mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi\}\|^2}{2\sigma^2}\right) \cosh\left(\dfrac{\langle \mathbf{t}_\pi, \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \rangle}{\sigma^2}\right)\right)}$
  otherwise **Restart**.
  return $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

If the random oracle was not called using some input $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i$, then $\mathcal{F}$ has $1/|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|$ chances of producing a $\mathbf{c}$ such that $\mathbf{c} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c})$. This turns out that $\delta - 1/|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|$ be the probability that $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{c}_j$ for some j.

FORGERY 1. Let's consider the situation that $\mathbf{c}_{j+1}$ is the result after using $\mathcal{F}$ which is $\mathbf{c}_{j+1} = H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu', \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j)$. Then by comparing this with a legitimate signature, we have:

$$H_1\big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j\big) = H_1\big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu', \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j\big)$$

$\mathcal{F}$ will find a preimage of $\mathbf{c}_j$ if $\mu \neq \mu'$ or $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j \neq \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j$ or $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j \neq \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j$. Then, we have with overwhelming probability that $\mu = \mu'$ and $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j = \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j = \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j$. These equalities will result in: $\mathbf{A}_{2q}(\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}') = 0 \bmod 2q$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q}(\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}') = 0 \bmod 2q$. We assume that both $\mathbf{t}$ and $\mathbf{t}'$ are different and they met the L2RS.SigVer conditions, so it yields $\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}' \neq 0 \bmod q$, and $\|\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}'\| \le 2B_2$.

FORGERY 2. In this scenario, we assume that the L2RS scheme can be forged by an attacker $\mathcal{F}$ as it was presented in the FORGERY 1 and obtain $\mathbf{c}_j$, then another attacker can generate $(\mathbf{c}'_j, \ldots, \mathbf{c}'_w) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$ by replaying the first attack and using same message μ. We use the forking lemma [51] to show the probability

Algorithm 8 One-Time Unforgeability - Signature algorithm of L2RS Hybrid 2 $\sigma_L(\mu)$

Input: $\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L = \{\mathbf{a}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{a}_w\}$, Pub-Params: $\mathbf{H}$ and $\mathbf{A}$.

Output: $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$

procedure L2RS.HYBRID-2($\mathbf{S}_\pi, \mu, L,$ Pub-Params)
  Set $\mathbf{H}_{2q} = \big(2 \cdot \mathbf{H}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{h} + q\big) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$, where $\mathbf{h} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
  Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_\pi$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_\pi + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
  Let $\mathbf{u} = (u_1, \ldots, u_m)^T$, where $u_i \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le i \le m$.
  Choose at random $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$
  for $(i = \pi+1, \pi+2, \ldots, w, 1, 2, \ldots, \pi-1)$ **do**
    Call L2RS.Lift($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{a}_i$) to obtain $\mathbf{A}_{2q,i} = (2 \cdot \mathbf{A}, -2 \cdot \mathbf{a}_i + q) \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^{1\times m}$.
    Let $\mathbf{t}_i = (t_{i,1}, \ldots, t_{i,m})^T$, where $t_{i,j} \leftarrow D_\sigma^n$, for $1 \le j \le m$.
    Compute $\mathbf{c}_{i+1} = H_1\Big(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_i + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_i\Big)$.
  Choose $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
  Choose $\mathbf{t}_\pi \leftarrow D_\sigma^m$
  Continue with probability $\frac{1}{M}$ otherwise **Restart**.
  return $\sigma_L(\mu) = \Big(\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h}\Big)$.

of $\mathbf{c}_j = \mathbf{c}'_j$ and the forger uses an oracle response $\mathbf{c}'_j$ is at least:

$$\left(\delta - \tfrac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}\right) \cdot \left(\frac{\delta - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}}{y} - \tfrac{1}{|\mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}|}\right) \tag{2}$$

Therefore, with the probability (2), $\mathcal{F}$ creates a signature $\sigma_L(\mu) = (\mathbf{c}'_1, \mathbf{t}'_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}'_w, \mathbf{h})$ where $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j = \mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}'_j$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_j = \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}' + q \cdot \mathbf{c}'_j$. We now obtained: $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot (\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}') = \mathbf{q}(\mathbf{c}_j - \mathbf{c}'_j) \bmod 2q$ and $\mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot (\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}') = \mathbf{q}(\mathbf{c}_j - \mathbf{c}'_j) \bmod 2q$. Since $\mathbf{c}_j - \mathbf{c}'_j \neq 0 \bmod 2$, so in both equations, we have $\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}' \neq 0 \bmod 2q$ where $\|\mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}'\|_\infty < q/2$. By applying this reduction, we find a small non-zero vector $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{t} - \mathbf{t}' \neq 0 \bmod q$. This $\mathbf{v}$ will compute $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{v} = 0 \bmod q$ with $\|\mathbf{v}\| \le 2B_2$. Since $\mathbf{A}_{2q} \bmod q = 2(\mathbf{A}, -\mathbf{a}) \bmod q$, we have $2(\mathbf{A}, -\mathbf{a})\mathbf{v} = 0 \bmod q$, this implies that $(\mathbf{A}, -\mathbf{a})\mathbf{v} = 0 \bmod q$, since q is odd. Notice that L2RS.Hydrid-2 shown in **Algorithm 8** no longer uses the private-key $\mathbf{S}_\pi$, except for generating $\mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi}$ to obtain the final $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ solution. We modified the L2RS.KeyGen algorithm with the L2RS.Hydrid-3 game shown in **Algorithm 9**, where the public-key $\mathbf{a}$ is uniformly and randomly taken: $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q$. By the argument of the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) - **Lemma 1** and our assumption that $\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$ is negligible in n. The probability of success of an attacker in L2RS.Hydrid-3 differs by a negligible amount from the success probability in L2RS.KeyGen and is thus non-negligible. Therefore, this vector $\mathbf{v}$ will be a solution to the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem, where $\beta = 2B_2$, with non-negligible probability and with respect to $(\mathbf{A}, -\mathbf{a})$ over $\mathcal{R}_q$.

□

Algorithm 9 Key pair generation of L2RS Hybrid 3 $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$

Input: Pub-Param: $\mathbf{A}$.
Output: $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$, being the public-key and the private-key, respectively.
1: **procedure** L2RS.HYBRID-3($\mathbf{A}$)
2: Let $\mathbf{S}^T = (\mathbf{s}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{s}_{m-1}) \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1\times(m-1)}$, where $\mathbf{s}_i \leftarrow (-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)^n$, for $1 \leq i \leq m-1$
3: Choose $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q$
4: **return** $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{S})$.

C Security Analysis - Anonymity

Proof. We prove the anonymity of this scheme using the sequence-of-games approach [52] where we make changes between successive games. In doing so, we use the "*transition based on indistinguishability*". We can start this analysis by:

Game 0: Suppose that an attacker $\mathcal{A}$ is given the list of pk's $L = \{\mathbf{a}_0, \mathbf{a}_1\}$, the signature $\sigma_L(\mu)$, message μ, and the random oracle models (H_1 and H_2). The key generation algorithm creates the pair of users' keys in this ring signature: Private-Keys $\leftarrow (\mathbf{S}_0, \mathbf{S}_1)$ and the Public-Keys $\leftarrow (\mathbf{a}_0, \mathbf{a}_1)$; a user b is chosen uniformly at random from the list $L = \{\mathbf{a}_0, \mathbf{a}_1\}$, then the signature $\sigma_L(\mu) =$ L2RS.SigGen($\mathbf{S}_b, \mu, L,$ Pub-Param) is generated. So in **Game 0**, a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$; thus in the event **Game 0**, $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds in breaking ambiguity **Game 0**$(b = b')$ if $\Pr[\textbf{Game 0}] \leq \frac{1}{2} + non - negl(\lambda)$.

Game 1: Changes in this game are made to the user π in the second part of the linkability tag $\mathbf{h} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}) \in \mathcal{R}_q$, in signature of user π, and public-key $\mathbf{a} = (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}) \in \mathcal{R}_q$ in the L2RS.KeyGen algorithm. The $\mathbf{h}$ and $\mathbf{a}_1$ are now randomly chosen from $\mathcal{R}_q$. We claim that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 0}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 1}]| \leq \epsilon_{LHL_{G1}}$.

Where $\epsilon_{LHL_{G1}}$ is the advantage of some efficient algorithm which is negligible. In both cases $\mathbf{h} = (\mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}) \in \mathcal{R}_q$ and $\mathbf{a} = (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}) \in \mathcal{R}_q$, we know that $\mathbf{H}$ and $\mathbf{A}$ are uniform and $\mathbf{S}$ is chosen small and with coefficients in $(-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)$. When $\mathbf{S}$ is multiplied by $\mathbf{H}$ and $\mathbf{A}$ respectively, it gives $\mathbf{h}$ and $\mathbf{a}$ that are close to uniform over $\mathcal{R}_q$. By applying the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) - **Lemma 1**, the statistical distance between the distribution of ($\mathbf{h}$ mod q and $\mathbf{a}$ mod q) and the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$ is at most $n \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$. We conclude that in **Game 1**:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 0}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 1}]| \leq n \cdot \tfrac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{\tfrac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}. \tag{3}$$

Game 2: This time a change is made in the second part of the remaining public-keys $\mathbf{a}_i$ $(1 \leq i \leq w,\ i \neq \pi)$ which are in the ring signature list L. They are now

randomly chosen as $\mathbf{a}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_q$. It turns out that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 1}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 2}]| \leq \epsilon_{LHL_{G2}}$.

Where $\epsilon_{LHL_{G2}}$ is the advantage of some efficient algorithm which is negligible. We consider that for ($i = 1$ to w where $i \neq \pi$), we know that $\mathbf{a}_i = (\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}_i \bmod q)$ are uniform and all $\mathbf{S}_i$'s are chosen small with coefficients in $(-2^\gamma, 2^\gamma)$. When the $\mathbf{S}_i$'s are multiplied by $\mathbf{A}_i$'s, it gives $(\mathbf{a}_i \bmod q)$'s that are close to uniform over $\mathcal{R}_q$. By applying the Leftover Hash Lemma (LHL) - **Lemma 1**, the statistical distance between the distribution of the $(\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}_i \bmod q)$'s and the uniform distribution on $\mathcal{R}_q \times \mathcal{R}_q$ is at most $n \cdot \frac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q^n}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} \cdot (w-1)$. So in **Game 2**, we conclude that:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 1}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 2}]| \leq n \cdot \tfrac{1}{2} \cdot \sqrt{\tfrac{q^n}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} \cdot (w-1). \tag{4}$$

Game 3: At this time, we make a change in $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1}$. Instead of programming the oracle as $H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,i} \cdot \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{u})$, it is now randomly chosen $\mathbf{c}_{\pi+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n,\kappa}$. We have that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 2}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 3}]| \leq \epsilon_{G3}$ where ϵ_{G3} is the advantage of some efficient algorithm which is negligible. This scenario outputs a signature $\sigma_L(\mu_1) = (\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{t}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_w, \mathbf{h})$ and programs the oracle as $H_1(L, \mathbf{H}_{2q}, \mu, \mathbf{A}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi, \mathbf{H}_{2q} \cdot \mathbf{t}_\pi + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi) = \mathbf{c}_{\pi+1}$. Then, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes h queries to H_1; so the distinguishing advantage of the signing algorithm and the one in **Game 2** is at most $h \cdot 2^{-n+1}$. We conclude that in **Game 3**:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 2}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 3}]| \leq h \cdot 2^{-n+1}. \tag{5}$$

Game 4: In this game a change is made in $\mathbf{t}_\pi$. Namely, instead of computing it as $\mathbf{u} + \mathbf{S}_{2q,\pi} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\pi \cdot (-1)^{bit}$, it is now directly chosen from the Gaussian distribution D_σ^n. It is argued that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 3}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 4}]| \leq \epsilon_{RS_{G4}}$.

Where $\epsilon_{RS_{G4}}$ is the advantage of some efficient algorithm which is negligible. In previous Games, $\mathbf{t}_\pi$ is computed using rejection sampling - **Lemma 2**, thus it is always sample from the Gaussian distribution D_σ^n. In this Game, however, $\mathbf{t}_\pi$ is directly chosen from D_σ^n, this means that the advantage $\epsilon_{RS_{G4}}$ will be zero as in both **Game 3** and **Game 4**, $\mathbf{t}_\pi$ is having same distribution. In **Game 4**, we have:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 3}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 4}]| = 0. \tag{6}$$

Game 5: Finally, in the **Game 5**, a change is made in the index π. Namely, instead of choosing $\pi + 1$, it will be randomly chosen $(1, \ldots, w)$. We claim that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 4}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 5}]| \leq \epsilon_{G5}$ where ϵ_{G5} is the advantage of some efficient algorithm which is negligible. In this **Game 5**, we consider that when π is replaced by a fixed d, it might produce some collisions with previous queries to the oracle H_1; saying this, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ may make h queries to H_1; therefore, the distinguishing advantage of the signing algorithm between **Game 4** and this **Game 5** is at most $h \cdot 2^{-n+1} \cdot w$. Finally, in **Game 5** we have:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 4}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 5}]| \leq h \cdot 2^{-n+1} \cdot w. \tag{7}$$

We also conclude that in **Game 5**, the adversary's view is statistical independent of π, thus $\Pr[\textbf{Game 5}] = \frac{1}{w}$.
Combining the probabilities of the above games (C), (4), (5), (6) and (7) we obtain:

$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 5}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 0}]| \leq |\Pr[\textbf{Game 1}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 0}]| + |\Pr[\textbf{Game 2}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 1}]| + |\Pr[\textbf{Game 3}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 2}]| + |\Pr[\textbf{Game 4}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 3}]| + |\Pr[\textbf{Game 5}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 4}]|$.

By replacing the resulting probabilities, we have:

$$|\Pr[\textbf{Game 5}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 0}]| \leq \frac{1}{w} - \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon, \tag{8}$$

which means that $|\Pr[\textbf{Game 5}] - \Pr[\textbf{Game 0}]| \leq \epsilon$, which itself is smaller than

$$\frac{n \cdot (w-1)}{2} \cdot \left(\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} + \sqrt{\frac{q^{n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} \right) + h \cdot 2^{-n+1} \cdot (1+w).$$

We notice that since h and w are polynomial in n, we get $h \cdot 2^{-n+1} \cdot (1+w)$ is negligible in n. In addition, we can say that $\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} + \sqrt{\frac{q^{n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}} \right) \leq 2 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$, which is negligible by the assumption that $\sqrt{\frac{q^{2n}}{2^{(\gamma+1)\cdot(m-1)\cdot n}}}$ is also negligible. Hence we conclude that ϵ is negligible, meaning that $\Pr[\textbf{Game 0}] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$. □

D Security Analysis - Linkability

Proof. We construct the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ for the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem. This algorithm runs the linkability attack game (Def. 5) as follows:

1. $\mathcal{B}$ generates using the L2RS.KeyGen algorithm all private-keys $\mathbf{S}_i$'s with the corresponding public-keys $\mathbf{a}_i$'s, then $\mathcal{B}$ gives $\mathbf{S}_\pi$ to the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ as a response to the attacker's $\mathcal{CO}$ query.
2. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two signatures $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$ and $\sigma'_{L'}(\mu')$ along with their corresponding lists L and L' such that both signatures are successfully verified by L2RS.SigVer, but the linkability tags are different $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} \neq \mathbf{h}_{\mu'}$.
3. $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi} = \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \bmod q$, where π is the true signer's π linkability tag. This $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi}$ tag can then be compared with the linkability tags $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1}$and $\mathbf{h}_{\mu'}$, output by $\mathcal{A}$, in step 2, and one of them will be different.
4. Without loss of generality, suppose $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} \neq \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi} \bmod q$. Using the forking lemma [51], $\mathcal{B}$ rewinds the attacker $\mathcal{A}$ to the H_1 query corresponding to the L2RS.SigVer of the signature $\sigma_L(\mu_1)$. $\mathcal{B}$ reruns $\mathcal{A}$ with a different response of H_1 and ultimately gets another signature: $\sigma_L(\mu_2) =$

$(\mathbf{c}_{1,\mu_2}, \mathbf{t}_{1,\mu_2}, \ldots, \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}, \mathbf{h}_{\mu_2})$. This second signature is used to extract a solution to the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem, in case the $\mathcal{A}$ finds an efficient way to unlink these signatures, as shown in step 7.

5. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ matches the challenge message of both signatures where $\mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{2q,w,\mu_1}$ are kept. Thus we have:
   (a) $\mathbf{A}_{2q,w,\mu_1} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1} = \mathbf{A}_{2q,w,\mu_1} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2}$,
   (b) $\mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1} = \mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1} \cdot \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2} + q \cdot \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2}$.
   These expressions can be represented as:
   (a) $\mathbf{A}_{2q,w,\mu_1} \cdot (\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) = q \cdot (\mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2} - \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1})$,
   (b) $\mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1} \cdot (\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) = q \cdot (\mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2} - \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1})$.
   Reducing them mod$q$ we have (if $(\mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2} - \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1}) \neq 0 \bmod 2$):
   (a) $\mathbf{A}_{2q,w,\mu_1} \cdot (\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) = 0 \bmod q$,
   (b) $\mathbf{H}_{2q,\mu_1} \cdot (\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) = 0 \bmod q$.
   We denote by $\mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_1}$, the first $(m-1)$ ring elements in $\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1}$ and by $\mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1}$ the m-th ring element in $\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1}$, i.e. $\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_2} \\ \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_2} \end{pmatrix} \in \mathcal{R}_q^m$, and using the public-key and linkability parts, we have:
   (a) $2 \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot (\mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_2}) = -2 \cdot \mathbf{a} \cdot (\mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_2})$,
   (b) $2 \cdot \mathbf{H} \cdot (\mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_2}) = -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} \cdot (\mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_2})$, where $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} \triangleq \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \in \mathcal{R}_q$.
6. We let $\bar{\mathbf{S}} = \frac{(\mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}'_{w,\mu_2})}{(\mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_2})} \bmod q$ where $(\mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}''_{w,\mu_2}) \neq 0 \bmod q$. We distinguish two cases:
   (a) If $\bar{\mathbf{S}} \neq \mathbf{S}_\pi \bmod q$, since we have $\mathbf{A} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{S}} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi = \mathbf{a} \bmod q$, then $(\bar{\mathbf{S}} - \mathbf{S})$ is a small non-zero vector $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ solution for $\mathbf{A} \in \mathcal{R}_q^{1 \times (m-1)}$.
   (b) If $\bar{\mathbf{S}} = \mathbf{S}_\pi \bmod q$, then $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = \mathbf{H} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{S}} \bmod q = \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \bmod q$. The target is to show that $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi} \bmod 2$ and $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi} \bmod q$. If so, then we have $\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi} \bmod 2q$, which is a contradiction with our assumption at step 4 of this proof. We now prove the first target:

$$\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}'_{\mu_1} + q = 1 \bmod 2 = -2 \cdot \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi + q = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi},$$

   where the first and the last equalities follow from definition of $\mathbf{h}$ in second line of **Algorithm 2**. To show the second target, we have

$$\mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} = -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} + q = -2 \cdot \mathbf{h}_{\mu_1} \bmod q$$

$$= -2 \cdot \mathbf{H} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{S}} \bmod q = -2 \cdot \mathbf{H} \cdot \mathbf{S}_\pi \bmod q = \mathbf{h}_{\mu_\pi},$$

   where the first and the last equalities follow from definition of $\mathbf{h}$ in second line of **Algorithm 2** and the middle equality is true based on the argument at the beginning of step (6.b).
7. Since $(\mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_2} - \mathbf{c}_{w,\mu_1}) \neq 0 \bmod 2$, we have $(\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) \neq 0 \bmod 2q$. In addition, we know that $\|\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}\|_\infty < q/2$, which implies that $(\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) \neq 0 \bmod q$. Ultimately, we have $\mathbf{A} \cdot (\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) = 0 \bmod q$ and $\|(\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2}) \bmod q\| \leq 2B_2$. Therefore, this small non-zero vector $(\mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_1} - \mathbf{t}_{w,\mu_2})$ is the output of the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$, and this vector is a solution to the $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ problem with $\beta = 2B_2$ for $\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{R}_q$.

□

E Security Analysis - Non-Slanderability

Proof. Let's suppose there is a non-slanderability adversary $\mathcal{A}_{Sland}$ who is given $\mathbf{pk}_i, \mathbf{sk}_i, i \neq \pi,$ and $i \in \{1, \dots w\}$, and he produces a valid signature $\sigma'_L(\mu)$ with linkability tag $\mathbf{h}_{\sigma'_L(\mu)}$ which is equal to $\mathbf{h}_{\sigma_L(\mu)}$, $\sigma_L(\mu)$ being the legitimate signature generated with respect to $\mathbf{sk}_\pi$. This means that $\mathcal{A}_{Sland}$ can create a signature with the linkability tag $\mathbf{h}_{\sigma_L(\mu)}$ without knowing $\mathbf{sk}_\pi$. The adversary can also compute a valid $\sigma''_L(\mu)$ with $\mathbf{sk}_i,\ i \neq \pi,$ and $i \in \{1, \dots w\}$ for which $\mathbf{h}_{\sigma''_L(\mu)} \neq \mathbf{h}_{\sigma'_L(\mu)}$. We give $(\sigma''_L(\mu), \sigma'_L(\mu))$ to the forger, which can turn it to an $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ solution. In particular, it will be computationally secure when two valid signatures created by different users are unlinked using the L2RS algorithms. An adversary $\mathcal{A}$ will break these properties with negligible probability as demonstrated in Theorems (2 and 4), and with these probabilities the $\mathcal{A}$ will find a $\mathcal{R}$-$\mathbf{SIS}^{\mathcal{K}}_{q,m,\beta}$ solution. Therefore, non-slanderability is implied by the definitions of the unforgeability (Def. 3) and linkability (Def. 5), and security analysis, (**Appendix B**) and (**Appendix D**), respectively. □