

ON THE SECURITY OF THE WOTS-PRF SIGNATURE SCHEME

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ABSTRACT. We identify a flaw in the security proof and a flaw in the concrete security analysis of the WOTS-PRF variant of the Winternitz one-time signature scheme, and discuss the implications to its concrete security.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Winternitz one-time signature (WOTS) scheme (see [22, 8]) is an optimization of a one-time signature scheme first described by Lamport [20]; the latter is now called the Lamport-Diffie one-time signature scheme. The WOTS scheme is widely believed to be resistant to attacks by large-scale quantum computers, and therefore is a prime candidate for inclusion in emerging standards for post-quantum cryptography.

Several variants of WOTS have been proposed and studied in the literature. The original WOTS scheme used a one-way function and was analyzed by Dods et al. [6]. The Leighton and Micali scheme WOTS-LM is described in an IETF Internet-Draft [21], and has been analyzed in the random oracle model [17] and the quantum random oracle model [7]. Buchmann et al. [4] (see also [3, 11]) proposed a variant, called WOTS-PRF, that uses a pseudorandom function (PRF) instead of a hash function. Another hash-based WOTS variant, called WOTS⁺, was proposed by Hülsing [12] and has been included in an IETF standard [14]. In [16], a modification of WOTS⁺ specifically designed to resist multi-target attacks was studied.

The practicality of a one-time signature scheme is enhanced by using a Merkle tree [22] to simultaneously authenticate many public keys for the one-time signature scheme. Merkle tree-based signature schemes that use a WOTS variant as the underlying one-time signature scheme include the eXtended Merkle Signature Scheme (XMSS) [5], XMSS⁺ [13], XMSS^{MT} [15], and XMSS-T [16].

The most attractive feature of WOTS-PRF is that it has a reductionist security proof with minimal assumptions [4], namely the existence of a secure PRF whose existence in turn is guaranteed by the existence of one-way functions [9, 10]. This is unlike, say, WOTS-LM whose only known security proof assumes that the underlying hash function is a purely random function [17], or WOTS⁺ whose security proof assumes the existence of a one-way function that is also second-preimage resistant and ‘undetectable’ [12].

In this paper, we show that the security proof for WOTS-PRF in [4] is flawed. Furthermore, we show that even if the flaw can be repaired, the concrete security analysis in [4] is incorrect since it underestimates the possible number of “key collisions” for the PRF by using an unconstructible reductionist argument to relate this number to PRF security. We

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show that this underestimation leads to a drastic overestimation of the concrete security of WOTS-PRF and the Merkle signature schemes that employ it including XMSS and XMSS⁺.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The WOTS-PRF signature scheme is described in §2. In §3 we identify a flaw in the reductionist security proof. The flaw in the concrete security analysis and its implications are presented in §4. We make some concluding remarks in §5.

2. THE WOTS-PRF SIGNATURE SCHEME

The WOTS-PRF signature scheme [4] has the following ingredients:

- (1) A security parameter $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
- (2) The bitlength m of messages.
- (3) A Winternitz parameter $w \in \mathbb{N}$, which for simplicity we will take to be a power of two: $w = 2^e$.
- (4) A pseudorandom function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. For $(k, x) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$, we will denote $f(k, x)$ by $f_k(x)$. The *iterates* of f are defined as follows. For $(k, x) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$,

$$f_k^0(x) = k \quad \text{and} \quad f_k^i(x) = f_{f_k^{i-1}(x)}(x) \quad \text{for } i \geq 1.$$

Thus, $f_k^1(x) = f_k(x)$, $f_k^2(x) = f_{f_k(x)}(x)$, and so on.

- (5) A checksum C on messages defined as follows: set

$$\ell_1 = \left\lceil \frac{m}{e} \right\rceil, \quad \ell_2 = \left\lceil \frac{\log_2(\ell_1(w-1))}{e} \right\rceil + 1, \quad \ell = \ell_1 + \ell_2.$$

Define $C : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{e\ell_2}$ as follows. Let $M \in \{0, 1\}^m$. Obtain M^0 by prepending M with 0's until the bitlength of M^0 is $e\ell_1$, and then write $M^0 = M_1 \| M_2 \| \dots \| M_{\ell_1}$ where each M_i has bitlength e . Interpret each M_i as a non-negative integer and compute $c(M) = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell_1} (w-1 - M_i)$. The checksum $C(M)$ is obtained by converting $c(M)$ to a binary string and then prepending 0's as necessary to obtain a binary string of bitlength exactly $e\ell_2$.

We next present the WOTS-PRF signature scheme.

Key generation. Each user A does the following:

- (1) Select $x \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$.
- (2) Select $sk_1, sk_2, \dots, sk_\ell \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$.
- (3) Compute $pk_i = f_{sk_i}^{w-1}(x)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$; $(sk_i, f_{sk_i}^1(x), f_{sk_i}^2(x), \dots, f_{sk_i}^{w-1}(x))$ is called the i -th Winternitz hash chain.
- (4) A 's public signature verification key is $pk = (pk_0, pk_1, \dots, pk_\ell)$ where $pk_0 = x$.
 A 's secret signature generation key is $sk = (sk_1, sk_2, \dots, sk_\ell)$.

Signature generation. To sign a message $M \in \{0, 1\}^m$, A does the following:

- (1) Compute the checksum $C = C(M)$, and let $B = M^0 \| C = b_1 \| b_2 \| \dots \| b_\ell$ where each b_i has bitlength e .
- (2) Compute $\sigma_i = f_{sk_i}^{b_i}(x)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$.
- (3) A 's signature on M is $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots, \sigma_\ell)$.

Signature verification. To verify A 's signed message (M, σ) , the verifier does the following:

- (1) Compute the checksum $C = C(M)$, and let $B = M^0 \| C = b_1 \| b_2 \| \dots \| b_\ell$ where each b_i has bitlength e .
- (2) Compute $pk'_i = f_{\sigma_i}^{w-1-b_i}(pk_0)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$.
- (3) Accept the signature if and only if $pk'_i = pk_i$ for all $i = 1, 2, \dots, \ell$.

3. THE WOTS-PRF SECURITY PROOF

This section presents the WOTS-PRF reductionist security proof from [4] and the flaw we observed in the analysis of its success probability. We begin with the definitions of a secure one-time signature scheme, a secure pseudorandom function, and the maximum and minimum number of key collisions.

Definition 1. A one-time signature scheme \mathcal{S} is said to be (t, ϵ) -secure if all adversaries $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{S}}$ whose running times are bounded by t have success probability less than ϵ in the following game: $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{S}}$ is given a public key pk for \mathcal{S} and can query a signing oracle (with respect to pk) for the signature σ of one message M of its choosing; $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{S}}$'s challenge is to generate a valid signed message (M^*, σ^*) with $M^* \neq M$. The security level of \mathcal{S} is $\log_2(t/\epsilon)$ bits.

Definition 2. A function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is said to be a (t, ϵ) -secure PRF if all adversaries \mathcal{A}_f whose running times are bounded by t have advantage less than ϵ in the following game: \mathcal{A}_f is given blackbox access to an oracle $O(\cdot)$ that with equal probability is either $f_k(\cdot)$ for hidden key $k \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$ or else a random function $R : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$; \mathcal{A}_f 's challenge is to determine which it is. (\mathcal{A}_f 's advantage is the absolute value of the differences in probabilities that \mathcal{A}_f declares that $O(\cdot)$ is $f_k(\cdot)$ in the case where $O(\cdot)$ is $f_k(\cdot)$ and the case where $O(\cdot)$ is $R(\cdot)$.) The security level of f is $\log_2(t/\epsilon)$ bits.

Definition 3. Consider the function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. For each pair $(k, x) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$, let

$$N_{k,x} = \#\{k' \in \{0, 1\}^n : f_{k'}(x) = f_k(x)\},$$

and

$$T_x = \max_k \{N_{k,x}\} \quad \text{and} \quad S_x = \min_k \{N_{k,x}\}.$$

Then the maximum number κ and minimum number κ' of key collisions are

$$\kappa = \max_x \{T_x\} \quad \text{and} \quad \kappa' = \min_x \{S_x\}.$$

Observe that $N_{k,x} \geq 1$, and so $1 \leq \kappa' \leq \kappa$. We note that the definition of κ' in [4] is incorrect, as are the definitions of κ and κ' in [3]. Our definitions of κ and κ' are equivalent to those given in [11].

In [4], the following notion of a key one-way (KOW) function is introduced.

Definition 4. A function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is said to be (t, ϵ) -KOW if all adversaries \mathcal{A}_{KOW} whose running times are bounded by t have advantage less than ϵ in the following game: \mathcal{A}_{KOW} is given (x, y) , where $x, k \in_R \{0, 1\}^n$ and $y = f_k(x)$; \mathcal{A}_{KOW} 's challenge is to find some $k' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ with $f_{k'}(x) = y$.

Proposition 2.7 in [4] shows that a (t, ϵ) -secure PRF is a $(t - 2, \epsilon/(1/\kappa - 1/2^n))$ -KOW. The following is the main security claim in [4]. We include a summary of the proof from [4].

Theorem 1 (Theorem 2.8 in [4]). *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a (t', ϵ') -secure PRF. Then WOTS-PRF is a (t, ϵ) -secure one-time signature scheme with*

$$(1) \quad t = t' - t_{\text{Kg}} - t_{\text{Vf}} - 2,$$

$$(2) \quad \epsilon \leq \epsilon' \ell^2 w^2 \kappa^{w-1} \frac{1}{1/\kappa - 1/2^n},$$

where t_{Kg} and t_{Vf} denotes the running times of the WOTS-PRF key generation and verification algorithms, respectively.

Summary of proof from [4]. Suppose that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ is a forger that runs in time t and produces a WOTS-PRF forgery with probability at least ϵ . We construct an adversary \mathcal{A}_{KOW} that uses $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ to solve the KOW challenge.

The adversary \mathcal{A}_{KOW} is given a KOW challenge (x, y) . It begins by generating a WOTS-PRF key pair as specified in §2 with one exception. It selects random indices $\alpha \in_R [1, \ell]$ and $\beta \in_R [1, w - 1]$. Instead of selecting the secret key component sk_α and computing $pk_\alpha = f_{sk_\alpha}^{w-1}(x)$, \mathcal{A}_{KOW} sets $pk_\alpha = f_y^{w-1-\beta}(x)$; i.e., it inserts y at position β in the Winternitz hash chain that an honest execution of the key generation algorithm would have produced to determine pk_α .

Next, \mathcal{A}_{KOW} invokes $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ with public key pk and answers its signing oracle query M as follows. If $b_\alpha < \beta$, then \mathcal{A}_{KOW} terminates the experiment since it doesn't know the first β entries of the α 'th Winternitz hash chain. Otherwise, if $b_\alpha \geq \beta$, then $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ produces the required signature σ on M as specified in §2 except that it sets $\sigma_\alpha = f_y^{b_\alpha - \beta}(x)$. If $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ produces a valid forgery (M', σ') within its allotted time, and if $b'_\alpha < \beta$, then $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ computes $k' = f_{\sigma'_\alpha}^{\beta-1-b'_\alpha}(x)$ and outputs k' if $f_{k'}(x) = y$; otherwise $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ terminates with failure. See Figure 1.




FIGURE 1. The incomplete α 'th Winternitz hash chain in \mathcal{A}_{KOW} 's experiment.

\mathcal{A}_{KOW} 's success probability ϵ_{KOW} is assessed as follows. The probability that $b_\alpha \geq \beta$ is at least $(\ell w)^{-1}$. The probability that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ succeeds is at least ϵ subject to the condition that pk is a valid public key, i.e., there exists $sk_\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f_{sk_\alpha}^\beta(x) = y$. This happens with probability at least $1/\kappa^\beta$ according to Definition 3. The probability that $b'_\alpha < \beta$ is at least $(\ell w)^{-1}$. The probability that $y = f_{k'}(x)$ holds where $k' = f_{\sigma'_\alpha}^{\beta-1-b'_\alpha}(x)$ is at least $1/\kappa^{w-1-\beta}$. This is because there exists at most κ^{w-1} keys mapping x to pk_α after $w - 1$ iterations of f and only κ^β of these keys maps x to y after β iterations.

In summary we have $\epsilon_{\text{KOW}} \geq \epsilon/(\ell^2 w^2 \kappa^\beta \kappa^{w-1-\beta})$ and $t_{\text{KOW}} = t + t_{\text{Kg}} + t_{\text{Vf}}$. This yields a PRF forger \mathcal{A}_{PRF} with $\epsilon_{\text{PRF}} \geq \epsilon(1/\kappa - 1/2^n)/(\ell^2 w^2 \kappa^{w-1})$ and $t_{\text{PRF}} = t + t_{\text{Kg}} + t_{\text{Vf}} + 2$. \square

We observe a flaw in the proof of Theorem 1, which pertains to the probability analysis of the reduction. To aid in our explanations, we introduce the notion of a *keychain*.

Definition 5. Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a PRF, and fix $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$. For any $\gamma \in \mathbb{N}$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$, a γ -*keychain to y* is an ordered tuple $(k_1, k_2, \dots, k_\gamma)$ of n -bit keys such that $k_{i+1} = f_{k_i}(x)$ for $i = 1, 2, \dots, \gamma - 1$ and $k_\gamma = y$.

The flaw is in the claim that the probability that $y = f_{k'}(x)$ holds is at least $1/\kappa^{w-1-\beta}$. Consider the tree of all w -keychains to pk_α ; see Figure 2. By definition of κ , there exist at




FIGURE 2. The tree of w -keychains to pk_α .

most $\kappa^{w-1-\beta}$ $(w - \beta)$ -keychains to pk_α . Note that y is the first coordinate of one of these keychains. Now, since $b'_\alpha < \beta$, the $(w - b'_\alpha)$ -keychain to pk_α beginning at σ'_α must connect with one of the $(w - \beta)$ -keychains to pk_α . If the connecting keychain is selected uniformly at random, then the probability that the connecting keychain begins with y (and thus $y = f_{k'}(x)$) is indeed at least $1/\kappa^{w-1-\beta}$. However, there is no justification for assuming that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ selects a connecting chain uniformly at random. Indeed, since $\mathcal{A}_{\text{WOTS}}$ knows σ_α , it is conceivable that it always selects σ'_α so that the $(w - b'_\alpha)$ -keychain beginning at σ'_α does not pass through σ_α , and thus never connects with y ; in this event, the probability that $y = f_{k'}(x)$ holds is zero.

4. CONCRETE SECURITY OF WOTS-PRF

In [4], the following relationship between the security level of the PRF f and the maximum number of key collisions κ for f is proven.

Lemma 2. Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a (t, ϵ) -secure PRF with security level $b = \log_2(t/\epsilon)$. Then $\kappa \leq 2^{n-b} + 1$.

Proof, paraphrased from [4]. Suppose that $\kappa > 2^{n-b} + 1$ and let $(x, y) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$ be a pair for which there exist κ keys k for which $f_k(x) = y$. We construct a PRF-adversary \mathcal{A}_f as follows. \mathcal{A}_f queries its oracle $O(\cdot)$ with x . If $O(x) = y$ then \mathcal{A}_f declares that

$O(\cdot)$ is $f_k(\cdot)$; otherwise it declares that $O(\cdot)$ is $R(\cdot)$. Clearly \mathcal{A}_f 's runs in time $t' = 1$. Furthermore,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}_f \text{ declares that } O(\cdot) \text{ is } f_k(\cdot) \mid O(\cdot) \text{ is indeed } f_k(\cdot)] = \frac{\kappa}{2^n} > 2^{-b} + 2^{-n}$$

and

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}_f \text{ declares that } O(\cdot) \text{ is } f_k(\cdot) \mid O(\cdot) \text{ is indeed } R(\cdot)] = 2^{-n}.$$

Hence \mathcal{A}_f 's advantage is $\epsilon' > 2^{-b}$, which contradicts the assumed PRF security level of b for f . \square

Since the only way for the adversary of a good PRF f to gain an advantage is to guess the hidden key, the authors of [4] conclude that f can be expected to have security level $b = n$, whence $\kappa \leq 2$. However, we will argue that $\kappa = 2$ is a severe underestimation of the maximum number of key collisions for f . The problem with the proof of Lemma 2 is that the adversary \mathcal{A}_f described is *non-constructive* since no efficient method for determining the pair (x, y) for f may be known. On the other hand, the security level b of the PRF f is usually assessed by considering all known *constructible* algorithms for the PRF security game in Definition 2. Thus, \mathcal{A}_f 's advantage $\epsilon' > 2^{-b}$ in the proof does not contradict the assumed security level of f .

We show in §4.1 that κ can be expected to be considerably larger than 2 even for ‘good’ PRFs. The implications of the underestimation of κ to the concrete security guarantees for WOTS-PRF are explored in §4.2.

Remark 1. As argued in [18, 19] (see also [2]), the security level of a PRF f against attacks that might be unconstructible is expected to be significantly lower than when only constructible attacks are considered. In particular, if f is a good PRF with security level n against constructible attacks, then f can be expected to have security level no more than $n/2$ against unconstructible attacks. Furthermore, determining the exact security level of f against unconstructible attacks is expected to be a very challenging undertaking. The significance of the difference in the constructible and unconstructible security levels of f to the concrete security guarantees of Bellare’s security proof [1] for the HMAC authentication scheme is discussed in [18, 19].

Remark 2. A one-time signature scheme \mathcal{S} is said to be (t, ϵ) -strongly secure if, in addition to satisfying Definition 1, it is required that the signed message (M^*, σ^*) produced by the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{S}}$ satisfies $(M^*, \sigma^*) \neq (M, \sigma)$. Theorem 3.5 of [4] proves that WOTS-PRF is strongly secure assuming that the underlying PRF f is second-key resistant (SKR) or key-collision resistant (KCR). Furthermore, it is assumed that the minimum number of key collisions κ' for f (see Definition 3) satisfies $\kappa' \geq 2$. However, since

$$\kappa' = \min_{(k,x)} \{N_{k,x}\},$$

it is highly unlikely that $\kappa' \neq 1$ for PRFs f used in practice. Indeed, one would expect with overwhelming probability that $N_{k,x} = 1$ for at least one pair (k, x) for a function f selected uniformly at random from the space of all functions from $\{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$ to $\{0, 1\}^n$. Thus, the claim that WOTS-PRF is strongly secure if $\kappa' \geq 2$ is vacuous for common constructions of PRFs.

4.1. Balls and bins. Consider an experiment wherein N balls are thrown, independently and uniformly at random, into N bins. Of interest is the expected maximum number of balls in any bin. This study is analogous to the determination of the expected value of T_x for a fixed $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (cf. Definition 3) for a uniform random function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$. Here, the balls are the keys $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (so $N = 2^n$), the bins are the elements of the codomain $\{0, 1\}^n$, and ball k is placed in bin $f_k(x)$. Then the expected maximum number M of balls in a bin is equal to the expected value of T_x , which in turn is at most the expected value of κ .

Theorem 3 ([23]). *Consider an experiment wherein N balls are randomly assigned to N bins. Let M be the random variable that counts the maximum number of balls in a bin. Then*

$$E[M] = \frac{\ln N}{\ln \ln N} (1 + o(1)) \text{ with probability } 1 - o(1).$$

Moreover,

$$\Pr[\text{there is at least one bin with } \geq \alpha \frac{\ln N}{\ln \ln N} \text{ balls}] = \begin{cases} 1 - o(1), & \text{if } 0 < \alpha < 1, \\ o(1), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Clearly the value $\ln N / \ln \ln N$ can be made arbitrarily large. Hence, for any $t \in \mathbb{N}$ one can produce values $0 < \alpha < 1$ and $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\alpha \ln N / \ln \ln N \geq t$. Thus, even though the PRF f is not uniformly random, this gives strong evidence that $\kappa \leq 2$ is in general false.

4.2. Concrete security assurances of WOTS-PRF and XMSS. Theorem 1 states that if f is a (t', ϵ') -secure PRF, then WOTS-PRF is a (t, ϵ) -secure one-time signature scheme with $t \approx t'$ and $\epsilon \leq \epsilon' \ell^2 w^2 \kappa^{w-1} / (1/\kappa - 1/2^n)$. The *tightness gap* in the security reduction of Theorem 1 is

$$\ell^2 w^2 \kappa^{w-1} \frac{1}{1/\kappa - 1/2^n} \approx \ell^2 w^2 \kappa^w,$$

which is sensitive to the value to κ . For example, suppose that the PRF f is instantiated using AES with 128-bit keys, whereby it is reasonable to assume that it has a security level of 128 bits. The authors of [4], take $\kappa = 2$, $m = 128$, $w = 16$ and conclude that Theorem 1 guarantees a security level of at least 91 bits for WOTS-PRF. However, since one expects that

$$\kappa \geq \frac{\ln(2^{128})}{\ln(\ln(2^{128}))} \approx 20,$$

Theorem 1 can guarantee a security level of at most 39 bits for WOTS-PRF, which is insufficient in practice.

As a second example, consider XMSS when instantiated with WOTS-PRF. The security proof in [11] yields an XMSS security level of

$$(3) \quad b > n - h - 3 - \max\{h + 1, w \log_2(\kappa) + \log_2(\ell w)\},$$

where h is the height of the XMSS tree. Taking $n = m = 256$, $w = 64$, $\kappa = 2$ and $h = 16$, Table 7.1 concludes that XMSS has a security level of at least 161 bits. However, since one expects that

$$\kappa \geq \frac{\ln(2^{256})}{\ln(\ln(2^{256}))} \approx 34.3,$$

the security bound (3) can at best guarantee that $b > -100$, which is vacuous.

Similar conclusions can be drawn about the concrete security levels given for XMSS in [5] and XMSS⁺ in [13].

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We emphasize that our observations on the WOTS-PRF security proof have no bearing on the security proofs for other variants of WOTS such as WOTS-LM and WOTS⁺. Furthermore, our remarks in §4.2 on the concrete security bounds for XMSS and XMSS⁺ only apply when these signature schemes are instantiated with WOTS-PRF. In particular, they are not applicable to XMSS as described in the IETF RFC [14] where WOTS⁺ is the underlying one-time signature scheme.

An open problem is to devise a (tight) reductionist security proof for WOTS-PRF (or a variant of it) under the sole assumption that f is a secure PRF.

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