Paper 2016/1139

Comments on “Flaw in the Security Analysis of Leakage-resilient Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol from CT-RSA 2016 and Restoring the Security Proof”

Rongmao Chen, Yi Mu, Guomin Yang, Willy Susilo, and Fuchun Guo

Abstract

In CT-RSA 2016, Chen, Mu, Yang, Susilo and Guo proposed a strongly leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol. In a rencent work, Chakraborty et al. claimed that they identified a flaw in the security analysis of Chen et al.’s protocol. In the letter, we point out that the flaw identified by Chakraborty et al. is invalid and does not exist in the original proof presented in Chen et al.’s paper.