A Forgery Attack on the  Candidate LTE  Integrity Algorithm 128-EIA3

Thomas Fuhr; Henri Gilbert; Jean-Renë Reinhard; Marion Videau

Paper 2010/618

A Forgery Attack on the Candidate LTE Integrity Algorithm 128-EIA3

Thomas Fuhr, Henri Gilbert, Jean-Renë Reinhard, and Marion Videau

Abstract

In this note we show that the message authentication code 128-EIA3 considered for adoption as one of the integrity algorithms of the emerging mobile standard LTE is vulnerable to a simple existential forgery attack. This attack allows, given any message and the associated MAC value under an unknown integrity key and an initial vector, to predict the MAC value of a related message under the same key and the same initial vector with a success probability 1/2.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords: message authentication codes forgery attacks
Contact author(s): henri gilbert @ ssi gouv fr
History: 2010-12-08: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2010/618
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/618,
      author = {Thomas Fuhr and Henri Gilbert and Jean-Renë Reinhard and Marion Videau},
      title = {A Forgery Attack on the  Candidate {LTE}  Integrity Algorithm 128-{EIA3}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/618},
      year = {2010},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/618}
}