Paper 2010/574
Cryptanalysis of PRESENT-like ciphers with secret S-boxes
Julia Borghoff, Lars R. Knudsen, Gregor Leander, and Soeren S. Thomsen
Abstract
At Eurocrypt 2001, Biryukov and Shamir investigated the security of AES-like ciphers where the substitutions and affine transformations are all key-dependent and successfully cryptanalysed two and a half rounds. This paper considers PRESENT-like ciphers in a similar manner. We focus on the settings where the S-boxes are key dependent, and repeated for every round. We break one particular variant which was proposed in 2009 with practical complexity in a chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext scenario. Extrapolating these results suggests that up to 28 rounds of such ciphers can be broken. Furthermore, we outline how our attack strategy can be applied to an extreme case where the S-boxes are chosen uniformly at random for each round and where the bit permutation is secret as well.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Symmetric key ciphersblock ciphersPRESENTdifferential cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- g leander @ mat dtu dk
- History
- 2010-11-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2010/574
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2010/574,
author = {Julia Borghoff and Lars R. Knudsen and Gregor Leander and Soeren S. Thomsen},
title = {Cryptanalysis of {PRESENT}-like ciphers with secret S-boxes},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2010/574},
year = {2010},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/574}
}
