Paper 2008/536
Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems
Emily Shen, Elaine Shi, and Brent Waters
Abstract
Predicate encryption is a new encryption paradigm which gives the secret key owner fine-grained control over access to encrypted data. The secret key owner can generate tokens corresponding to predicates. An encryption of a plaintext x can be decrypted using a token corresponding to a predicate f if the plaintext satisfies the predicate, i.e., f(x) = 1. Prior work on public-key predicate encryption has focused on the notion of plaintext privacy, the property that ciphertexts reveal no information about the encrypted plaintext. In this paper, we consider a new notion called predicate privacy, the property that tokens reveal no information about the encoded query predicate. Predicate privacy is inherently impossible to achieve in the public-key setting and has therefore received little attention in prior work. In this work, we consider predicate encryption in the symmetric-key setting and present a symmetric-key predicate encryption scheme which supports inner product queries. We prove that our scheme achieves both plaintext privacy and predicate privacy.
Note: Elaine Shi (eshi@parc.com) Emily Shen (eshen@csail.mit.edu)
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- PDF PS
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Contact author(s)
- bwaters @ cs utexas edu
- History
- 2008-12-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2008/536
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2008/536, author = {Emily Shen and Elaine Shi and Brent Waters}, title = {Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2008/536}, year = {2008}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/536} }