

On the Provable Security of Multi-Receiver Signcryption Schemes

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Abstract. In ATC 2007, an identity based signcryption scheme for multiple receivers was proposed by Yu et al. In this paper, we first show that Yu et al.'s signcryption scheme is insecure by demonstrating an universal forgeability attack - anyone can generate a valid signcryption on any message on behalf of any legal user for any set of legal receivers without knowing the secret keys of the legal users. Also, we point out a subtle flaw in the proof of confidentiality given by Yu et al. and show that the scheme does not provide confidentiality. Further, we propose a corrected version of Yu et al.'s scheme and formally prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption.

In another direction, Fagen Li et al. have proposed a pairing based multi-recipient signcryption scheme which works in public key infrastructure (PKI). We show that, the scheme proposed by Fagen Li et al. is not adaptive chosen ciphertext secure. We propose a new PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme and formally prove confidentiality and unforgeability of the scheme. Since all the previously reported schemes are shown to have flaws either in this paper or else where, the schemes reported in this paper are the only correct and efficient ones (both identity based and PKI based) for multi-receiver signcryption.

Keywords. Signcryption, Cryptanalysis, Identity Based Cryptography, PKI, Multi-Receiver Signcryption, Bilinear Pairing.

1 Introduction

Encryption and signatures are basic cryptographic tools offered by public key cryptography for achieving privacy and authenticity. Both primitives are used in a variety of high level protocols. There are scenarios where properties of both primitives are needed. The most common example is secure emailing, where the messages should be encrypted and signed to provide confidentiality and authenticity. For achieving this, encryption schemes and signature schemes can be combined together. This was shown to be complex by An et al. in [2]. Signcryption, introduced by Zheng in 1997 [22], is a cryptographic primitive that offers confidentiality and unforgeability simultaneously similar to the sign-then-encrypt technique, but with lesser computational complexity and lower communication cost. This has made signcryption a suitable primitive for applications that require secure and authenticated message delivery, where devices have limited resources. After Zheng's work, a number of signcryption schemes were proposed ([25],[4], [16], [19], [20], [5], [8], [13]). The security notion for signcryption was first formally defined in 2002 by Baek et al. in [3]. This was similar to the notion of semantic security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack.

The concept of identity based (ID-based) cryptosystem was introduced by Shamir [1] in 1984. The distinguishing characteristic of identity based cryptography is the ability to use any string as a public key. In particular, this string maybe the email address, telephone number, or any publicly available parameter of an individual that is unique to that individual. The corresponding private key can only be derived by a trusted Private Key Generator (PKG) who keeps a master secret which is involved in the user private key

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derivation. An identity based cryptosystem removes the need for senders to look up the receiver's public key before sending out an encrypted message. It provides a more convenient alternative to conventional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).

Identity based signcryption schemes achieve the functionality of signcryption with the added advantage that identity based cryptography provides. In [14], Malone-Lee gave the first identity based signcryption scheme. Later it was found that Malone-Lee's scheme was not semantically secure. Since then, quite a few identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed ([11], [5], [13], [8], [17], [6]). To date, some of the most efficient identity based signcryption schemes are that of Chen et al. [6], and Barreto et al. [17]

Related Work and Our Contribution: In practice, broadcasting a message to multiple users in a secure and authenticated manner is an important facility for a group of people who are jointly working on the same project to communicate with one another. While this can be achieved by using the single-user signcryption primitive individually for each recipient, it results in huge computation and communication overhead. Instead, we opt for multi-receiver signcryption, whose objective is to efficiently broadcast a single ciphertext to different receivers by performing a single signcryption operation, while achieving both authenticity and unforgeability.

We point out that there are only two identity based multi-receiver signcryption schemes till date. Duan et al. [9] were the first to come up with an identity based scheme for multi-receiver signcryption. Their scheme requires just one pairing operation to signcrypt a single message for multiple receivers. Chik How Tan [7] proved that, in spite of its efficiency and clever construct, [9] lacks adaptive chosen ciphertext security. Yu et al. [21] came up with another scheme with improved efficiency in the unsigncryption phase (their scheme requires one less pairing operation than Dual et al.'s). However, in this paper, we show that Yu et al.'s scheme [21] is insecure with respect to unforgeability and confidentiality, by demonstrating an attack which shows that any legal user of the system can generate a signcryption on any message on behalf of any other legal user for any set of receivers without knowing the secret key of any other legal users. Further, we propose a corrected version of Yu et al.'s scheme and prove its security (confidentiality and unforgeability) under the existing security model for signcryption. Thus, it turns out that ours is the only existing correct and provably secure identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme.

To the best of our knowledge, three PKI based multi-receiver signcryption schemes which uses pairing are reported in the literature [12, 18, 10]. Zheng has given a construct for multi-receiver signcryption in [12]. However, it is known that Zheng's [12] signcryption scheme is not forward secure, anyone who obtains the sender's private key can recover the original message from a signcryption, which was shown in [23], following that Duan et al. [18] proposed a multi-receiver signcryption scheme, which is a combination of Zheng's multi-receiver signcryption and Bellare's concepts on multi-receiver setting for public key encryption [15]. However, [18] is insecure with respect to insider security, i.e. during the confidentiality game the senders private key is known to the adversary, knowing it the adversary can distinguish the message hidden in the signcryption (Since the work is not published and is only available in the authors web page, we do not review and provide the formal attack on the scheme in [18]). Recently, Fagen Li et al. [10] proposed a multi-receiver signcryption scheme which depends on bilinear pairing. We show that [10] is not adaptive chosen ciphertext secure, also we propose a new multi-receiver signcryption scheme and formally prove the confidentiality and unforgeability of the new scheme. Thus, all the previously reported schemes are flawed ones and the only correct PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme is the scheme presented in this paper.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the preliminaries like bilinear pairings and related computational problems, the general framework of identity based and PKI based signcryption schemes for multi-receiver and the security models for those schemes. Next, in Section 3, we review Yu et al.'s identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme and present the attacks on the scheme. In section 4, we propose the improved identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme and the formal security proof for it. In Section 5, we review Fagen Li et al.'s multi-receiver signcryption scheme and show that it is not adaptive chosen ciphertext secure. Following that in section 6 we lay out the details of our new multi-receiver signcryption scheme and give the formal proof for confidentiality and unforgeability of the new scheme and in section 7 we conclude the discussion.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Bilinear Pairing

Let \mathbb{G}_1 be an additive cyclic group generated by P , with prime order q , and \mathbb{G}_2 be a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order q . A bilinear pairing is a map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ with the following properties.

- **Bilinearity.** For all $P, Q, R \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
 - $\hat{e}(P + Q, R) = \hat{e}(P, R)\hat{e}(Q, R)$
 - $\hat{e}(P, Q + R) = \hat{e}(P, Q)\hat{e}(P, R)$
 - $\hat{e}(aP, bQ) = \hat{e}(P, Q)^{ab}$
- **Non-Degeneracy.** There exist $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$ such that $\hat{e}(P, Q) \neq I_{\mathbb{G}_2}$, where $I_{\mathbb{G}_2}$ is the identity element of \mathbb{G}_2 .
- **Computability.** There exists an efficient algorithm to compute $\hat{e}(P, Q)$ for all $P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1$.

2.2 Computational Assumptions

In this section, we review the computational assumptions related to bilinear maps that are relevant to the protocol we discuss.

Definition 1. (*Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)*): Given $(P, aP, bP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^3$ for unknown $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the CDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to compute abP . The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the CDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH} = Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP) = abP \mid a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The CDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{CDH}$ is negligibly small.

Definition 2. (*Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP)*): Given $(P, aP, bP, cP) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the BDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to compute $\hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the BDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{BDH} = Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP) = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc} \mid a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*]$$

The BDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{BDH}$ is negligibly small.

Definition 3. (*Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDHP)*): Given $(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) \in \mathbb{G}_1^4 \times \mathbb{G}_2$ for unknown $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, the DBDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is to decide if $\alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} in solving the DBDH problem in \mathbb{G}_1 is defined as

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{DBDH} = |Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}) = 1] - Pr [\mathcal{A}(P, aP, bP, cP, \alpha) = 1]|$$

The DBDH Assumption is that, for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm \mathcal{A} , the advantage $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{DBDH}$ is negligibly small.

2.3 ID-Based Multi-Receiver Signcryption

A generic multi-receiver IBSC scheme for sending a single message to t users consists of the following probabilistic polynomial time algorithms,

- **Setup**(κ). Given a security parameter κ , the Private Key Generator (PKG) generates the public parameters $params$ and master secret key msk of the system.
- **Keygen**(ID_{Alice}). Given an identity ID_{Alice} , the PKG computes the corresponding private key D_{Alice} and transmits it to $Alice$ in a secure way.

- **Signcrypt** $(m, ID_{Alice}, \mathcal{L} = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t\}, D_{Alice})$. To send a message m to a set of receivers with identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t , *Alice* with identity ID_{Alice} and private key D_{Alice} runs this algorithm to obtain the signcryption σ .
- **Unsigncrypt** $(\sigma, ID_{Alice}, ID_{Bob}, D_{Bob})$. When *Bob* with identity ID_{Bob} and private key D_{Bob} receives the signcryption σ from *Alice* with identity ID_{Alice} , Bob runs this algorithm to obtain either the plain text m or *invalid* according as whether σ was a valid signcryption from Alice to Bob or not.

For consistency, we require that if $\sigma = \text{Signcrypt}(m, ID_{Alice}, \mathcal{L} = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t\}, D_{Alice})$, then $m = \text{Unsigncrypt}(\sigma, ID_{Alice}, ID_i, D_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq t$.

2.4 Security Model for ID-Based Multi-Receiver Signcryption (IBMSC)

We describe the security models for *confidentiality* and *unforgeability* for IBMSC schemes given by [5] in this section. These are the strongest security notions for IBMSC schemes.

Confidentiality: A signcryption scheme is semantically secure against chosen ciphertext attack (IND-IBMSC-CCA2) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

Setup Phase: The challenger \mathcal{C} runs the *Setup* algorithm and sends the system public parameters to the adversary \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} now chooses a list of identities $\mathcal{L} = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t\}$ of users $\{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_t\}$ as the target receiver identities for which \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query the private keys.

Phase I: In this phase, \mathcal{A} makes polynomial number of queries to the following oracles.

1. **Keygen Oracle:** \mathcal{A} produces an identity ID_A and queries for the secret key of user A . The *Keygen Oracle* returns D_A to \mathcal{A} .
2. **Signcrypt Oracle:** \mathcal{A} produces a message m , sender identity ID_A and a list of receiver identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t . \mathcal{C} computes the secret key D_A from *Keygen*(ID_A) and returns to \mathcal{A} , the signcryption σ .
3. **Unsigncrypt Oracle:** \mathcal{A} produces a sender identity ID_A , receiver identity ID_B and a signcryption σ . Note that in order to construct m from σ , \mathcal{C} must know the secret key of ID_B and \mathcal{C} obtains it by invoking *Keygen*(ID_B). \mathcal{C} returns the corresponding message m to \mathcal{A} if σ is a valid signcryption from ID_A to ID_B else returns *invalid*.

Challenge: \mathcal{A} produces two messages m_0 and m_1 of equal length from the message space \mathcal{M} and an arbitrary sender identity ID_A . The challenger \mathcal{C} flips a coin, sampling a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and computes $\sigma^* = \text{Signcrypt}(m_b, ID_A, \mathcal{L}, D_A)$. σ^* is returned to \mathcal{A} as the challenge signcryption.

Phase II: \mathcal{A} is allowed to make polynomial number of new queries as in **Phase I** with the following restrictions: \mathcal{A} should not query the *Unsigncryption Oracle* for σ^* or should not have queried the *Keygen Oracle* for the secret keys of identities in the targeted receiver list \mathcal{L} .

Guess: At the end of this game, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' . \mathcal{A} wins the game if $b' = b$.

Unforgeability: A signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-IBMSC-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

Setup Phase: The challenger \mathcal{C} runs the *Setup* algorithm to generate the master public and private keys *params* and *msk* respectively. \mathcal{C} gives system public parameters *params* to \mathcal{A} and keeps the master private key *msk* secret from \mathcal{A} . Now, \mathcal{A} selects a sender identity ID_A and gives it to \mathcal{C} for which \mathcal{A} is not allowed to query the private key.

Training Phase: \mathcal{A} now makes polynomial number of queries to the oracles as described in **Phase I** of the confidentiality game.

Forgery: \mathcal{A} produces a signcryption σ^* on a message m and wins the game if the private key of sender identity ID_A was not queried in the **Training Phase**, the signcryption σ^* is valid on message m from ID_A to some arbitrary receiver ID_B for which \mathcal{A} knows the private key and σ^* is not the output of any of the previous queries to the *Signcrypt Oracle* with ID_A as sender and m as the message.

2.5 Security Model for PKI Based Multi-Receiver Signcryption for (MSC)

Here, we describe the security models for *confidentiality* and *unforgeability* of PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme. These are the strongest security notions for MSC schemes. Let S denote the sender and R denote the receiver.

Confidentiality: A multi-receiver signcryption scheme is semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-MSC-CCA2), if no polynomially bounded adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

The challenger \mathcal{C} , takes the security parameter κ as input and runs *Extract* to generate multiple key pairs (sk_{R_i}, pk_{R_i}) , (for $i = 1, \dots, n$) for n receivers. All sk_{R_i} are kept secret while pk_{R_i} the corresponding public keys are given to \mathcal{A} . (Note that, \mathcal{A} can choose any user for which it knows the private key, as sender).

Phase I: \mathcal{A} performs a series of queries in an adaptive fashion in this phase. The oracles which \mathcal{A} can access are given below:

Signcryption oracle: \mathcal{A} produces a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and requests the signcryption of the message m , from the sender S to a set of receivers with public keys $(pk_{R_1}, pk_{R_2}, \dots, pk_{R_n})$.

Unsigncryption oracle: \mathcal{A} produces a signcryption σ , public key pk_S of the sender and the public key pk_R of the receiver as input to this oracle and requests the corresponding message m as output.

These queries may be asked adaptively, i.e. each query may depend on the answers to previous ones.

Challenge: At the end of *Phase I*, \mathcal{A} gives to \mathcal{C} , two equal length plaintexts m_0 and m_1 and a sender public key pk_S , for which \mathcal{A} knows the private key. Now, \mathcal{C} chooses $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and generates the challenge signcryption $\sigma^* = \text{signcrypt}(m_b, sk_S, pk_{R_1}, \dots, pk_{R_n})$, where $\{pk_{R_1}, \dots, pk_{R_n}\}$ are the n receiver public keys for which \mathcal{A} does not know the corresponding secret keys. \mathcal{C} returns σ^* to \mathcal{A} .

Phase II: \mathcal{A} can perform polynomial number of queries adaptively again as in *Phase I* but \mathcal{A} cannot make an unsigncryption query on σ^* .

Guess: \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' and wins the game if $b' = b$.

Unforgeability: A multi-receiver signcryption scheme is existentially unforgeable under chosen message attack (EUF-MSC-CMA) if no probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible advantage in the following game.

The challenger \mathcal{C} , takes the security parameter κ as input to generate the public parameters of the system and runs the *Extract* algorithm to generate a key pair (sk_S, pk_S) and gives pk_S to \mathcal{A} and keeps the private key sk_S secret. \mathcal{A} is allowed to have access to all recipients private keys as well as the corresponding public keys.

Training Phase: The adversary \mathcal{A} makes polynomial number of queries to the oracles as described in *Phase I* of the confidentiality game.

This phase consists of several requests by \mathcal{A} to \mathcal{C} for signcryption of messages with S as the sender and an arbitrary set of users as receivers. \mathcal{C} responds to \mathcal{A} with the signcryption of the message. Formally, \mathcal{A} generates the public key pk_{R_i} for the users R_i and sends $\{m, pk_{R_i}, \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ to \mathcal{C} and asks for signcryption of m with S as the sender and $\{R_i, \text{ for } 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ as receivers. \mathcal{C} responds with $\sigma = \text{signcryption}(m, S, pk_{R_1}, \dots, pk_{R_n})$.

Forgery: After a polynomial number of interactions as above during the *Training Phase*, \mathcal{A} generates σ^* as signcryption of a message m^* with S as the sender and $\{R_1^*, R_2^*, \dots, R_n^*\}$ as the receiver set. \mathcal{A} sends σ^* and public keys of the receiver set to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} verifies if σ^* is a valid signcryption of m with S as the sender and $\{R_1^*, R_2^*, \dots, R_n^*\}$ as the receiver set. If \mathcal{C} finds that σ^* is valid and σ^* is not the output of any previous queries to the *Signcrypt Oracle* with S as the sender then \mathcal{A} is said to have successfully forged the signcryption on message m with S as the sender and has won the game.

3 Yu et al.'s ID-Based Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme (Y-IBMSC)

In this section, we review Yu et al.'s identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme (Y-IBMSC) and show that the scheme does not provide unforgeability as well as confidentiality.

3.1 Review of Y-IBMSC

The Y-IBMSC scheme in [21] has the following algorithms.

Setup(κ): The security parameter of the scheme is κ , $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are two cyclic groups of prime order q , P is a generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and \hat{e} is a bilinear map defined as $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$. Let n_0, n_1, n_2 and n_3 denote the number of bits required to represent an identity, an element of \mathbb{G}_1 , an element of \mathbb{G}_2 and a message respectively. Three hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^{n_0} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_3} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^{n_2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_3}$ are used. The PKG randomly chooses $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $R \in \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{\mathbf{0}_{\mathbb{G}_1}\}$ and computes $P_{pub} = sP$ and $\theta = \hat{e}(R, P_{pub})$, where $\mathbf{0}_{\mathbb{G}_1}$ denotes the zero element of \mathbb{G}_1 . The public parameters are $\langle \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, P, P_{pub}, R, \theta, \hat{e}, H_1, H_2, H_3 \rangle$.

Keygen(ID_A): The public key and private key of user A are computed from his identity ID_A as $Q_A = H_1(ID_A)$ and $D_A = sQ_A$ respectively.

Signcrypt($m, ID_A, ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n, D_A$): Suppose A wants to encrypt a message m to n receivers with identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n . User A does the following.

1. Randomly chooses $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
2. Computes the following.
 - (a) $X = rQ_A$
 - (b) $h_2 = H_2(X||m)$
 - (c) $Z = (r + h_2)D_A$
 - (d) $U = rP$
 - (e) $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$
 - (f) $y = m \oplus H_3(\omega)$
 - (g) $W = \theta^r \omega$
 - (h) $T_i = rH_1(ID_i) + rR$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$.
3. The signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, X, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n, \mathcal{L} \rangle$, where \mathcal{L} is the list of receivers who can designcrypt the message. Here, T_i is meant for the receiver ID_i .

Unsigncrypt(σ, ID_A, ID_i, D_i) : A receiver with identity ID_i uses his secret key D_i to unsigncrypt $\sigma = \langle y, U, X, W, T_i, \mathcal{L} \rangle$ from ID_A as follows.

1. Computes the following.
 - (a) $\omega' = W \hat{e}(U, D_i) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, T_i)^{-1}$
 - (b) $m' = y \oplus H_3(\omega')$
 - (c) $Q_A = H_1(ID_A)$
 - (d) $h'_2 = H_2(X||m')$
2. If $\omega' = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, X + h'_2 Q_A)$, returns m' . Otherwise, returns *invalid*.

3.2 Attack on Y-IBMSC

The scheme described above is insecure from the point of view of unforgeability and confidentiality. Anybody can generate a valid signcryption for any message m^* as if it were generated by another legal user. We describe how these attacks proceed in this section.

Attack on Unforgeability: Let *Alice* be a legal user of the system and *Eve* be any forger. If *Eve* wants to generate a signcryption on any message m^* as if it were generated by *Alice* for a list of legal users of the system with identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n , *Eve* just has to do the following.

1. Randomly choose $r^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
2. Compute the following.
 - (a) $X^* = r^* Q_{Alice}$
 - (b) $h_2^* = H_2(X^*||m^*)$
 - (c) $Z^* = (r^* + h_2^*) Q_{Alice}$.
 - (d) $U^* = r^* P$
 - (e) $\omega^* = \hat{e}(Z^*, P_{pub})$

- (f) $y^* = m^* \oplus H_3(\omega^*)$
 - (g) $W^* = \theta^{r^*} \omega^*$
 - (h) $T_j^* = r^* H_1(ID_j) + r^* R$, for $1 \leq j \leq n$
3. $\sigma^* = \langle y^*, U^*, X^*, W^*, T_1^*, T_2^*, \dots, T_n^*, \mathcal{L}^* \rangle$ is the signcryption by *Alice* on message m^* generated by *Eve* for the list of users \mathcal{L}^* with identities $\{ID_j\}_{1 \leq j \leq n}$

We now prove that the σ^* generated by *Eve* is a valid signcryption from *Alice* to the receivers in \mathcal{L}^* on the message m^* .

Unsigncrypt($\sigma^* = \langle y^*, U^*, X^*, W^*, T_1^*, T_2^*, \dots, T_n^*, \mathcal{L}^* \rangle, ID_{Alice}, ID_j, D_j$). A receiver with identity ID_j uses his secret key D_j to unsigncrypt σ^* obtained from *Eve* as follows.

- First, computes the following.
 1. $Q_{Alice} = H_1(ID_{Alice})$
 2. Next, it can be seen that

$$\begin{aligned}
 \omega' &= W^* \hat{e}(U^*, D_j) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, T_j^*) \\
 &= \theta^{r^*} \omega^* \hat{e}(r^* P, sQ_j) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, r^* Q_j + r^* R)^{-1} \\
 &= \hat{e}(P_{pub}, R)^{r^*} \omega^* \hat{e}(P, Q_j)^{r^* s} \hat{e}(P, Q_j)^{-r^* s} \hat{e}(P, R)^{-r^* s} \\
 &= \omega^*
 \end{aligned}$$

3. $m' = y^* \oplus H_3(\omega') = m^*$
 4. $h'_2 = H_2(X^* || m') = h_2^*$
- Next, the check $\omega' \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(P_{pub}, X^* + h'_2 Q_{Alice})$ is performed. We show below that this test will succeed and hence message m^* will be returned.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{e}(P_{pub}, X^* + h'_2 Q_{Alice}) &= \hat{e}(sP, r^* Q_{Alice} + h_2^* Q_{Alice}) \quad (\text{since } h'_2 = h_2^*) \\
 &= \hat{e}(sP, (r^* + h_2^*) Q_{Alice}) \\
 &= \hat{e}(P_{pub}, Z^*) \quad (\text{from Step 2(c) of } Eve\text{'s forgery above}) \\
 &= \hat{e}(Z^*, P_{pub}) \quad (\text{by symmetry of the bilinear map}) \\
 &= \omega^* = \omega'
 \end{aligned}$$

From this it is clear that *Eve* can succeed in generating a signcryption of message m^* with *Alice* as sender and identities ID_j , $1 \leq j \leq n$ as receivers without knowing the secret key of *Alice*. Thus any legal user can forge any message on behalf of any other legal user to any set of receivers.

Attack on Confidentiality : The scheme in [21] does not provide confidentiality. This can be shown by the following:

Let m_0 and m_1 be the two messages given by the adversary to the challenger during the challenge phase of the confidentiality game. On seeing the challenge signcryption $\sigma^* = \langle y^*, U^*, X^*, W^*, T_i^*, \mathcal{L}^* = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n\} \rangle$, the adversary will be able to compute $h_2^0 = H_2(X^* || m_0)$ and $w^0 = \hat{e}(X^* + h_2^0 Q_{ID_1}, P_{pub})$. Then, he can compute $m' = y^* \oplus H_3(w^0)$. If $m' = m_0$ then adversary knows that σ^* is signcryption of m_0 , else, σ^* is signcryption of m_1 .

4 Improved ID-Based Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme (I-IBMSC)

In this section, we propose an improved version of Y-IBMSC, which we formally prove to be secure.

4.1 Scheme

The setup and key generation algorithms of I-IBMSC are similar to that of Y-IBMSC, but with slightly different hash functions. The details are given below.

Setup(κ): Let κ be the security parameter of the system. Let \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 be two groups of prime order q and let P be the generator of \mathbb{G}_1 and \hat{e} be a bilinear map defined as $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$. As before, let n_0, n_1, n_2 and n_3 denote the number of bits required to represent an identity, an element of \mathbb{G}_1 , an element of \mathbb{G}_2 and a message respectively. Consider three hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^{n_0} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^{n_0+2n_1+n_3} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^{n_2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_3}$. The PKG chooses its secret key $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ randomly and sets the master public key as $P_{pub} = sP$. It also chooses $R \in \mathbb{G}_1 \setminus \{0_{\mathbb{G}_1}\}$ at random and computes $\theta = e(R, sP)$, where $0_{\mathbb{G}_1}$ denotes the zero element of \mathbb{G}_1 . The public parameters of the system are $\langle \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, P, P_{pub}, R, \theta, \hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2, H_1, H_2, H_3 \rangle$.

Keygen(ID_A): The public key and private key of user A are computed from his identity ID_A as $Q_A = H_1(ID_A)$ and $D_A = sQ_A$ respectively.

Signcrypt($m, ID_A, ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n, D_A$): For signcryption of message m by user A with identity ID_A and secret key D_A to n receivers with identities ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n , do the following.

1. Randomly choose $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$
2. Compute the following.
 - (a) $U = r_1P$
 - (b) $X = r_2Q_A$
 - (c) $h_2 = H_2(ID_A \| U \| X \| m)$
 - (d) $Z = (r_2 + h_2)D_A$
 - (e) $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$
 - (f) $y = (m \| Z \| X) \oplus H_3(\omega)$
 - (g) $W = \theta^{r_1}\omega$
 - (h) $T_i = r_1(Q_i + R)$, for $1 \leq i \leq n$
3. The signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n, \mathcal{L} \rangle$, where \mathcal{L} is the list of receivers who can unisgncrypt the message. Here, T_i is meant for the receiver ID_i .

Unisgncrypt(σ, ID_A, ID_i, D_i): A receiver with identity ID_i uses his secret key D_i to unisgncrypt $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_i, \mathcal{L} \rangle$ from ID_A as follows.

1. Compute the following.
 - (a) $\omega' = W\hat{e}(U, D_i)\hat{e}(P_{pub}, T_i)^{-1}$
 - (b) $m' \| Z' \| X' = y \oplus H_3(\omega')$
 - (c) $h'_2 = H_2(ID_A \| U \| X' \| m')$
2. If $\omega' = \hat{e}(Z', P)$ and $\omega' = \hat{e}(X' + h'_2Q_A, P_{pub})$, return m' . Otherwise, return *invalid*.

4.2 Proof of Correctness of I-IBMSC

In this section, we show that our improved scheme is consistent. If $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_i \rangle$ is a valid signcryption for a user with identity ID_i , then **Unisgncrypt**(σ, ID_A, ID_i, D_i) does the following.

1. Compute $Q_A = H_1(ID_A)$
2. Next, we observe that

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega' &= W\hat{e}(U, D_i)\hat{e}(P_{pub}, T_i)^{-1} \\
&= \theta^{r_1}\omega\hat{e}(r_1P, sQ_i)\hat{e}(sP, r_1Q_i + r_1R)^{-1} \\
&= \hat{e}(P, R)^{r_1s}\omega\hat{e}(P, Q_i)^{r_1s}\hat{e}(P, Q_i)^{-r_1s}\hat{e}(P, R)^{-r_1s} \\
&= \omega
\end{aligned}$$

3. Compute $m' \| Z' = c \oplus H_3(\omega') = m \| Z$
4. Compute $h'_2 = H_2(ID_A \| U \| X \| m') = h_2$
5. Next, the checks $\omega' \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(Z', P)$ and $\omega' \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(X + h'_2Q_A, P_{pub})$ are performed. We show below that these tests will succeed and hence message m' will be returned.

– **Check 1**

$$\omega' = \omega = \hat{e}(Z, P) = \hat{e}(Z', P)$$

– *Check 2*

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{e}(X + h'_2 Q_A, P_{pub}) &= \hat{e}(X + h_2 Q_A, P_{pub}) \\
&= \hat{e}(r_2 Q_A + h_2 Q_A, sP) \\
&= \hat{e}((r_2 + h_2) Q_A, sP) \\
&= \hat{e}((r_2 + h_2) D_A, P) \\
&= \omega = \omega'
\end{aligned}$$

4.3 Proof of Confidentiality of I-IBMSC

Theorem 1. *Our identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme I-IBMSC is secure against any IND-IBMSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if DBDHP is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 .*

(Note: We consider the security model for confidentiality of an identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme, described in section 2.4 to prove the IND-IBMSC-CCA2 security of our scheme).

The challenger \mathcal{C} receives an instance (P, aP, bP, cP, α) of the DBDH problem, its goal is to decide whether $\alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$ or not. Suppose there exists an IND-IBMSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} for the proposed I-IBMSC scheme. We show that \mathcal{C} can use \mathcal{A} to solve the DBDH problem instance it has received. \mathcal{C} will set the random oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_2} , \mathcal{O}_{H_3} , $\mathcal{O}_{KeyExtract}$, $\mathcal{O}_{Signcrypt}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{Unsigncrypt}$. The answers to the oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_2} , and \mathcal{O}_{H_3} are randomly selected, therefore, to maintain consistency, \mathcal{C} will maintain three lists $L_1 = \langle ID_i, Q_i, x_i \rangle$, $L_2 = \langle ID_i, U, X, m, h_2 \rangle$, $L_3 = \langle \omega, h_3 \rangle$. We assume that \mathcal{A} will ask for $H_1(ID)$ before ID is used in any key extraction, signcryption and unsigncryption queries.

Setup Phase: First, the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs the list of identities $\mathcal{L} = \{ID_0^*, ID_1^*, \dots, ID_t^*\}$ which is the set of target users. Then, \mathcal{C} gives \mathcal{A} the system parameters $params$ consisting of P , $P_{pub} = cP$, $R = bP$, and $\theta = \hat{e}(R, P_{pub})\hat{e}(R, cP)$.

Phase I: \mathcal{A} now adaptively queries on the various oracle \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_2} , \mathcal{O}_{H_3} , $\mathcal{O}_{KeyExtract}$, $\mathcal{O}_{Signcrypt}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{Unsigncrypt}$. The descriptions of these oracles follow.

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_i)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) in L_1 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with Q_i . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i \notin \mathcal{L}$, randomly choose a new¹ $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $Q_i = x_i P$.
2. If $ID_i \in \mathcal{L}$, randomly choose a new $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $Q_i = x_i P - R$.
3. Add the tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) to L_1 and return Q_i .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_2}(ID_i || U || X || m)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, U, X, m, h_2) in L_2 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} returns h_2 . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} chooses a new $h_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, adds the tuple (ID_i, U, X, m, h_2) to L_2 and returns h_2 .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_3}(\omega)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ω, h_3) in L_3 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} returns h_3 . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} chooses a new $h_3 \in_R \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_3}$, adds the tuple (ω, h_3) in L_3 and returns h_3 .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{KeyExtract}(ID_i)$: \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i \in \mathcal{L}$ return *invalid*.
2. If $ID_i \notin \mathcal{L}$, recover the tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) from L_1 and return $D_i = x_i P_{pub} = cQ_i$.

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{Signcrypt}(m, ID_A, \mathcal{L}_1)$: On receiving this query, where $\mathcal{L}_1 = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t\}$ is the list of intended receivers, if $ID_A \notin \mathcal{L}$, \mathcal{C} computes D_A using $\mathcal{O}_{KeyExtract}(ID_A)$, generates the signcryption in a normal way and returns it; else if $ID_A \in \mathcal{L}$, \mathcal{C} chooses r, r' and a new $h_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and does the following.

1. Compute $U = r'P$
2. Compute $X = rP - h_2 \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_A)$ and add the tuple (ID_A, U, X, m, h_2) to L_2 .
3. Compute the following.

¹ By new, we mean that the random value chosen must not have been already chosen during an earlier execution.

- (a) $Z = rP_{pub}$
- (b) $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$
- (c) $y = \mathcal{O}_{H_3}(\omega) \oplus (m \| Z \| X)$
- (d) For all $ID_j \in \mathcal{L}_1, T_j = r'(\mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_j) + R)$.
- (e) $W = \theta r' \omega$

4. Return the signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_t, \mathcal{L}_1 \rangle$.

Note that, \mathcal{C} has not followed the **Signcrypt** algorithm but has used a different method to obtain σ because \mathcal{C} does not know the private key of ID_A . Although σ is generated using a different method, we show that it is a valid signcryption on message m from ID_A to the set of receivers \mathcal{L}_1 because it passes the verification done by \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} can perform the unsigncryption of σ by considering one of the receiver identity $ID_j \in \mathcal{L}_1$ and see that σ is a valid signcryption:

First \mathcal{A} retrieves ω from W which is proved to be correct below:

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega' &= W \hat{e}(U, D_j) \hat{e}(P_{pub}, T_j)^{-1} \\
&= \theta r' \omega \hat{e}(r'P, x_j bP) \hat{e}(bP, r'(x_j P + R))^{-1} \\
&= \hat{e}(R, bP)^{r'} \omega \hat{e}(r'P, x_j bP) \hat{e}(bP, r'x_j P)^{-1} \hat{e}(bP, R)^{-1} \\
&= \omega
\end{aligned}$$

Next, \mathcal{A} retrieves $(m' \| Z' \| X')$ from y by computing $y \oplus H_3(\omega')$. Since $\omega' = \omega$, $(m' \| Z' \| X')$ is retrieved correctly and thus the computation $h'_2 = H_2(ID_A \| U \| X' \| m')$ is also correct.

Also, since Z' is correct, the check $\omega' \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(Z', P)$ also passes. Now, we show that the check $\omega' = \hat{e}(X' + h'_2 Q_A, P_{pub})$ also holds due to the following correctness proof:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{e}(X' + h'_2 Q_A, P_{pub}) &= \hat{e}(rP - h_2 x_A P + h'_2 x_A P, bP) \\
&= \hat{e}(rP - h_2 x_A P, bP) \hat{e}(h'_2 x_A P, bP) \\
&= \hat{e}(rP, bP) \hat{e}(h_2 x_A P, bP)^{-1} \hat{e}(h'_2 x_A P, bP) \\
&= \hat{e}(rP, bP) \\
&= \hat{e}(rbP, P) \\
&= \hat{e}(rP_{pub}, P) \\
&= \hat{e}(Z', bP) \\
&= \omega'
\end{aligned}$$

Since $\omega' = \omega$, the signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n, \mathcal{L}_1 \rangle$ passes the verification done by \mathcal{A} .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Unsigncrypt}}(\sigma, \mathbf{ID}_A, \mathbf{ID}_j)$: On receiving this query, where the signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_t, \mathcal{L}_1 \rangle$, if $ID_j \notin \mathcal{L}$ then \mathcal{C} computes D_j using $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyExtract}}(ID_j)$, unsigncrypts σ in the normal way and returns the corresponding message to \mathcal{A} else if $ID_j \in \mathcal{L}$, then \mathcal{C} tries to locate entries $(ID_A, U, m, h_2) \in L_2$ and $(\omega, h_3) \in L_3$ for some h_2, h_3 , and ω under the constraints that $\omega = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, X + h_2 \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_A))$, $(m \| Z \| X) = h_3 \oplus y$, and $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$. If such an entry is found then the message m is returned, otherwise, the oracle returns *invalid*.

Challenge: After the first query stage, \mathcal{A} outputs two plaintext messages m_0 and m_1 of equal length, together with a sender's identity ID_A on which he wishes to be challenged. \mathcal{A} now waits for a challenge signcryption built under the receivers' identities $ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t \subseteq \mathcal{L}$. Now, \mathcal{C} chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and signcrypts message m_b as follows.

1. Choose a new h_2 and $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
2. Compute $U^* = aP$
3. Compute $X^* = rP - h_2 \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_A)$ and add the tuple $(ID_A, U^*, X^*, m_b, h_2)$ to the list L_2 .
4. Compute the following.
 - (a) $Z^* = rP_{pub} = rcP$
 - (b) $\omega = \hat{e}(Z^*, P)$
 - (c) $y^* = \mathcal{O}_{H_3}(\omega) \oplus (m_b \| Z^* \| X^*)$
 - (d) $T_j^* = x_j aP$ for $1 \leq j \leq t$
 - (e) $W^* = \alpha \omega$

5. Create a new label $\mathcal{L}^* = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_t\}$ and send the signcryption as $\sigma^* = \langle y^*, U^*, W^*, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_t, \mathcal{L}^* \rangle$ to the adversary.

Phase II: \mathcal{A} can perform queries as above. However, \mathcal{A} cannot query the unsigncryption oracle with the challenge signcryption σ^* as input or the signcryption oracle with messages m_0 or m_1 and ID_A as the sender.

Guess: At the end of the simulation, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' for which, \mathcal{A} believes that the challenge signcryption σ^* is the signcryption of $m_{b'}$ from ID_A to \mathcal{L}^* . If the relation $b = b'$ holds, then \mathcal{C} outputs 1 as the answer to the DBDH problem. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} outputs 0. We have,

σ^* is a valid signcryption of m_b from ID_A to the receivers in \mathcal{L}^*

$$\begin{aligned}
&\Leftrightarrow \omega = W^* \hat{e}(T_j, P_{pub})^{-1} \hat{e}(U^*, D_j) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \alpha \hat{e}(T_j, P_{pub})^{-1} \hat{e}(U^*, D_j) = 1 \quad (\text{because we have } W^* = \alpha \omega) \\
&\Leftrightarrow \alpha \hat{e}(x_j aP, cP)^{-1} \hat{e}(aP, (x_j - b)cP) = 1 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \alpha \hat{e}(x_j aP, cP)^{-1} \hat{e}(aP, x_j cP) \hat{e}(aP, -bcP) = 1 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \alpha \hat{e}(P, -abcP) = 1 \\
&\Leftrightarrow \alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}
\end{aligned}$$

These calculations show that we get a correct ω if and only if $\alpha = \hat{e}(P, P)^{abc}$.

So, we can see that the challenger \mathcal{C} has the same advantage in solving the DBDH problem as the adversary \mathcal{A} has in distinguishing a valid signcryption from a random string. So, if there exists an adversary who can succeed in such a CCA2 attack with non-negligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the DBDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can distinguish a valid signcryption from a random string with non-negligible advantage. Hence I-IBMSC is secure against any IND-IBMSC-CCA2 attack. \square

4.4 Proof of Unforgeability of I-IBMSC

Theorem 2. *Our identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme I-IBMSC is secure against any EUF-IBMSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if CDHP is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 .*

(Note: We consider the security model for unforgeability of an identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme, described in section 2.4 to prove the EUF-IBMSC-CMA security of our scheme).

The challenger \mathcal{C} receives an instance (P, aP, bP) of the CDH problem. His goal is to determine abP . Suppose there exists an EUF-IBMSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} for our proposed I-IBMSC scheme. We show that \mathcal{C} can use \mathcal{A} to solve the CDH problem. \mathcal{C} will set the random oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_2} , \mathcal{O}_{H_3} , $\mathcal{O}_{KeyExtract}$, $\mathcal{O}_{Signcrypt}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{Unsigncrypt}$. The answers to the oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_2} , and \mathcal{O}_{H_3} are randomly selected, therefore, to maintain consistency, \mathcal{C} will maintain three lists $L_1 = \langle ID_i, Q_i, x_i \rangle$, $L_2 = \langle ID_i, U, X, m, h_2 \rangle$, $L_3 = \langle \omega, h_3 \rangle$. We assume that \mathcal{A} will ask for $H_1(ID)$ before ID is used in any key extraction, signcryption and unsigncryption queries. First, the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs the identity ID_A of the sender whose signcryption he claims to be able to forge.

Setup Phase: \mathcal{C} gives \mathcal{A} the system parameters *params*, consisting of P , $P_{pub} = bP$, R , $\theta = \hat{e}(R, P_{pub}) = \hat{e}(R, bP)$.

Training Phase: \mathcal{A} interacts with \mathcal{C} by accessing the various oracles provided by \mathcal{C} . The descriptions of these oracles are presented below.

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_i)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) in L_1 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} answers with Q_i . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i \neq ID_A$, choose a new² $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $Q_i = x_i P$.
2. If $ID_i = ID_A$, choose a new $x_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and set $Q_i = (x_i - a)P$.
3. Add the tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) to L_1 and return Q_i .

² By new, we mean that the random value chosen must not have been already chosen during an earlier execution.

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_2}(\mathbf{ID}_i \| \mathbf{U} \| \mathbf{X} \| \mathbf{m})$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ID_i, U, X, m, h_2) in L_2 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} returns h_2 . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} chooses a new $h_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, adds the tuple (ID_i, U, X, m, h_2) to L_2 and returns h_2 .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{H_3}(\omega)$: \mathcal{C} checks if there exists a tuple (ω, h_3) in L_3 . If such a tuple exists, \mathcal{C} returns h_3 . Otherwise, \mathcal{C} chooses a new $h_3 \in_R \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_3}$, adds the tuple (ω, h_3) in L_3 and returns h_3 .

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyExtract}}(\mathbf{ID}_i)$: \mathcal{C} does the following.

1. If $ID_i = ID_A$, return *invalid*.
2. If $ID_i \neq ID_A$, recover the tuple (ID_i, Q_i, x_i) from L_1 and return $D_i = x_i P_{pub} = bQ_i$.

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Signcrypt}}(\mathbf{m}, \mathbf{ID}_i, \mathcal{L})$: On receiving this query, where $\mathcal{L} = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n\}$ is the list of intended receivers, if $ID_i \neq ID_A$, \mathcal{C} computes D_i using $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyExtract}}(ID_i)$, generates the signcryption in a normal way and returns it; else if $ID_i = ID_A$, \mathcal{C} chooses r, r' and a new $h_2 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and does the following.

1. Compute $U = r'P$
2. Compute $X = rP - h_2 \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_A)$ and add the tuple (ID_A, U, X, m, h_2) to L_2 .
3. Compute the following.
 - (a) $Z = rP_{pub}$
 - (b) $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$
 - (c) $y = \mathcal{O}_{H_3}(\omega) \oplus (m \| Z \| X)$
 - (d) For all $ID_j \in \mathcal{L}, T_j = r'(\mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_j) + R)$.
 - (e) $W = \theta^{r'} \omega$
4. Return the signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n, \mathcal{L} \rangle$.

(**Note:** The correctness proof for the validity of the signcryption σ is identical to that in the confidentiality proof in the previous section (section. 4.3) and hence we omit it.)

Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Unsigncrypt}}(\sigma, \mathbf{ID}_i, \mathbf{ID}_j)$: On receiving this query, where the signcryption $\sigma = \langle y, U, W, T_1, T_2, \dots, T_n, \mathcal{L} \rangle$, if $ID_j \neq ID_A$, \mathcal{C} computes D_j using $\mathcal{O}_{\text{KeyExtract}}(ID_j)$, unsigncrypts σ in the normal way and returns the corresponding message to \mathcal{A} , else if $ID_j = ID_A$, then \mathcal{C} tries to locate entries $(ID_i, U, X, m, h_2) \in L_2$ and $(\omega, h_3) \in L_3$ for some h_2, h_3 , and ω under the constraints that $\omega = \hat{e}(P_{pub}, X + h_2 \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(ID_i))$, $(m \| Z \| X) = h_3 \oplus y$, and $\omega = \hat{e}(Z, P)$. If such an entry is found, then m is returned, otherwise, the oracle returns *invalid*.

Forgery: Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs a forged signcryption $\sigma' = \langle y', U', W', T'_1, T'_2, \dots, T'_n, \mathcal{L}' \rangle$ on some message m' from the sender ID_A to users in the set $\mathcal{L}' = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n\}$, with $ID_A \notin \mathcal{L}'$.

Now, \mathcal{C} unsigncrypts the signcryption σ' with the private key of any of the identities $ID_j \in \mathcal{L}'$ to get the value Z' . \mathcal{C} verifies the validity of the signcryption σ' . If σ' is a valid signcryption from ID_A to ID_j on message m' then Z' is a valid signature on m' by ID_A , \mathcal{C} can apply the oracle replay technique [24] to produce two valid signcryptions $\sigma' = \langle y', U', W', T'_1, T'_2, \dots, T'_n, \mathcal{L}' \rangle$ and $\sigma'' = \langle y'', U', W', T'_1, T'_2, \dots, T'_n, \mathcal{L}' \rangle$ on the same message m' from the sender ID_A to users in the set $\mathcal{L}' = \{ID_1, ID_2, \dots, ID_n\}$, with $ID_A \notin \mathcal{L}'$.

\mathcal{C} now unsigncrypts both σ' and σ'' to obtain the values $Z' = (r_2 + h'_2)D_A$ and $Z'' = (r_2 + h''_2)D_A$ and applies standard arguments for the outputs of the forking lemma since both Z' and Z'' are valid signatures for the same message m' for the same random tape of the adversary. Finally, \mathcal{C} obtains the solution to the CDH instance as $x_A P_{pub} - (h'_2 - h''_2)^{-1}(Z' - Z'')$. In fact,

$$\begin{aligned} x_A P_{pub} - (h'_2 - h''_2)^{-1}(Z' - Z'') &= x_A P_{pub} - (h'_2 - h''_2)^{-1}(h'_2 - h''_2)D_A \\ &= x_A P_{pub} - D_A = x_A bP - D_A \\ &= x_A bP - (x_A - a)bP = abP \end{aligned}$$

So, we can see that \mathcal{C} has the same advantage in solving the CDH problem as the adversary \mathcal{A} has in forging a valid signcryption. So, if there exists an adversary who can forge a valid signcryption with non-negligible advantage, that means there exists an algorithm to solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can forge a valid signcryption with non-negligible advantage. Hence, I-IBMSC is secure against any EUF-IBMSC-CMA attack. \square

5 Li et al.'s Multi-receiver Signcryption Scheme (L-MSc)

In this section, we review Li et al.'s multi-receiver signcryption scheme (L-MSc) as described in [10] and show that the scheme is not adaptive chosen ciphertext secure. This system is a PKI based system.

5.1 Review of L-MSc

This scheme has the following three algorithms. Given κ and l as the two security parameters, the sender and the receiver agrees up on two cyclic groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of prime order $q > 2^\kappa$ (the number of bits required to represent \mathbb{G}_1 is l), a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ and a generator $P \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$. They also choose three cryptographic hash functions $H_1 : \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_1}$, $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^{n_1+(n+1)l} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$ and $H_3 : \mathbb{G}_1^3 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$.

Extract: User U does the following to extract the private/public key pair:

- Choose $x_U \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and sets it as his private key.
- Sets the public key as $Y_U = x_U P$.

The sender is represented by S and the set of receivers are denotes as R_i , where ($i = 1$ to n)

Signcrypt: Given a message m , a set of receivers R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n and the sender S executes the following steps:

- Randomly chooses $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $R \in \mathbb{G}_1$.
- Computes $U = rP$.
- Computes $c = m \oplus H_1(R)$.
- Computes $V = x_S H_2(c, U, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Computes $Z_i = R \oplus H_3(U, Y_{R_i}, rY_{R_i})$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

The signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$.

Unsigncrypt: On receiving a signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$, each receiver R_i performs the following steps.

- Computes $R = Z_i \oplus H_3(U, Y_{R_i}, x_{R_i} U)$.
- Computes $m = c \oplus H_1(R)$.
- Computes $H = H_2(c, U, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Accepts the message if and only if $\hat{e}(P, V) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(Y_S, H)$, return *invalid* otherwise.

5.2 Attack on Li et al.'s Multi-receiver Signcryption Scheme (L-MSc)

The above scheme is insecure against adaptive chosen ciphertext security, we launch the attack on the confidentiality of the scheme as follows.

Attack on Confidentiality The crucial argument in the confidentiality proof of [10] is that the adversary \mathcal{A} will not realize that the challenge signcryption σ^* is not a valid signcryption unless \mathcal{A} asks for the hash value $H_3(aP, bP, abP)$. We prove that this is not the only means for \mathcal{A} to unsigncrypt the challenge signcryption σ^* . \mathcal{A} can modify σ^* by attaching an arbitrary message (with respect to the existing message) and generating a new signcryption (\mathcal{A} knows the secret key of the sender in confidentiality game) for the manipulated message. Now, \mathcal{A} can make use of the oracles to unsigncrypt the altered signcryption and thus \mathcal{A} is able to find the message in σ^* without solving any hard problem.

During the IND-MSc-CCA2 game, the adversary \mathcal{A} , on getting the challenge signcryption $\sigma^* = (U^*, c^*, V^*, Z_1^*, \dots, Z_n^*)$, can do the following to identify whether σ^* is a signcryption of m_0 or m_1 without solving any hard problem.

- \mathcal{A} computes $c' = c^* \oplus m'$.

- Chooses an arbitrary sender, for which it knows the private key (let the private key be x_A).
- Computes $V' = x_A H_2(c', U^*, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$ (note: \mathcal{A} can choose the receivers of the newly generated signcryption as any subset of receivers from the challenge signcryption), where all values except c' are the same as in the challenge signcryption.
- Now, $\sigma' = (U^*, c', V', Z_1^*, \dots, Z_n^*)$ is a valid signcryption from user A to multiple receivers R_i , where $i = 1$ to n .
- Since σ' is a valid signcryption and is also not the exact challenge signcryption, \mathcal{A} can obtain the unsigncryption of σ' during *Phase II* from \mathcal{C} .

$Unsigncrypt(\sigma')$ produces $m_b \oplus m'$. As m' is selected by \mathcal{A} and it also knows m_0 and m_1 , it can easily identify whether c^* is a signcryption of m_0 or m_1 .

6 New Multi-receiver Signcryption Scheme (N-MSc)

The bug identified in this scheme is not a trivial one but it can be rectified by altering the scheme according to the guideline of An et al. [2]. We propose a new multi-receiver signcryption scheme and prove the confidentiality against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack and unforgeability against chosen message attack in the random oracle model in this section.

6.1 Scheme.

The improved scheme also has three algorithms. First, given κ as the security parameter, the sender and the receiver agrees up on two cyclic groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 of prime order $q > 2^\kappa$ (Let the number of bits required to represent a message m be n_1), a bilinear map $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_2$ and a generator $P \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$. They also choose four cryptographic hash functions $H_1 : \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_1+n_2}$, $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $H_3 : \mathbb{G}_1^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$. and $H_4 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n_2}$

Extract: User U does the following to extract the private/public key pair:

- Chooses $x_U \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and sets it as his private key.
- Sets the public key as $Y_U = x_U P$.

The sender is represented by S and the set of receivers are denotes as R_i , where ($i = 1$ to n)

Signcrypt: Given a message m , a set of receivers R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n , the sender S executes the following steps to perform signcryption:

- Chooses $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $W \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$.
- Computes $U = rP$ and $h = H_4(m, W, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Computes $c = (m||h) \oplus H_1(W)$.
- Computes $V = x_S H_2(c, U, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Computes $Z_i = W \oplus H_3(U, Y_{R_i}, rY_{R_i})$, for $i = 1, \dots, n$.

The signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$.

Unsigncrypt: On receiving a signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$, each receiver R_i performs the following steps.

- Computes $W' = Z_i \oplus H_3(U, Y_{R_i}, x_{R_i} U)$.
- Computes $h' = H_4(m, W', Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Retrieves the message m and h as $(m||h) = c \oplus H_1(W')$.
- Computes $H = H_2(c, U, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Accepts the message if $\hat{e}(P, V) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(Y_S, H)$ and $h \stackrel{?}{=} h'$, otherwise rejects the signcryption σ .

Remark 1: For a signcryption scheme to be secure in multi-user setting it is required to have the following binding in the *Encrypt-then-Sign (EtS)* paradigm.

- Encryption should involve the identity of sender,
- The signature should involve the identity of the receiver.

This key issue was proved by An, Dodis and Rabin in [2]. The scheme by Fagen Li et al. [10] also uses the *(EtS)* paradigm, but it fails to achieve the above said property. Thus, during the confidentiality game, the adversary is able to alter the signature part of the challenge signcryption and produce a new valid signcryption as if it is signcrypted by a legitimate user for some other message (It can be the signature of the actual sender itself, as the secret key of the sender is known to the adversary during the confidentiality game to prove the insider security). This led to the weakness on adaptive chosen ciphertext security of [10] as demonstrated in the attack.

6.2 Proof of Confidentiality of N-MSC

Theorem 3. *Our multi-receiver signcryption scheme N-MSC is secure against any IND-N-MSC-CCA2 adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if CDHP is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 .*

(Note: We consider the security model for confidentiality of a PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme, described in section 2.5 to prove the IND-N-MSC-CCA2 security of our scheme).

The challenger \mathcal{C} uses the adversary \mathcal{A} , who is capable of breaking the IND-N-MSC-CCA2 security of N-MSC to solve the CDH problem in polynomial time. Let (P, aP, bP) be a random instance of the CDH problem \mathcal{C} has received. \mathcal{C} starts the game by initializing the system parameters, choosing a receiver $R_* \in \{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n\}$ and sets the public key of the user R_* as $Y_{R_*} = bP$, which is the challenge public key and gives the public keys of all users $\{R_1, R_2, \dots, R_n\}$ to \mathcal{A} .

Phase I: \mathcal{A} then adaptively queries on the various oracles $\mathcal{O}_{H_1}, \mathcal{O}_{H_2}, \mathcal{O}_{H_3}, \mathcal{O}_{H_4}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{Signcryption}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Unsigncryption}}$.

Hash oracle queries: To handle the hash queries to oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_i} , for $(i = 1, 2, 3, 4)$, \mathcal{C} maintains lists L_i which keeps track of the answers given to the corresponding hash oracle queries by \mathcal{A} . Upon a query by \mathcal{A} on the hash oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_i} , for $(i = 1, 2, 3, 4)$, \mathcal{C} responds in the following way: \mathcal{C} first checks in the respective list L_i , whether the oracle is queried previously for the same input; if so, retrieves and returns the corresponding value; if not queried previously, randomly generate an element from the output range of the corresponding hash function, returns the element to \mathcal{A} and stores the input and output values in the corresponding list.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{Signcryption}}$ queries: To face the signcryption query on a plaintext m and a sender S with public key pk_S both chosen by \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{C} does the following:

- If the public key of the sender is not the target public key, (i.e. $Y_S \neq Y_{R_*}$) then \mathcal{C} proceeds as per the **Signcrypt** algorithm.
- If the public key of the sender is the target public key (i.e. $Y_S = Y_{R_*}$) then \mathcal{C} proceeds as follows:
 - Chooses $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and $W \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$.
 - Computes $U = rP$ and queries $h_4 = \mathcal{O}_{H_4}(m, W, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$ and $h_1 = \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(W)$. If entries $(m, W, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, h_4)$ and (W, h_1) already exists in the list L_4 and L_1 respectively, \mathcal{C} uses them.
 - Computes $c = (m \| h_4) \oplus h_1$.
 - Chooses $x' \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, sets $H'_2 = x'P$ and stores the tuple $(c, U, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, H'_2)$ in the list L_2 .
 - Computes $V = x'bP$.
 - Queries $h_{3_i} = \mathcal{O}_{H_3}(U, Y_{R_i}, rY_{R_i})$.
 - Computes $Z_i = W \oplus h_{3_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n$.
 - The signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$ is then returned as the signcryption of the message m with Y_{R_*} as the sender to \mathcal{A} .

Note that, the signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$ generated by this oracle with the targeted user as sender is valid, which we prove here. Since all other verifications except $\hat{e}(P, V) = \hat{e}(Y_S, H'_2)$ (which is the key verification during the unsigncryption process) are hash equality checks we omit them and show the validity of σ with respect to the former check alone:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{e}(P, V) &= \hat{e}(P, x' bP) \\
&= \hat{e}(P, bH'_2) \\
&= \hat{e}(bP, H'_2) \\
&= \hat{e}(Y_S, H'_2)
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$ generated by the oracle is valid with respect to the sender and the receiver.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{Unsigncryption}}$ **queries:** Upon receiving an unsigncryption query on a signcryption $\sigma = (U, c, V, Z_1, \dots, Z_n)$ and a senders public key Y_S both chosen by \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{C} proceeds as follows:

- If the public key of the receiver is not the target public key, i.e. $Y_R \neq Y_{R^*}$ then \mathcal{C} proceeds as per the **Unsigncrypt** algorithm.
- If the public key of the receiver is the target public key i.e. $Y_R = Y_{R^*}$ then \mathcal{C} proceeds as follows:
 - Retrieves $(U, Y_{R_i}, rY_{R_i}, h_{3_i})$, where $(0 \leq i \leq q_{H_3})$ from list L_3 , if the tuple does not exist return *invalid*.
 - Computes $W = Z_i \oplus h_{3_i}$.
 - Retrieves the message m' and h'_4 by computing $(m' \| h'_4) = c \oplus h_1$ where h_1 is retrieved from the list L_1 by searching for a tuple (W, h_1) in it, if not present returns *invalid*.
 - Retrieves $(m, W, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, h_4)$ from the list L_4 , if the tuple does not exist returns *invalid*.
 - Retrieves $(c, U, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, H'_2)$ from the list L_2 , if the tuple does not exist returns *invalid*.
 - Returns the message m to \mathcal{A} if and only if $\hat{e}(P, V) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(Y_S, H'_2)$ and $h_4 \stackrel{?}{=} h'_4$, otherwise return *invalid* and *Abort*.

Challenge: At the end of **Phase I**, \mathcal{A} produces two plaintexts m_0 and m_1 to \mathcal{C} and requires the signcryption on one of the two messages with the receivers public keys that includes the challenge public key Y_{R^*} . \mathcal{C} chooses a random bit $b \in_R \{0, 1\}$ and signcrypts m_b as follows.

- Computes $U^* = aP$ and chooses $W^* \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$.
- Queries the oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_4} and \mathcal{O}_{H_1} to obtain $h_4^* = \mathcal{O}_{H_4}(m, W^*, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$ and $h_1^* = \mathcal{O}_{H_1}(R)$ respectively.
- Computes $c^* = (m_b \| h_4^*) \oplus h_1^*$.
- Queries the oracle \mathcal{O}_{H_2} and obtains $H_2^* = \mathcal{O}_{H_2}(c^*, U^*, Y_S, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n})$.
- Computes $V^* = x_S H_2^*$.

\mathcal{C} then chooses $\{Z_1^*, \dots, Z_n^*\} \in_R \mathbb{G}_1$ and sends the challenge signcryption $\sigma^* = (U^*, c^*, V^*, Z_1^*, \dots, Z_n^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .

Phase II: \mathcal{A} adaptively performs series of queries in this phase also but with the restriction that, \mathcal{A} is not allowed to get the unsigncryption of the challenge signcryption σ^* . These queries are handled by \mathcal{C} as those in the first stage.

(Note that \mathcal{A} cannot realize that σ^* is not a valid signcryption for the senders private key x_S and the receiver public key Y_{R^*} unless \mathcal{A} asks for the hash value $H_3(U^*, Y_{R^*}, aY_{R^*}) = H_3(aP, bP, abP)$. In that case, the solution of the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem would be inserted in the list L_3 and it does not matter to the challenger, even if the simulation of \mathcal{A} 's view is no longer perfect.)

Guess: At the end of **Phase II**, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' .

\mathcal{C} ignores the result of \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{C} is only interested in the tuple in the list L_3 which is of the form (aP, bP, X, \cdot) . \mathcal{C} now checks whether $\hat{e}(P, X) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(aP, bP)$ for all entries of the list L_3 and if this relation holds, stops and outputs X as the solution of the CDH problem instance \mathcal{C} has received. If no tuple of this kind satisfies the equality, \mathcal{C} stops and outputs *invalid*. The probability that \mathcal{C} 's answer to the CDH problem is correct, is same as the probability that \mathcal{A} queries $\mathcal{O}_{H_3}(aP, bP, abP)$ and this implies that \mathcal{C} can solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage and this is a contradiction. \square

6.3 Proof of Unforgeability of N-MSC

Theorem 4. *Our multi-receiver signcryption scheme N-MSC is secure against any EUF-N-MSC-CMA adversary \mathcal{A} under the random oracle model if CDHP is hard in \mathbb{G}_1 .*

(Note: We consider the security model for unforgeability of a PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme, described in section 2.5 to prove the EUF-N-MS-CMA security of our scheme).

The challenger \mathcal{C} uses the adversary \mathcal{A} , who is capable of breaking the EUF-N-MS-CMA security of N-MS-C to solve the CDH problem in polynomial time. Let (P, aP, bP) be a random instance of the CDH problem given to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} starts the game by choosing a sender S^* and sets $Y_{S^*} = aP$ as the public key of the user S^* , which is the challenge public key. Now, \mathcal{C} sends Y^* to \mathcal{A} (Note that \mathcal{A} is allowed to choose receivers of its own choice for which \mathcal{A} knows the private keys)

Training Phase: \mathcal{A} is allowed to adaptively perform queries on the various oracles \mathcal{O}_{H_1} , \mathcal{O}_{H_3} , \mathcal{O}_{H_4} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Signcryption}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Unsigncryption}}$ (Note that the definition of all oracles except \mathcal{O}_{H_2} are same as that in the confidentiality proof in section 6.2).

\mathcal{O}_{H_2} queries: When \mathcal{A} queries the hash value of a tuple $\langle c, U, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, H'_2 \rangle$ that was previously queried, \mathcal{C} returns the corresponding value which was previously stored in the list L_2 . If it is a fresh tuple then \mathcal{C} chooses $w \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and defines the value $H'_2 = wbP$ which is returned to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{C} now adds the tuple $\langle c, U, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n}, H'_2, w \rangle$ to the list L_2 .

Forgery: Finally, \mathcal{A} produces a forged signcryption $\sigma^* = (U^*, c^*, V^*, Z_1^*, \dots, Z_n^*)$ on an arbitrary message m^* with S^* as the sender. (The restriction in generating σ^* is, it should not have been generated by signcryption oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Signcryption}}$ as an output for any previous queries on the message m^* with S^* as sender). \mathcal{C} can very well unsigncrypt and verify the validity of the forged signcryption σ^* because \mathcal{C} knows the secret key of all the receivers.

If the forged signcryption passes the verification then \mathcal{C} can obtain the solution for CDH problem by performing the following steps:

- \mathcal{C} checks list L_2 whether $\langle c^*, U^*, Y_{R_1}, \dots, Y_{R_n} \rangle$ was previously queried by \mathcal{A} during the *Training Phase*. If not queried by \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{C} *aborts* the game else, if it was queried, the value H'_2 corresponding to the query was set by \mathcal{C} to be wbP .
- Thus, V^* which is obtained from the forged signcryption contains the solution for the CDH instance \mathcal{C} has received, which can be retrieved as follows.
 - $V^* = x_{S^*} H'_2 = wabP$
 - Since \mathcal{C} knows w , it can compute $abP = w^{-1}V^*$.

So, we can see that \mathcal{C} has the same advantage in solving the CDH problem as the adversary \mathcal{A} has in forging a valid signcryption. So, if there exists an adversary who can forge a valid signcryption with non-negligible advantage, then there exists an algorithm to solve the CDH problem with non-negligible advantage. Since this is not possible, no adversary can forge a valid signcryption with non-negligible advantage. Hence, N-MS-C is secure against any EUF-N-MS-CMA attack. \square

7 Conclusion

We present the complexity figure for both our schemes I-IBMSC and N-MS-C below:

| Scheme | Signcrypt | | | | Designcrypt | | | |
|---------|-----------|-----|----|----|-------------|----|----|----|
| | PA | SM | GE | MG | PA | SM | GE | MG |
| I-IBMSC | 1 | 3+n | 1 | - | 4 | 1 | 1 | - |
| N-MS-C | - | 3 | - | 1 | 2 | 1 | - | 1 |

Table-1: Complexity figure for I-IBMSC and N-MS-C

PA - Pairing, SM - Scalar Multiplication, GE - Exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 , MG - Mapping to \mathbb{G}_1 .

In this paper, we presented the cryptanalysis of the identity based multi-receiver signcryption scheme by Yu et al. [21] and showed an universal forgeability attack on the scheme whereby anybody can generate a valid signcryption of any message to any subset of legitimate users as if a legitimate user had generated it. Also, we showed that the scheme does not provide confidentiality, i.e. it is not indeed adaptive chosen ciphertext secure. We have also proposed an improved scheme and proved its security formally in the existing security

model for identity based multi-receiver signcryption schemes.

We have also cryptanalyzed a PKI based multi-receiver signcryption scheme by Fagen Li et al. [10] by demonstrating an attack on the confidentiality of the scheme. We have also proposed a new multi-receiver signcryption scheme and have proved both confidentiality and unforgeability formally in the random oracle model.

As all the previously reported identity based and PKI based multi-receiver signcryptions schemes which use bilinear pairing were shown to be flawed, our schemes are the only available correct schemes for identity based and PKI based multi-receiver signcryptions schemes which use bilinear pairing.

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