Paper 2005/456

A Secure Scheme for Authenticated Encryption

Fuw-Yi Yang

Abstract

The paper proposes a new scheme of authenticated encryption that is either publicly verifiable or not publicly verifiable depending on the quantity of information the recipient released. This property would give recipient much flexibility in many applications. This scheme combines the ElGamal encryption with Schnorr signature. Considering the security goal of signature, the resultant scheme is at least as secure as that of the combined signature scheme. The security goal of encryption is examined under the chosen ciphertext attack, it is proven directly related to the security of signature. Furthermore, this new scheme is also secure against one-more-decryption attack. This novel security goal may be valuable in the applications of private information retrieval.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Keywords
Authenticated encryptiondigital signatureencryptionone-more-decryption attacksigncryption.
Contact author(s)
yangfy @ ms7 hinet net
History
2005-12-31: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2005/456
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2005/456,
      author = {Fuw-Yi Yang},
      title = {A Secure Scheme for Authenticated Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2005/456},
      year = {2005},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2005/456}
}
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