Paper 2017/553

Further Analysis of a Proposed Hash-Based Signature Standard

Scott Fluhrer

Abstract

We analyze the concrete security of a hash-based signature scheme described in the most recent Internet Draft by McGrew, Fluhrer and Curcio. We perform this analysis in the random-oracle model, where the Merkle-Damgård hash compression function is models as the random oracle. We show that, even with a large number of different keys the attacker can choose from, and a huge computational budget, the attacker succeeds in creating a forgery with negligible probability ($< 2^{-129}$).

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
sfluhrer @ cisco com
History
2017-06-08: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2017/553
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/553,
      author = {Scott Fluhrer},
      title = {Further Analysis of a Proposed Hash-Based Signature Standard},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/553},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/553}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/553}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.