Practical Evaluation of Masking Software Countermeasures on an IoT processor

David McCann; Elisabeth Oswald

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Paper 2017/399

Practical Evaluation of Masking Software Countermeasures on an IoT processor

David McCann and Elisabeth Oswald

Abstract

Implementing cryptography on Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, that is resilient against side channel analysis, has so far been a task only suitable for specialist software designers in interaction with access to a sophisticated testing facility. Recently a novel tool has been developed, ELMO, which offers the potential to enable non-specialist software developers to evaluate their code w.r.t. power analysis for a popular IoT processor. We explain a crucial extension of ELMO, which enables a user to test higher-order masking schemes much more efficiently than so far possible as well as improve the ease and speed of diagnosing masking errors.

Note: Resubmitted following email exchange with Tancrede Lepoint to clarify publication status.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: IoT masking side channel attacks
Contact author(s): david mccann @ bristol ac uk
History: 2017-05-09: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2017/399
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2017/399,
      author = {David McCann and Elisabeth Oswald},
      title = {Practical Evaluation of Masking Software Countermeasures on an IoT processor},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/399},
      year = {2017},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/399}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/399}
}