Paper 2016/828

Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE

Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum

Abstract

We introduce a new technique for doing the key recovery part of an integral or higher order differential attack. This technique speeds up the key recovery phase significantly and can be applied to any block cipher with S-boxes. We show several properties of this technique, then apply it to PRINCE and report on the improvements in complexity from earlier integral and higher order differential attacks on this cipher. Our attacks on 4 and 6 rounds were the fastest and the winner of PRINCE Challenge's last round in the category of chosen plaintext attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. The Int'l Workshop on Lightweight Cryptography for Security & Privacy (LightSec 2016)
Keywords
PRINCELightweightBlock cipherKey recovery attackIntegralHigher-order differential.
Contact author(s)
shahram @ simula no
History
2016-08-30: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2016/828
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/828,
      author = {Shahram Rasoolzadeh and Håvard Raddum},
      title = {Faster Key Recovery Attack on Round-Reduced PRINCE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/828},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/828}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/828}
}
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