Cryptanalysis of Haraka

Jérémy Jean

Paper 2016/396

Cryptanalysis of Haraka

Jérémy Jean

Abstract

In this note, we describe attacks on the recently proposed Haraka hash functions. First, for the two hash functions Haraka-256/256 and Haraka-512/256 in the family, we show how two colliding messages can be constructed in about $2^{16}$ function evaluations. Second, we invalidate the preimage security claim for Haraka-512/256 with an attack finding one preimage in about $2^{192}$ function evaluations. These attacks are possible thanks to symmetries in the internal state that are preserved over several rounds.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Hash Function Preimage Attack Collision Attack
Contact author(s): Jeremy Jean @ ssi gouv fr
History: 2016-04-21: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2016/396
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2016/396,
      author = {Jérémy Jean},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Haraka},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2016/396},
      year = {2016},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/396}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/396}
}