Paper 2015/877

Study of a Parity Check Based Fault-Detection Countermeasure for the AES Key Schedule

Christophe Clavier, Julien Francq, and Antoine Wurcker

Abstract

In this paper we study a parity check based countermeasure proposed by Chen et al. that thwarts their attack by detecting byte fault injection during the AES key schedule process. We provide a generalization of their approach that allows to derive parity equations for every AES sizes not given by the authors. We analyze why Chen et al. countermeasure does not properly works. Doing so we are able to extend the coverage of the fault detection to the full expanded key. Finally we suggest optimizations that reduce memory and computation costs, and propose an adaptation to a more general fault model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
side-channel analysisfault attacksparity check countermeasureAES key schedule
Contact author(s)
antoine wurcker @ xlim fr
History
2015-09-13: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/877
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/877,
      author = {Christophe Clavier and Julien Francq and Antoine Wurcker},
      title = {Study of a Parity Check Based Fault-Detection Countermeasure for the AES Key Schedule},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/877},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/877}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/877}
}
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