Re-encryption Veriﬁability: How to Detect Malicious Activities of a Proxy in Proxy Re-encryption

Satsuya Ohata; Yutaka Kawai; Takahiro Matsuda; Goichiro Hanaoka; Kanta Matsuura

Paper 2015/112

Re-encryption Veriﬁability: How to Detect Malicious Activities of a Proxy in Proxy Re-encryption

Satsuya Ohata, Yutaka Kawai, Takahiro Matsuda, Goichiro Hanaoka, and Kanta Matsuura

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new functionality for proxy re-encryption (PRE) that we call re-encryption verifiability. In a PRE scheme with re-encryption verifiability (which we simply call verifiable PRE, or VPRE), a receiver of a re-encrypted ciphertext can verify whether the received ciphertext is correctly transformed from an original ciphertext by a proxy, and thus can detect illegal activities of the proxy. We formalize the security model for a VPRE scheme, and show that the single-hop uni-directional PRE scheme by Hanaoka et al. (CT-RSA 2012) can be extended to a secure VPRE scheme.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. CT-RSA 2015
Keywords: Proxy Re-encryption Re-encryption Verifiability Soundness
Contact author(s): satsuya @ iis u-tokyo ac jp
History: 2015-02-24: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/112
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/112,
      author = {Satsuya Ohata and Yutaka Kawai and Takahiro Matsuda and Goichiro Hanaoka and Kanta Matsuura},
      title = {Re-encryption Veriﬁability: How to Detect Malicious Activities of a Proxy in Proxy Re-encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/112},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/112}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/112}
}