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Paper 2014/187

FFT-Based Key Recovery for the Integral Attack

Yosuke Todo

Abstract

The integral attack is one of the most powerful attack against block ciphers. In this paper, we propose two new techniques for the integral attack, the FFT technique and the key concealment technique. The FFT technique is useful for the integral attack with enormous chosen plaintexts. As the previous result using FFT, Collard et al. showed a new technique which reduces the complexity for the linear attack. In this paper, we review the result of Collard et al. to estimate the complexity in detail, and we show the complexity can be estimated from the number of times using the addition of integers. Moreover, we show that attacks using FFT can be applied to the integral attack. As applications, we show integral attacks against AES and CLEFIA. For AES, we show that 6-round AES can be attacked with about $2^{51.7} additions. For CLEFIA, we show that 12-round CLEFIA can be attacked with about $2^{86.9}$ additions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MAJOR revision.
Keywords
cryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
todo yosuke @ lab ntt co jp
History
2014-03-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/187
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/187,
      author = {Yosuke Todo},
      title = {FFT-Based Key Recovery for the Integral Attack},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/187},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/187}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/187}
}
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