Paper 2013/378
A note on quantum related-key attacks
Martin Roetteler and Rainer Steinwandt
Abstract
In a basic related-key attack against a block cipher, the adversary has access to encryptions under keys that differ from the target key by bit-flips. In this short note we show that for a quantum adversary such attacks are quite powerful: if the secret key is (i) uniquely determined by a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, (ii) the block cipher can be evaluated efficiently, and (iii) a superposition of related keys can be queried, then the key can be extracted efficiently.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. arXiv:1306.2301 [quant-ph]
- Keywords
- quantum computingrelated-key attack
- Contact author(s)
- rsteinwa @ fau edu
- History
- 2013-06-12: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/378
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/378,
author = {Martin Roetteler and Rainer Steinwandt},
title = {A note on quantum related-key attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/378},
year = {2013},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/378}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/378}
}
